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The work of the World Bank Group is to end extreme poverty and build shared prosperity. Today, we have 
every reason to believe that it is within our grasp to end extreme poverty by 2030. But we will not meet 
this goal without tackling the problem of climate change.
Our ﬁrst Turn Down the Heat report, released late last year, concluded the world would warm by 4°C 
by the end of this century if we did not take concerted action now.
This new report outlines an alarming scenario for the days and years ahead—what we could face in 
our lifetime. The scientists tell us that if the world warms by 2°C—warming which may be reached in 
20 to 30 years—that will cause widespread food shortages, unprecedented heat-waves, and more intense 
cyclones. In the near-term, climate change, which is already unfolding, could batter the slums even more 
and greatly harm the lives and the hopes of individuals and families who have had little hand in raising 
the Earth’s temperature.
Today, our world is 0.8°C above pre-industrial levels of the 18th century. We could see a 2°C world in 
the space of one generation.
The ﬁrst Turn Down the Heat report was a wake-up call. This second scientiﬁc analysis gives us a more 
detailed look at how the negative impacts of climate change already in motion could create devastating 
conditions especially for those least able to adapt. The poorest could increasingly be hit the hardest.
For this report, we turned again to the scientists at the Potsdam Institute for Climate Impact Research 
and Climate Analytics. This time, we asked them to take a closer look at the tropics and prepare a climate 
forecast based on the best available evidence and supplemented with advanced computer simulations.
With a focus on Sub-Saharan Africa, South East Asia and South Asia, the report examines in greater 
detail the likely impacts for affected populations of present day, 2°C and 4°C warming on critical areas like 
agricultural production, water resources, coastal ecosystems and cities.
The result is a dramatic picture of a world of climate and weather extremes causing devastation and 
human suffering. In many cases, multiple threats of increasing extreme heat waves, sea-level rise, more severe 
storms, droughts and ﬂoods will have severe negative implications for the poorest and most vulnerable.
In Sub-Saharan Africa, signiﬁcant crop yield reductions with 2°C warming are expected to have strong 
repercussions on food security, while rising temperatures could cause major loss of savanna grasslands 
threatening pastoral livelihoods. In South Asia, projected changes to the monsoon system and rising peak 
temperatures put water and food resources at severe risk. Energy security is threatened, too. While, across 
South East Asia, rural livelihoods are faced with mounting pressures as sea-level rises, tropical cyclones 
increase in intensity and important marine ecosystem services are lost as warming approaches 4°C.
Across all regions, the likely movement of impacted communities into urban areas could lead to ever 
higher numbers of people in informal settlements being exposed to heat waves, ﬂooding, and diseases.
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The case for resilience has never been stronger.
This report demands action. It reinforces the fact that climate change is a fundamental threat to eco-
nomic development and the ﬁght against poverty.
At the World Bank Group, we are concerned that unless the world takes bold action now, a disastrously 
warming planet threatens to put prosperity out of reach of millions and roll back decades of development.
In response we are stepping up our mitigation, adaptation, and disaster risk management work, and 
will increasingly look at all our business through a “climate lens.”
But we know that our work alone is not enough. We need to support action by others to deliver bold 
ideas that will make the biggest difference.
I do not believe the poor are condemned to the future scientists envision in this report. In fact, I am 
convinced we can reduce poverty even in a world severely challenged by climate change.
We can help cities grow clean and climate resilient, develop climate smart agriculture practices, and 
ﬁnd innovative ways to improve both energy efﬁciency and the performance of renewable energies. We 
can work with countries to roll back harmful fossil fuel subsidies and help put the policies in place that 
will eventually lead to a stable price on carbon.
We are determined to work with countries to ﬁnd solutions. But the science is clear. There can be no 
substitute for aggressive national emissions reduction targets.
Today, the burden of emissions reductions lies with a few large economies. Not all are clients of the 
World Bank Group, but all share a commitment to ending poverty.
I hope this report will help convince everyone that the beneﬁts of strong, early action on climate change 
far outweigh the costs.
We face a future that is precarious because of our warming planet. We must meet these challenges with 
political will, intelligence, and innovation. If we do, I see a future that eases the hardships of others, allows 
the poor to climb out of poverty, and provides young and old alike with the possibilities of a better life.
Join us in our ﬁght to make that future a reality. Our successes and failures in this ﬁght will deﬁne our 
generation.
Dr. Jim Yong Kim
President, World Bank Group
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This report focuses on the risks of climate change to development in Sub-Saharan Africa, South East Asia and South Asia. Build-
ing on the 2012 report, Turn Down the Heat: Why a 4°C Warmer World Must be Avoided2???????????????????????????????????????
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Scope of the Report
The ﬁrst Turn Down the Heat report found that projections of 
global warming, sea-level rise, tropical cyclone intensity, arid-
ity and drought are expected to be felt disproportionately in the 
developing countries around the equatorial regions relative to the 
countries at higher latitudes. This report extends this previous 
analysis by focusing on the risks of climate change to development 
in three critical regions of the world: Sub-Saharan Africa, South 
East Asia and South Asia. 
While covering a range of sectors, this report focuses on how 
climate change impacts on agricultural production, water resources, 
coastal zone ﬁsheries, and coastal safety are likely to increase, often 
signiﬁcantly, as global warming climbs from present levels of 0.8°C 
up to 1.5°C, 2°C and 4°C above pre-industrial levels. This report 
illustrates the range of impacts that much of the developing world 
is already experiencing, and would be further exposed to, and it 
indicates how these risks and disruptions could be felt differently in 
other parts of the world. Figure 1 shows projections of temperature 
and sea-level rise impacts at 2°C and 4°C global warming. 
The Global Picture
Scientiﬁc reviews published since the ﬁrst Turn Down the Heat 
report indicate that recent greenhouse gas emissions and future 
emissions trends imply higher 21st century emission levels than 
previously projected. As a consequence, the likelihood of 4°C 
warming being reached or exceeded this century has increased, 
in the absence of near-term actions and further commitments to 
reduce emissions. This report reafﬁrms the International Energy 
Agency’s 2012 assessment that in the absence of further mitiga-
tion action there is a 40 percent chance of warming exceeding 
4°C by 2100 and a 10 percent chance of it exceeding 5°C in the 
same period.
The 4°C scenario does not suggest that global mean tempera-
tures would stabilize at this level; rather, emissions scenarios leading 
to such warming would very likely lead to further increases in both 
temperature and sea-level during the 22nd century. Furthermore, 
2 Turn Down the Heat: Why a 4°C Warmer World Must be Avoided, launched by 
the World Bank in November 2012.
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even at present warming of 0.8°C above pre-industrial levels, the 
observed climate change impacts are serious and indicate how 
dramatically human activity can alter the natural environment 
upon which human life depends.
The projected climate changes and impacts are derived 
from a combined approach involving a range of climate models 
of varying complexity, including the state of the art Coupled 
Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5), semi-empirical 
modeling, the “Simple Climate Model” (SCM), the Model for 
the Assessment of Greenhouse Gas Induced Climate Change 
(MAGICC; see Appendix 1) and a synthesis of peer reviewed 
literature.
Figure 1 ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????
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Key Findings Across the Regions
Among the key issues highlighted in this report are the early 
onset of climate impacts, uneven regional distribution of climate 
impacts, and interaction among impacts which accentuates cascade 
effects. For example:
1. Unusual and unprecedented heat extremes3: Expected 
to occur far more frequently and cover much greater land 
areas, both globally and in the three regions examined. For 
example, heat extremes in South East Asia are projected 
to increase substantially in the near term, and would have 
signiﬁcant and adverse effects on humans and ecosystems 
under 2°C and 4°C warming.
2. Rainfall regime changes and water availability: Even without 
any climate change, population growth alone is expected to 
put pressure on water resources in many regions in the future. 
With projected climate change, however, pressure on water 
resources is expected to increase signiﬁcantly. 
?? Declines of 20 percent in water availability are projected 
for many regions under a 2°C warming and of 50 percent 
for some regions under 4°C warming. Limiting warming 
to 2°C would reduce the global population exposed to 
declining water availability to 20 percent. 
?? South Asian populations are likely to be increasingly vul-
nerable to the greater variability of precipitation changes, 
in addition to the disturbances in the monsoon system 
and rising peak temperatures that could put water and 
food resources at severe risk. 
3. Agricultural yields and nutritional quality: Crop production 
systems will be under increasing pressure to meet growing 
global demand in the future. Signiﬁcant crop yield impacts 
are already being felt at 0.8°C warming. 
?? While projections vary and are uncertain, clear risks 
emerge as yield reducing temperature thresholds for 
important crops have been observed, and crop yield 
improvements appear to have been offset or limited by 
observed warming (0.8°C) in many regions. There is also 
some empirical evidence that higher atmospheric levels 
of carbon dioxide (CO
2) could result in lower protein 
levels of some grain crops.
?? For the regions studied in this report, global warming 
above 1.5°C to 2°C increases the risk of reduced crop 
yields and production losses in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
South East Asia and South Asia. These impacts would 
have strong repercussions on food security and are likely 
to negatively inﬂuence economic growth and poverty 
reduction in the impacted regions.
4. Terrestrial ecosystems: Increased warming could bring about 
ecosystem shifts, fundamentally altering species compositions 
and even leading to the extinction of some species. 
?? By the 2030s (with 1.2–1.3°C warming), some ecosys-
tems in Africa, for example, are projected to experience 
maximum extreme temperatures well beyond their present 
range, with all African eco-regions exceeding this range 
by 2070 (2.1–2.7°C warming). 
?? The distribution of species within savanna ecosystems are 
projected to shift from grasses to woody plants, as CO
2 
fertilization favors the latter, although high temperatures 
and precipitation deﬁcits might counter this effect. This 
shift will reduce available forage for livestock and stress 
pastoral systems and livelihoods.
5. Sea-level rise: Has been occurring more rapidly than previ-
ously projected and a rise of as much as 50 cm by the 2050s 
may be unavoidable as a result of past emissions: limiting 
warming to 2°C may limit global sea-level rise to about 70 
cm by 2100. 
?? As much as 100 cm sea-level rise may occur if emission 
increases continue and raise the global average tempera-
ture to 4°C by 2100 and higher levels thereafter. While 
the unexpectedly rapid rise over recent decades can 
now be explained by the accelerated loss of ice from the 
Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets, signiﬁcant uncertainty 
remains as to the rate and scale of future sea-level rise. 
?? The sea-level nearer to the equator is projected to be 
higher than the global mean of 100 cm at the end of the 
century. In South East Asia for example, sea-level rise 
is projected to be 10–15 percent higher than the global 
mean. Coupled with storm surges and tropical cyclones, 
this increase is projected to have devastating impacts on 
coastal systems.
6. Marine ecosystems: The combined effects of warming and 
ocean acidiﬁcation are projected to cause major damages to 
coral reef systems and lead to losses in ﬁsh production, at 
least regionally.
?? Substantial losses of coral reefs are projected by the time 
warming reaches 1.5–2°C from both heat and ocean 
3 In this report, “unusual” and “unprecedented” heat extremes are deﬁned by 
using thresholds based on the historical variability of the current local climate. The 
absolute level of the threshold thus depends on the natural year-to-year variability in 
the base period (1951–1980), which is captured by the standard deviation (sigma). 
Unusual heat extremes are deﬁned as 3-sigma events. For a normal distribution, 
3-sigma events have a return time of 740 years. The 2012 US heat wave and the 
2010 Russian heat wave classify as 3-sigma events. Unprecedented heat extremes 
are deﬁned as 5-sigma events. They have a return time of several million years. 
These events which have almost certainly never occurred to date are projected for 
the coming decades. See also Chapter 2 (Box 2.2).
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acidiﬁcation effects, with a majority of coral systems no 
longer viable at current locations. Most coral reefs appear 
unlikely to survive by the time 4°C warming is reached. 
?? Since the beginning of the Industrial Revolution, the pH 
of surface ocean waters has fallen by 0.1 pH units. Since 
the pH scale, like the Richter scale, is logarithmic, this 
change represents approximately a 30 percent increase 
in acidity. Future predictions indicate that ocean acidity 
will further increase as oceans continue to absorb carbon 
dioxide. Estimates of future carbon dioxide levels, based 
on business as usual emission scenarios, indicate that by 
the end of this century the surface waters of the ocean 
could be nearly 150 percent more acidic, resulting in pH 
levels that the oceans have not experienced for more 
than 20 million years.
Sub-Saharan Africa: Food Production  
at Risk
Sub-Saharan Africa is a rapidly developing region of over 800 mil-
lion people, with 49 countries, and great ecological, climatic and 
cultural diversity. Its population for 2050 is projected to approach 
1.5 billion people. 
The region is confronted with a range of climate risks that could 
have far-reaching repercussions for Sub-Saharan Africa´s societies 
and economies in future. Even if warming is limited below 2°C, there 
are very substantial risks and projected damages, and as warming 
increases these are only expected to grow further. Sub-Saharan 
Africa is particularly dependent on agriculture for food, income, 
and employment, almost all of it rain-fed. Under 2°C warming, 
large regional risks to food production emerge; these risks would 
become stronger if adaptation measures are inadequate and the 
CO
2 fertilization effect is weak. Unprecedented heat extremes are 
projected over an increasing percentage of land area as warming 
goes from 2 to 4°C, resulting in signiﬁcant changes in vegetative 
cover and species at risk of extinction. Heat and drought would 
also result in severe losses of livestock and associated impacts 
on rural communities.
Likely Physical and Biophysical Impacts as a Function of Pro-
jected Climate Change
?? Water availability: Under 2°C warming the existing differ-
ences in water availability across the region could become 
more pronounced. 
?? In southern Africa, annual precipitation is projected to 
decrease by up to 30 percent under 4°C warming, and 
parts of southern and west Africa may see decreases 
in groundwater recharge rates of 50–70 percent. This 
is projected to lead to an overall increase in the risk of 
drought in southern Africa.
?? Strong warming and an ambiguous precipitation signal 
over central Africa is projected to increase drought risk 
there. 
?? In the Horn of Africa and northern part of east Africa 
substantial disagreements exists between high-resolution 
regional and global climate models. Rainfall is projected 
by many global climate models to increase in the Horn 
of Africa and the northern part of east Africa, making 
these areas somewhat less dry. The increases are pro-
jected to occur during higher intensity rainfall periods, 
rather than evenly during the year, which increases 
the risk of ﬂoods. In contrast, high-resolution regional 
climate models project an increasing tendency towards 
drier conditions. Recent research showed that the 2011 
Horn of Africa drought, particularly severe in Kenya and 
Somalia, is consistent with an increased probability of 
long-rains failure under the inﬂuence of anthropogenic 
climate change. 
?? Projected aridity trends: Aridity is projected to spread due 
to changes in temperature and precipitation, most notably in 
southern Africa (Figure 2). In a 4°C world, total hyper-arid 
and arid areas are projected to expand by 10 percent compared 
to the 1986–2005 period. Where aridity increases, crop yields 
are likely to decline as the growing season shortens. 
Sector Based and Thematic Impacts 
?? Agricultural production is expected to be affected in the 
near-term, as warming shifts the climatic conditions that 
are conducive to current agricultural production. The annual 
average temperature is already above optimal values for wheat 
during the growing season over much of the Sub-Saharan 
Africa region and non-linear reductions in maize yield above 
certain temperature thresholds have been reported. Signiﬁcant 
impacts are expected well before mid-century even for relatively 
low levels of warming. For example, a 1.5°C warming by the 
2030s could lead to about 40 percent of present maize cropping 
areas being no longer suitable for current cultivars. In addi-
tion, under 1.5°C warming, signiﬁcant negative impacts on 
sorghum suitability in the western Sahel and southern Africa 
are projected. Under warming of less than 2°C by the 2050s, 
total crop production could be reduced by 10 percent. For 
higher levels of warming there are indications that yields may 
decrease by around 15–20 percent across all crops and regions.
?? Crop diversiﬁcation strategies will be increasingly important: 
The study indicates that sequential cropping is the preferable 
option over single cropping systems under changing climatic 
conditions. Such crop diversiﬁcation strategies have long been 
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practiced in Africa, providing a robust knowledge base and 
opportunity for scaled up approaches in this area.
?? Diversiﬁcation options for agro-pastoral systems are likely 
to decline (e.g. switching to silvopastoral systems, irrigated 
forage production, and mixed crop-livestock systems) as climate 
change reduces the carrying capacity of the land and livestock 
productivity. For example, pastoralists in southern Ethiopia 
lost nearly 50 percent of their cattle and about 40 percent of 
their sheep and goats to droughts between 1995 and 1997.
?? Regime shifts in African ecosystems are projected and could 
result in the extent of savanna grasslands being reduced. By the 
time 3°C global warming is reached, savannas are projected 
to decrease to approximately one-seventh of total current land 
area, reducing the availability of forage for grazing animals. 
Projections indicate that species composition of local ecosystems 
might shift, and negatively impact the livelihood strategies of 
communities dependent on them.
?? Health is expected to be signiﬁcantly affected by climate 
change. Rates of undernourishment are already high, rang-
ing between 15–65 percent, depending on sub-region. With 
warming of 1.2–1.9°C by 2050, the proportion of the popula-
tion undernourished is projected to increase by 25–90 percent 
compared to the present. Other impacts expected to accompany 
climate change include mortality and morbidity due to extreme 
events such as extreme heat and ﬂooding.
?? Climate change could exacerbate the existing develop-
ment challenge of ensuring that the educational needs of 
all children are met. Several factors that are expected to 
worsen with climate change, including undernourishment, 
childhood stunting, malaria and other diseases, can under-
mine childhood educational performance. The projected 
increase in extreme monthly temperatures within the next 
few decades may also have an adverse effect on learning 
conditions.
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South East Asia: Coastal Zones and 
Productivity at Risk
South East Asia has seen strong economic growth and urbanization 
trends, but poverty and inequality remain signiﬁcant challenges 
in the region. Its population for 2050 is projected to approach 759 
million people with 65 percent of the population living in urban 
areas. In 2010, the population was 593 million people with 44 
percent of the population living in urban areas. 
South East Asia has a high and increasing exposure to slow 
onset impacts associated with rising sea-level, ocean warming 
and increasing acidiﬁcation combined with sudden-onset impacts 
associated with tropical cyclones and rapidly increasingly heat 
extremes. When these impacts combine they are likely to have 
adverse effects on several sectors simultaneously, ultimately 
undermining coastal livelihoods in the region. The deltaic areas 
of South East Asia that have relatively high coastal population 
densities are particularly vulnerable to sea-level rise and the pro-
jected increase in tropical cyclones intensity.
Likely Physical and Biophysical Impacts as a Function of Pro-
jected Climate Change
?? Heat extremes: The South East Asian region is projected to see 
a strong increase in the near term in monthly heat extremes. 
Under 2°C global warming, heat extremes that are virtually 
absent at present will cover nearly 60–70 percent of total 
land area in summer, and unprecedented heat extremes up to 
30–40 percent of land area in northern-hemisphere summer. 
With 4°C global warming, summer months that in today´s 
climate would be termed unprecedented, would be the new 
normal, affecting nearly 90 percent of the land area during 
the northern-hemisphere summer months. 
?? Sea-level rise: For the South East Asian coastlines, projec-
tions of sea-level rise by the end of the 21st century relative to 
1986–2005 are generally 10–15 percent higher than the global 
mean. The analysis for Manila, Jakarta, Ho Chi Minh City, and 
Bangkok indicates that regional sea-level rise is likely to exceed 
50 cm above current levels by about 2060, and 100 cm by 2090. 
?? Tropical cyclones: The intensity and maximum wind speed 
of tropical cyclones making landfall is projected to increase 
signiﬁcantly for South East Asia; however, the total number 
of land-falling cyclones may reduce signiﬁcantly. Damages 
may still rise as the greatest impacts are caused by the most 
intense storms. Extreme rainfall associated with tropical 
cyclones is expected to increase by up to a third reaching 
50–80 mm per hour, indicating a higher level of ﬂood risk in 
susceptible regions. 
?? Saltwater intrusion: A considerable increase of salinity intru-
sion is projected in coastal areas. For example, in the case of 
the Mahaka River region in Indonesia for a 100 cm sea-level 
rise by 2100, the land area affected by saltwater intrusion is 
expected to increase by 7–12 percent under 4°C warming. 
Sector Based and Thematic Impacts
?? River deltas are expected to be impacted by projected sea-
level rise and increases in tropical cyclone intensity, along 
with land subsidence caused by human activities. These fac-
tors will increase the vulnerability of both rural and urban 
populations to risks including ﬂooding, saltwater intrusion 
and coastal erosion. The three river deltas of the Mekong, 
Irrawaddy and Chao Phraya, all with signiﬁcant land areas less 
than 2 m above sea-level, are particularly at risk. Aquaculture, 
agriculture, marine capture ﬁsheries and tourism are the most 
exposed sectors to climate change impacts in these deltas.
?? Fisheries would be affected as primary productivity in the 
world´s oceans is projected to decrease by up to 20 percent by 
2100 relative to pre-industrial conditions. Fish in the Java Sea 
and the Gulf of Thailand are projected to be severely affected 
by increased water temperature and decreased oxygen levels, 
with very large reductions in average maximum body size by 
2050. It is also projected that maximum catch potential in 
the southern Philippines could decrease by about 50 percent. 
?? Aquaculture farms may be affected by several climate 
change stressors. Increasing tropical cyclone intensity, salinity 
intrusion and rising temperatures may exceed the tolerance 
thresholds of regionally important farmed species. Aquaculture 
is a rapidly growing sector in South East Asia, which accounts 
for about 5 percent of Vietnam’s GDP. As nearly 40 percent of 
dietary animal protein intake in South East Asia comes from 
ﬁsh, this sector also signiﬁcantly contributes to food security 
in the region. 
?? Coral reef loss and degradation would have severe impacts 
for marine ﬁsheries and tourism. Increasing sea surface tem-
peratures have already led to major, damaging coral bleaching 
events in the last few decades.4 Under 1.5°C warming and 
increasing ocean acidiﬁcation, there is a high risk (50 percent 
probability) of annual bleaching events occurring as early as 
2030 in the region (Figure 3). Projections indicate that all coral 
reefs in the South East Asia region are very likely to experience 
severe thermal stress by the year 2050, as well as chemical 
stress due to ocean acidiﬁcation. 
4 Coral bleaching can be expected when a regional warm season maximum 
temperature is exceeded by 1°C for more than four weeks and bleaching becomes 
progressively worse at higher temperatures and/or longer periods over which the 
regional threshold temperature is exceeded. Whilst corals can survive a bleaching 
event they are subject to high mortality and take several years to recover. When 
bleaching events become too frequent or extreme coral reefs can fail to recover.
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?? Agricultural production, particularly for rice in the Mekong 
Delta, is vulnerable to sea-level rise. The Mekong Delta 
produces around 50 percent of Vietnam’s total agricultural 
production and contributes signiﬁcantly to the country’s rice 
exports. It has been estimated that a sea-level rise of 30 cm, 
which could occur as early as 2040, could result in the loss 
of about 12 percent of crop production due to inundation and 
salinity intrusion relative to current levels. 
?? Coastal cities concentrate increasingly large populations and 
assets exposed to climate change risks including increased 
tropical storm intensity, long-term sea-level rise and sudden-
onset coastal ﬂooding. Without adaptation, the area of Bangkok 
projected to be inundated due to ﬂooding linked to extreme 
rainfall events and sea-level rise increases from around 40 
percent under 15 cm sea-level rise above present (which 
could occur by the 2030s), to about 70 percent under an 
88cm sea-level rise scenario (which could occur by the 2080s 
under 4°C warming). Further, the effects of heat extremes are 
particularly pronounced in urban areas due to the urban heat 
island effect and could result in high human mortality and 
morbidity rates in cities. High levels of growth of both urban 
populations and GDP further increase ﬁnancial exposure to 
climate change impacts in these areas. The urban poor are 
particularly vulnerable to excessive heat and humidity stresses. 
In 2005, 41 percent of the urban population of Vietnam and 
44 percent of that of the Philippines lived in informal settle-
ments. Floods associated with sea-level rise and storm surges 
carry signiﬁcant risks in informal settlements, where lack of 
drainage and damages to sanitation and water facilities are 
accompanied by health threats. 
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South Asia: Extremes of Water Scarcity 
and Excess
South Asia is home to a growing population of about 1.6 billion 
people, which is projected to rise to over 2.2 billion people by 
2050. It has seen robust economic growth in recent years, yet 
poverty remains widespread, with the world’s largest concentra-
tion of poor people residing in the region. The timely arrival of 
the summer monsoon, and its regularity, are critical for the rural 
economy and agriculture in South Asia. 
In South Asia, climate change shocks to food production and 
seasonal water availability appear likely to confront populations 
with ongoing and multiple challenges to secure access to safe 
drinking water, sufﬁcient water for irrigation and hydropower 
production, and adequate cooling capacity for thermal power 
production. Potential impact hotspots such as Bangladesh are 
projected to be confronted by increasing challenges from extreme 
river ﬂoods, more intense tropical cyclones, rising sea-level and 
very high temperatures. While the vulnerability of South Asia’s 
large and poor populations can be expected to be reduced in the 
future by economic development and growth, climate projections 
indicate that high levels of local vulnerability are likely to remain 
and persist. 
Many of the climate change impacts in the region, which 
appear quite severe with relatively modest warming of 1.5–2°C, 
pose a signiﬁcant challenge to development. Major investments 
in infrastructure, ﬂood defense, development of high temperature 
and drought resistant crop cultivars, and major improvements in 
sustainability practices, for example in relation to groundwater 
extraction would be needed to cope with the projected impacts 
under this level of warming.
Likely Physical and Biophysical Impacts as a Function of Pro-
jected Climate Change
?? Heat extremes: Irrespective of future emission paths, in the 
next twenty years a several-fold increase in the frequency of 
unusually hot and extreme summer months is projected. A 
substantial increase in mortality is expected to be associated 
with such heat extremes and has been observed in the past. 
?? Precipitation: Climate change will impact precipitation with 
variations across spatial and temporal scales. Annual precipi-
tation is projected to increase by up to 30 percent in a 4°C 
world, however projections also indicate that dry areas such 
as in the north west, a major food producing region, would 
get drier and presently wet areas, get wetter. The seasonal 
distribution of precipitation is expected to become ampliﬁed, 
with a decrease of up to 30 percent during the dry season and 
a 30 percent increase during the wet season under a 4°C world 
(Figure 4). The projections show large sub-regional variations, 
with precipitation increasing during the monsoon season for 
currently wet areas (south, northeast) and precipitation decreas-
ing for currently dry months and areas (north, northwest), 
with larger uncertainties for those regions in other seasons.
?? Monsoon: Signiﬁcant increases in inter-annual and intra-
seasonal variability of monsoon rainfall are to be expected. 
With global mean warming approaching 4°C, an increase 
in intra-seasonal variability in the Indian summer monsoon 
precipitation of approximately 10 percent is projected. Large 
uncertainty, however, remains about the fundamental behavior 
of the Indian summer monsoon under global warming.
?? Drought: The projected increase in the seasonality of precipita-
tion is associated with an increase in the number of dry days, 
leading to droughts that are ampliﬁed by continued warming, 
with adverse consequences for human lives. Droughts are 
expected to pose an increasing risk in parts of the region. 
Although drought projections are made difﬁcult by uncertain 
precipitation projections and differing drought indicators, some 
regions emerge to be at particularly high risk. These include 
north-western India, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Over southern 
India, increasing wetness is projected with broad agreement 
between climate models.
?? Glacial loss, snow cover reductions and river ﬂow: Over 
the past century, most of the Himalayan glaciers have been 
retreating. Melting glaciers and loss of snow cover pose a 
signiﬁcant risk to stable and reliable water resources. Major 
rivers, such as the Ganges, Indus and Brahmaputra, depend 
signiﬁcantly on snow and glacial melt water, which makes 
them highly susceptible to climate change-induced glacier 
melt and reductions in snowfall. Well before 2°C warming, a 
rapid increase in the frequency of low snow years is projected 
with a consequent shift towards high winter and spring runoff 
with increased ﬂooding risks, and substantial reductions in dry 
season ﬂow, threatening agriculture. These risks are projected 
to become extreme by the time 4°C warming is reached.
?? Sea-level rise: With South Asian coastlines located close to 
the equator, projections of local sea-level rise show a stronger 
increase compared to higher latitudes. Sea-level rise is pro-
jected to be approximately 100–115 cm in a 4°C world and 
60–80 cm in a 2°C world by the end of the 21st century relative 
to 1986–2005, with the highest values expected for the Maldives. 
Sector Based and Thematic Impacts 
?? Crop yields are vulnerable to a host of climate-related 
factors in the region, including seasonal water scarcity, ris-
ing temperatures and salinity intrusion due to sea-level rise. 
Projections indicate an increasingly large and likely negative 
impact on crop yields with rising temperatures. The projected 
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CO2 fertilization effect could help to offset some of the yield 
reduction due to temperature effects, but recent data shows 
that the protein content of grains may be reduced. For warm-
ing greater than 2°C, yield levels are projected to drop even 
with CO2 fertilization.
?? Total crop production and per-capita calorie availability is 
projected to decrease signiﬁcantly with climate change. Without 
climate change, total crop production is projected to increase 
signiﬁcantly by 60 percent in the region. Under a 2°C warming, 
by the 2050s, more than twice the imports might be required 
to meet per capita calorie demand when compared to a case 
without climate change. Decreasing food availability is related 
to signiﬁcant health problems for affected populations, including 
childhood stunting, which is projected to increase by 35 percent 
compared to a scenario without climate change by 2050, with 
likely long-term consequences for populations in the region.
?? Water resources are already at risk in the densely popu-
lated countries of South Asia, according to most methods 
for assessing this risk. For global mean warming approaching 
4°C, a 10 percent increase in annual-mean monsoon intensity 
and a 15 percent increase in year-to-year variability of Indian 
summer monsoon precipitation is projected compared to 
normal levels during the ﬁrst half of the 20th century. Taken 
together, these changes imply that an extreme wet monsoon 
that currently has a chance of occurring only once in 100 years 
is projected to occur every 10 years by the end of the century. 
?? Deltaic regions and coastal cities are particularly exposed 
to compounding climate risks resulting from the interacting 
effects of increased temperature, growing risks of river ﬂooding, 
rising sea-level and increasingly intense tropical cyclones, posing 
a high risk to areas with the largest shares of poor populations. 
Under 2°C warming, Bangladesh emerges as an impact hotspot 
with sea-level rise causing threats to food production, liveli-
hoods, urban areas and infrastructure. Increased river ﬂooding 
combined with tropical cyclone surges also present signiﬁcant 
risks. Human activity (building of irrigation dams, barrages, 
river embankments and diversions in the inland basins of rivers) 
can seriously exacerbate the risk of ﬂooding downstream from 
extreme rainfall events higher up in river catchments. 
?? Energy security is expected to come under increasing 
pressure from climate-related impacts to water resources. 
The two dominant forms of power generation in the region 
are hydropower and thermal power generation (e.g., fossil 
fuel, nuclear and concentrated solar power), both of which 
can be undermined by inadequate water supply. Thermal 
power generation may also be affected through pressure 
placed on cooling systems due to increases in air and water 
temperatures.
Tipping Points, Cascading Impacts and 
Consequences for Human Development
This report shows that the three highly diverse regions of Sub-
Saharan Africa, South East Asia, and South Asia that were analyzed 
are exposed to the adverse effects of climate change (Tables 1-3). 
Most of the impacts materialize at relatively low levels of warming, 
well before warming of 4°C above pre-industrial levels is reached.
Each of the regions is projected to experience a rising inci-
dence of unprecedented heat extremes in the summer months 
by the mid-2020s, well before a warming of even 1.5°C. In fact, 
with temperatures at 0.8°C above pre-industrial levels, the last 
decade has seen extreme events taking high death tolls across 
all regions and causing wide-ranging damage to assets and agri-
cultural production. As warming approaches 4°C, the severity 
of impacts is expected to grow with regions being affected dif-
ferently (see Box 1). 
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Tipping Points and Cascading Impacts
As temperatures continue to rise, there is an increased risk of 
critical thresholds being breached. At such “tipping points”, 
elements of human or natural systems—such as crop yields, dry 
season irrigation systems, coral reefs, and savanna grasslands—
are pushed beyond critical thresholds, leading to abrupt system 
changes and negative impacts on the goods and services they 
provide. Within the agricultural sector, observed high temperature 
sensitivity in some crops (e.g., maize), where substantial yield 
reductions occur when critical temperatures are exceeded, points 
to a plausible threshold risk in food production regionally. In a 
global context, warming induced pressure on food supplies could 
have far-reaching consequences.
Some major risks cannot yet be quantiﬁed adequately: For 
example, while large uncertainty remains, the monsoon has been 
identiﬁed as a potential tipping element of the Earth system. Physi-
cally plausible mechanisms for an abrupt change in the Indian 
monsoon towards a drier, lower rainfall state could precipitate a 
major crisis in the South Asian region.
Climate impacts can create a domino-effect and thereby ulti-
mately affect human development. For example, decreased yields 
and lower nutritional value of crops could cascade throughout 
society by increasing the level of malnutrition and childhood stunt-
ing, causing adverse impacts on educational performance. These 
effects can persist into adulthood with long-term consequences 
for human capital that could substantially increase future devel-
opment challenges. Most of the impacts presented in the regional 
analyses are not unique to these regions. For example, global 
warming impacts on coral reefs worldwide could have cascading 
impacts on local livelihoods, and tourism. 
Multi-Sectoral Hotspots
Under 4°C warming, most of the world’s population is likely 
to be affected by impacts occurring simultaneously in multiple 
sectors. Furthermore, these cascading impacts will likely not be 
conﬁned to one region only; rather they are expected to have far-
reaching repercussions across the globe. For example, impacts in 
the agricultural sector are expected to affect the global trade of 
food commodities, so that production shocks in one region can 
have wide-ranging consequences for populations in others. Thus, 
vulnerability could be greater than suggested by the sectoral 
analysis of the assessed regions due to the global interdependence, 
and impacts on populations are by no means limited to those that 
form the focus of this report. Many of the climatic risk factors are 
concentrated in the tropics. However, no region is immune to the 
impacts of climate change. In fact, under 4°C warming, most of 
the world´s population is likely to be affected by impacts occur-
ring simultaneously in multiple sectors.
Results from the recent Inter-Sectoral Impact Model Intercom-
parison Project (ISI-MIP) were used to assess ‘hotspots’ where 
considerable impacts in one location occur concurrently in more 
than one sector (agriculture, water resources, ecosystems and 
health (malaria)). The proportion of the global population affected 
contemporaneously by multiple impacts increases signiﬁcantly 
under higher levels of warming. Assuming ﬁxed year-2000 popu-
lation levels and distribution, the proportion of people exposed 
to multiple stressors across these sectors would increase by 20 
percent under 2°C warming to more than 80 percent under 4°C 
warming above pre-industrial levels. This novel analysis5 ﬁnds 
exposure hotspots to be the southern Amazon Basin, southern 
Europe, east Africa and the north of South Asia. The Amazon and 
Box 1: Regional Tipping Points, 
Cascading Impacts, and 
Development Implications
?? Sub-Saharan Africa’s????????????????????????????????????-
???????????????????????? ???????????? ???????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????
?? South East Asian rural livelihoods are faced with mounting 
?????????????????????????????????? ???????? ????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
rise and storms. The displacement of impacted rural and 
coastal communities resulting from the loss of livelihood into 
urban areas could lead to ever higher numbers of people 
????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????? ????
? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????
?? South Asian populations in large parts depend on the stabili-
?????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????? ???????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????? ????????? ??????????????????????
?????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????
5 Based on the ﬁrst inter-sectoral climate model intercomparison, the ﬁrst round 
of which was concluded in early 2013. Papers are in revision at the time of writing 
this report.
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the East African highlands are particularly notable due to their 
exposure to three overlapping sectors. Small regions in Central 
America and West Africa are also affected. 
Consequences for Development
Climate change is already undermining progress and prospects 
for development and threatens to deepen vulnerabilities and 
erode hard-won gains. Consequences are already being felt on 
every continent and in every sector. Species are being lost, lands 
are being inundated, and livelihoods are being threatened. More 
droughts, more ﬂoods, more strong storms, and more forest ﬁres 
are taxing individuals, businesses and governments. Climate-
related extreme events can push households below the poverty 
trap threshold, which could lead to greater rural-urban migration 
(see Box 2). Promoting economic growth and the eradication of 
poverty and inequality will thus be an increasingly challenging 
task under future climate change.
Actions must be taken to mitigate the pace of climate change 
and to adapt to the impacts already felt today. It will be impos-
sible to lift the poorest on the planet out of poverty if climate 
change proceeds unchecked. Strong and decisive action must be 
taken to avoid a 4°C world—one that is unmanageable and laden 
with unprecedented heat waves and increased human suffering. 
It is not too late to hold warming near 2°C, and build resilience 
to temperatures and other climate impacts that are expected to 
still pose signiﬁcant risks to agriculture, water resources, coastal 
infrastructure, and human health. A new momentum is needed. 
Dramatic technological change, steadfast and visionary political 
will, and international cooperation are required to change the 
trajectory of climate change and to protect people and ecosystems. 
The window for holding warming below 2°C and avoiding a 4°C 
world is closing rapidly, and the time to act is now.
Box 2: New Clusters of 
Vulnerability—Urban Areas
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Saharan Africa’s population will live in urban areas compared to 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
mounting pressure. 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????? ???????????? ???????????????????
?? ????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????
?? ??? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????
?? Informal settlements concentrate large populations and often 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
infrastructure and durable housing. In such areas, people are 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????
?? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
conducive to the transmission of vector and water borne 
?????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????
become more prevalent with climate change. 
?? ???????????????????????????????????????????????? ????
vulnerable to increases in food prices following production 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????
change. 
Climate change poses a particular threat to urban residents 
?????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????
???? ?????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????? ??????
outlined above. Urban planning and enhanced social protec-
????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????
resilient communities in the face of climate change.
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Endnotes
1 Years indicate the decade during which warming levels are exceeded in a business-as-usual scenario, not in mitigation scenarios limiting warming to these levels, or 
below, since in that case the year of exceeding would always be 2100, or not at all.
2 This is the general picture from CMIP5 global climate models; however, signiﬁcant uncertainty appears to remain. Observed drought trends (Lyon and DeWitt 2012) and 
attribution of the 2011 drought in part to human inﬂuence (Lott et al. 2013) leaves signiﬁcant uncertainty as to whether the projected increased precipitation and reduced 
drought are robust (Tierney, Smerdon, Anchukaitis, and Seager 2013).
3 Dai (2012). CMIP5 models under RCP4.5 for drought changes 2050–99, warming of about 2.6°C above pre-industrial levels.
4 see Endnote 2.
5 Parry et al. (2007).
6 Temperature increase of 2.3°C and 2.1°C for the period 2041–2079 under SRES A2 and B2 (Döll, 2009).
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°C degrees Celsius
3-sigma events Events that are three standard deviations 
outside the historical mean
5-sigma events Events that are ﬁve standard deviations out-
side the historical mean
AI Aridity Index
ANN Annual
AOGCM Atmosphere-Ocean General Circulation Model
AR4 Fourth Assessment Report of the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change
AR5 Fifth Assessment Report of the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change
BAU Business as Usual
CaCO3 Calcium Carbonate
CAT Climate Action Tracker
CMIP5  Coupled Model Intercomparison Project 
Phase 5
CO2 Carbon Dioxide 
DIVA  Dynamic Interactive Vulnerability  
Assessment
DJF December January February
ECS Equilibrium Climate Sensitivity
GCM General Circulation Model
GDP Gross Domestic Product
FPU Food Productivity Units
GFDRR Global Facility for Disaster Reduction and 
Recovery
IAM Integrated Assessment Model
IEA International Energy Agency
IPCC Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
ISI-MIP Inter-Sectoral Impact Model Intercomparison 
Project
JJA June July August
MAGICC Model for the Assessment of Greenhouse-gas 
Induced Climate Change
MGIC Mountain Glaciers and Ice Caps 
NH Northern Hemisphere 
OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development
PDSI Palmer Drought Severity Index
ppm parts per million
RCP Representative Concentration Pathway
SCM Simple Climate Model
SLR Sea-level Rise
SRES IPCC Special Report on Emissions Scenarios 
SREX IPCC Special Report on Managing the Risks 
of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance 
Climate Change Adaptation
SSA Sub-Saharan Africa
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
UNFCCC United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change
UNRCO United Nations Resident Coordinator’s Ofﬁce
USAID United States Agency for International 
Development
WBG World Bank Group 
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Aridity Index  The Aridity Index (AI) is an indicator designed for 
identifying structurally “arid” regions, that is, regions with a 
long-term average precipitation deﬁcit. AI is deﬁned as total 
annual precipitation divided by potential evapotranspiration, 
with the latter a measure of the amount of water a representative 
crop type would need as a function of local conditions such as 
temperature, incoming radiation and wind speed, over a year 
to grow, which is a standardized measure of water demand.
Biome  A biome is a large geographical area of distinct plant and 
animal groups, one of a limited set of major habitats, classiﬁed 
by climatic and predominant vegetative types. Biomes include, 
for example, grasslands, deserts, evergreen or deciduous 
forests, and tundra. Many different ecosystems exist within 
each broadly deﬁned biome, which all share the limited range 
of climatic and environmental conditions within that biome.
C3/C4 plants refers to two types of photosynthetic biochemical 
“pathways”. C3 plants include more than 85 percent of plants 
on Earth (e.g. most trees, wheat, rice, yams and potatoes) and 
respond well to moist conditions and to additional carbon 
dioxide in the atmosphere. C4 plants (for example savanna 
grasses, maize, sorghum, millet, sugarcane) are more efﬁcient 
in water and energy use and outperform C3 plants in hot and 
dry conditions. 
 CAT  The Climate Action Tracker (CAT) is an independent science-
based assessment, which tracks the emission commitments 
and actions by individual countries. The estimates of future 
emissions deducted from this assessment serve to analyse 
warming scenarios that would result from current policy: 
(a) CAT Reference BAU: a lower reference ‘business-as-usual’ 
(BAU) scenario that includes existing climate policies, but not 
pledged emission reductions; and (b) CAT Current Pledges: 
a scenario additionally incorporating reductions currently 
pledged internationally by countries. 
CMIP5  The Coupled Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 
(CMIP5) brought together 20 state-of-the-art GCM groups, 
which generated a large set of comparable climate-projections 
data. The project provided a framework for coordinated climate 
change experiments and includes simulations for assessment 
in the IPCC´s AR5.
CO
2 fertilization  The CO2 fertilization effect may increase the rate 
of photosynthesis mainly in C3 plants and increase water use 
efﬁciency, thereby producing increases in agricultural C3 crops 
in grain mass and/or number. This effect may to some extent 
offset the negative impacts of climate change, although grain 
protein content may decline. Long-term effects are uncertain 
as they heavily depend on a potential physiological long-term 
acclimation to elevated CO2, as well as on other limiting factors 
including soil nutrients, water and light. 
GCM  A General Circulation Model is the most advanced type 
of climate model used for projecting changes in climate due 
to increasing greenhouse-gas concentrations, aerosols and 
external forcings like changes in solar activity and volcanic 
eruptions. These models contain numerical representations 
of physical processes in the atmosphere, ocean, cryosphere 
and land surface on a global three-dimensional grid, with 
the current generation of GCMs having a typical horizontal 
resolution of 100 to 300 km.
GDP (Gross Domestic Product) is the sum of the gross value 
added by all resident producers in the economy plus any 
product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the 
value of the products. It is calculated without deductions for 
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depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degrada-
tion of natural resources.
GDP (PPP) per capita is GDP on a purchasing power parity basis 
divided by population. Please note: Whereas PPP estimates for 
OECD countries are quite reliable, PPP estimates for develop-
ing countries are often rough approximations.
Hyper-aridity  Land areas with very low Aridity Index (AI), gener-
ally coinciding with the great deserts. There is no universally 
standardized value for hyper-aridity, and values between 0 and 
0.05 are classiﬁed in this report as hyper-arid. 
IPCC AR4, AR5  The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
(IPCC) is the leading body of global climate change assess-
ments. It comprises hundreds of leading scientists worldwide 
and on a regular basis publishes assessment reports which 
give a comprehensive overview over the most recent scientiﬁc, 
technical and socio-economic information on climate change 
and its implications. The Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) was 
published in 2007. The upcoming Fifth Assessment Report 
(AR5) will be completed in 2013/2014.
ISI-MIP  The ﬁrst Inter-Sectoral Impact Model Intercomparison 
Project (ISI-MIP) is a community-driven modeling effort which 
provides cross-sectoral global impact assessments, based on 
the newly developed climate [Representative Concentration 
Pathways (RCPs)] and socio-economic scenarios. More than 
30 models across ﬁve sectors (agriculture, water resources, 
biomes, health and infrastructure) participated in this model-
ing exercise. 
MAGICC  Carbon-cycle/climate model of “reduced complexity,” here 
applied in a probabilistic set-up to provide “best-guess” global-
mean warming projections, with uncertainty ranges related to 
the uncertainties in carbon-cycle, climate system and climate 
sensitivity. The model is constrained by historical observations 
of hemispheric land/ocean temperatures and historical estimates 
for ocean heat-uptake, reliably determines the atmospheric 
burden of CO2 concentrations compared to high-complexity 
carbon-cycle models and is also able to project global-mean 
near-surface warming in line with estimates made by GCMs.
Pre-industrial levels (what it means to have present 0.8°C 
warming)  The instrumental temperature records show that 
the 20-year average of global-mean near-surface air tempera-
ture in 1986–2005 was about 0.6°C higher than the average 
over 1851–1879. There are, however, considerable year-to-
year variations and uncertainties in data. In addition the 
20-year average warming over 1986–2005 is not necessarily 
representative of present-day warming. Fitting a linear trend over 
the period 1901 to 2010 gives a warming of 0.8°C since “early 
industrialization.” Global-mean near-surface air temperatures 
in the instrumental records of surface-air temperature have 
been assembled dating back to about 1850. The number of 
measurement stations in the early years is small and increases 
rapidly with time. Industrialization was well on its way by 
1850 and 1900, which implies using 1851–1879 as a base 
period, or 1901 as a start for linear trend analysis might lead 
to an underestimate of current and future warming, but global 
greenhouse-gas emissions at the end of the 19th century were 
still small and uncertainties in temperature reconstructions 
before this time are considerably larger.
RCP  Representative Concentration Pathways (RCPs) are based on 
carefully selected scenarios for work on integrated assessment 
modeling, climate modeling, and modeling and analysis of 
impacts. Nearly a decade of new economic data, information 
about emerging technologies, and observations of environmental 
factors, such as land use and land cover change, are reﬂected in 
this work. Rather than starting with detailed socioeconomic sto-
rylines to generate emissions scenarios, the RCPs are consistent 
sets of projections of only the components of radiative forcing 
(the change in the balance between incoming and outgoing 
radiation to the atmosphere caused primarily by changes in 
atmospheric composition) that are meant to serve as input for 
climate modeling. These radiative forcing trajectories are not 
associated with unique socioeconomic or emissions scenarios, 
and instead can result from different combinations of economic, 
technological, demographic, policy, and institutional futures.
RCP2.6  RCP2.6 refers to a scenario which is representative of the 
literature on mitigation scenarios aiming to limit the increase 
of global mean temperature to 2°C above the pre-industrial 
period. This emissions path is used by many studies that are 
being assessed for the IPCC´s Fifth Assessment Report and is 
the underlying low emissions scenario for impacts assessed in 
other parts of this report. In this report we refer to the RCP2.6 
as a 2°C World.
RCP8.5  RCP8.5 refers to a scenario with no-climate-policy baseline 
with comparatively high greenhouse gas emissions which is 
used by many studies that are being assessed for the upcoming 
IPCC Fifth Assessment Report (AR5). This scenario is also the 
underlying high emissions scenario for impacts assessed in 
other parts of this report. In this report we refer to the RCP8.5 
as a 4°C World above the pre-industrial period.
Severe & extreme  Indicating uncommon (negative) consequences. 
These terms are often associated with an additional qualiﬁer 
????????
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like “unusual” or “unprecedented” that has a speciﬁc quanti-
ﬁed meaning (see “Unusual & unprecedented”). 
SRES  The Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES), published 
by the IPCC in 2000, has provided the climate projections for 
the Fourth Assessment Report (AR4) of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). They do not include mitiga-
tion assumptions. The SRES study includes consideration of 40 
different scenarios, each making different assumptions about 
the driving forces determining future greenhouse gas emissions. 
Scenarios are grouped into four families, corresponding to a 
wide range of high and low emission scenarios. 
SREX  In 2012 the IPCC published a special report on Managing 
the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance Climate 
Change Adaptation (SREX). The report provides an assessment 
of the physical as well as social factors shaping vulnerability to 
climate-related disasters and gives an overview of the potential 
for effective disaster risk management. 
Unusual & unprecedented  In this report, unusual and unprec-
edented heat extremes are deﬁned using thresholds based 
on the historical variability of the current local climate. The 
absolute level of the threshold thus depends on the natural 
year-to-year variability in the base period (1951–1980), which 
is captured by the standard deviation (sigma). Unusual heat 
extremes are deﬁned as 3-sigma events. For a normal distri-
bution, 3-sigma events have a return time of 740 years. The 
2012 U.S. heat wave and the 2010 Russian heat wave classify 
as 3-sigma and thus unusual events. Unprecedented heat 
extremes are deﬁned as 5-sigma events. They have a return 
time of several million years. Monthly temperature data do 
not necessarily follow a normal distribution (for example, 
the distribution can have “long” tails, making warm events 
more likely) and the return times can be different from the 
ones expected in a normal distribution. Nevertheless, 3-sigma 
events are extremely unlikely and 5-sigma events have almost 
certainly never occurred.
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One of the key conclusions of Turn Down the Heat was that 
the impacts of climate change would not be evenly distributed 
(Box 1.2). In a 4°C world, climate change is expected to affect 
societies across the globe. As is illustrated in Figure 1.1, tempera-
tures do not increase uniformly relative to present-day conditions 
and sea levels do not rise evenly. Impacts are both distributed and 
felt disproportionately toward the tropics and among the poor.
This report provides a better understanding of the distribution 
of impacts in a 4°C world by looking at how different regions—Sub-
Saharan Africa, South East Asia, and South Asia—are projected 
to experience climate change. While such climate events as heat 
waves are expected to occur across the globe, geographic and 
socioeconomic conditions produce particular vulnerabilities in 
different regions. Vulnerability here is broadly understood as a 
function of exposure to climate change and its impacts and the 
extent to which populations are able to cope with these impacts.8
Specific climate impacts form the basis of each regional 
assessment:
?? Sub-Saharan Africa heavily relies on agriculture as a source 
of food and income. Ninety-seven percent of agricultural 
production is currently rainfed. This leaves the region highly 
vulnerable to the consequences of changes in precipitation 
patterns, temperature, and atmospheric CO2 concentration 
for agricultural production.
?? South East Asia, with its archipelagic landscape and a large 
proportion of the population living in low-lying deltaic and 
coastal regions (where a number of large cities are located), 
is particularly vulnerable to the impacts of sea-level rise. 
South East Asia is also home to highly bio-diverse marine 
wildlife and many coastal livelihoods depend on the goods 
6 Hereafter referred to as Turn Down the Heat.
7 This report analyzes a range of scenarios that includes a recent IEA analysis, 
as well as current and planned national climate policies, and makes projections of 
warming that are quantiﬁed in Chapter 2. In contrast, the previous report (World 
Bank 2012) used an illustrative “policy” scenario that has relatively ambitious proposed 
reductions by individual countries for 2020, as well as for 2050, and thus suggests 
that there is only a 20 percent likelihood of exceeding 4°C by 2100.
8 IPCC (2007) deﬁnes vulnerability as “the degree to which geophysical, biological 
and socio-economic systems are susceptible to, and unable to cope with, adverse 
impacts of climate change”.
TURN DOWN THE HEAT: CLIMATE EXTREMES, REGIONAL IMPACTS, AND THE CASE FOR RESILIENCE
?
and services offered by these ecosystems. The impacts of 
sea-level rise and changes in marine conditions, therefore, 
are the focus for South East Asia, with the Philippines and 
Vietnam serving as examples for maritime and mainland 
regions respectively.
?? In South Asia, populations rely on seasonal monsoon rainfall 
to meet a variety of needs, including human consumption 
and irrigation. Agricultural production, an income source 
for approximately 70 percent of the population, in most part 
depends on groundwater resources being replenished by 
monsoon rains. Snow and glacial melt in the mountain ranges 
are the primary source of upstream freshwater for many river 
basins and play an important role in providing freshwater for 
the region. The variability of monsoon rainfall is expected 
to increase and the supply of water from melting mountain 
glaciers is expected to decline in the long term. South Asia 
is, therefore, particularly vulnerable to impacts on freshwater 
resources and their consequences.
Box 1.1 Deﬁnition of Warming Levels and Base Period in this Report
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Box 1.2 Extreme Events 2012–2013
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This new report builds on the scientiﬁc background of the earlier 
report and zooms in on the three focus regions to examine how 
they are impacted by warming up to and including an increase in 
global mean temperature of 4°C above pre-industrial levels in the 21st 
century. The projections on changes in temperature, heat extremes, 
precipitation, and aridity are based on original analysis of Coupled 
Model Intercomparison Project Phase 5 (CMIP5) Global Circulation 
Model (GCM) output and those of sea-level rise on CMIP5 GCMs, 
semi-empirical modeling, and the “simple climate model,” the 
Model for the Assessment of Greenhouse Gas Induced Climate 
Change (MAGICC; see also Appendix 1 for details) (Box 1.3). The 
sectoral analysis for the three regions is based on existing literature.
The report is structured as follows. Chapter 2 explores the 
probability of warming reaching 4°C above pre-industrial levels 
and discusses the possibility of signiﬁcantly limiting global mean 
warming to below 2°C. It further provides an update on global 
climate impact projections for different levels of global warm-
ing. The updated analysis of the risks at the global level further 
complements the 2012 report and provides a framework for the 
regional case studies. Chapters 3 to 5 present analysis of climate 
impacts for the three regions: Sub-Saharan Africa, South East 
Asia, and South Asia.
The focus of the regional chapters is the nature of the impacts 
and the associated risks posed to the populations of the regions. 
The possibility of adaptation and its capacity to minimize the 
vulnerability to the risks accompanying climate change is not 
assessed in this report. Rather, this report sets out to provide 
an overview of the challenges that human populations are 
expected to face under future projected climate change due to 
impacts in selected sectors. Some dimensions of vulnerability of 
populations are not covered here, such as gender and the ways 
in which climate change impacts may be felt differently by men 
and women. Finally, while many of the ﬁndings presented in 
this report may prove relevant to development policy in these 
regions, this report is not intended to be prescriptive; rather, it 
is intended to paint a picture of some of the challenges looming 
in a 4°C world.
In this report, as in the previous one, “a 4°C world” is used as 
shorthand for warming reaching 4°C above pre-industrial levels 
by the end of the century. It is important to note that this does 
not imply a stabilization of temperatures nor that the magnitude 
of impacts is expected to peak at this level. Because of the slow 
response of the climate system, the greenhouse gas emissions and 
concentrations that would lead to warming of 4°C by 2100 and 
associated higher risk of thresholds in the climate system being 
crossed, would actually commit the world to much higher warm-
ing, exceeding 6°C or more in the long term with several meters 
of sea-level rise ultimately associated with this warming (Rogelj 
et al. 2012; International Energy Agency 2012; Schaeffer and van 
Vuuren 2012). For a 2°C warming above pre-industrial levels, 
stabilization at this level by 2100 and beyond is assumed in the 
projections, although climate impacts would persist for decades, 
if not centuries to come: sea-level rise, for example, would likely 
reach 2.7 meters above 2000  levels by 2300 (Schaeffer, Hare, 
Rahmstorf, and Vermeer 2012).
Populations across the world are already experiencing the ﬁrst 
of these challenges at the present level of warming of 0.8°C above 
pre-industrial levels. As this report shows, further major challenges 
are expected long before the end of the century in both 2°C and 
a 4°C warming scenarios. Urgent action is thus needed to prevent 
those impacts that are still avoidable and to adapt to those that 
are already being felt and will continue to be felt for decades to 
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come. For many systems, climate change exacerbates other non-
climatic stressors such as land degradation or marine pollution. 
Even without climate change, human support systems are likely 
to be placed under further pressure as populations grow.
Box 1.3 Climate Change Projections, Impacts, and Uncertainty
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In this report, the low-emissions scenario RCP2.6, a scenario 
which is representative of the literature on mitigation scenarios 
aiming to limit the increase of global mean temperature to 2°C 
(Van Vuuren et al. 2011), is used as a proxy for a 2°C world. 
The high-emissions scenario RCP8.5 is used as proxy for a 4°C 
world. These emissions paths are used by many studies that 
are being assessed for the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) of 
the IPCC. These are the underlying projections of temperature 
and precipitation changes, as well as those on heat extremes 
and sea-level rise in this chapter and the regional parts of 
this report.
Observed Changes and Climate Sensitivity
Observations show that warming during the last decade has been 
slower than earlier decades (Figure 2.1). This is likely the result of 
a temporary slowdown or “hiatus” in global warming and a natural 
phenomenon (Easterling and Wehner 2009; Meehl et al. 2011). Slower 
and faster decades of warming occur regularly superimposed on an 
overall warming trend (Foster and Rahmstorf 2011).  Evaluating all 
major inﬂuences that determine global mean temperature changes, 
Foster and Rahmstorf (2011) show that over the past decade the 
underlying trend in warming continued unabated, if one ﬁlters 
out the effects of ENSO, solar variations, and volcanic activity.9
One of the basic tests of a model is whether it is able to 
reproduce observed changes: recent analysis shows clearly that 
in both the IPCC’s Third and Fourth Assessment Reports climate 
model warming projections match observations very well. 
(Figure 2.2) (Foster and Rahmstorf (2011).
The recent slower warming has led to media attention that 
suggests the sensitivity of the climate system to anthropogenic 
emissions might be smaller than estimated previously.10 However, 
an overall review of climate sensitivity that takes into account mul-
tiple lines of evidence, including methodologies that result in low 
climate sensitivity estimates and other studies that show instead a 
larger estimate of sensitivity (Knutti and Hegerl 2008), results in 
values for climate sensitivity consistent with IPCC’s AR4: “most 
likely” around 3°C, a 90 percent probability of larger than 1.5°C, 
“very likely” in the range of 2–4.5°C; values substantially higher 
than 4.5°C cannot be ruled out.
9 This can be explained by natural external forcings, like those of solar and volcanic 
origin, and physical mechanisms within the climate system itself, with a large role 
played by the El Niño/La Niña-Southern-Oscillation (ENSO), a pattern of natural 
ﬂuctuations in heat transfer between the ocean’s surface and deeper layers. If such 
ﬂuctuations are ﬁltered out of the observations, a robust continued warming signal 
emerges over the past three decades. It is this signal that should be compared to the 
average warming of climate models, because the latter exhibit the same upswings 
and downswings of warming as the observational signal, but at different times, due 
to the natural chaotic nature of the climate system. Taking an average from many 
models ﬁlters out these random variations; hence, this must also be done with 
observational data sets before comparing with model results.
10 Recently, one such study that resulted in a value around 2°C, much like other 
studies using comparable methods and included in IPCC’s meta-analysis, received 
media attention (see Box 2.1). http://www.forskningsradet.no/en/Newsarticle/
Global_warming_less_extreme_than_feared/1253983344535/p1177315753918.
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Unlike global warming, for sea-level rise, the models con-
sistently underestimate the accelerating rise in sea levels com-
pared to observations (Figure 2.3). Along with observations, 
Figure 2.3 shows projections for sea-level rise by ice-sheet and 
ocean models reported in the IPCC’s Third and Fourth Assessment 
Reports. Remarkably, the models are not able to keep pace with 
observed sea-level rise, which rises 60-percent faster compared 
to the best estimates from models. This mismatch initiated the 
development of “semi-empirical” models (e.g., Rahmstorf 2007; 
Kemp et al. 2011) that constrain model parameters by centuries 
to millennia of observations.11 Based on these parameters, such 
models project changes that by 2100 are generally higher than 
the process-based models by around 30–50 percent (see World 
Bank 2012 for more background).
How Likely is a 4°C World?
The previous Turn Down the Heat report estimated that current 
emission reductions pledges by countries worldwide, if fully 
implemented, would likely lead to warming exceeding 3°C 
before 2100.
New assessments of business-as-usual emissions in the absence 
of strong climate mitigation policies (Riahi et al. 2013; Kriegler et 
al. 2013; Schaeffer et al. 2013), as well as recent reevaluations of 
the likely emission consequences of pledges and targets adopted 
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Box 2.1 Climate Sensitivity
Climate sensitivity ????????????????????????????????? ????????????-
????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????
??????????????????2?????????????????????????? ???????????????????
???????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????
radiativea forcing.
Research efforts are continuing to better constrain ECS. 
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our current understanding of the ECS and use an intermediate 
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but is emerging from all the feedback processes included in the 
model.
a?????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????
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11 Data dating back more than about 150 years is generally from reconstructions of 
past climatic circumstance obtained by proxy data, i.e. observational evidence from 
which past climate changes can be derived.
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by countries, point to a considerable likelihood of warming reach-
ing 4°C above pre-industrial levels within this century. The latest 
research supports both of these ﬁndings (see Appendix 1):
The most recent generation of energy-economic models 
estimates emissions in the absence of further substantial policy 
action (business as usual), with the median projections reaching 
a warming of 4.7°C above pre-industrial levels by 2100, with 
a 40 percent chance of exceeding 5°C (Schaeffer et al. 2013). Newly 
published assessments of the recent trends in the world’s energy 
system by the International Energy Agency in its World Energy 
Outlook 2012 indicate global-mean warming above pre-industrial 
levels would approach 3.8°C by 2100. In this assessment, there 
is a 40 percent chance of warming exceeding 4°C by 2100 and 
a 10 percent chance of it exceeding 5°C.
In relation to the effects of pledges, the updated UNEP Emis-
sions Gap Assessment 2012, found that present emission trends 
and pledges are consistent with emission pathways that reach 
warming in the range of 3 to 5°C by 2100, with global emissions 
estimated for 2020 closest to levels consistent with a pathway 
leading to 3.5–4°C warming by 2100.12
The high emissions scenario underlying novel assessments, 
RCP8.5, reaches a global-mean warming level of about 4°C above 
pre-industrial levels by the 2080s and gives a median warming of 
about 5°C by 2100.13
According to new analysis (see Appendix 1), there is a 66-per-
cent likelihood that emissions consistent with RCP8.5 will lead to 
a warming of 4.2 to 6.5°C, and a remaining 33-percent chance that 
warming would be either lower than 4.2°C or higher than 6.5°C 
by 2100.14 On average, the most recent business-as-usual scenarios 
lead to warming projections close to those of RCP8.5 and there is a 
medium chance that end-of-century temperature rise exceeds 4°C. 
Approximately 30 percent of the most recent business-as-usual 
scenarios reach a warming higher than that associated with 
RCP8.5 by 2100 (see Figure 2.4, right-hand panel).
Can Warming be Held Below 2°C?
State-of-the-art climate models show that, if emissions are 
reduced substantially, there is a high probability that global 
mean temperatures can be held to below 2°C relative to pre-
industrial levels. Climate policy has to date not succeeded in 
curbing global greenhouse gas emissions, and emissions are 
steadily rising (Peters et al. 2013). However, recent high emis-
sion trends do not imply high emissions forever (van Vuuren and 
Riahi 2008). Several studies show that effective climate policies 
can substantially inﬂuence the trend and bring emissions onto a 
feasible path in line with a high probability of limiting warming 
to below 2°C, even with limited emissions reductions in the short 
term (for example, OECD 2012; Rogelj et al. 2012a; UNEP 2012; 
van Vliet et al. 2012; Rogelj et al. 2013). The available scientiﬁc 
literature makes a strong case that achieving deep emissions 
reductions over the long term is feasible; reducing total global 
emissions to below 50 percent of 2000 levels by 2050 (Clarke et 
al. 2009; Fischedick et al. 2011; Riahi et al. 2012). Recent stud-
ies also show the possibility, together with the consequences of 
delaying action (den Elzen et al. 2010; OECD 2012; Rogelj et al. 
2012a, 2013; van Vliet et al. 2012).
Patterns of Climate Change
This report presents projections of global and regional temperature 
and precipitation conditions, as well as expected changes in aridity 
and in the frequency of severe heat extremes. These analyses are 
based on the ISI-MIP database (Warszawski et al., in preparation), 
consisting of a subset of the state-of-the-art climate model projections 
of the Coupled Model Intercomparison Project phase 5 (CMIP5; K. 
E. Taylor, Stouffer, and Meehl, 2011) that were bias-corrected against 
late twentieth century meteorological observations (Hempel, Frieler, 
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12 This applies for the “unconditional pledges, strict rules” case.
13 RCP refers to “Representative Concentrations Pathway,” which underlies the 
IPCC´s Fifth Assessment Report. RCPs are consistent sets of projections for only the 
components of radiative forcing (the change in the balance between incoming and 
outgoing radiation to the atmosphere caused primarily by changes in atmospheric 
composition) that are meant to serve as inputs for climate modeling. See also Box 1, 
“What are Emission Scenarios?” on page 22 of the previous report.
14 A probability of >66 percent is labeled “likely” in IPCC’s uncertainty guidelines 
adopted here.
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Warszawski, Schewe and Piontek 2013; see also Appendix 2). The 
latter refers to a method of letting the models provide more accurate 
future projections on a global, as well as on a regional (subcontinental) 
scale. The patterns of change in this subset of models are shown to 
be consistent with published CMIP5 multi-model mean changes for 
temperature, precipitation, and heat extremes. Following Hansen, 
Sato, and Ruedy (2012), the period 1951–80 is deﬁned as a baseline 
for changes in heat extremes. This baseline has the advantage of 
having been a period of relatively stable global temperature, prior 
to rapid global warming, and of providing sufﬁcient observational 
measurements such that the climatology is well deﬁned. The baseline 
for sea-level rise projections is the period 1986–2005.
This chapter discusses the results from a global perspective; 
the following three chapters look at three selected regions: Sub-
Saharan Africa, South East Asia, and South Asia. The focus is on 
changes expected during the summer, as this is the season when 
climate change is expected to have the greatest impact on human 
populations in many regions (Hansen, Sato, and Ruedy 2012).
Projected Temperature Changes
Under scenario RCP2.6, global average land surface temperatures 
for the months June, July, August peak at approximately 2°C above 
the 1951–80 baseline by 2050 and remain at this level until the end 
of the century (Figure 2.5). The high emissions scenario RCP8.5 fol-
lows a temperature trajectory similar to that of RCP2.6 until 2020, 
but starts to deviate upwards strongly after 2030. Warming contin-
ues to increase until the end of the century with global-mean land 
surface temperature for the northern hemisphere summer reaching 
nearly 6.5°C above the 1951–80 baseline by 2100. Note that these 
values are higher than the associated global mean temperature 
anomalies since warming is more pronounced over land than ocean.
Warming is generally stronger in the Northern Hemisphere, a 
pattern which is found for both emissions scenarios and for both 
the summer and winter seasons (see Figure 2.6 for JJA). This is a 
well-documented feature of global warming. Thus, Northern Hemi-
sphere summers are expected to typically warm by 2–3°C under 
RCP2.6 and by 6.5–8°C under RCP8.5. As shown in the previous 
report, regions that see especially strong absolute warming include 
the Mediterranean, the western United States, and northern Russia.
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A good way to gain appreciation of the warming is to compare 
it to the historically observed natural year-to-year temperature 
variability (Hansen et al. 2012). The absolute warming is thus 
divided (normalized) by the local standard deviation (sigma), 
which represents the normal year-to-year changes in monthly 
temperature because of natural variability (see the box 2.2). A 
normalized warming of 5-sigma, therefore, means that the aver-
age change in the climate is ﬁve times larger than the current 
normal year-to-year variability. In the tropics, natural variability 
is small (with typical standard deviations of less than 1°C), so the 
normalized warming peaks in the tropics (Figure 2.6), although 
the absolute warming is generally larger in the Northern Hemi-
sphere extra-tropics. Under a high-emissions scenario (RCP8.5), 
the expected 21st century warming in tropical regions in Africa, 
South America, and Asia shifts the temperature distribution by 
more than six standard deviations (Fig. 2.2.1.2). A similarly large 
shift is projected for some localized extra-tropical regions, including 
the eastern Mediterranean, the eastern United States, Mexico, and 
parts of central Asia. Such a large normalized warming implies a 
totally new climatic regime in these regions by the end of the 21st 
century, with the coldest months substantially warmer than the 
hottest months experienced during 1951–80. The extent of the 
land area projected to shift into a new climatic regime (that is, 
a warming by six standard deviations or more) is dramatically 
reduced when emissions are limited to the RCP2.6 scenario. 
Under such a low-emissions scenario, only localized regions 
in eastern tropical Africa and South East Asia are projected to 
see substantial normalized warming up to about four standard 
deviations. In some regions, non-linear climate feedbacks seem to 
play a role in causing warming under RCP8.5 to be much larger 
than under RCP2.6. The eastern Mediterranean region illustrates 
this situation. It warms by ~3°C (or ~2 sigma) under the low-
emissions scenario compared to ~8°C (or ~6 sigma) under the 
high-emissions scenario.
Projected Changes in Heat Extremes
A thorough assessment of extreme events by the IPCC (2012) con-
cludes that it is very likely that the length, frequency, and intensity 
of heat waves will increase over most land areas under future 
climate warming, with more warming resulting in more extremes. 
The following quantiﬁes how much a low emission scenario 
(RCP2.6) would limit the increase in frequency and intensity of 
future heat waves as compared to RCP8.5.
Several studies have documented the expected increase in 
heat extremes under a business-as-usual (BAU) emissions scenario 
Figure 2.6:? ??????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????
TURN DOWN THE HEAT: CLIMATE EXTREMES, REGIONAL IMPACTS, AND THE CASE FOR RESILIENCE
??
or in simulations with a doubling of CO2 (typically resulting in 
~3°C global mean warming). Without exception, these show that 
heat extremes, whether on daily or seasonal time scales, greatly 
increase under high-emissions scenarios. The intensity of extremely 
hot days, with a return time of 20 years,15 is expected to increase 
between 5°C and 10°C over continents, with the larger values 
over North and South America and Eurasia related to substantial 
decreases in regional soil moisture there (Zwiers and Kharin 1998). 
The frequency of days exceeding the present-day 99th percentile 
could increase by a factor of 20 (D. N. Barnett, Brown, Murphy, 
Sexton, and Webb 2005). Moreover, the intensity, duration, and 
frequency of three-day heat events is projected to signiﬁcantly 
increase—by up to 3°C in the Mediterranean and the western and 
southern United States (G. A. Meehl and Tebaldi 2004). Studying 
the 2003 European heat wave, Schär et al. (2004) project that 
toward the end of the century approximately every second European 
summer is likely to be warmer than the 2003 event. On a global 
scale, extremely hot summers are also robustly predicted to become 
much more common (D. N. Barnett, Brown, Murphy, Sexton, and 
Webb 2005b). Therefore, the intensity, duration, and frequency of 
summer heat waves are expected to be substantially greater over 
all continents, with the largest increases over Europe, North and 
South America, and East Asia (Clark, Brown, and Murphy 2006).
In this and in the previous report, threshold-exceeding heat 
extremes are analyzed with the threshold deﬁned by the historical 
observed variability (see Box 2.2). For this deﬁnition of extremes, 
regions that are characterized by high levels of warming combined 
with low levels of historical variability tend to see the strongest 
increase in extremes (Sillmann and Kharin 2013a). The approach 
is useful because ecosystems and humans are adapted to local 
climatic conditions and infrastructure is designed with local cli-
matic conditions and its historic variations in mind. Thus even 
a relatively small change in temperature in the tropics can have 
relatively large impacts, for example if coral reefs experience tem-
peratures exceeding their sensitivity thresholds (see, for example, 
Chapter 4 on “Projected Impacts on Coral Reefs”).
An alternative approach would be to study extremes exceeding 
an absolute threshold, independent of the past variability. This is 
mostly relevant when studying impacts on speciﬁc sectors where 
the exceedance of some speciﬁc threshold is known to cause severe 
impacts. For example, wheat growth in India has been shown to 
be very sensitive to temperatures greater than 34°C (Lobell, Sib-
ley, & Ortiz-Monasterio, 2012). As this report is concerned with 
impacts across multiple sectors, thresholds deﬁned by the local 
climate variability are considered to be the most relevant index.
This report analyzes the timing of the increase in monthly 
heat extremes and their patterns by the end of the 21st century for 
both the low-emission (RCP2.6 or a 2°C world) and high-emission 
(RCP8.5 or a 4°C world) scenarios. In a 2°C world, the bulk of 
Box 2.2 Heat Extremes
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????? ??????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
3-sigma Events – Three Standard Deviations Outside the Normal
?? ?????????????????????????
?? ???????? ???????????
?? ?????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????st????????
5-sigma Events – Five Standard Deviations Outside the Normal
?? ?????????????????????????????
?? ?????????????? ?????????????????????????? ????????????????????
?? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????? ?
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????? ?????????????? ????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????? ????????????????????
????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????a
a???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
15 This means that there is a 0.5 probability of this event occurring in any given year.
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the increase in monthly extremes, as projected for a 4°C world by 
the end of the century, would be avoided. Although unusual heat 
extremes (beyond 3-sigma) would still become substantially more 
common over extended regions, unprecedented extremes (beyond 
the 5-sigma threshold) would remain essentially absent over most 
continents. The patterns of change are similar to those described 
for a 4°C world, but the frequency of threshold-exceeding extremes 
is strongly reduced. It is only in some localized tropical regions 
that a strong increase in frequency compared to the present day is 
expected (see the regional chapters). In these regions, speciﬁcally 
in western tropical Africa (see Chapter 3 on “Regional Patterns of 
Climate Change”) and South East Asia (see Chapter 5 on “Regional 
Patterns of Climate Change”), summer months with unusual tem-
peratures become dominant, occurring in about 60–80 percent of 
years, and extremes of unprecedented temperatures become regular 
(about 20–30 percent of years) by the end of the century.
In parallel with the increase in global mean temperature, in 
a 2°C world the percentage of land area with unusual temperatures 
steadily increases until 2050; it then plateaus at around 20 percent, 
as shown in Figure 2.7. On a global scale, the land area affected 
by northern hemisphere summer months with unprecedented 
temperatures remains relatively small (at less than 5 percent). This 
implies that, in the near term, extremes would increase manifold 
compared to today even under the low-emissions scenario. In a 4°C 
world, the land area experiencing extreme heat would continue to 
increase until the end of the century. This results in unprecedented 
monthly heat covering approximately 60 percent of the global land 
area by 2100. Although these analyses are based on a new set of 
climate models (that is, those used in ISI-MIP—see Appendix 2), 
the projections for a 4°C world are quantitatively consistent with 
the results published in the previous report.
Under RCP8.5 (or a 4°C world), the annual frequency of warm 
nights beyond the 90th percentile increases to between 50–95 per-
cent, depending on region, by the end of the century (Sillmann 
and Kharin 2013a). Under RCP2.6 (or a 2°C world), the frequency 
of warm nights remains limited to between 20–60 percent, with 
the highest increases in tropical South East Asia and the Amazon 
region (Sillmann and Kharin 2013a). Extremes, expressed as an 
exceedance of a particular percentile threshold derived from natural 
variability in the base period, show the highest increase in tropical 
regions, where interannual temperature variability is relatively 
small. Under RCP8.5, the duration of warm spells, deﬁned as the 
number of consecutive days beyond the 90th percentile (Sillmann 
and Kharin 2013b), increases in tropical regions to more than 300, 
occurring essentially year round (Sillmann and Kharin 2013a).
Precipitation Projections
On a global scale, warming of the lower atmosphere strengthens 
the hydrological cycle, mainly because warmer air can hold more 
water vapor (Coumou and Rahmstorf 2012). This strengthening 
causes dry regions to become drier and wet regions to become 
wetter (Trenberth 2010). There are other important mechanisms, 
however, such as changes in circulation patterns and aerosol forc-
ing, which may lead to strong deviations from this general picture. 
Increased atmospheric water vapor can also amplify extreme 
precipitation (Sillmann and Kharin 2013a).
Although modest improvements have been reported in the pre-
cipitation patterns simulated by the state-of-the-art CMIP5 models 
(Kelley, Ting, Seager, and Kushnir 2012; Jia & DelSole 2012; Zhang 
and Jin 2012) as compared to the previous generation (CMIP3), 
substantial uncertainty remains. This report therefore only pro-
vides changes in precipitation patterns on annual and seasonal 
timescales. The ISI-MIP models used were bias-corrected such 
that they reproduce the observed historical mean and variation in 
precipitation. The projections might therefore also provide more 
robust and consistent trends on regional scales.
The expected change in annual mean precipitation by 2071–
99 relative to 1951–80 is shown in Figure 2.8 for RCP2.6 (a 2°C 
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world) and RCP8.5 (a 4°C world). Across the globe, most dry areas 
get drier and most wet areas get wetter. The patterns of change in 
precipitation are geographically similar under the low and high 
emissions scenarios, but the magnitude is much larger in the lat-
ter. Under the weak climatic forcing in a 2°C world, precipitation 
changes are relatively small compared to natural variability, and 
the models disagree in the direction of change over extended 
regions. As the climatic signal in a 4°C world becomes stronger, 
the models converge in their predictions showing much less 
inter-model disagreement in the direction of change. Uncertainty 
remains mostly in those regions at the boundary between areas 
getting wetter and areas getting drier in the multi-model mean.
There are important exceptions to the dry-get-drier and wet-
get-wetter patterns. Firstly, arid regions in the southern Sahara 
and in eastern China are expected to see more rainfall. Although 
the percentage change can be greater than 50 percent, absolute 
changes are still very small because of the current exceptionally 
dry conditions in these regions. Secondly, in the eastern part of the 
Amazon tropical rainforest, annual rainfall is likely to decrease. A 
clearly highly impacted region is the Mediterranean/North African 
region, which is expected to see up to 50 percent less annual rainfall 
under the high-emission scenario associated with a 4°C world.
In some regions, changes in extreme precipitation are expected 
to be more relevant from the point of view of impact than changes 
in the annual mean. Inter-model disagreement, however, tends to 
be larger for more extreme precipitation events, limiting robust 
projections (Sillmann and Kharin 2013b). Still on a global scale, 
total wet day precipitation and maximum ﬁve-day precipitation 
are robustly projected to increase by 10 percent and 20 percent, 
respectively, under RCP8.5 (Sillmann and Kharin 2013a). Region-
ally, the number of consecutive dry days is expected to increase in 
subtropical regions and decrease in tropical and near-arctic regions 
(Sillmann and Kharin 2013a). In agreement with Figures 2.6 and 2.8, 
extreme indices for both temperature and precipitation (notably 
consecutive dry days) stand out in the Mediterranean, indicating 
a strong intensiﬁcation of heat and water stress.
Sea-level Rise
Projecting sea-level rise as a consequence of climate change is 
a highly difﬁcult, complex, and controversial scientiﬁc problem, 
as was discussed in the previous report. This section focuses on 
brieﬂy recapping projections at a global level and providing an 
update on new ﬁndings, thus providing the global context for the 
regional sea-level rise projections in Chapters 3–5.
Process-based approaches dominate sea-level rise projections. 
They refer to the use of numeric models that represent the physical 
processes at play, such as the CMIP5 models discussed in Chapter 
2 on “Patterns of Climate Change” that form the basis for much of 
the work on projected climate impacts presented in this report. Key 
contributions of observed and future sea-level rise are the thermal 
expansion of the ocean and the melting of mountain glaciers ice 
caps, and the large ice sheets of Greenland and Antarctica. In the 
case of the Greenland and Antarctic ice sheets, uncertainties in the 
scientiﬁc understanding of the response to global warming lead to 
less conﬁdence in the application of ice-sheet models to sea-level 
rise projections for the current century (e.g., Rahmstorf 2007).
A second approach to projecting global sea-level rise is to take 
into account the observed relationship between past sea-level rise 
and global mean temperature over the past millennium to project 
future sea-level rise (Kemp et al. 2011; Schaeffer et al. 2012). This 
“semi-empirical” approach generally leads to higher projections, 
with median sea-level rise by 2081–2100 of 100 cm for RCP8.5, 
with a 66 percent uncertainty range of 81–118 cm and a 90 per-
cent range of 70–130 cm. The low-carbon pathway RCP2.6 leads 
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to 67 cm of SLR by that time, with a 66 percent range of 57–77 cm 
and a 90 percent range of 54–98 cm. According to this analysis, 
a 50 cm sea-level rise by the 2050s may be locked in whatever 
action is taken now; limiting warming to 2°C may limit sea-level 
rise to about 70 cm by 2100, but in a 4°C world over 100cm can 
be expected, with the sea-level rise in the tropics 10–15 percent 
higher than the global average. All three regions studied here have 
extensive coastlines within the tropics with high concentrations 
of vulnerability.
Although semi-empirical approaches have their own limitations 
and challenges (for example, Lowe and Gregory 2010; Rahmstorf 
et al. 2012), in this report these higher projections were adopted 
as the default, noting that uncertainties are large and this report 
primarily looks at the literature from a risk perspective.
Most impacts studies looking at sea-level rise focus on the 
level reached by a certain time. The rate of sea-level rise is another 
key indicator for risk, as well as for the long-term resilience of 
ecosystems and small-island developing states (Figure 2.9). The 
difference between high- and low-emissions scenarios is especially 
large for this indicator by 2100 compared to sea-level rise per se.16
As explained in the previous report, sea-level rises unevenly 
across the globe. A clear feature of regional projections (see 
Figure 2.10) is the relatively high sea-level rise at low latitudes (in 
the tropics) and below-average sea-level rise at higher latitudes 
(Perrette, Landerer, Riva, Frieler, and Meinshausen 2013). This is 
primarily because of the polar location of ice masses, the gravi-
tational pull of which decreases because of the gradual melting 
process and accentuates the rise in the tropics, far away from the 
ice sheets. Close to the main ice-melt sources (Greenland, Arctic 
Canada, Alaska, Patagonia, and Antarctica), crustal uplift and 
reduced attraction cause a below-average rise, and even a sea-level 
fall in the very near-ﬁeld of a mass source.
Ocean dynamics, such as ocean currents and wind patterns, 
shape the pattern of projected sea level. In particular, an above-
average contribution from ocean dynamics is projected along the 
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16 In addition, a high rate of sea-level rise by 2100 will set the stage for several 
centuries of further sea-level rise, given the slow response of oceans and ice sheets, 
amounting to multiple meters of SLR for the highest scenarios. Indeed, even in the 
low Decline to 1.5°C scenario extended model runs (not shown) analogous to those 
in Schaeffer et al. (2013) show that even with emissions ﬁxed at year-2100 levels, 
the rate of SLR is projected to drop well below present-day observed rates by 2300, 
but not yet to zero.
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northeastern North American and eastern Asian coasts, as well as 
in the Indian Ocean. On the northeastern North American coast, 
gravitational forces counteract dynamic effects because of the 
nearby location of Greenland. Along the eastern Asian coast and 
in the Indian Ocean, which are far from melting glaciers, both 
gravitational forces and ocean dynamics act to enhance sea-level 
rise, which can be up to 20 percent higher than the global mean. 
Highlighting the coastlines, Figure 2.11 shows sea-level rise along 
a latitudinal gradient, with speciﬁed locations relevant for the 
regional climate impacts sections presented later.
Other local circumstances can modify the regional pattern 
signiﬁcantly through local vertical movement of land caused 
by natural factors, such as the post-glacial rebound of land still 
underway at high latitudes; anthropogenic inﬂuences other than 
climate change, such as compaction of soil following extraction 
of natural resources or large-scale infrastructure development, 
can also modify the regional pattern It is beyond the scope of this 
report to explore such particular local circumstances.
Ocean Warming and Acidiﬁcation
The world’s oceans are expected to see further changes related 
to climate change. The previous report presented projections of 
ocean acidiﬁcation, which occurs when the oceans absorb CO2 as 
atmospheric concentrations: The scenarios of 4°C warming or 
more by 2100 correspond to a carbon dioxide concentration of 
above 800 ppm and lead to a further decrease of pH by another 0.3, 
equivalent to a 150-percent acidity increase since pre-industrial 
levels. The degree and rate of observed ocean acidiﬁcation due to 
anthropogenic CO2 emissions appears to be greater than during any 
of the ocean acidiﬁcation events identiﬁed in the geological past 
and is expected to have wide-ranging and adverse consequences 
for coral reefs and marine production. Some of the impacts of 
ocean acidiﬁcation are presented in Chapter 4 under “Impacts on 
Agricultural and Aquaculture Production in Deltaic and Coastal 
Regions”.
The world s´ oceans have, in addition, been taking up approxi-
mately 93 percent of the additional heat caused by anthropogenic 
climate change (Levitus et al. 2012). This has been observed for 
depths up to 2,000 meters. Since the late 1990s, the contribu-
tion of waters below 700 meters increases and the overall heat 
uptake has been reported to have been higher during the last 
decade (1.19 ± 0.11 W m–2) than the preceding record (Bal-
maseda, Trenberth, and Källén 2013). Ocean warming exerts a 
large inﬂuence on the continents: 80 to 90 percent of warming 
over land has been estimated to be indirectly driven by ocean 
warming (Dommenget 2009). This implies a time lag and com-
mitment to further global warming following even large emission 
decreases. Furthermore, recent research suggests that warming 
further enhances the negative effect of acidiﬁcation on growth, 
development, and survival across many different calcifying 
species (Kroeker et al. 2013).
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Sub-Saharan Africa is a rapidly developing region of over 800 mil-
lion people, with 49 countries17, and great ecological, climatic, 
and cultural diversity. By 2050, its population is projected to 
approach 1.5–1.9 billion people. With a 4°C global warming by 
the end of the century, sea level is projected to rise up to 100 cm, 
droughts are expected to become increasingly likely in central and 
southern Africa, and never-before-experienced heat extremes are 
projected to affect increasing proportions of the region. Projections 
also show an increased likelihood of increased annual precipitation 
in the Horn of Africa and parts of East Africa that is likely to be 
concentrated in bursts and, thereby, increase the risk of ﬂooding. 
Increased atmospheric concentrations of CO
2 are likely to facilitate 
a shift from grass to woodland savanna and thereby negatively 
impact pastoral livelihoods if grass-based forage is reduced. Climate 
change is expected to have adverse impacts and pose severe risks, 
particularly on agricultural crop production, pastoral and livestock 
systems, and capture ﬁsheries. It may also signiﬁcantly increase 
the challenges of ensuring food security and eradicating poverty.
Sub-Saharan Africa is particularly vulnerable to impacts on 
agriculture. Most of the region´s agricultural crop production is 
rainfed and therefore highly susceptible to shifts in precipitation 
and temperature. A net expansion of the overall area classiﬁed as 
arid or hyper-arid is projected for the region as a whole, with likely 
adverse consequences for crop and livestock production. Since 
the 1950s, much of the region has experienced increased drought 
and the population´s vulnerability is high: The 2011 drought in 
the Horn of Africa, for example, affected 13 million people and 
led to extremely high rates of malnutrition, particularly among 
children. Under future climate change, droughts are projected to 
become increasingly likely in central and southern Africa, with 
a 40-percent decrease in precipitation in southern Africa if global 
temperatures reach 4°C above pre-industrial levels by the 2080s 
(2071–2099 relative to 1951–1980).
17 This report deﬁnes Sub-Saharan Africa as the region south of the Sahara. For 
the projections on changes in temperature, precipitation, aridity, heat extremes, and 
sea-level rise, the area corresponds broadly to regions 15, 16, and 17 in the IPCC´s 
special report on Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance 
Climate Change Adaptation (SREX).
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Pastoral systems are also at risk from climate impacts, as 
livestock is affected by extreme heat, water stress, an increased 
prevalence of diseases, and reduced fodder availability. Marine 
ﬁsh stocks migrate toward higher latitudes as waters warm and 
potential catches may be diminished locally, adding to the already 
large pressure placed on ecosystems by overﬁshing.
Heat extremes are projected to affect increasing proportions 
of the region, with adverse consequences for food production sys-
tems, ecosystems and human health. Direct and indirect impacts 
on human health are also expected, and an acceleration of the 
urbanization trend in response to additional pressures caused by 
climate change is likely to compound vulnerability.
Current Climate Trends and Projected 
Climate Change to 2100
Climate change exerts pressure on ecosystems and key sectors in 
Sub-Saharan Africa, with repercussions for the human populations 
dependent on them.
Rainfall
In terms of precipitation, the region is characterized by signiﬁcant 
inter-annual and inter-decadal variability, and long-term trends are 
uncertain and inconsistent on the sub-regional scale: For example, 
while West Africa has experienced declines in mean annual 
precipitation over the past century, an increase in the Sahel has 
been observed over the last decade. In southern Africa and the 
tropical rainforest zone, no long-term trend has been observed. 
Inter-annual variability has increased, however, with more intense 
droughts and rainfall events reported in parts of southern Africa. 
Eastern Africa has seen increasing rainfall in some parts over the 
past decades, which is a reversal of a drying trend over most parts 
of the region during the past century.
Under 2°C warming, the existing differences in water availability 
across the region are likely to become more pronounced. For example, 
average annual rainfall is projected to increase mainly in the Horn 
of Africa (with both positive and negative impacts), while parts of 
Southern and West Africa may see decreases in rainfall and ground-
water recharge rates of 50–70 percent. Under 4°C warming, annual 
precipitation in Southern Africa may decrease by up to 30 percent, 
while East Africa is projected by many models to be wetter than 
today, leading to an overall decrease in the risk of drought. Some 
important caveats are in order however, on precipitation projec-
tions. First, there is a signiﬁcant degree of uncertainty, particularly 
for east and west Africa. Second, even if, on an annual average, 
precipitation does increase, it is likely to be concentrated in bursts 
rather than evenly distributed over the year.18 In addition, droughts 
are projected to become increasingly likely over southern and cen-
tral Africa. A “likely” event is deﬁned as a >66 percent chance of 
occurring, using the modeling approaches adopted in this report.
Temperature
Since the 1960s, measurements show that there has been a warm-
ing trend that has continued to the present, with an increase in 
the number of warm spells over southern and western Africa. 
Recent work has found a detectable human-induced warming 
over Africa as a whole, with warm extremes in South Africa 
since 1961. A summer warming trend is projected to be mostly 
uniformly distributed throughout the region. In a 4°C world and 
relative to a 30-year baseline period (1951–80), monthly summer 
temperature increases over Sub-Saharan Africa are projected to 
reach 5°C above the baseline temperature by 2100. In a 2°C world, 
increases in African summer temperatures are projected to peak 
at about 1.5°C above the baseline temperature by 2050.
As global mean temperatures rise, unusual and unprecedented 
heat extremes19 are projected to occur with greater frequency dur-
ing summer months. By the time global warming reaches 1.5°C 
in the 2030s, heat extremes that are unusual or virtually absent 
today are projected to cover over one-ﬁfth of land areas in the 
Southern Hemisphere summer months. Unprecedented monthly 
heat extremes, could cover up to 5 percent of land areas in this 
timeframe. Under 2°C warming, monthly heat extremes that 
are unusual or virtually absent in today´s regional climate are 
projected to cover nearly 45 percent of land areas by the 2050s, 
and unprecedented heat extremes are expected to cover up 
to 15 percent of land area in the summer. With global warming 
reaching about 4°C by the end of the century, unusual summer-
time heat extremes are projected to cover most of the land areas 
(85 percent), with unprecedented heat extremes covering more 
than 50 percent.
18 Uncertainty is particularly large for East Africa due to concerns about whether 
the GCM models adequately capture the dynamics of the rainy seasons in that region 
and because higher resolution regional climate models do not seem to reproduce, 
but rather contradict, the increase in precipitation seen in the projections of most 
global models. Drought risk results from periods of anomalously low precipitation 
or high warming or both, but this risk is also inﬂuenced by other climate variables 
like wind speed and incoming radiation. Climate-model projections of warming 
generally have lower uncertainty, while uncertainties in precipitation projections 
differ between regions. Uncertainties in drought projections are smallest for Southern 
Africa (primarily driven by warming), somewhat larger for Central Africa (because 
of smaller signals of change), and largest for West Africa (for which there is large 
disagreement across models on precipitation changes, both in sign and in amplitude).
19 In this report, unusual and unprecedented heat extremes are deﬁned using thresholds 
based on the historical variability of the current local climate. The absolute level of 
the threshold thus depends on the natural year-to-year variability in the base period 
(1951–1980), which is captured by the standard deviation (sigma). Unusual heat 
extremes are deﬁned as 3-sigma events. For a normal distribution, 3-sigma events 
have a return time of 740 years. The 2012 U.S. heat wave and the 2010 Russian heat 
wave classify as 3-sigma events. Unprecedented heat extremes are deﬁned as 5-sigma 
events. They have a return time of several million years. Monthly temperature data 
do not necessarily follow a normal distribution (for example, the distribution can 
have “long” tails, making warm events more likely) and the return times can be dif-
ferent from the ones expected in a normal distribution. Nevertheless, 3-sigma events 
are extremely unlikely and 5-sigma events have almost certainly never occurred.
????????????????????????????????????????????
??
Likely Physical and Biophysical Impacts of Projected 
Climate Change
The projected changes in rainfall, temperature, and extreme event 
frequency and/or intensity will have both direct and indirect 
impacts on sea-level rise, aridity, crop yields, and agro-pastoral 
systems that would affect populations.
Projected Aridity Trends
Patterns of aridity20 are projected to shift and expand within the 
total area classiﬁed as such due to changes in temperature and 
precipitation. Arid regions are projected to spread, most notably in 
Southern Africa but also in parts of West Africa. Total hyper-arid 
and arid areas are projected to expand by 10 percent compared 
to the 1986–2005 period. Where aridity increases, crop yields are 
likely to decline as the growing season shortens. Decreased aridity 
is projected in East Africa; the change in area, however, does not 
compensate for increases elsewhere.
Sea-level Rise
Sea level is projected to rise more than the global average in the 
tropics and sub-tropics. Under a warming of 1.5°C, sea-level is 
projected to rise by 50 cm along Sub-Saharan Africa’s tropical 
coasts by 2060, with further rises possible under high-end projec-
tions. In the 2°C warming scenario, sea-level rise is projected to 
reach 70 cm by the 2080s, with levels higher toward the south. 
The 4°C warming scenario is projected to result in a rise of 100 cm 
of sea-level by the 2090s. The difference in rate and magnitude of 
sea-level rise between the 4°C warming scenario and the 2°C warm-
ing scenario by 2100 becomes pronounced due to the continuing 
rate of sea-level rise in the higher warming scenario relative to the 
stabilized level under 2°C. The projected sea-level under 4°C would 
increase the share of the population at risk of ﬂooding in Guinea-
Bissau and Mozambique to around 15 percent by 2100, compared 
to around 10 percent in projections without sea-level rise; in The 
Gambia, the share of the population at risk of ﬂooding would increase 
many fold to 10 percent of the population by 2070.
Sector-based and Thematic Impacts
Ecosystems
Savanna grasslands may be reduced in area, with potential impacts 
on livelihoods and pastoral systems. By the time 3°C global warm-
ing is reached, savannas are projected to decrease from about a 
quarter at present to approximately one-seventh of total land area, 
reducing the availability of food for grazing animals. Both changes 
in climatic conditions and increasing atmospheric CO2 concentration 
are projected to play a role in bringing about regime shifts in African 
ecosystems, thereby altering the composition of species. Due to 
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20 Aridity is characterized by a structural precipitation deﬁcit-meaning a lack of 
necessary rainfall amounts for vegetation and/or crop growth-and is potentially driven 
by a positive feedback mechanism. In regions where the soil dries out due to a lack 
of precipitation, no more heat can be converted into latent heat and all heat results 
in increased surface temperatures. This additional heating of the land increases 
evaporative demand of crops and ampliﬁes the precipitation deﬁcit.
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21 The range is given across the following crops: millet, sorghum, wheat, cassava, 
and groundnuts.
CO2 fertilization, trees may be able to outcompete shade-intolerant 
grasses in savannas, leading to a reduction in grassland area and 
declines in food availability for livestock and other animals. It is not 
yet clear if the negative effects of increased drought on trees in the 
region would limit such forest expansion. In response to changes 
in temperature and rainfall variability, a 20-percent decline in tree 
density in the western Sahel has been observed since the 1950s.
Agricultural Production
Several lines of evidence indicate a likely substantial risk to crop 
yields and food production adversely affecting food security 
by 1.5–2°C warming, with growing risks at higher levels of warming.
?? High temperature sensitivity thresholds for some important 
crops, such as maize, wheat, and sorghum, have been observed, 
with large yield reductions once the threshold is exceeded. 
For example, the photosynthesis rate (key factor in growth 
and yield) of crops such as wheat and rice is at a maximum 
for temperatures from about 20–32°C. The IPCC AR4 report 
(IPCC 2007) stated that even moderate increases (1–2°C) are 
likely to have a negative effect on yields for major cereals like 
wheat, maize, and rice; further warming will have increasingly 
negative effects, showing decreases in wheat yield in low 
latitude regions of approximately 50 percent for an increase 
in mean local temperature of about 5°C. As these temperature 
thresholds are exceeded more frequently with 2°C and 4°C 
warming, signiﬁcant production shocks are likely.
?? Loss or change of suitable areas. A 1.5°–2°C warming by 
the 2030s–2040s could lead to about 40–80 percent reductions 
in present maize, millet, and sorghum cropping areas for cur-
rent cultivars. By 3°C warming, this reduction could grow to 
more than 90 percent.
?? Signiﬁcant yield decreases are expected in the near term 
under relatively modest levels of warming. Under 1.5–2°C 
warming, median yield losses of around 5 percent are pro-
jected, increasing to median estimates of around –15 percent 
(range –5 percent to –27 percent for 2–2.5°C warming).21 
Under 3–4°C warming there are indications that yields may 
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decrease by around 15–20 percent across all crops and regions, 
although the availability of studies estimating potential yield 
impacts is limited.
?? Per capita crop production at warming of about 1.8°C (by 
the 2050s) is projected to be reduced by 10 percent compared 
to a case without climate change. With larger yield reductions 
projected for higher levels of warming, this risk could grow; 
however, this has yet to be quantiﬁed. Livestock production 
is also expected to suffer due to climate impacts on forage 
availability and heat stress.
?? Diversiﬁcation options for agro-pastoral systems (e.g., switch-
ing to silvopastoral systems, irrigated forage production, and 
mixed crop-livestock systems) are likely to dwindle as climate 
change reduces the carrying capacity of the land and livestock 
productivity. The livestock sector has been vulnerable to drought 
in the past. For example, pastoralists in southern Ethiopia lost 
nearly 50 percent of their cattle and about 40 percent of their 
sheep and goats to droughts between 1995–97.
?? The CO2 fertilization effect remains uncertain. A strong positive 
response of crops to increasing atmospheric CO2 concentra-
tions would help to dampen the impacts related to changes 
in temperature and precipitation. However, important crops, 
including maize, sorghum, and pearl millet—among the domi-
nant crops in Africa—are not very sensitive to atmospheric 
CO2 concentrations. Furthermore, the magnitude of these effects 
remains uncertain when compared with the results from the 
free-air CO2 enrichment (FACE)
22 experiments, because the 
fertilization effects used in various models appear to be over-
estimated. Under sustained CO2 fertilization, the nutritional 
value of grain per unit of mass has been observed to decrease.
Fisheries
Livelihoods dependent on ﬁsheries and other ecosystem services 
are projected to be threatened in some regions, with critical species 
possibly ceasing to be locally available. Potential ﬁsh catches off 
the coast of West Africa, where ﬁsh accounts for as much as 50 per-
cent of the animal protein consumed, is likely to be reduced by 
as much as 50 percent by the 2050s (compared to 2000 levels). 
In other regions, such as the eastern and southeastern coasts of 
Sub-Saharan Africa, yield potential has been projected to increase.
Health
Malnutrition can have major secondary health implications by 
causing childhood stunting or by increasing susceptibility to 
other diseases. Under warming of 1.2–1.9°C, undernourishment 
levels are expected to be in the range of 15–65 percent, depend-
ing on the sub-region, due to crop yield and nutritional quality 
declines. Moderate stunting of children under age ﬁve is expected 
to occur at a rate of 16–22 percent, and severe stunting at a rate 
of 12–20 percent. Without climate change, however, moderate 
stunting rates are projected to remain close to present levels 
(21–30 percent across the region), and severe stunting is projected 
to decrease by 40 percent.
Integrated Synthesis of Climate Change 
Impacts in Sub-Saharan Africa
Sub-Saharan Africa is confronted with a range of climate risks that 
could have far-reaching repercussions for the region´s societies 
and economies. Even in a situation in which warming is limited 
below 2°C, there are very substantial risks that would continue 
to grow as warming approaches 4°C.
Climate Change Projected to Increase Poverty and 
Risks from Disease
Poverty in the region may grow even further due to climate impacts, 
as poor households with climate sensitive sources of income are 
often disproportionately affected by climate change and large parts 
of the population still depend on the agricultural sector as their 
primary source of food security and income. Below 2°C warming, 
large regional risks to food production and security emerge; these 
risks would become stronger if adaptation measures were inad-
equate and the CO2 fertilization effect is weak. Poverty has been 
estimated to increase by up to one percent following severe food 
production shocks in Malawi, Uganda, and Zambia. As warming 
approaches 4°C, the impacts across sectors increase.
Malnutrition as a consequence of impacts on food production further 
increases susceptibility to diseases, compounding the overall health 
risks in the region. Childhood stunting resulting from malnutrition 
is associated with reductions in both cognitive ability and school 
performance. Projected crop yield losses and adverse effects on 
food production that result in lower real incomes would exacerbate 
poor health conditions and malnutrition; with malaria and other 
diseases expected to worsen under climate change, adverse effects 
on childhood educational performance may be expected.
The diseases that pose a threat in Sub-Saharan Africa as a conse-
quence of climate change include vector- and water-borne diseases 
such as malaria, Rift Valley fever, and cholera. The risk of these 
diseases is expected to rise as changes in temperature and precipita-
tion patterns increase the extent of areas with conditions conducive 
to vectors and pathogens. Other impacts expected to accompany 
climate change include mortality and morbidity due to such extreme 
events as ﬂooding and more intense and hotter heat waves.
22 FACE experiments measure the effect of elevated CO2 concentrations in the open 
air, thereby excluding factors in a traditional laboratory setting that may inﬂuence 
experimental results.
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Climate Change Expected to Challenge Urban 
Development, Infrastructure, and Education
The existing urbanization trend in Sub-Saharan Africa could be 
accelerated by the stresses that climate change is expected to place 
on rural populations. These pressures are expected to arise partly 
through impacts on agricultural production, which currently provides 
livelihoods to 60 percent of the labor force in the region. Migration 
to urban areas may provide new livelihood opportunities, but it 
also exposes migrants to new risks. Conditions that characterize 
poor urban areas, including overcrowding and inadequate access 
to water, drainage, and sanitation facilities, aid the transmission 
of vector- and water-borne diseases. As many cities are located 
in coastal areas, they are exposed to coastal ﬂooding because of 
sea-level rise. The poorest urban dwellers tend to be located in 
vulnerable areas, such as ﬂoodplains and steep slopes, further plac-
ing them at risk of extreme weather events. Impacts occurring even 
far-removed from urban areas can be felt in these communities. 
For example, food price increases following agricultural produc-
tion shocks have the most damaging consequences within cities.
Impacts on infrastructure caused by sea-level rise can have 
effects on human and economic development, including impacts 
on human health, port infrastructure, and tourism. For example, 
ﬂoods in 2009 in the Tana Delta in Kenya cut off medical ser-
vices to approximately 100,000 residents; sea-level rise of 70cm 
by 2070 would cause damages to port infrastructure in Dar es 
Salaam, Tanzania—a hub for international trade—exposing assets 
of US$10 billion, or more than 10 percent of the city’s GDP (Kebede 
and Nicholls 2011). Such damage to the Dar es Salaam port would 
have would have larger economic consequences since it serves as 
the seaport for several of its landlocked neighbours.
There are indications that climate change could impact the 
ability to meet the educational needs of children in particularly 
vulnerable regions. Projected crop yield losses and adverse effects 
on food production would exacerbate poor health conditions and 
malnutrition; with malaria and other diseases expected to worsen 
under climate change, adverse effects on childhood educational 
performance may be expected. Childhood stunting resulting from 
malnutrition is associated with reduced cognitive ability and school 
performance. The projected increase in extreme monthly tempera-
tures within the next few decades may also have an adverse effect 
on learning conditions for students and teachers.
Overall, populations in Sub-Saharan Africa are expected to 
face mounting pressures on food production systems and risks 
associated with rising temperature and heat extremes, drought, 
changing precipitation patterns, sea-level rise, and other extreme 
events. Health impacts are likely to increase and be exacerbated 
by high rates of malnutrition, with possible far-reaching and 
long-term consequences for human development. Signiﬁcant 
crop yield reductions at warming levels as low as 2°C warming 
are expected to have strong repercussions on food security for 
vulnerable populations, including in many growing urban areas. 
These and other impacts on infrastructure, in combination, may 
negatively impact economic growth and poverty reduction in 
the region. A warming of 4°C is projected to bring large reduc-
tions in crop yield, with highly adverse effects on food security, 
major increases in drought severity and heat extremes, reduc-
tions in water availability, and disruption and transformation of 
important ecosystems. These impacts may cause large adverse 
consequences for human populations and livelihoods and are 
likely to be highly deleterious to the development of the region.
Introduction
This report deﬁnes Sub-Saharan Africa as the region south of the 
Sahara. For the projections on changes in temperature, precipita-
tion, aridity, heat extremes, and sea-level rise, the area corresponds 
broadly to regions 15, 16, and 17 in the IPCC´s special report on 
Managing the Risks of Extreme Events and Disasters to Advance 
Climate Change Adaptation (SREX).
The region´s development prospects have been improving as it 
has experienced above-average growth. The picture that emerges 
from the scientiﬁc evidence of climate impacts, however, is that 
global warming poses escalating risks which could undermine 
promising trends, even at relatively low levels of warming.
The most prominent physical risk factors identiﬁed for the 
region are:
?? Increases in temperatures and extremes of heat
?? Adverse changes to precipitation patterns in some regions
?? Increased incidences of extreme weather events
?? Sea-level rise
?? Increased aridity
This analysis reviews these physical impacts23 and their effects 
on speciﬁc sectors, including agriculture, water resources, and 
human health.24
Sub-Saharan Africa is characterized by a large diversity of 
cultural, social, and economic conditions. This diversity shapes 
23 Not all physical risks are covered in this section; tropical cyclones, for example, 
are dealt with in the South East Asia section.
24 This section does not cover all sectors affected by climate change. Risks to the 
energy sector, for example, are dealt with in the South Asian section.
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the vulnerability of populations to these physical impacts. A num-
ber of geographic factors also inﬂuence the nature and extent of 
the physical impacts of climate change. For example, more than 
one in ﬁve people in Sub-Saharan Africa live on degraded land, 
which is more prone to losses in agricultural production and 
water availability.
The focus of this regional analysis is on food production systems. 
The IPCC AR4 in 2007 found that Africa is particularly vulnerable 
to the impacts of climate change, with a substantial risk that agri-
cultural production and access to food in many African countries 
could be severely compromised—which could adversely affect 
food security and malnutrition. Recent literature on agriculture 
and ecosystems conﬁrms this ﬁnding, and is presented in Chapter 
3, under “Projected Ecosystem Changes” and “Human Impacts.”
Regional Patterns of Climate Change
A warming trend since the  1960s to the present has been 
observed in Sub-Saharan Africa (Blunden & Arndt, 2012). 
Between 1961 and 2000, for example, there was an increase in 
the number of warm spells over southern and western Africa. 
More recent work ﬁnds a detectable human-induced warming 
over Africa as a whole, with warm extremes in South Africa 
since 1961(Knutson, Zeng, and Wittenberg 2013). In terms of 
precipitation, the region is characterized by signiﬁcant inter-annual 
and inter-decadal variability, but trends are inconsistent on the 
sub-regional scale: West Africa and the tropical rainforest zone 
have experienced declines in mean annual precipitation while 
no long-term trend has been observed in southern Africa even 
though inter-annual variability has increased with more intense 
droughts and rainfall events have been reported. Eastern Africa, 
meanwhile, has seen increasing rainfall in the northern part of 
the region and decreasing rainfall in the southern part.
In the IPCC AR4, Giannini, Biasutti, Held, and Sobel (2008) 
analyze temperature and precipitation changes in the CMIP3 cli-
mate model ensemble under the SRES AIB scenario relative to 
pre-industrial levels. Two continental-scale patterns dominate 
African climate variability: (1) a drying pattern related to ocean 
warming and enhanced warming of the southern tropics compared 
to the northern tropics, and (2) the effects of the El Niño Southern 
Oscillation (ENSO), which is more dominant in East Africa and 
South Africa (Giannini, Biasutti, Held, and Sobel 2008).
The CMIP3 model-spread is considerable, however, with 
uncertainty even in the direction of change for precipitation in 
some regions. For eastern tropical Africa and southern Africa, 
there is generally stronger consensus between models than for 
western Africa. A clear percentage-increase in rainfall is projected 
in eastern tropical Africa and a smaller percentage-decrease is 
projected in southern Africa.
Box 3.1 Observed Vulnerability
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Some modest improvements in representing precipitation pat-
terns by CMIP5 models have been reported, though not speciﬁcally 
for Sub-Saharan Africa (Kelley et al. 2012; Li, Waliser, Chen, and 
Guan 2012; Zhang and Jin 2012). Uncertainty in future precipitation 
projections remains large. Moreover, recent decadal ﬂuctuations in 
Africa´s climate, especially droughts in the Sahel region, have been 
notoriously hard to reproduce in coupled climate models (Giannini, 
Biasutti, Held, and Sobel 2008; Mohino, Janicot, and Bader 2010). 
The analyses presented here are based on ISI-MIP models, which 
are bias-corrected to reproduce the observed historical mean and 
variation in both temperature and precipitation. This way, future 
projections might provide more robust and consistent trends. 
Nevertheless, given the uncertainty in the underlying climate 
models, only large-scale changes in precipitation patterns over 
those regions where the models agree can be considered robust. 
Warming patterns, however, are much more robust.
Projected Temperature Changes
The projected austral summer (December, January, and February, 
or DJF) warming of the Sub-Saharan land mass for low- and high-
emission scenarios is shown in Figure 3.2. Warming is slightly 
less strong than for that of the global land area, which is a general 
feature of the Southern Hemisphere (see Figure 2.7). In a 2°C 
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world, African summer temperatures peak by 2050 at about 1.5°C 
above the 1951–80 baseline and remain at this level until the end 
of the century. In a 4°C world, warming continues to increase 
until the end of the century, with monthly summer temperatures 
over Sub-Saharan Africa reaching 5°C above the 1951–80 baseline 
by 2100. Geographically, this warming is rather uniformly distrib-
uted, although in-land regions in the subtropics warm the most 
(see Figure 3.3). In subtropical southern Africa, the difference in 
warming between RCP2.6 and RCP8.5 is especially large. This is 
likely because of a positive feedback with precipitation: the mod-
els project a large decrease in precipitation here (see Figure 3.6), 
limiting the effectiveness of evaporative cooling of the soil.
The normalized warming (that is, the warming expressed in 
terms of the local year-to-year natural variability) shows a par-
ticularly strong trend in the tropics (Figure 3.3). The normalized 
warming is a useful diagnostic as it indicates how unusual the 
warming is compared to ﬂuctuations experienced in the past. 
The monthly temperature distribution in tropical Africa shifts 
by more than six standard deviations under a high-emission 
scenario (RCP8.5), moving this region to a new climatic regime 
by the end of the 21st century. Under a low-emission scenario 
(RCP2.6), only localized regions in eastern tropical Africa will 
witness substantial normalized warming up to about four stan-
dard deviations.
Projected Changes in Heat Extremes
The frequency of austral summer months (DJF) hotter than 5-sigma, 
characterized by unprecedented temperatures (see the Chapter 2 
on “Projected Temperature Changes”), increases over Sub-Saharan 
Africa under the high-emission scenario (Figure 3.4 and 3.5). 
By 2100, the multi-model mean of RCP8.5 projects that 75 percent 
of summer months would be hotter than 5-sigma (Figure 3.5) and 
substantially higher than the global average (see Chapter 2 on 
“Projected Changes in Heat Extremes”). The model uncertainty 
in the exact timing of the increase in frequency of extremely hot 
months is larger for Sub-Saharan Africa compared to the global 
mean uncertainty as averaging is performed over a smaller surface 
area. During the 2071–99 period, more than half (~60 percent) of 
Sub-Saharan African summer months are projected to be hotter 
than 5-sigma, with tropical West Africa in particular being highly 
impacted (~90 percent). Over this period, almost all summer 
months across Sub-Saharan Africa will be hotter than 3-sigma, 
with temperatures considered unusual or virtually absent in today’s 
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climate (Figure 3.4). Under RCP8.5, all African regions, especially 
the tropics, would migrate to a new climatic regime. The precise 
timing of this shift depends on the exact regional deﬁnition and 
the model used.
Under the low-emission scenario, the bulk of the high-impact 
heat extremes expected in Sub-Saharan Africa under RCP8.5 would 
be avoided. Extremes beyond 5-sigma are projected to cover a minor, 
although non-negligible, share of the surface land area (~5 per-
cent), concentrated over western tropical Africa (Figure 3.4). Over 
most subtropical regions, 5-sigma events would still be rare. In 
contrast, the less extreme months, beyond 3-sigma, would increase 
substantially to about 30 percent of the Sub-Saharan land area 
(Figure 3.5). Thus, even under a low-emission scenario, a sub-
stantial increase in heat extremes in the near term is anticipated.
Consistent with these ﬁndings, CMIP5 models project that 
the frequency of warm nights (beyond the 90th percentile) and 
the duration of warm spells increases most in tropical Africa 
(Sillmann and Kharin 2013a). Under RCP8.5, by the end of the 
century warm nights are expected to occur about 95 percent of 
the time in tropical west and east Africa and about 85 percent of 
the time in southern Africa, with only limited inter-model spread. 
Limiting greenhouse gas emissions to a RCP2.6 scenario reduces 
these numbers to ~50 percent and ~30 percent respectively.
Precipitation Projections
Consistent with CMIP3 projections (Giannini, Biasutti, Held, and 
Sobel 2008a), the ISI-MIP models’ projected change in annual 
mean precipitation shows a clear pattern of tropical East Africa 
(Horn of Africa) getting wetter and southern Africa getting drier. 
Note that for Somalia and eastern Ethiopia the projections show a 
large relative change over a region that is very dry. Western tropi-
cal Africa only shows a weak (<10 percent) increase in annual 
precipitation, although model uncertainty is large and there is 
limited agreement among models on the size of changes. The dipole 
pattern of wetting in tropical East Africa and drying in southern 
Africa is observed in both seasons and in both emission scenarios. 
Under the low-emission scenario, the magnitudes of change are 
smaller, and the models disagree on the direction of change over 
larger areas. Under the high-emission scenario, the magnitude of 
change becomes stronger everywhere and the models converge in 
the direction of change. For this stronger signal of change, model 
disagreement between areas getting wetter and areas getting drier 
(in the multi-model mean) is limited to regions at the boundary 
and some regions in tropical western Africa.
Subtropical southern Africa could see a decrease of annual pre-
cipitation by up to 30 percent, contributing to an increase in aridity 
in this region (see Chapter 3 on “Aridity”), although it must be noted 
that this is a large relative change in a region with very low rainfall.
The wetting of tropical East-Africa occurs predominantly dur-
ing the austral summer (DJF), whereas the drying of southern 
Africa occurs predominantly during the austral winter (JJA), the 
driest season, so that the annual pattern is primarily determined 
by the smaller relative changes during the wetter season (DJF).
However, the agreement between global models on increased 
precipitation in East Africa and the Horn of Africa in particular does 
not necessarily imply high conﬁdence in these results. Although global 
climate models are needed to project interactions between global 
circulation patterns of atmosphere and ocean, regional models offer 
a higher spatial resolution and provide a way to take into account 
complex regional geography and reproduce local climate generally 
better than global models. Regional models use boundary conditions 
prescribed by global models, so that their large-scale forcings, for 
example due to anthropogenic inﬂuences, are consistent with GCMs.
Regional climate models do not reproduce the increase in pre-
cipitation projected by global models for East Africa as a whole. On 
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a sub-regional scale, these models show areas of strongly reduced 
precipitation by mid-century for a roughly 2°C global warming, for 
example in Uganda and Ethiopia (Patricola and Cook 2010; Cook 
and Vizy 2013; Laprise et al. 2013). Cook and Vizy (2012) showed 
how the strong decrease of the long rains in regional climate mod-
els, combined with warming, would lead to a drastically shorter 
growing season in East Africa, partly compensated by a modest 
increase in short-rains season length.
Using global-model projections in precipitation, (Dai, 2012) esti-
mated for a global-mean warming of 3°C by the end of the 21st 
century that drought risk expressed by the Palmer Drought 
Severity Index25 (PDSI) reaches a permanent state of severe to 
extreme droughts in terms of present-day conditions over southern 
Africa, as well as increased drought risk over Central Africa. Dai 
(2012) showed that projected changes in soil-moisture content 
are generally consistent with the pattern of PDSI over Sub-
Saharan Africa. Taylor et al. (2012) conﬁrmed that the projected 
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25 Drought indicators like PDSI include a time-dependent water balance calculation 
that includes monthly precipitation, temperature, wind speed, incoming radiation, 
and takes account of present-day local climate so that drought risk is presented 
relative to existing conditions.
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increased drought risk over southern Africa is consistent across 
other drought indicators, but added West Africa as an area where 
projections consistently show an increased drought risk. However, 
Figure 3.6 shows that precipitation changes are highly uncertain 
in the latter region, which Taylor et al (2012) might not have been 
taken into account fully.
According to Giannini, Biasutti, Held, and Sobel (2008a), the 
uncertainties in western tropical Africa are mainly because of 
competing mechanisms affecting rainfall. On the one hand, the 
onset of convection and subsequent rainfall is mainly affected by 
temperature at the surface and higher levels in the atmosphere. 
On the other hand, the amount of moisture supply is primarily 
affected by changes in atmospheric circulation, which can be 
induced by the temperature contrast between land and ocean. 
The effect of El Niño events mainly act via the ﬁrst mechanism, 
with warming of the whole tropical troposphere stabilizing the 
atmospheric column and thereby inhibiting strong convection 
(Giannini, Biasutti, Held, and Sobel 2008a).
Sillmann and Kharin (2013a) studied precipitation extremes 
for 2081–2100 in the CMIP5 climate model ensemble under the 
low emission high emission scenario. Under the high-emission 
scenario, the total amount of annual precipitation on days with at 
least 1 mm of precipitation (total wet-day precipitation) increases 
in tropical eastern Africa by 5 to 75 percent, with the highest 
increase in the Horn of Africa, although the latter represents 
a strong relative change over a very dry area. In contrast to 
global models, regional climate models project no change, or 
even a drying for East Africa, especially during the long rains. 
Consistently, one recent regional climate model study projects 
an increase in the number of dry days over East Africa (Vizy 
and Cook 2012b). Changes in extreme wet rainfall intensity were 
found to be highly regional and projected to increase over the 
Ethiopian highlands.
Sillmann and Kharin (2013a) further projected changes of +5 to 
–15 percent in total wet-day precipitation for tropical western Africa 
with large uncertainties, especially at the monsoon-dependent 
Guinea coast. Very wet days (that is, the top 5 percent) show 
even stronger increases: by 50 to 100 percent in eastern tropical 
Africa and by 30 to 70 percent in western tropical Africa. Finally in 
southern Africa, total wet day precipitation is projected to decrease 
by 15 to 45 percent, and very-wet day precipitation to increase 
by around 20 to 30 percent over parts of the region. However, 
some localized areas along the west coast of southern Africa are 
expected to see decreases in very wet days (up to 30 percent). 
Here, increases in consecutive dry days coincide with decreases 
in heavy precipitation days and maximum consecutive ﬁve-day 
precipitation, indicating an intensiﬁcation of dry conditions. The 
percentile changes in total wet-day precipitation, as well as in 
very wet days, are much less pronounced in the low emission 
scenario RCP2.6.
Aridity
The availability of water for ecosystems and society is a function of 
both demand and supply. The long-term balance between demand 
and supply is a fundamental determinant of the ecosystems and 
agricultural systems able to thrive in a certain area. This section 
assesses projected changes in Aridity Index (AI), an indicator 
designed for identifying “arid” regions, that is regions with a struc-
tural precipitation deﬁcit (UNEP 1997; Zomer 2008). AI is deﬁned as 
total annual precipitation divided by potential evapotranspiration; 
the latter is a standardized measure of water demand representing 
the amount of water a representative crop type would need over 
a year to grow (see Appendix 2). Potential evapotranspiration is 
to a large extent governed by (changes in) temperature, although 
other meteorological variables play a role as well.
A smaller AI value indicates a larger water deﬁcit (i.e., more 
arid condition), with areas classiﬁed as hyper-arid, arid, semi-
arid, and sub-humid as speciﬁed in Table 3.2. In the absence of 
an increase in rainfall, an increase in potential evapotranspiration 
translates into a lower AI value and a shift toward more structur-
ally arid conditions.
Analysis by the authors shows that, in general, the annual 
mean of monthly potential evapotranspiration increases under 
global warming (see Appendix 2). This is observed over all of 
Sub-Saharan Africa with strong model agreement, except for 
regions projected to see a strong increase in precipitation. In 
Eastern Africa and the Sahel region, the multi-model mean shows 
a small reduction in potential evapotranspiration—but the models 
disagree. Thus regions that are getting wetter in terms of increased 
rainfall see either only a limited increase or even a decrease in 
potential evapotranspiration. By contrast, a more unambiguous 
signal emerges for regions projected to get less rainfall (notably 
southern Africa), where the projections show an enhanced increase 
in potential evapotranspiration. This is likely because of the feed-
back between precipitation and evaporation via temperature. In 
regions receiving more rainfall there is enough water available 
for evaporative cooling; this limits the warming of the surface. In 
regions where the soil dries out because of a lack of precipitation, 
however, no more heat can be converted into latent heat and all 
heat results in increased surface temperatures.
Table 3.2:???? ???????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????
???? ??????????? ???? ???????????
?????????? 0 ????
Arid ???? 0.2
Semi-arid 0.2 ???
Sub-humid ??? ????
????????????????????????????????????????????
??
In general, a local warming, ampliﬁed by dry conditions, 
leads to an increase in potential evaporation. In other words, 
were a standard crop-type to grow there, it would need to release 
more heat in the form of evapotranspiration to survive the local 
conditions. This shortens the growing season, if moisture is the 
main factor constraining the length of the growing season, which 
is generally the case in sub-humid and drier regions. A shorter 
growing season implies lower crop yields, a higher risk of crop 
failure, or a need to shift to different crop types (adaptation). In 
the absence of an increase in rainfall (supply), an increase in 
potential evapotranspiration (demand) translates into a lower AI 
value and a shift toward more structurally arid conditions. There 
is a close match between the shift in potential evapotranspiration 
in Figure 3.7 and the shift in AI, which is shown in Figure 3.8, 
with the strongest deterioration toward more arid conditions in 
Southern Africa. A notable exception is southwestern Africa, where 
Figure 3.7:? ??????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Figure 3.8:? ??????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
shift to more arid conditions and vice versa.
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the evapotranspiration-driven shift in AI is ampliﬁed by a decline 
in rainfall (see Figure 3.6). By contrast, the improved (higher) arid-
ity index in East Africa is correlated with higher rainfall projected 
by global climate models, a characteristic that is uncertain and 
not reproduced by higher-resolution regional climate models (see 
Chapter 3 on “Precipitation Projections”). In addition, note that 
for Somalia and eastern Ethiopia the shift implies a large relative 
shift imposed on a very low aridity index value, which results in 
AI values still classiﬁed as arid or semi-arid.
The shift in AI in Figure 3.8 translates into a shift of categoriza-
tion of areas into aridity classes. Figure 3.9 shows that although 
there is little change in net dry areas in a 2°C world, a 4°C world 
leads to a shift of total area classiﬁcation toward arid and hyper-
arid. The overall area of hyper-arid and arid regions is projected 
to grow by 10 percent in a 4°C world (from about 20 percent 
to 23 percent of the total sub-Saharan land area), and by 3 percent 
in a 2°C world by 2080–2100 relative to 1986–2005. As semi-arid 
area shrinks, total arid area increases by 5 percent in a 4°C world 
and 1 percent in a 2°C world. The results for a 4°C world are con-
sistent with Fischer et al. (2007), who used a previous generation 
of GCMs and a more sophisticated classiﬁcation method based on 
growing period length to estimate a 5–8 percent increase in arid 
area in Africa by 2070–2100.
Regional Sea-level Rise
The difference in regional sea-level rise in Sub-Saharan Africa 
between a 2°C and a 4°C world is about 35 cm by 2100 using the 
semi-empirical model employed in this report. As explained in 
Chapter 2, current sea levels and projections of future sea-level rise 
are not uniform across the world. Sub-Saharan Africa as deﬁned 
in this report stretches from 15° north to 35° south. Closer to the 
equator, but not necessarily symmetrically north and south, projec-
tions of local sea-level rise show a stronger increase compared to 
mid-latitudes. Sub-Saharan Africa experienced sea-level rise of 21 cm 
by 2010 (Church and White 2011). For the African coastlines, sea-level 
rise projected by the end of the 21st century relative to 1986–2005 is 
generally around 10-percent higher than the global mean, but 
higher than this for southern Africa (for example, Maputo) and 
lower for West Africa (for example, Lomé). Figure 3.10 shows the 
regional sea-level rise projections under the high emission scenario 
RCP8.5 for 2081–2100. Note that these projections include only the 
effects of human-induced global climate change, not those of local 
land subsidence resulting from natural or human inﬂuences.
Figure 3.9:? ??????????? ???????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Figure 3.10:????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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The time series of sea-level rise in a selection of locations in 
Sub-Saharan Africa is shown in Figure 3.11. Locations in West 
Africa are very close in terms of latitude and are projected to 
face comparable sea-level rise in a 4°C world, that is around 105 
(85 to 125) cm by 2080–2100 (a common time period in impact 
studies assessed in the following sections). In a 2°C world, the 
rise is signiﬁcantly lower but still considerable, at 70 (60 to 80) 
cm. Near Maputo in southern Africa, regional sea-level rise is 
some 5 cm higher by that time. For these locations, the likely 
regional sea-level rise (>66 percent chance) exceeds 50 cm 
above 1986–2005 by the 2060s in a 4°C warming scenario 
and 100 cm by the 2090s, both about 10 years before the global 
mean exceeds these levels.
In a 2°C warming scenario, 0.5 m is likely exceeded by 
the 2070s, only 10 years after exceeding this level in a 4°C warming 
scenario. By the 2070s, the rate of sea-level rise in a 2°C warm-
ing scenario peaks and remains constant, while that in the 4°C 
warming scenario continues to increase. As a result, one meter of 
sea-level rise is reached in a 4°C warming scenario by 2090; this 
level is not likely to be exceeded until well into the 22nd century 
in a 2°C warming scenario.
The Vulnerability of Coastal Populations 
and Infrastructure
Sea-level rise would have repercussions for populations and 
infrastructure located in coastal areas. Using the DIVA model, 
Hinkel et al. (2011) investigate the future impacts of sea-level rise 
in Sub-Saharan Africa on population and assets in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, with and without adaptation measures, under four differ-
ent sea-level rise scenarios26 and a no sea-level rise scenario. The 
applied adaptation measures are dikes building, maintenance, and 
upgrades and beach nourishment.
26 Forty-two cm, 64 cm, 104 cm, and 126 cm above 1995 sea level for a range of 
mitigation and non-mitigation scenarios.
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Projected Number of People Flooded and 
Displaced
Hinkel et al. (2011) estimate the number of people ﬂooded27 every 
year and the number of people forced to migrate because of the 
impacts of coastal erosion induced by sea-level rise. Under the 
high sea-level rise scenario (126 cm by 2100), the authors estimate 
that there would be approximately 18 million28 people ﬂooded 
in Sub-Saharan Africa per year. Under a sea-level rise scenario 
(64 cm by 2100), there would be close to 11 million people ﬂooded 
every year. In the no sea-level rise scenario, only accounting for 
delta subsidence and increased population, up to 9 million people 
would be affected.
Mozambique and Nigeria are projected to be the most affected 
African countries, with 5 and 3 million people respectively being 
ﬂooded by 2100 under the high sea-level rise scenario. However, 
Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and The Gambia would suffer the 
highest percentage of population affected, with up to 10 percent 
of their total projected population affected by ﬂooding.
As a consequence of land loss because of coastal erosion induced 
by sea-level rise, the authors project that by 2100 between 12,00029 
(low business-as-usual sea-level rise scenario) and 33,000 people30 
(high business-as-usual sea-level rise scenario) could be forced 
to migrate.
Projected Damage to Economic Assets
Infrastructure in coastal zones is particularly vulnerable to both 
sea-level rise and to such weather extremes as cyclones. Damage 
to port infrastructure in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, for example, 
would have serious economic consequences. The seaport handles 
approximately 95 percent of Tanzania’s international trade and 
serves landlocked countries further inland (Kebede and Nich-
olls 2011). Most of the tourism facilities of Mombasa, Kenya, are 
located in coastal zones, which are under threat of sea-level rise 
in addition to a higher frequency of ﬂooding and other extreme 
weather events that already cause damage almost every year 
(Kebede, Nicholls, Hanson, and Mokrech 2012). Damage to seafront 
hotel infrastructure has also already been reported in Cotonou, 
Benin—with this also considered a risk with rising sea levels 
elsewhere (Hope 2009). While to date there are few projections 
of the effects on gross domestic product (GDP) from impacts on 
the tourism sector, the agglomeration of tourism infrastructure in 
coastal areas may place this sector at severe risk of the impacts 
of sea-level rise.
Hinkel et al. (2011) estimate the damage costs resulting from 
sea-level rise in Sub-Saharan Africa, deﬁning damage costs as the 
projected cost of economic damage induced by coastal ﬂooding, 
forced migration, salinity intrusion, and loss of dry land. The 
authors estimate damage costs using a 1995 dollar undiscounted 
value.31 In a no-adaption scenario, the sea-level rise would incur 
approximately $3.3 billion32 in damages in Sub-Saharan Africa 
under the 126 cm sea-level rise scenario. Under a lower emission 
scenario leading to a 2°C temperature increase by the end of the 
century, damages due to sea-level rise may be up to half a billion 
dollars lower. Mozambique and Guinea Bissau are expected to be 
the most affected African countries, with a loss of over 0.15 percent 
of their national GDPs.
Water Availability
The impact of climate change on temperature and precipitation 
is expected to bring about major changes in the terrestrial water 
cycle. This affects the availability of water resources and, conse-
quently, the societies that rely on them (Bates, Kundzewicz, Wu, 
and Palutikof 2008).
Different forms of water availability are distinguishable. 
Blue water refers to water in rivers, streams, lakes, reservoirs, or 
aquifers that is available for irrigation, municipal, industrial, and 
other uses. Green water refers to the precipitation that inﬁltrates 
the soil, which rainfed agriculture and natural ecosystems depend 
on. Because of the different exposure to climate change, the 
fraction of blue water in aquifers will be discussed separately as 
groundwater. Blue water resulting from river runoff and surface 
water and green water are directly affected by temperature and 
precipitation changes; whereas, groundwater, a component of blue 
27 This is the “expected number of people subject to annual ﬂooding taking into 
account coastal topography, population and defenses” as well the effects of sea-level 
rise (Hinkel et al. 2011).
28 Hinkel, Vuuren, Nicholls, and Klein (2012)the number of people ﬂooded reach-
es 168 million per year in 2100. Mitigation reduces this number by factor 1.4, adaptation 
by factor 461 and both options together by factor 540. The global annual ﬂood cost 
(including dike upgrade cost, maintenance cost and residual damage cost project 27 mil-
lion people ﬂooded in 2100 under this sea-level rise scenario in Africa. The 18 million 
people ﬁgure for Sub-Saharan Africa was obtained by subtracting the number of people 
ﬂooded in Egypt (about 8 million), Tunisia (0.5 million), and Morocco (0.5 million).
29 About 15,000 people are projected to be forced to migrate in 2100 under this 
sea-level rise scenario in the whole of Africa. The ﬁgure of 12,000 people for Sub-
Saharan Africa was obtained by subtracting the number of people forced to migrate 
in Egypt (about 2,000) and in Morocco (about 1,000).
30 About 40,000 people are projected to be forced to migrate in 2100 under this 
sea-level rise scenario in the whole of Africa. The ﬁgure of 33,000 people for Sub-
Saharan Africa was obtained by subtracting the number of people forced to migrate 
in Egypt (about 5,000) and in Morocco (about 2,000).
31 Note that using an undiscounted 1995 dollar may contribute to an overestima-
tion of future damage costs.
32 Hinkel et al. (2012)the number of people ﬂooded reaches 168 million per year 
in 2100. Mitigation reduces this number by factor 1.4, adaptation by factor 461 and 
both options together by factor 540. The global annual ﬂood cost (including dike 
upgrade cost, maintenance cost and residual damage cost project $8.9 billion in 
damages in 2100 under this sea-level rise scenario in Africa. The $3.3 billion dam-
age ﬁgure for Sub-Saharan Africa was obtained by subtracting the damage cost in 
Egypt (about $5 billion), Tunisia, Morocco ($0.5 billion), and in Libya ($0.1 billion).
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water, is relatively more resilient to climate variability as long as 
it is sufﬁciently33 recharged from precipitation (Kundzewicz and 
Döll 2009; Taylor et al. 2012).
The Sub-Saharan African region’s vulnerability to changes in 
water availability is particularly high because of its dependence 
on rainfed agriculture (Calzadilla, Zhu, Rehdanz, Tol, and Ring-
ler 2009; Salvador Barrios, Outtara, Strobl, and Ouattara 2008) 
and its lack of water-related infrastructure (Brown and Lall 2006).
Present Threats to Water Availability
Because of a lack of investment in water-related infrastructure 
that could alleviate stressors, Sub-Saharan Africa is among the 
regions in the world most seriously threatened by an absence of 
water security (Vörösmarty et al. 2010). Vörösmarty et al. (2010) 
ﬁnd that large parts of Sub-Saharan Africa have medium to high 
threats34 arising from semi-aridity and highly seasonally variable 
water availability, compounded by pollution and human and 
agricultural water stresses.
Threats are especially high along the Guinea coast and East 
Africa. This contrasts to regions, such as Europe, where even higher 
levels of water availability threats are circumvented because of 
massive investments in water-related infrastructure. According to 
Vörösmarty et al. (2010), even to alleviate present-day vulnerabili-
ties, a central challenge for Sub-Saharan Africa lies in improving 
water security by investing in water resource development without 
undermining riverine biodiversity, as has happened in developed 
regions similar to Europe.
The index assessed in Vörösmarty et al. (2010) refers to the 
threat of scarcity in access to clean blue water; green water security 
seems presently less at risk. Rockström et al. (2009) found that 
many of the areas classiﬁed as blue water scarce (that is, with 
less than 1,000 m³ per capita per year as is the case for Burkina 
Faso, Nigeria, Sudan, Uganda, Kenya, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, 
parts of Zimbabwe, and South Africa) can at present provide an 
adequate overall supply of green water required for producing a 
standard diet (1,300 m³ per capita per year). Since these indica-
tors refer to water availability per capita, one way to interpret 
these ﬁndings is that there is a better match between population 
density and available green water (for agricultural production) 
than between population and available blue water.
Groundwater often is the sole source of safe drinking water in 
rural areas of Sub-Saharan Africa (MacDonald et al. 2009). Unlike 
the major aquifer systems in northern Africa, most of Sub-Saharan 
Africa has generally low permeability and minor aquifers, with some 
larger aquifer systems located only in the Democratic Republic of” 
before Congo, parts of Angola, and southern Nigeria (MacDonald 
et al. 2012). A lack of assessments of both groundwater resources 
and water quality are among the large uncertainties in assessing 
the yield of African aquifers (MacDonald et al. 2012). Given that 
groundwater can act as a buffer for projected climate change, the 
main challenge will be to quantify whether projected recharge 
rates would balance with increasing demand-driven exploitation 
(Taylor et al. 2012).
Projected Impacts on Water Availability
The future impacts of climate change on water availability and 
stress for Sub-Saharan Africa have been studied for many years. A 
critical uncertainty is projecting changes in regional precipitation 
(see Chapter 3 on “Precipitation Projections”). One of the important 
messages from these projections is that large regions of uncertainty 
remain, particularly in West Africa and East Africa, but that the 
uncertainties are reduced with increasing levels of warming. In 
other words, model projections tend to converge when there is a 
stronger climate change signal. Projected future population levels 
and the scale of economic activity have a major impact on indices 
of water scarcity and availability: a larger population reduces 
water availability per person, all other circumstances being equal.
Gerten et al. (2011) investigate the changes in water availability 
per capita. Considering the impacts of climate change alone,35 they 
drive a hydrological model with a large ensemble of CMIP3, or 
earlier generation, climate models. For the 2080s (with a global-
mean warming of 3.5°C above pre-industrial levels), they found 
decreases in green water availability of about 20 percent relative 
to 1971–2000 over most of Africa36 and increases of about 20 percent 
for parts of East Africa (Somalia, Ethiopia, and Kenya). Although 
green water availability and the Aridity Index assessed in Chapter 
3 under “Aridity” are driven by different measures of demand, 
the analysis undertaken for this report found a strong consistency 
between the patterns of decreased green water availability and 
increased aridity across Africa. Gerten et al. (2011) further assessed 
changes in blue water availability, indicating a 10–20 percent 
increase in East Africa, Central Africa, and parts of West Africa. 
The latter is not fully consistent with the more recent multi-model 
studies discussed below and in Chapter 3 under “Crops”, which 
found a decrease of blue water availability over virtually all of 
West Africa (Schewe et al. 2013). Taken together and assuming 
a constant population, most of East Africa and Central Africa 
33 Kundzewicz and Döll 2009 deﬁne renewable groundwater resources as those 
where the extraction is equal to the long-term average groundwater recharge. If the 
recharge equals or exceeds use, it can be said to be sufﬁcient.
34 The threats are deﬁned using expert assessment of stressor impacts on human 
water security and biodiversity, using two distinctly weighted sets of 23 geospatial 
drivers organized under four themes (catchment disturbance, pollution, water 
resource development, and biotic factors). The threat scale is deﬁned with respect 
to the percentiles of the resulting threat distribution (e.g., moderate threat level 
(0.5), very high threat (0.75)).
35 In this scenario, population is held constant at the year 2000 level under the 
SRESA2 scenario (arriving at 4.1°C by the end of the century).
36 South Africa is excluded because changes were found to be insigniﬁcant.
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show an increase of total green and blue water availability, while 
Southern Africa and most of West Africa is expected to experience 
reductions of up to 50 percent. If projected population increases 
are taken into account, these results indicate with high consensus 
among models that there is at least a 10-percent reduction in total 
water availability per capita for all of Sub-Saharan Africa.
A scarcity index can be deﬁned by relating the total green 
and blue water availability to the amount needed to produce a 
standard diet and taking into account population growth. For East 
Africa, Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and most of 
West Africa, the scarcity index indicates that these countries are 
very likely to become water scarce; most of Southern Africa is 
still unlikely to be water scarce.37 In the latter case, this is mainly 
because of much lower projections of population growth than for 
the other parts of the region, with at most a twofold increase (com-
pared to a fourfold increase for the Sub-Saharan African average). 
It should be noted that the study by Gerten et al. assumes that 
the CO2 fertilization effect reduces the amount of water needed 
to produce a standard diet. The CO2 fertilization effect, however, 
and therefore the extent to which the effect of potential water 
shortages might be offset by the CO2 fertilization effect, remain 
very uncertain. Without CO2 fertilization, Gerten et al. (2011) note 
that water scarcity deepens, including in South Africa and Sudan, 
and adds countries like Mauritania, the Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Zimbabwe, and Madagascar to the list of African countries 
very likely to be water scarce.
For many countries, the estimate of water availability at the 
country level may imply that a large portion of its population could 
still suffer from water shortages because of a lack of sufﬁcient water-
related infrastructure among other reasons (Rockström et al. 2009).
In a more recent study of water availability, Schewe et al. 
(2013) use a large ensemble of the most recent CMIP5 generation 
of climate models combined with nine hydrological models. They 
investigate the annual discharge (that is, runoff accumulated along 
the river network) for different levels of warming during the 21st 
century under the high warming scenario (RCP8.5 ~3.5°C above 
pre-industrial levels by 2060–80).38
Under 2.7°C warming above pre-industrial levels within regions 
with a strong level of model agreement (60–80 percent)—Ghana, 
Côte d’Ivoire, and southern Nigeria—decreases in annual runoff 
of 30–50 percent are projected. For southern Africa, where there 
is much greater consensus among impact models, decreases 
of 30–50 percent are found, especially in Namibia, east Angola, 
and western South Africa (all of which feature arid climates), 
Madagascar, and Zambia; there are also local increases. Large 
uncertainties remain for many regions (e.g., along the coast of 
Namibia, Angola and in the central Democratic Republic of Congo). 
With over 80-percent model consensus, there is a projected increase 
of annual discharge of about 50 percent in East Africa (especially 
southern Somalia, Kenya, and southern Ethiopia).
This multi-model study found that the largest source of uncer-
tainty in West Africa and East Africa results from the variance 
across climate models, while in Southern Africa both climate 
and hydrological models contribute to uncertainty. Uncertainty 
in hydrological models dominates in western South Africa and in 
the western Democratic Republic of Congo.
These projected regional changes are enhanced by up to a 
factor of two for a warming of ~3.5°C above pre-industrial levels, 
compared to 2.7°C warming above pre-industrial levels, and there 
is more consensus across the models. These ﬁndings are consistent 
with the changes in aridity previously discussed.
While these broad patterns are consistent with earlier studies, 
there are important differences. For example, Fung, Lopez, and 
New (2011) and Arnell et al. (2011) found even more pronounced 
decreases in Southern Africa of up to 80 percent for a warming 
of 4°C above 1961–90 levels (which corresponds to ~4.4°C above 
pre-industrial levels). Gosling et al. (2010) use one hydrological 
model with a large ensemble of climate models for a range of 
prescribed temperature increases. The projections for 4°C warm-
ing relative to 1961–90 (which corresponds to ~4.4°C above 
pre-industrial levels) are largely consistent with the ﬁndings of 
Schewe et al. (2013), albeit with some regional differences (e.g., 
more rather than less runoff in Tanzania and northern Somalia).
In general, effects are found to be ampliﬁed in a 4°C world 
toward the end of the 21st century and, with population growth 
scenarios projecting steady increases in the region, large parts 
of Sub-Saharan Africa are projected to face water scarcity (Fung 
et al. 2011). To help alleviate vulnerability to changes in surface 
water, the more resilient groundwater resources can act as a buf-
fer—if used sustainably under population growth. However, Sub-
Saharan Africa has mostly small discontinuous aquifers; because 
of a lack of geologic assessments as well as projected increased 
future land use, large uncertainties about their yields remain. 
Furthermore, with regions such as South Africa facing a strong 
decrease in groundwater recharges (Kundzewicz and Döll 2009), 
the opportunities to balance the effects of more variable surface 
water ﬂows by groundwater are severely restricted.
The Role of Groundwater
As noted before, groundwater can provide a buffer against climate 
change impacts on water resources, because it is relatively more 
resilient to moderate levels of climate change in comparison to surface 
37 Large parts of Sub-Sahara Africa (except for Senegal, The Gambia, Burkina Faso, 
Eritrea, Ethiopia, Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and Malawi) are projected to be very 
unlikely to be water scarce by 2100 in the A2 scenario, for a constant population, 
due to climate change alone.
38 Note that Schewe et al. (2013) only discuss annual discharges; the distribution 
of discharges across the season can have severe impacts.
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water resources (Kundzewicz and Döll 2009). Döll (2009) studies 
groundwater recharge for 2041–79 compared to the 1961–90 average 
using two climate models for the SRES A2 and B2 scenarios (global-
mean warming 2.3°C and 2.1°C respectively above pre-industrial 
levels). For both scenarios, Döll ﬁnds a decrease in recharge rates 
of 50–70 percent in western Southern Africa and southern West 
Africa, while the recharge rate would increase in some parts of eastern 
Southern Africa and East Africa by around +30 percent. Note that 
these increases might be overestimated, as the increased occurrence 
of heavy rains, which are likely in East Africa (Sillmann, Kharin, 
Zwiers, Zhang, and Bronaugh, 2013), lowers actual groundwater 
recharge because of inﬁltration limits which are not considered in 
this study. MacDonald et al. (2009) also note that increased rainfall, 
especially heavy rainfall—as is projected for East Africa—is likely to 
lead to contamination of shallow groundwater as water tables rise 
and latrines ﬂood, or as pollutants are washed into wells.
Döll (2009) determine the affected regions in western South-
ern Africa and southern West Africa as highly vulnerable when 
deﬁning vulnerability as the product of a decrease in groundwa-
ter recharge and a measure of sensitivity to water scarcity. The 
sensitivity index is composed of a water scarcity indicator as an 
indicator of dependence of water supply on groundwater and the 
Human Development Index.
The prospects of alleviating surface water scarcity by using 
groundwater are severely restricted for those areas where not only 
surface water availability but also groundwater recharge is reduced 
because of climate change (as is the case for western Southern 
Africa and southern West Africa) (Kundzewicz and Döll 2009).
Apart from uncertainty in precipitation projections in Döll (2009), 
which only used two climate models as drivers, sources of uncer-
tainty lie in the hydrological model used and the lack of knowledge 
about groundwater aquifers (MacDonald et al. 2009). A further 
uncertainty relates to changes in land use because of agriculture, 
which responds differently to changes in precipitation compared to 
natural ecosystems (R G Taylor et al. 2012). There is more certainty 
about rises in groundwater extraction in absolute terms resulting 
from population growth, which threatens to overexploit groundwater 
resources, particularly in semiarid regions where projected increases 
of droughts, as well as the projected expansion of irrigated land, 
is expected to intensify groundwater demand (Taylor et al. 2012).
Agricultural Production
Agriculture is often seen as the most weather dependent and 
climate-sensitive human activity. It is particularly exposed to 
weather conditions in Sub-Saharan Africa, where 97 percent of total 
crop land is rainfed (Calzadilla et al. 2009). Given that 60 percent 
of the labor force is involved in the agricultural sector, livelihoods 
are also exposed (Collier, Conway, and Venables 2008).
It is widely accepted that agricultural production in Sub-Saharan 
Africa is particularly vulnerable to the effects of climate change 
because of a number of environmental characteristics (Barrios, 
Outtara, and Strobl 2008). Sub-Saharan Africa is characterized by 
large differences in water availability because of the diversity of 
geographical conditions. While the tropics are humid throughout 
the year, rainfall in the subtropics is limited to the wet season(s). 
Further poleward, the semiarid regions rely on the wet seasons 
for water and, together with the arid regions, receive little runoff 
from permanent water sources. This is exacerbated by high tem-
peratures and dry soils, which absorb more moisture. Average 
runoff is therefore about 15-percent lower in Sub-Saharan Africa 
than in any other continent (Barrios et al. 2008). As the tropical 
regions are not suitable for crop production, crop production in 
Sub-Saharan Africa is typically located in semiarid regions. The 
same holds for livestock production, which for animals other than 
pigs, is not practiced in humid regions because of susceptibility of 
diseases and low digestibility of associated grasses (Barrios et al. 
2008; see Figure 3.12). This, taken together with the fact that less 
than 4 percent of cultivated area in Sub-Saharan Africa is irrigated 
(You et al. 2010), makes food production systems highly reliant 
on rainfall and thus vulnerable to climatic changes, particularly 
to changes in precipitation and the occurrence of drought.
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The following render agricultural productivity critically vulner-
able to climate change: high dependence on precipitation com-
bined with observed crop sensitivities to maximum temperatures 
during the growing season (Asseng et al. 2011; David B Lobell, 
Schlenker, and Costa-Roberts 2011a; Schlenker and Roberts 2009); 
varying and often uncertain responses to factors such as increasing 
CO2 concentration; and low adaptive capacities (Müller 2013). As 
a consequence, climate change is expected to affect agriculture 
by reducing the area suitable for agriculture, altering the grow-
ing season length, and reducing the yield potential (Kotir 2011; 
Thornton, Jones, Ericksen, and Challinor 2011a). The impacts of 
extreme events are as yet uncertain but are expected to be signiﬁ-
cant (Rötter, Carter, Olesen, and Porter 2011).
Africa has already seen declines in per capita agricultural output 
in recent decades, especially for staple foods; the most important 
staple foods are cassava, rice, soybean, wheat, maize, pearl millet, 
and sorghum (Adesina 2010; Liu et al. 2008). Important factors 
include high levels of population growth, volatile weather, and cli-
matic conditions that have seen droughts or ﬂooding destroy or limit 
harvests. A number of other factors have also contributed, including 
use of low-productivity technologies and limited and costly access 
to modern inputs (Adesina 2010). Levels of malnutrition39 are high, 
partly as a result of this limited productivity and the high dependence 
on domestic production. The prevalence of malnutrition among chil-
dren under ﬁve exceeds 21 percent (2011 data; World Bank 2013n) 
and one in three people in Sub-Saharan Africa is chronically hungry 
(Schlenker and Lobell 2010). The prevalence of undernutrition in 
Sub-Saharan Africa has decreased only slightly since the 1990s, 
from 32.8 percent (1990–92) to 26.8 percent (projections for 2010–12; 
Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 2012a).
An important factor remains: the yield potential of arable land 
in Sub-Saharan Africa is signiﬁcantly higher than actually achieved 
(see Figure 3.13). Factors that limit yield differ across regions and 
crops. For example, nutrient availability is the limiting factor for 
maize in Western Africa, while water availability is an important 
co-limiting factor in East Africa (Mueller et al. 2012).
The agricultural areas in Sub-Saharan Africa that have been 
identiﬁed as the most vulnerable to the exposure of changes in 
climatic conditions are the mixed semiarid systems in the Sahel, 
arid and semiarid rangeland in parts of eastern Africa, the systems 
in the Great Lakes region of eastern Africa, the coastal regions of 
eastern Africa, and many of the drier zones of southern Africa 
(Thornton et al. 2006). Faures and Santini (2008) state that relative 
poverty, which limits adaptive capacities of the local population 
and thus increases vulnerability, is generally highest in highland 
temperate, pastoral, and agro-pastoral areas. Those areas classiﬁed 
in the study as highland temperate areas include, for example, 
Lesotho and the highlands of Ethiopia and Angola; the pastoral 
zones include much of Namibia, Botswana, and the Horn of 
Africa; and the agro-pastoral zones include parts of the Sahel 
region and of Angola, Namibia, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Zambia, 
Kenya, and Somalia.
Although (changes in) rainfall patterns are crucial for the Sahel 
region and a drying since the 1960s is well documented (Box 3.2), 
climate model projections of precipitation in this region diverge 
widely even in the sign of future change, not just for the genera-
tion of models at the time of IPCC’s AR4 but also for the latest 
CMIP5 generation of models used for AR5 (Roehrig et al. 2012). 
Sahel rainfall is closely linked to sea-surface temperatures in the 
39 Deﬁned as a physical condition that is caused by the interaction of an inadequate 
diet and infection, and of which under-nutrition or insufﬁcient food energy intake 
is one form (Liu et al. 2008; Roudier et al. 2011).
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equatorial Atlantic, which are set to increase under global warm-
ing (Roehrig et al. 2012), with local rainfall changes ampliﬁed by 
land-surface feedbacks, including vegetation patterns (Giannini et 
al. 2008). Anthropogenic aerosols over the North Atlantic, however, 
may have contributed to historic Sahel drying (Rotstayn and Lohm-
ann 2002; Ackerley et al. 2011; Booth et al. 2012), so that drying might 
be alleviated as aerosol emissions in the Northern Hemisphere are 
reduced due to air-quality policy or low-carbon development. Total 
rainfall has recovered somewhat from the 1980s, although there 
are indications that precipitation frequency has remained at a low 
level while individual rainfall events have become more intense 
(Giannini et al. 2008). This is consistent with a basic understand-
ing of a warming world that increases the moisture capacity of the 
atmosphere and leads to more intense precipitation events.
Crops
Climate change is expected to affect crop yields through a range 
of factors.
Climatic Risk Factors
One risk factor to which the region is exposed is increasing tem-
perature. High temperature sensitivity thresholds for important 
crops such as maize, wheat, and sorghum have been observed, with 
large yield reductions once the threshold is exceeded (Luo 2011). 
Maize, which is one of the most common crops in Sub-Saharan 
Africa, has been found to have a particularly high sensitivity 
to temperatures above 30°C within the growing season. Each 
day in the growing season spent at a temperature above 30°C 
reduces yields by one percent compared to optimal, drought-free 
rainfed conditions (David B Lobell, Schlenker et al. 2011). The 
optimal temperature of wheat, another common crop, is generally 
between 15 and 20°C, depending on the varieties of wheat. The 
annual average temperature across Sub-Saharan Africa is already 
above the optimal temperature for wheat during the growing season 
(Liu et al. 2008), and it is expected to increase further. Increases 
in temperature may translate into non-linear changes in crop 
yields when high temperature thresholds are crossed. Long-term 
impacts (toward the end of the 21st century) could be more than 
twice those in the shorter term to 2050 (Berg, De Noblet-Ducoudré, 
Sultan, Lengaigne, and Guimberteau 2012).
Drought represents a continuing threat to agriculture, and 
Africa might be the region most affected by drought-caused 
yield reductions in the future (Müller, Cramer, Hare, and Lotze-
Campen 2011). Recent projections by Dai (2012) indicate that the 
Sahel and southern Africa are likely to experience substantially 
increased drought risk in future decades. Rainfall variability on 
intra-seasonal, inter-annual, and inter-decadal scales may also 
be a critical source of risk (Mishra et al. 2008). Some studies ﬁnd 
that in Sub-Saharan Africa the temporal distribution of rainfall 
is more signiﬁcant than the total amount (for example, Wheeler 
et al. 2005, cited in Laux, Jäckel, Tingem, and Kunstmann 2010).
Another factor that could play a role for future agricultural pro-
ductivity is plant disease. Climate extremes can alter the ecology of 
plant pathogens, and higher soil temperatures can promote fungal 
growth that kills seedlings (Patz, Olson, Uejo, and Gibbs 2008).
One of the major sources of discrepancy between projections 
of crop yields lies in the disagreement over the relative signiﬁcance 
of temperature and precipitation (see Lobell and Burke 2008 on 
this debate). Assessing the relative role of temperature and rain-
fall is difﬁcult as the two variables are closely linked and interact 
(Douville, Salaa-Melia, and Tyteca 2006). The signiﬁcance of 
each may vary according to geographical area. For example, 
Berg et al. (2012) ﬁnd that yield changes in arid zones appear to 
be mainly driven by rainfall changes; in contrast, yield appears 
proportional to temperature in equatorial and temperate zones. 
Similarly, Batisane and Yarnal (2010) ﬁnd that rainfall variability 
is the most important factor limiting dryland agriculture; this 
may not be so elsewhere. Levels of rainfall variability that would 
be considered low in some climate regions, such as 50 mm, can 
mean the difference between a good harvest and crop failure in 
semi-arid regions with rainfed agriculture.
Box 3.2: The Sahel Region
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CO2 Fertilization Effect Uncertainty
Whether the CO2 fertilization effect is taken into account in crop 
models also inﬂuences outcomes, with the studies that include it 
generally more optimistic than those that do not. The CO2 fertiliza-
tion effect may increase the rate of photosynthesis and water use 
efﬁciency, thereby producing increases in grain mass and number; 
this may offset to some extent the negative impacts of climate change 
(see Laux et al. 2010 and Liu et al. 2008). Crop yield and total pro-
duction projections differ quite signiﬁcantly depending on whether 
the potential CO2 fertilization effect is strong, weak, or absent. See 
Chapter 3 on “Agricultural Production” for further discussion of the 
CO2 fertilization effect.
Projected Changes in Crop Yields
Many recent studies examining one or more climatic risk factors pre-
dict project signiﬁcant damage to agricultural yields in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. These include Knox, Hess, Daccache, and Ortola (2011), 
Ericksen et al. (2011), Thornton, Jones, Ericksen, and Challinor (2011), 
and Schlenker and Lobell (2010). However, crop modeling suggests 
that there can be positive as well as negative impacts on agriculture 
in Africa, and impacts are expected to vary according to farm type 
and crop type (Müller et al. 2011) and depending on whether or not 
adaptation is assumed (Müller 2013). Müller (2013), in a literature 
review of African crop productivity under climate change, points 
out that uncertainty in projections increases with the level of detail 
in space and time. Despite uncertainties, Müller (2013) emphasizes 
that there is a very substantial risk based on projections of a sub-
stantial reduction in yield in Africa. According to Müller (2013), yield 
reductions in the near term, while often not as severe as in the long 
term, are particularly alarming as they leave only little time to adapt.
A substantial risk of large negative impacts on crop yields in the 
West African region, with a median 11-percent reduction by the 2080s, 
is found in recent meta-analysis of 16 different studies (Roudier et 
al. 2011). The West African region presently holds over 40 percent 
of Sub-Saharan Africa’s population and over half of the area for 
cereal, root, and tuber crops. Rainfall in West Africa depends on the 
West African monsoon, for which climate change projections differ 
widely. Some project a drier climate and some a wetter climate, 
which is reﬂected in the broad range of yield projections.
Larger impacts are found in the northern parts of West Africa, 
with a median 18-percent reduction in yield projected, compared 
to the southern West African region, with 13-percent reductions. 
Dry cereal production in Niger, Mali, Burkina Faso, Senegal, and 
The Gambia is expected to be more severely affected than those 
in Benin, Togo, Nigeria, Ghana, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Cameroon, 
Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, and Côte d’Ivoire, with relative changes of 
–18 percent and –13 percent respectively. This difference can be 
explained by a greater warming over continental Africa, the Sahel, 
and the Sahara in particular, compared to the western parts of the 
region (where temperatures are expected to increase more slowly).
Consistent with other work, this review ﬁnds that negative 
impacts on production are intensiﬁed with higher levels of warm-
ing (Roudier et al. 2011). It ﬁnds close to zero or small negative 
changes for the 2020s for most scenarios (1.1–1.3°C above pre-
industrial levels globally); median losses in the order of –5 percent 
by the 2050s (1.6–2.2°C above pre-industrial levels globally); 
and, for the 2080s, a range of reductions of around –5 percent to 
–20 percent, with the median reduction being greater than 10 per-
cent (2.4–4.3°C above pre-industrial levels globally).
The smallest reductions or largest increases are with the 
CO
2 fertilization effect taken into account and the greatest reduc-
tions are all without it. Analyzing the subset of studies, which also 
account for CO2 fertilization, Roudier et al. (2011) ﬁnd that the 
CO2 fertilization effect, which is particularly strong in high emis-
sion scenarios and for such C3 crops as soybean and groundnut, 
leads to signiﬁcant differences in projections. It may even reverse 
the direction of impacts. However, major crops in West Africa 
are C4 crops, such as maize, millet, and sorghum, for which the 
CO2 fertilization effect is less pronounced, so that the positive 
effect may be overestimated (Roudier et al. 2011).
Figure 3.14:???? ???????????? ????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????
????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????
????? ??????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????
??
Schlenker and Lobell (2010) estimated the impacts of climate 
change on ﬁve key African crops, which are among the most 
important calorie, protein, and fat providers in Sub-Saharan Africa: 
maize, sorghum, millet, groundnuts, and cassava (rice and wheat 
are excluded from the study as they are usually irrigated). They 
estimated country-level yields for the 2050s (2046–65) by obtain-
ing future temperature and precipitation changes from 16 GCMs 
for the A1B SRES scenario and by applying these future changes 
to two historical weather data series (1961  to 2000 and 2002, 
respectively) with regression analysis. In this study, for a 2050s 
global-mean warming of about 2.2°C above pre-industrial levels the 
median impacts across Sub-Saharan Africa on the yield of maize, 
sorghum, millet, groundnut, and cassava40 are projected to be nega-
tive, resulting in aggregate changes of –22 percent, –17 percent, 
–17 percent, –18 percent, and –8 percent. This important work also 
estimates the probability of yield reductions, which is useful for 
risk assessments looking at the tales of the probability distribution 
of likely future changes. It ﬁnds a 95-percent probability that the 
yield change will be greater than –7 percent for maize, sorghum, 
millet, and groundnut, with a 5-percent probability that damages 
will exceed 27 percent for these crops.41 The results further indicate 
that the changes in temperature appear likely to have a much stron-
ger impact on crop yield than projected changes in precipitation.
The negative results of this work for sorghum are reinforced 
by more recent work by Ramirez-Villegas, Jarvis, and Läderach 
(2011). They ﬁnd signiﬁcant negative impacts on sorghum suit-
ability in the western Sahelian region and in Southern Africa in 
this timeframe, which corresponds to a warming of about 1.5°C 
above pre-industrial levels globally.42
In interpreting the signiﬁcance and robustness of these results 
there are a number of important methodological caveats. It should 
be kept in mind that the methodological approach of Schlenker 
& Lobell (2010) does not consider the potential fertilization effect 
of increased CO2 concentration, which might improve projected 
results. However, maize, sorghum, and millet are C4 crops with 
a lower sensitivity to higher levels of CO2 than other crops. The 
authors also do not take into account any potential future develop-
ments in technology, shifts in the growing season as a potential 
adaptation measure, or potential changes in rainfall distribution 
within growing seasons (though temperature has been identiﬁed 
as the major driver of changes in crop yield in this study). Further, 
a potential disadvantage of the panel data used by Schlenker and 
Lobell (2010) is that responses to permanent changes in climatic 
conditions might be different compared to responses to weather 
shocks, which are measured by the observational data. The esti-
mates presented should be assumed as conservative, but relevant 
as a comparison of predicted impacts on maize yields to previous 
studies (Schlenker and Lobell 2010).
Further evidence of the potential for substantial yield declines 
in Sub-Saharan Africa comes from a different methodological 
approach applied by Berg et al. (2012). Berg et al. assess the 
potential for impacts on the crop productivity on one of the most 
important staple foods, a C4 millet cultivar, in a tropical domain, 
including Africa and India, for the middle (2020–49) and end of 
the century (2070–99), compared to the 1970–99 baseline. Across 
both regions and for all climatic zones considered, the overall 
decline in productivity of millet was –6 percent (with a range of 
–29 to +11 percent) for the highest levels of warming by the 2080s. 
Changes in mean annual yield are consistently negative in the 
equatorial zones and, to a lesser extent, in the temperate zones 
under both climate change scenarios and both time horizons.
A robust long-term decline in yield in the order of 16–19 percent 
is projected for the equatorial fully humid climate zone (which 
includes the Guinean region of West Africa, central Africa, and 
most parts of East Africa) under the SRESA1B scenario (3.6°C 
above pre-industrial levels globally) and the SRESA2 scenario 
(4.4°C), respectively, for 2100. Although projected changes for the 
mid-century are smaller, changes are evident and non-negligible, 
around 7 percent under the A1B – (2.1°C) and –6 percent under 
the A2 (1.8°C) scenario for the equatorial fully humid zone.
The approach of Berg et al. (2012) accounts for the potential 
of an atmospheric CO
2 effect on C4 crop productivity for the 
A2 scenario; the projections show that, across all models, the 
fertilization effect is limited (between 1.6 percent for the equatorial 
fully humid zone and 6.8 percent for the arid zone). This ﬁnding 
is consistent with the results of prior studies.
The yield declines by Berg et al. (2012) are likely to be opti-
mistic in the sense that the approach taken is to estimate effects 
based on assumptions that are not often achieved in practice: 
for example, optimal crop management is assumed as well as a 
positive CO
2 fertilization effect. Berg et al. (2012) also point out 
that the potential to increase yields in Sub-Saharan Africa through 
improved agricultural practices is substantial and would more 
than compensate for the potential losses resulting from climate 
change. When considering annual productivity changes, higher 
temperatures may facilitate shorter but more frequent crop cycles 
within a year. If sufﬁcient water is available, no changes in total 
annual yield would occur, as declining yields per crop cycle are 
compensated by an increasing number of cycles (Berg et al. 2012). 
As this much-needed progress has not been seen in past decades, 
it can be assumed that climate change will represent a serious 
additional burden for food security in the region.
40 Note that the model ﬁt for cassava is poor because of its weakly deﬁned grow-
ing season.
41 These are damages projected for the period  2045–2065, compared to the 
period 1961–2006.
42 The authors use an empirical model (EcoCrop) and analyze the impact of the 
SRESA1B scenario driven by 24 general circulation models in the 2030s for sorghum 
climate suitability.
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Reductions in the Length of the Growing Period
A recent study conducted by Thornton et al. (2011) reinforces the 
emerging picture from the literature of a large risk of substantial 
declines in crop productivity with increasing warming. This work 
projects changes in the average length of growing periods across 
Sub-Saharan Africa, deﬁned as the period in which temperature 
and moisture conditions are conducive to crop development, the 
season failure rate, and the climate change impact on speciﬁc 
crops.43 The projections are relatively robust for large areas of 
central and eastern Sub-Saharan Africa (20 percent or less vari-
ability in climate models) and more uncertain for West Africa 
and parts of southern Africa (variability of climate models up 
to 40 percent) and for southwest Africa and the desert in the north 
(more than 50 percent variability).
The length of the growing period is projected to be reduced 
by more than 20 percent across the whole region by the 2090s 
(for a global-mean warming of 5.4°C above pre-industrial levels); 
the only exceptions are parts of Kenya and Tanzania, where the 
growing season length may moderately increase by 5–20 percent. 
The latter is not expected to translate into increased crop produc-
tion; instead, a reduction of 19 percent is projected for maize 
and 47 percent for beans, while no (or only a slightly) positive 
change is projected for pasture grass (Thornton et al. 2011). Over 
much of the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa, reductions for maize range 
from –13 to –24 percent, and for beans from –69 to –87 percent, 
respectively, but the variability among different climate models is 
larger than the variability for East Africa. The season failure rate 
is projected to increase across the whole region, except for central 
Africa. For southern Africa, below the latitude of 15°S, Thornton 
et al. (2011) project that rainfed agriculture would fail once every 
two years absent adaptation.
Another risk outlined in the study by Philip K Thornton, Jones, 
Ericksen, and Challinor (2011) is that areas may transition from 
arid-semiarid, rainfed, mixed cropland to arid-semiarid rangeland, 
with consequential loss of cropland production. The authors 
project that about 5 percent of the area in Sub-Saharan Africa 
(some 1.2 million km²) is at risk of such a shift in a 5°C world; 
this would represent a signiﬁcant loss of cropland.
Relative Resilience of Sequential Cropping Systems
Waha et al. (2012) identify and assess traditional sequential crop-
ping systems44 in seven Sub-Saharan African countries in terms of 
their susceptibility to climate change.45 Compared to single-cropping 
systems, multiple-cropping systems reduce the risk of complete 
crop failure and allow for growing several crops in one growing 
season. Thus, multiple cropping, which is a common indigenous 
agricultural practice, is a potential adaptation strategy to improve 
agricultural productivity and food security.
The study by Waha et al. (2012) ﬁnds that, depending on the 
agricultural management system and the respective climate change 
scenario, projected crop yields averaged over all locations included 
in the analysis decrease between 6–24 percent for 2070–99. Projec-
tions indicate that the decline is lowest for traditional sequential 
cropping systems (the sequential cropping system most frequently 
applied in the respective district is composed of two short-growing 
crop cultivars) as compared to single cropping systems (only one 
long-growing cultivar) and highest-yielding sequential cropping 
systems (a sequential cropping system composed of two short-
growing crop cultivars with the highest yields).46 There are signiﬁ-
cant spatial differences. While maize and wheat-based traditional 
sequential cropping systems in such countries as Kenya and South 
Africa might see yield increases of more than 25 percent, traditional 
sequential cropping systems based on rice in Burkina Faso and on 
groundnut in Ghana and Cameroon are expected to see declines 
of at least 25 percent (Waha et al. 2012).
The study indicates that sequential cropping is the preferable 
option (versus single cropping systems) under changing climatic 
conditions. However, the survey data show that farmers apply 
sequential cropping in only 35 percent of the administrative units 
studied and, in some countries, such as Senegal, Niger, and Ethio-
pia, growing seasons are too short for sequential cropping. Waha 
et al. (2012) point out that the high labor intensity of sequential 
cropping systems, lack of knowledge, and lack of market access are 
also reasons for not using sequential cropping. Capacity develop-
ment and improvements in market access have been identiﬁed in 
the scientiﬁc literature as likely support mechanisms to promote 
climate change adaptation.
43 The study uses three SRES scenarios, A2, A1B, and B1, and 14 GCMs and increased 
both the spatial and temporal resolution of the model with historical gridded climate 
data from WorldClim and daily temperature, precipitation, and solar radiation data 
by using MarkSim (a third-order Markov rainfall generator). Crop simulations are 
projected by the models in the decision support system for agro-technology transfer.
44 Waha et al. (2012) deﬁne this as “a cropping system with two crops grown on the 
same ﬁeld in sequence during one growing season with or without a fallow period. 
A speciﬁc case is double cropping with the same crop grown twice on the ﬁeld.” 
See their Table 1 for deﬁnitions of different systems.
45 For their assessment, Waha et al. (2012) use historical climate data for the 30-year 
period 1971–2000 and climate projections for 2070–2099 generated by three GCMs 
(MPI-ECHAM5, UKMO-HadCM3, and NCAR-CCSM3) for the A2 SRES emissions 
scenario (global-mean warming of 3°C for 2070–2099 above pre-industrial levels). 
Atmospheric CO2 concentrations are kept constant in the study. Growing periods and 
different cropping systems are identiﬁed from a household survey dataset, encom-
passing almost 8,700 households. To simulate yields of different crop cultivars, a 
process-based global vegetation model (LPJmL) is applied.
46 On average, single cropping systems only attain 38–54 percent of crop caloriﬁc 
yields of sequential cropping systems). While the highest-yielding sequential cropping 
systems do obtain higher absolute yields, traditional sequential cropping systems are 
more resilient to climate change impacts. Further, the results indicate that adjusting 
the sowing dates to the start of the main rainy season is beneﬁcial, as mean future 
crop yields are higher than in corresponding scenarios where sowing dates are kept 
constant with only few exceptions. Exceptions may be explained by the fact that 
temperature and precipitation are the limiting factors in the respective region, which 
is especially the case in mountainous areas (Waha et al. 2012)
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Shifting Crop Climates
A different perspective on risks to crop production can be gained 
by looking at the changes in land area suitable for different kinds 
of crops under climate change. This method does not speciﬁcally 
calculate changes to crop production. It can show the changes in 
regional distribution of suitable crop areas, as well as the emergence 
of novel climates that are quite dissimilar from the climatic zones 
in which crops are presently grown. The latter is also an indicator 
of risk as it implies a need to adjust agricultural practices, crop 
cultivars, and policies to new climatic regimes.
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Applying this framework, Burke, Lobell, and Guarino (2009) 
estimated shifts in crop climates for maize, millet, and sorghum. 
They ﬁnd that the majority of Sub-Saharan African countries 
are projected to be characterized by novel climatic conditions in 
more than half of the current crop areas by 2050 (see below), for 
a warming of about 2.1°C above pre-industrial levels.47
Increasing warming leads to greater fractions of cropping area 
being subject to novel climatic conditions. For speciﬁc crops, Burke 
et al. (2009) estimate that the growing season temperature for any 
given maize crop area in Africa will overlap48 on average 58 percent 
with observations of historical conditions by 2025 (corresponding 
approximately to 1.5°C above pre-industrial levels), 14 percent 
by 2050 (2.1°C), and only 3 percent by 2075 (3°C). For millet, 
the projected overlaps are 54 percent, 12 percent, and 2 percent, 
respectively; for sorghum 57 percent, 15 percent, and 3 percent. 
Departures from historical precipitation conditions are signiﬁcantly 
smaller than those for temperature (Burke et al. 2009).
In a second step in this analysis, present and projected crop 
climates are compared within and among countries in order to 
determine to what extent the future climate already exists in the 
same or in another country on the continent. Diminishing climate 
overlap means that current cultivars would become progressively 
less suitable for the crop areas.
If, as this study suggests, some African countries (mostly in 
the Sahel) could as early as 2050 have novel climates with few 
analogs for any crop, it might not be possible to transfer suitable 
cultivars from elsewhere in the world. Formal breeding of improved 
crop varieties probably has an important role to play in adaptation. 
However, current breeding programs are likely to be insufﬁcient 
for adapting to the severe shifts in crop climates projected and, 
given the quick changes of growing season temperatures, a severe 
time lag for the development of suitable crops can be expected 
(Burke et al. 2009).
Implications for Food Security
A recent assessment by Nelson and colleagues is a fully integrated 
attempt to estimate global crop production consequences of climate 
change. Nelson et al. (2009, 2010)49 estimate the direct effects 
of climate change on the production of different crops with and 
without the effect of CO2 fertilization under a global-mean warm-
ing of about 1.8–2°C above pre-industrial levels by 2050. Without 
climate change, crop production is projected to increase signiﬁcantly 
by 2050; however, the population is projected to nearly triple by that 
time. Consequently, per capita cereal production is projected to be 
about 10 percent lower in 2050 than in 2000. When food trade is 
taken into account, the net effect is a reduction in food availability 
per capita (measured as calories per capita) by about 15 percent 
compared to the availability in 2000. There is also an associated 
projected increase in malnutrition in children under the age of ﬁve. 
Without climate change, the number of children with malnutrition is 
projected to increase from 33 million to 42 million; climate change 
adds a further 10 million children by 2050.
In summary, there is substantial evidence that climate change 
impacts may have detrimental effects on agricultural yields in 
47 Projections of temperature and precipitation change are derived from the 18 climate 
models running the A1B scenario, which lead to temperatures approximately 1.6°C 
in 2050 above 1980–99 temperatures globally (2.1°C above pre-industrial levels). The 
projections are based on a comparison of historical (1960–2002) climatic conditions 
at a speciﬁc location, crop area, and months constituting the growing season with 
the projected climate for that location for different time slices.
48 An overlap occurs when land on which a crop is presently growing overlaps with 
the land area projected to be suitable for growing that crop type at a later time under 
a changed climate. In other words, the overlap area is an area where the crop type 
is presently grown and which continues to be suitable under a changed climate. A 
present crop growing region that is not in an overlap area is one in which the future 
climate is projected to be unsuitable for that crop type.
49 The estimates are based on the global agriculture supply and demand model 
IMPACT 2009, which is linked to the biophysical crop model DSSAT. Climate 
change projections are based on the NCAR and CSIRO models and the A2 SRES 
emissions scenario leading to a global mean warming of about 2.0°C above pre-
industrial levels by 2050 (Nelson et al. 2009, 2010). To capture the uncertainty in 
the CO2 fertilization effect, simulations are conducted at two levels of atmospheric 
CO2 in 2050—the year 2000 level of 369 ppm (called the no-CO2 fertilization scenario) 
and the projected level in 2050 of 532 ppm under the SRES A2 scenario (termed the 
with-CO2 fertilization scenario).
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Sub-Saharan Africa. Further, potential reductions in yields have to 
be seen in view of future population growth in Africa and the fact 
that agricultural productivity must actually grow in the region in 
order to improve and ensure food security (Berg et al. 2012; Mül-
ler 2013). There is still great uncertainty in model projections, mainly 
because of different assumptions and simpliﬁcations underlying the 
diverse methodological approaches but also because of uncertainty 
in climate projections, especially projections of precipitation.
Roudier et al. (2011) highlighted important general sources of 
uncertainty: the uncertainties about the response of different crops 
to changing climatic conditions, the coupling of climate and crop 
models, which are regularly based on different temporal and spatial 
scales and require downscaling of data, and assumptions about 
future adaptation. Furthermore, different cultivars, which are not 
speciﬁed in most of the studies, may respond differently to chang-
ing climatic conditions; this may partly explain the broad range 
of projections. The majority of studies included in the review of 
Roudier et al. (2011) do not explicitly take adaptation into account.
Despite the broad range of projections, robust overall conclu-
sions on the risks to agricultural production in Sub-Saharan Africa 
can be drawn based on several lines of evidence:
?? The projections for crop yields in Sub-Saharan Africa agree that 
changing climatic conditions, in particular higher temperatures 
and heat extremes, pose a severe risk to agriculture in the 
region. The risk is greater where rainfall declines.
?? High temperature sensitivity thresholds for crops have been 
observed. Where such thresholds are exceeded, reductions 
in yield may result. With temperature extremes projected to 
grow, there is a clear risk of large negative effects.
?? Reductions in growing season length are projected in many 
regions.
?? Large shifts in the area suitable for present crop cultivars are 
projected.
The magnitude of the CO
2 fertilization effect remains uncertain 
and, for many African crops, appears to be weak.
While there is also evidence that, with agricultural develop-
ment and improvement in management techniques, the potential 
to increase yields relative to current agricultural productivity is 
substantial, it is also clear that such improvements have been dif-
ﬁcult to achieve. Adaptation and general improvements in current 
agricultural management techniques are key for short and long-term 
improvements in yield productivity. There would be mounting 
challenges in the next few decades, however, as some countries in 
Sub-Saharan Africa may even see novel crop climatic conditions 
develop quickly with few or no analogs for current crop cultivars.
The Impacts of Food Production Declines 
on Poverty
Agricultural production shocks have led to food price increases 
in the past, and particular types of households have been found 
to be more affected than others by food price increases because 
of climate stressors and other economic factors. Kumar and 
Quisumbing (2011), for example, found that rural female-headed 
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households are particularly vulnerable to food price increases. 
Hertel, Burke, and Lobell (2010) show that, by 2030, poverty 
implications because of food price rises in response to productiv-
ity shocks have the strongest adverse effects on non-agricultural, 
self-employed households and urban households, with poverty 
increases by up to one third in Malawi, Uganda, and Zambia. On 
the contrary, in some exporting regions (for example, Australia, 
New Zealand, and Brazil) aggregate trade gains would outweigh 
the negative effect of direct crop losses. Overall, Hertel et al. (2010) 
expect global trade to shrink, which leads to an overall efﬁciency 
loss and climate change impacts on crop production are projected 
to decrease global welfare by $123 billion, which would be the 
equivalent of approximately 18 percent of the global crops sec-
tor GDP. In contrast to other regions assessed in this study, no 
poverty reduction for any stratum of society is projected in most 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa when assuming a low or medium 
agricultural productivity scenario.
Similarly, in a scenario approaching 3.5°C above pre-industrial 
levels by the end of the century, Ahmed, Diffenbaugh, and Her-
tel (2009) project that urban wage-labor-dependent populations 
across the developing world may be most affected by once-in-30-
year climate extremes, with an average increase of 30 percent in 
poverty compared to the base period. This study ﬁnds that the 
poverty rate for this group in Malawi, for example, is estimated 
to as much as double following a once-in-30-year climate event, 
compared to an average increase in poverty of 9.2 percent among 
rural agricultural households. The work by Thurlow, Zhu, and 
Diao (2012) is consistent with this claim that urban food security 
is highly sensitive to climatic factors; it indicates that two-ﬁfths of 
additional poverty caused by climate variability is in urban areas.
Of a sample of 16 countries across Latin America, Asia, and 
Africa examined in a study by Ahmed et al. (2009), the largest 
“poverty responses” to climate shocks were observed in Africa. 
Zambia’s national poverty rate, for example, was found to have 
increased by 7.5 percent over 1991–92, classiﬁed as a severe 
drought year, and 2.4 percent over 2006–07, classiﬁed as a severe 
ﬂood year (Thurlow et al. 2012). (See Box 3.3).
Livestock
Climate change is expected to have impacts on livestock produc-
tion in Sub-Saharan Africa, which would have implications for the 
many households that are involved in some way in the livestock 
industry across the Sub-Saharan African region (see Figure 3.17). 
These households can rely on livestock for food (such as meat 
and milk and other dairy products), animal products (such as 
leather), income, or insurance against crop failure (Seo and 
Mendelsohn 2007). In Botswana, pastoral agriculture represents 
the chief source of livelihood for over 40 percent of the nation’s 
residents, with cattle representing an important source of status 
and well-being for the vast majority of Kalahari residents (Dougill, 
Fraser, and Mark 2010).
Box 3.3: Agricultural Production Declines and GDP
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Regional climate change is found to be the largest threat to 
the economic viability of the pastoral food system (Dougill et al. 
2010). However, pastoral systems have largely been ignored in 
the literature on climate impacts, which has a bias toward the 
effects of climate change on crop production (Dougill et al. 2010; 
Thornton, Van de Steeg, Notenbaert, and Herrero 2009). Less is 
known, therefore, about the effects of climate change on livestock 
(Seo and Mendelsohn 2007).
Climate change is expected to affect livestock in a many ways, 
including through changing means and variability of temperature 
and precipitation (Thornton et al. 2009), thereby potentially placing 
livelihoods dependent on the sector at risk (Box 3.4). The savan-
nas and grasslands in which pastoral societies are often located 
are typically characterized by high variability in temperature and 
precipitation (Sallu, Twyman, and Stringer 2010). The pastoral 
systems of the drylands of the Sahel depend highly on natural 
resources, such as pasture, fodder, forest products, and water, 
all of which are directly affected by climate variability (Djoudi, 
Brockhaus, and Locatelli 2011). Sallu et al. (2010) note that histori-
cal drought events in the drylands of Botswana have reduced the 
diversity and productivity of vegetation, thereby limiting available 
grazing and fodder resources.
A study of pastoral farmers’ responses to climate variability 
in the Sahel, Barbier, Yacoumba, Karambiri, Zorome, and Some 
(2009) reports that farmers are more interested in the speciﬁc 
characteristics of a rainy season, not necessarily total rainfall, 
reﬂecting the ﬁnding in some of the literature on crops about 
the importance of the temporal distribution of rainfall. Increased 
unpredictability of rainfall poses a threat to livestock (Sallu et al. 
2010). Livestock is vulnerable to drought, particularly where it 
depends on local biomass production (Masike and Ulrich 2008), 
with a strong correlation between drought and animal death 
(Thornton et al. 2009).
Speciﬁc factors that are expected to affect livestock include 
the following:
?? The quantity and quality of feeds: through changes in herbage 
because of temperature, water, and CO2 concentration, and spe-
cies composition of pastures, which in turn can affect produc-
tion quantity and nutrient availability for animals and quality.
?? Heat stress: altering feed intake, mortality, growth, reproduc-
tion, maintenance, and production).
?? Livestock diseases, both due to change to diseases themselves 
and the spread of disease through ﬂooding.
?? Water availability: especially considering that water consump-
tion increases with warmer weather.
?? Biodiversity: the genetic variety of domestic animals is being 
eroded as some breeds die out, while the livestock sector is 
a signiﬁcant driver of habitat and landscape change and can 
itself cause biodiversity loss. (Thornton et al. 2009; Thornton 
and Gerber 2010).
The factors listed above may interact in complex ways; for 
example, relationships between livestock and water resources 
or biodiversity can be two-way (Thornton et al. 2009). The 
ways in which climate change impacts interact with other driv-
ers of change (such as population increases, land use changes, 
urbanization, or increases in demand for livestock) need to be 
considered (Thornton et al. 2009). Available rangeland may be 
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reduced by human inﬂuences, including moves toward increased 
biofuel cultivation (Morton 2012), veterinary fencing (Sallu et 
al. 2010), increasing competition for land (Sallu et al. 2010), 
and land degradation. Thorny bush encroachment, for example, 
is brought about by land degradation (Dougill et al. 2010), as 
well as rising atmospheric CO2 concentrations ((Higgins and 
Scheiter 2012; see also Chapter 3 on “Agricultural Production”). 
Finally, the implications of climate change impacts on livestock 
for the human populations that depend on pastoral systems are 
equally complex. Deleterious effects on livestock health may 
directly affect food and economic security and human health 
where populations depend on the consumption or sale of ani-
mals and their products (Caminade et al. 2011; Anyamba et al. 
2010). This issue is touched on brieﬂy in Chapter 3 on “Human 
Impacts” in the context of Rift Valley fever.
In some cases, less specialized rural households have been 
observed to display higher resilience to environmental shocks. In 
the drylands of Botswana, households that previously had special-
ized in livestock breeding were forced to diversify their income 
strategy and take up hunting and crop farming (Sallu et al. 2010); 
this may be seen as a form of adaptation. However, climate change 
impacts are expected to affect not only livestock production but 
also all alternative means of subsistence, such as crop farming 
and harvesting wild animals and plant products. Droughts in 
Botswana, for example, have resulted in declines in wild animal 
populations valued as hunting prey, wild herbs and fruits, wild 
medicines, and plant-based materials used for building construc-
tion and crafts (Sallu et al. 2010). It would appear, therefore, that 
diversiﬁcation is not necessarily always a solution to dwindling 
agricultural production.
Furthermore, in some instances, pastoralists—particularly 
nomadic pastoralists—appear to be less vulnerable than crop 
farmers, as they may be afforded some ﬂexibility to seek out 
water and feed. Mwang’ombe et al. (2011) found that extreme 
weather conditions in Kenya appeared to affect the agro-pasto-
ralists more than the pastoralists. Corroborating this, Thornton 
et al. (2009) describe livestock as “a much better hedge” against 
extreme weather events, such as heat and drought, despite their 
complex vulnerability. In fact, in southern Africa, reductions 
in growing season length and increased rainfall variability 
is causing some farmers to switch from mixed crop-livestock 
systems to rangeland-based systems as farmers ﬁnd growing 
crops too risky in these marginal areas. These conversions are 
not, however, without their own risks—among them, animal 
feed shortages in the dry season (P. K. Thornton et al. 2009). 
In Sahelian Burkina Faso, for example, farmers have identiﬁed 
forage scarcity as a factor preventing expansion of animal pro-
duction (Barbier et al. 2009). Furthermore, pastoralists who rely 
at least in part on commercial feed may be affected by changes 
in food prices (Morton 2012).
Projected Impacts on Livestock
Butt, McCarl, Angerer, Dyke, and Stuth (2005) present projections of 
climate change impacts on forage yields and livestock on a national 
scale. They compare 2030 to the 1960–91 period using two global 
circulation models and a range of biophysical models. For local 
temperature increases of 1–2.5°C, forage yield change in the Sikasso 
region in Mali is projected to be –5 to –36 percent, with variation in 
magnitude across parts of the region and the models. The livestock 
considered are cattle, sheep, and goats; these are affected through 
their maintenance requirements and loss of appetite as a result 
of thermal stress. Food intake for all livestock decreases. The rate 
of cattle weight gain is found to be –13.6 to –15.7 percent, while 
the rate of weight gain does not change for sheep and goats. The 
CO
2 fertilization effect is accounted for in this study.
Decreased rainfall in the Sahelian Ferlo region of northern 
Senegal has been found to be associated with decreases in optimal 
stocking density, which can lead to lower incomes for affected 
farmers, especially if combined with increased rainfall variability. 
A 15-percent decrease in rainfall, for example, in combination 
with a 20-percent increase in rainfall variability, would lead to 
a 30-percent reduction in the optimum stocking density. Livestock 
keeping is the main economic activity and essential to local food 
security in this region (Hein, Metzger, and Leemans 2009).
In contrast with these ﬁndings, Seo and Mendelsohn (2007) 
project precipitation decreases to negatively affect livestock 
revenues. They analyze the sensitivity of livestock revenue to 
higher temperatures and increased precipitation across nine 
Sub-Saharan African countries (Ethiopia, Ghana, Niger, Senegal, 
Zambia, Cameroon, Kenya, Burkina Faso, and South Africa) 
and Egypt. This is because although precipitation increases the 
productivity of grasslands it also leads to the encroachment of 
forests (see Chapter 3 on “Terrestrial Ecosystems”) and aids the 
transmission of livestock diseases.
Seo and Mendelsohn (2007) analyze large and small farms 
separately as they function in different ways. Small farms use 
livestock for animal power, as a meat supply, and, occasionally 
for sale; large farms produce livestock for sale. The study ﬁnds 
that higher temperatures reduce both the size of the stock and 
the net value per stock for large farms but not for small farms. 
It is suggested that the higher vulnerability of larger farms 
may be due to their reliance on breeds, such as beef cattle, that 
are less suited to extreme temperatures, which smaller farms 
tends to be able to substitute with species, such as goats, that 
can tolerate higher temperatures. Interestingly, the discrep-
ancy in the vulnerability of large and small farms observed 
with temperature increases is not as marked when it comes 
to precipitation impacts; here, both large and small farms are 
considered vulnerable.
The apparent inconsistencies in the above ﬁndings with respect 
to how changes in precipitation is projected to affect livestock yield 
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and the relative vulnerability of large and small farms underline 
the inadequacy of the current understanding of the impacts that 
climate change may have on pastoral systems. The impacts on 
forage yields and livestock sensitivity to high temperatures and 
associated diseases, however, do highlight the sector´s vulner-
ability to climate change.
Projected Ecosystem Changes
The impacts on livestock described in the previous section are 
closely tied to changes in natural ecosystems, as changes in the 
species composition of pastures affect livestock productivity 
(Thornton et al. 2009; Seo and Mendelsohn 2007). Processes, such 
as woody plant encroachment, threaten the carrying capacity of 
grazing land (Ward 2005). Thus, food production may be affected 
by climate-driven biome shifts. This is a particular risk to aquatic 
systems, as will be discussed below.
Africa’s tourism industry highly depends on the natural envi-
ronment; it therefore is also exposed to the risks associated with 
climate change. It is currently growing at a rate of 5.9 percent 
compared to a global average of 3.3 percent (Nyong 2009). Adverse 
impacts on tourist attractions, such as coral reefs and other areas of 
natural beauty, may weaken the tourism industry in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. It is believed that bleaching of coral reefs in the Indian 
Ocean and Red Sea has already led to a loss of revenue from the 
tourism sector (Unmüßig and Cramer 2008). Likewise, the glacier 
on Mount Kilimanjaro, a major attraction in Tanzania, is rapidly 
disappearing (Unmüßig and Cramer 2008).
Terrestrial Ecosystems
Sub-Saharan Africa encompasses a wide variety of biomes, including 
evergreen forests along the equator bordering on forest transitions 
and mosaics south and north further extending into woodlands 
and bushland thickets and semi-arid vegetation types. Grasslands 
and shrublands are commonly interspersed by patches of forest 
(W J Bond, Woodward, and Midgley 2005).
Reviewing the literature on ecosystem and biodiversity impacts 
in southern Africa, Midgley and Thuiller (2010) note the high 
vulnerability of savanna vegetation to climate change. Changes in 
atmospheric CO
2 concentration are expected to lead to changes in 
species composition in a given area (Higgins and Scheiter 2012). 
In fact, during the last decades, the encroachment of woody plants 
has already affected savannas (Buitenwerf, Bond, Stevens, and 
Trollope 2012; Ward 2005). The latter are often unpalatable to 
domestic livestock (Ward 2005).
Grasslands and savannas up to 30° north and south of the 
equator are typically dominated by heat tolerant C4 grasses and 
mixed tree-C4 grass systems with varying degrees of tree or shrub 
cover (Bond et al. 2005), where the absence of trees demarks 
grasslands in contrast to savannas. Forest trees, in turn, use 
the C3 pathway, which selects for low temperatures and high 
CO2 concentrations (Higgins and Scheiter 2012). However, Wil-
liam J. Bond and Parr (2010) classify as savannas those forests 
with a C4 grassy understory that burn frequently. At a global 
scale, the rainfall range for C4 grassy biomes ranges from approxi-
mately 200 mm mean annual precipitation (MAP) to 3000 mm 
MAP, with tree patches associated with higher precipitation (Bond 
and Parr 2010). According to Lehmann, Archibald, Hoffmann, 
and Bond (2011), however, the wettest African savanna experi-
ences 1750 mm MAP.
The Role of Fire
Fires contribute to the stability of these biomes through a posi-
tive feedback mechanism, effectively blocking the conversion of 
savannas to forests (Beckage, Platt, and Gross 2009). C4 grasses are 
heat-tolerant and shade-intolerant, such that a closed tree canopy 
would hinder their growth. Efﬁcient growth of C4 plants at high 
growing season temperatures allows for accumulation of highly 
ﬂammable material, increasing the likelihood of ﬁre that in turn 
hinders the encroachment of woody plant cover. Fire-promoting 
ground cover is absent in the humid microclimate of closed canopy 
woods, further stabilizing these systems (Lehmann et al. 2011). 
A further factor promoting the wider spread of savannas in Africa 
compared to other continents is the prevalence of mega-herbivores, 
as browse disturbance reduces woody plant cover in arid regions 
(Lehmann et al. 2011). However, grazing and trampling simultane-
ously reduce fuel loads and promote tree growth (Wigley, Bond, 
and Hoffman 2010).
While short-term responses of and biological activity in 
African biomes are typically driven by water availability and 
ﬁre regimes, in the longer term African biomes appear highly 
sensitive to changes in atmospheric CO2 concentrations (Midg-
ley and Thuiller 2010). Increases in CO2 concentrations are 
expected to favor C3 trees over C4 grasses, as at leaf-level the 
fertilization effect overrides the temperature effect; this shifts 
the competitive advantage away from heat tolerant C4 plants, 
resulting in a risk of abrupt vegetation shifts at the local level 
(Higgins and Scheiter 2012). The effect may be further enhanced 
by a positive feedback loop. Trees are expected to accumulate 
enough biomass under elevated atmospheric CO2 concentra-
tions to recover from ﬁres (Kgope, Bond, and Midgley 2009). 
This might shade out C4 grass production, contributing to 
lower severity of ﬁres and further promoting tree growth. 
Fire exclusion experiments show that biome shifts associated 
with the processes above can occur on relatively short time 
scales. High rainfall savannas can be replaced by forests in 
less than 20–30 years (Bond and Parr 2010).
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The Role of Changing Land Uses
In order to determine to what extent tree cover is affected by 
land-use practices (as opposed to global processes, such as cli-
mate change), Wigley et al. (2010) compared woody increases in 
three neighboring areas in the Hlabisa district, KwaZulu-Natal, 
South Africa, in 1937, 1960, and 2004. Overall, they observe the 
prevalence of a global driver over local factors. Different man-
agement of the otherwise comparable study sites did not yield 
predicted outcomes, where conservation and communal sites 
was expected to result in a decrease of tree cover (because of 
the prevalence of browsers, frequent ﬁres, and wood harvesting 
in the latter). Instead, total tree cover increased from 14 percent 
in 1937  to 58 percent in 2004  in the conservation area, and 
from 6 percent to 25 percent in the communal farming area. The 
third area, used for commercial ranching that is associated with 
high cattle and low browser density and suppressed ﬁres, expe-
rienced an increase from 3 percent to 50 percent. These results 
lead Wigley et al. (2010) to conclude that either increased CO
2 or 
atmospheric nitrogen deposition drove the observed changes 
during the study period. Kgope et al. (2009) further corroborated 
this result by conducting an open-top chamber experiment with 
two African acacia species and a common C4 savanna grass under 
different CO2 levels (150, 240, 387, 517, 709, and 995 ppm). Fire 
effects on seedling establishment were simulated by clipping the 
plants after the ﬁrst growing season. Results show that because of 
increased root reserves under elevated CO2 concentrations, trees 
should be more resistant to ﬁre than at pre-industrial levels, such 
that ﬁres are less likely to kill seedlings and effectively control 
tree growth. In this experiment, CO2 sensitivity was observed to 
be highest at sub-ambient and ambient CO2 levels and decreasing 
with above-present levels.
Projected Vegetation Shifts
To assess future potential vegetation shifts in grassland, savanna, 
and forest formation based on the changing competitive advantages 
of C3 and C4 vegetation types, Higgins and Scheiter (2012) applied 
a dynamic vegetation model under the SRES A1B scenario (3.5°C 
above pre-industrial levels). Their results yielded marked shifts in 
biomes in 2100 (compared to 1850) in which parts of deserts replace 
grasslands, grasslands are replaced by savannas and woodlands, 
and savannas are replaced by forests. The most pronounced change 
appears in savannas, which in this study are projected to decrease 
from 23 percent to 14 percent of total land coverage. The overall 
area dominated by C3 vegetation (woodlands, deciduous forests, 
and evergreen forests) increases from 31 percent to 47 percent in 
this projection (see Figure 3.18).
The rate of temperature change appears to inﬂuence the timing 
of the transition, as rapid temperature shifts allow for competitive 
advantage of C4 plants. Furthermore, with rising CO
2 concentration, 
C4 vegetation is more likely to occur in regions with low rainfall 
(less than 250 mm). It is essential to note that rainfall was kept 
constant in this projection.
Risks to Forests
Although the above projections indicate that climate-change-
induced vegetation shifts would often favor forests, forests are 
also at risk from changes in temperature and precipitation. Bond 
and Parr (2010) note that if extreme weather conditions increase 
because of climate change, forests may shrink at the expense of 
grasses (Box 3.5).
In their literature review, C. A. Allen et al. (2010) note the 
increasing number of instances where climate-related tree 
mortality has been observed, spanning a wide array of forest 
ecosystems (including savannas). Despite insufﬁcient coverage 
and comparability between studies precluding the detection of 
global trends in forest dieback attributable to climate change, 
observations are consistent with the present understanding of 
responses to climatic factors (particularly drought) inﬂuencing 
tree mortality. These climatic factors include carbon starvation 
because of water stress leading to metabolic limitations, often 
coinciding with increases in parasitic insects and fungi result-
ing from warmer temperatures. Furthermore, warmer winters 
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can lead to elevated respiration at the expense of stored carbon, 
again posing the risk of carbon starvation (McDowell et al. 2008). 
These mechanisms and their interdependencies are likely to be 
ampliﬁed because of climate change (McDowell et al. 2011). 
Despite persistent uncertainties pertaining to these mechanisms 
and thresholds marking tree mortality, C. A. Allen et al. (2010) 
conclude that increases in extreme droughts and temperatures 
pose risks of broad-scale climate-induced tree mortality. Accord-
ing to Allen et al. (2010), the potential for abrupt responses at 
the local level, once climate exceeds physiological thresholds, 
qualiﬁes this as a tipping point of non-linear behavior (Lenton 
et al. 2008).
In light of the opposing trends described above, William J. 
Bond & Parr (2010) conclude that “it is hard to predict what the 
future holds for forests vs. grassy biomes given these contrasting 
threats.” Thus, whether drought-related tree feedback may prevail 
over CO2- stimulated woody encroachment, remains unclear.
Aquatic Ecosystems
Climate change is expected to adversely affect freshwater as well 
as marine systems (Ndebele-Murisa, Musil, and Raitt2010; Cheung 
et al. 2010including declines in key protein sources and reduced 
income generation because of decreasing ﬁsh catches (Badjeck, 
Allison, Halls, and Dulvy 2010). Non-climatic environmental 
problems already place stress on ecosystem services. For example, 
overﬁshing, industrial pollution, and sedimentation have degraded 
water resources, such as Lake Victoria (Hecky, Mugidde, Ramlal, 
Talbot, and Kling 2010), reducing ﬁsh catches.
Freshwater Ecosystems
Reviewing the literature on changes in productivity in African 
lakes, Mzime R. Ndebele-Murisa et al. (2010) note that while 
these lakes are under stress from human usage, much of the 
changes observed are attributable to years of drought. Associ-
ated reductions in river inﬂow can contribute to a decrease in 
nutrient concentrations. Increasing water temperatures and 
higher evaporation further lead to stronger thermal stratiﬁca-
tion, further inhibiting primary productivity as waters do not 
mix and nutrients in the surface layers are depleted. Similarly, 
Mzime R. Ndebele-Murisa, Mashonjowa, and Hill (2011) state 
that temperature is an important driver of ﬁsh productivity in 
Lake Kariba, Zimbabwe, and best explains observed declines in 
Kapenta ﬁshery yields.
Inland freshwater wetlands are another freshwater ecosystem 
likely to be affected by climate change. One such wetland is the 
Sudd in Sahelian South Sudan, which provides a rich ﬁshery, 
ﬂood recession agriculture, grazing for livestock, handcrafts, and 
building materials, and plant and animal products (including for 
medicinal purposes). The Sudd, which is fed by the White Nile 
originating in the Great Lakes region in East Africa, could be 
depleted by reduced ﬂows resulting from changes in precipitation 
patterns (Mitchell 2013).
Furthermore, increasing freshwater demand in urban areas 
of large river basins may lead to reducing river ﬂows, which may 
become insufﬁcient to maintain ecological production; this means 
that freshwater ﬁsh populations may be impacted (McDonald et 
al. 2011).
Ocean Ecosystems
Climate-change related changes in ocean conditions can have 
signiﬁcant effects on ocean ecosystems. Factors inﬂuencing ocean 
conditions include increases in water temperature, precipitation, 
levels of salinity, wind velocity, wave action, sea-level rise, and 
extreme weather events. Ocean acidiﬁcation, which is associ-
ated with rising atmospheric CO2 concentrations, is another 
factor and is discussed in Chapter 4 under “Projected Impacts 
on Coral Reefs” in the context of coral reef degradation. Ocean 
ecosystems are expected to respond to altered ocean conditions 
with changes in primary productivity, species distribution, and 
food web structure (Cheung et al. 2010). Theory and empiri-
cal studies suggest a typical shift of ocean ecosystems toward 
higher latitudes and deeper waters in response to such changes 
(Cheung et al. 2010a). However, there is also an associated risk 
that some species and even whole ecosystems will be placed 
at risk of extinction (Drinkwater et al. 2010).
Taking into account changes in sea-surface temperatures, pri-
mary production, salinity, and coastal upwelling zones, Cheung et 
al. (2010) project changes in ﬁsh species distribution and regional 
patterns of maximum catch potential by 2055 in a scenario leading 
to warming of approximately 2°C in 2050 (and 4°C by 2100). The 
results are compared to a scenario in which conditions stabilize at 
year 2000 values. Comparing both scenarios shows potential yield 
Box 3.5: Tree Mortality in the Sahel
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increases of 16 percent along the eastern and southeastern coast 
of Sub-Saharan Africa (Madagascar, Mozambique, Tanzania, and 
Kenya). However, for the same regions with closer proximity to the 
coast, yield changes of –16 to –5 percent are projected. Increases of 
more than 100 percent at the coast of Somalia and South Africa are 
projected. Apart from the southern coast of Angola, for the western 
African coast—where ﬁsh contributes as much as 50 percent of animal 
protein consumed (Lam, Cheung, Swartz, and Sumaila 2012)—sig-
niﬁcant adverse changes in maximum catch potential are projected 
of – 16 to –5 percent for Namibia, –31 to 15 percent for Cameroon 
and Gabon, and up to 50 percent for the coast of Liberia and Sierra 
Leone (Cheung et al. 2010). Lam et al. (2012), applying the same 
method and scenario, report decreases ranging from 52–60 percent, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Togo, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone.
The analysis by Cheung et al. (2010) does not account for changes 
in ocean acidity or oxygen availability. Oxygen availability has been 
found to decline in the 200–700m zone and is related to reduced 
water mixing due to enhanced stratiﬁcation (Stramma, Schmidtko, 
Levin, and Johnson 2010). At the same time, warming waters lead 
to elevated oxygen demand across marine taxa (Stramma, Johnson, 
Sprintall, and Mohrholz 2008). Hypoxia is known to negatively 
impact the performance of marine organisms, leading to additional 
potential impacts on ﬁsh species (Pörtner 2010). Accordingly, a later 
analysis by Cheung, Dunne, Sarmiento, and Pauly (2011), which 
built on that of William Cheung et al (2010), found that acidiﬁcation 
and a reduction of oxygen content in the northeast Atlantic ocean 
lowered the estimated catch potentials by 20–30 percent relative 
to simulations not considering these factors.
Changes in catch potential can lead to decreases in local 
protein consumption in regions where ﬁsh is a major source of 
animal protein. For example, in their study of projected changes 
to ﬁshery yields in West Africa by 2055 in a 2°C world, V. W. Y. 
Lam, Cheung, Swartz, and Sumaila (2012) compare projected 
changes in catch potential with projected protein demand (based 
on population growth, excluding dietary shifts). They show 
that in 2055 Ghana and Sierra Leone are expected to experience 
decreases of 7.6 percent and 7.0 percent respectively from the 
amount of protein consumed in 2000. Furthermore, they project 
economic losses of 21 percent of annual total landed value (from 
$732 million currently to $577 million, using constant 2000 dollars). 
Côte d’Ivoire, Ghana, and Togo, with up to 40 percent declines, 
are projected to suffer the greatest impacts on their land values. 
The job loss associated with projected declines in catches is esti-
mated at almost 50 percent compared to the year 2000 (Lam et 
al. 2012). Of the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa, Malawi, Guinea, 
Senegal, and Uganda rank among the most vulnerable countries 
to climate-change-driven impacts on ﬁsheries. This vulnerability 
is based on the combination of predicted warming, the relative 
importance of ﬁsheries to national economies and diets, and 
limited adaptive capacity (Allison et al. 2009).
The vulnerability to impacts on marine ecosystems, how-
ever, differs from community to community. Cinner et al. 
(2012) measure the vulnerability to observed climate impacts on 
reef ecosystems in 42 communities across ﬁve western Indian 
Ocean countries (Kenya, Tanzania, Madagascar, Mauritius, and 
the Seychelles). The study provides evidence that not all sites 
are equally exposed to factors that cause bleaching. Reefs in 
Tanzania, Kenya, the Seychelles, and northwest Madagascar are 
found to experience more severe bleaching, while southwest 
Madagascar and Mauritius are less exposed because of lower 
seawater temperatures and UV radiation and higher wind veloc-
ity and currents. These ﬁndings caution against generalizations 
about the exposure of both ecosystems and the people dependent 
on them. The sensitivity of human communities to the reper-
cussions of bleaching events is highest in those communities 
in Tanzania and parts of Kenya and Madagascar that are most 
dependent on ﬁshing livelihoods.
Human Impacts
Climate change impacts as outlined above are expected to have 
further repercussions for affected populations. Other impacts may 
also occur and interact with these to result in severe threats to 
human life. The human impacts of climate change will be deter-
mined by the socio-economic context in which they occur. The 
following sections discuss some of the identiﬁed risk factors to 
affected populations and the potential repercussions for society.
Human Health
The increased prevalence of undernutrition is one of the most 
severe climate-related threats to human health in Sub-Saharan 
Africa. Insufﬁcient access to nutrition already directly impacts 
human health, with high levels of undernutrition across the 
region. Undernutrition is the result of inadequate food intake or 
inadequate absorption or use of nutrients. The latter can result from 
diarrheal disease (Cohen, Tirado, Aberman, and Thompson 2008). 
Undernutrition increases the risk of secondary or indirect health 
implications because it heightens susceptibility to other diseases 
(World Health Organization 2009; World Bank Group 2009). It can 
also cause child stunting, which is associated with higher rates of 
illness and death and which can have long-term repercussions into 
adulthood, including reduced cognitive development (Cohen et 
al. 2008). In fact, undernutrition has been cited as the single most 
signiﬁcant factor contributing to the global burden of disease; it is 
already taking a heavy toll, especially among children (IASC 2009).
In Sub-Saharan Africa in 2011, the prevalence of undernour-
ishment in the population ranges from 15–65 percent depending 
on the sub-region (Lloyd, Kovats, & Chalabi, 2011). Lloyd et al. 
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(2011) anticipates modest reductions in these rates in the absence 
of climate change; with warming of 1.2–1.9°C by 2050,50 the pro-
portion of the population that is undernourished is projected to 
increase by 25–90 percent compared to the present. The proportion 
of moderately stunted children, which ranges between 16–22 per-
cent in the 2010 baseline, is projected to remain close to present 
levels in a scenario without climate change. With climate change, 
the rate is projected to increase approximately 9 percent above 
present levels. The proportion of severely stunted children, which 
ranges between 12–20 percent in the 2010 baseline, is expected 
to decrease absent climate change by approximately 40 percent 
across all regions. With climate change, this overall reduction 
from present levels would be only approximately 10 percent. The 
implications of these ﬁndings are serious, as stunting has been 
estimated to increase the chance of all-cause death by a factor 
of 1.6 for moderate stunting and 4.1 for severe stunting (Black 
et al. 2008).
Other threats to health that are likely to be increased by climate 
change include fatalities and injuries due to extreme events or 
disasters such as ﬂooding (McMichael and Lindgren 2011; World 
Health Organization 2009). An indirect health effect of ﬂooding 
is the damage to key infrastructure. This was observed in a case 
in Kenya in 2009 when approximately 100,000 residents of the 
Tana Delta were cut off from medical services by ﬂoods that swept 
away a bridge linking the area with Ngao District Hospital (Daily 
Nation September 30, 2009, cited in Kumssa and Jones 2010).
Another risk is heat stress resulting from higher temperatures. 
Lengthy exposure to high temperatures can cause heat-related 
illnesses, including heat cramps, fainting, heat exhaustion, heat 
stroke, and death. More frequent and intense periods of extreme 
heat have been linked to higher rates of illness and death in affected 
populations. The young, the elderly, and those with existing health 
problems are especially vulnerable. Heat extremes are expected 
to also particularly affect farmers and others engaged in outdoor 
labor without adequate protective measures (Myers 2012). The 
populations of inland African cities are expected to be particularly 
exposed to extreme heat events, as the built-up environment 
ampliﬁes local temperatures (known as the “urban heat island 
effect”; UN Habitat 2011). However, as the heat extremes projected 
for Sub-Saharan Africa are unprecedented, the extent to which 
populations will be affected by or will be able to adapt to such 
heat extremes remains unknown. This remains an understudied 
area of climate-change-related impacts.
Vector and Water-borne Diseases
Further risks to human health in Sub-Saharan Africa include the 
following: vector-borne diseases including malaria, dengue fever, 
leishmaniasis, Rift Valley fever, and schistosomiasis, and water 
and food-borne diseases, including cholera, dysentery and typhoid 
fever, and diarrheal diseases; all of these diseases can be inﬂuenced 
by local climate (Costello et al. 2009). The diseases most sensitive 
to environmental changes are those that are vector-borne or food 
and water-borne. Flooding can be associated with outbreaks of 
diseases, such as cholera; while drought has been linked to such 
diseases as diarrhea, scabies, conjunctivitis, and trachoma (Patz 
et al. 2008). As cold-blooded arthropods (including mosquitoes, 
ﬂies, ticks, and ﬂeas) carry most vector-borne diseases, a marginal 
change in temperature can dramatically alter their populations. 
They are also highly sensitive to water and vegetation changes 
in their environment. Changes in these factors can, therefore, 
increase the incidence, seasonal transmission, and geographic 
range of many vector-borne diseases (Patz et al. 2008).
The incidence of malaria is notoriously difﬁcult to predict, There 
is great uncertainty about the role of environmental factors vis-à-vis 
endogenous, density-dependent factors in determining mosquito 
prevalence; many studies indicate, however, a correlation between 
increased malaria incidence and increased temperature and rainfall 
(Chaves and Koenraadt, 2010). In Botswana, for example, indices of 
ENSO-related climate variability have predicted malaria incidence 
(Thomson 2006); in Niger, total mosquito abundances showed 
strong seasonal patterns, peaking in August in connection with the 
Sahel water cycle (Caminade et al. 2011). This is consistent with 
observations that the drought in the Sahel in the 1970s resulted 
in a decrease in malaria transmission (Ermert, Fink, Morse, and 
Peeth 2012). Land-use patterns can also play a role in determin-
ing vector populations, with deforestation affecting temperature, 
and agricultural landscapes potentially providing suitable micro-
habitats for mosquito populations (Chaves and Koenraadt 2010).
The areas where malaria is present is projected to change, 
with malaria pathogens potentially no longer surviving in some 
areas while spreading elsewhere into previously malaria-free areas. 
Even today malaria is spreading into the previously malaria-free 
highlands of Ethiopia, Kenya, Rwanda, and Burundi, with the 
frequency of epidemics there increasing, and may also enter 
the highlands of Somalia and Angola by the end of the century 
(Unmüßig and Cramer 2008). In the Sahel, the northern fringe of 
the malaria epidemic belt is projected to have shifted southwards 
(by 1–2 degrees) with a warming of 1.7°C by 2031–50 because of 
a projected decrease in the number of rainy days in the summer 
(Caminade et al. 2011); this means that it is possible that fewer 
people in the northern Sahel will be exposed to malaria.
Outbreaks of Rift Valley fever (RVF), which are episodic, 
occur through mosquitos as the vector and infected domestic 
animals as secondary hosts and are linked to climate variability 
(including ENSO) (Anyamba et al. 2009). Intra-seasonal rainfall 
50 The study use the NCAR and CSIRO scenarios, which project a temperature 
increase of 1.9°C and 1.2°C above pre-industrial levels, respectively, by 2050.
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variability, in particular, is a key risk factor, as outbreaks tend to 
occur after a long dry spell followed by an intense rainfall event 
(Caminade et al. 2011). In light of projections of increased rainfall 
variability in the Sahel, RVF incidence in this area can be expected 
to increase. Caminade et al. (2011) identify northern Senegal and 
southern Mauritania as risk hotspots, given these areas’ relatively 
high livestock densities.
Rift Valley fever can spread through the consumption or 
slaughter of infected animals (cases of the disease in Burundi in 
May 2007 were believed to originate from meat from Tanzania; 
Caminade et al. 2011). Because of this, RVF outbreaks can also 
have implications for economic and food security as livestock 
contract the disease and become unsuitable for sale or consump-
tion. An outbreak in 1997–98 for example, affected ﬁve countries 
in the Horn of Africa, causing loss of human life and livestock 
and affecting the economies through bans on exports of livestock 
(Anyamba et al. 2009).
Africa has the largest number of reported cholera cases in the 
world. Cholera is an acute diarrheal illness caused by ingestion 
of toxigenic Vibrio Cholerae and is transmitted via contaminated 
water or food. The temporal pattern of the disease has been linked 
to climate. The relative signiﬁcance of temperature and precipita-
tion factors remains somewhat uncertain in projections of future 
incidence under climate change. Past outbreaks of cholera have 
been associated with record rainfall events (Tschakert 2007), often 
during ENSO events (Nyong 2009). The risk increases when water 
supplies and sanitation services are disrupted (Douglas et al. 
2008). This occurred during the severe ﬂooding in Mozambique 
in 2000, and again in the province of Cabo Delgado in early 2013 
(Star Africa 2013; UNICEF 2013), when people lost their liveli-
hoods and access to medical services, sanitation facilities, and 
safe drinking water (Stal 2009).
Repercussions of Health Effects
The repercussions of the health effects of climate change on society 
are complex. Poor health arising from environmental conditions, 
for instance, may lower productivity, leading to impacts on the 
broader national economy as well as on household incomes. Heat 
extremes and increased mean temperatures can reduce labor pro-
ductivity, thereby undermining adaptive capacity and making it 
more difﬁcult for economic and social development goals to be 
achieved (Kjellstrom, Kovats, Lloyd, Holt, and Tol 2009). Child 
undernutrition also has long-term consequences for the health 
and earning potential of adults (Victora et al. 2008).
The educational performance of children is also likely to be 
undermined by poor health associated with climatic risk factors. 
An evaluation of school children’s health during school days in 
Yaounde and Douala in Cameroon found that, in the hot season, 
high proportions of children were affected by headaches, fatigue, 
or feelings of being very hot. Without any protective or adaptive 
measures, these conditions made students absentminded and 
slowed writing speeds, suggesting that learning performance could 
be undermined by increased temperatures (Dapi et al. 2010). 
Child stunting is associated with reduced cognitive ability and 
school performance (Cohen et al. 2008); in addition, diseases 
such as malaria have a signiﬁcant effect on children’s school 
attendance and performance. Sachs and Malaney (2002) found 
that, because of malaria, primary students in Kenya annually 
miss 11 percent of school days while secondary school students 
miss 4.3 percent.
The complexity of the range of environmental and human-
controlled factors that affect human health is considerable. 
Among them, land-use changes (including deforestation, agri-
cultural development, water projects, and urbanization) may 
affect disease transmission patterns (Patz et al. 2008). Moreover, 
population movements can both be driven by and produce health 
impacts. Forced displacement, often in response to severe famine 
or conﬂict, is associated with high rates of infectious disease 
transmission and malnutrition; this can lead to the exposure of 
some populations to new diseases not previously encountered 
and against which they lack immunity (McMichael et al. 2012). 
People who migrate to poor urban areas, are possibly also at 
risk of disaster-related fatalities and injuries (McMichael et al. 
2012), especially in slum areas which are prone to ﬂooding and 
landslides (Douglas et al. 2008).
Population Movement
Projections of future migration patterns associated with climate 
change are largely lacking. However, the observed movements 
outlined below illustrate the nature of potential patterns and the 
complexity of the factors that inﬂuence population movement.
Migration can be seen as a form of adaptation and an appropriate 
response to a variety of local environmental pressures (Tacoli 2009; 
Warner 2010; Collier et al. 2008). Migration often brings with it a 
whole set of other risks, however, not only for the migrants but 
also for the population already residing at their point of relocation. 
For example, the spread of malaria into the Sub-Saharan African 
highlands is associated with the migration of people from the 
lowlands to the highlands (Chaves and Koenraadt 2010). Some 
of the health risks to migrants themselves have been outlined 
above. Other impediments faced by migrants can include ten-
sions across ethnic identities, political and legal restrictions, and 
competition for and limitations on access to land (Tacoli 2009); 
these, can also, potentially, lead to conﬂict (O. Brown, Hammill, 
and McLeman 2007). In turn, migration is a common response to 
circumstances of violent conﬂict (McMichael et al. 2012).
Migration can be driven by a multitude of factors, where nota-
bly the socioeconomic context also plays a key role (Tacoli 2009). 
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Environmental changes and impacts on basic resources, includ-
ing such extreme weather events as ﬂooding and cyclones, are 
signiﬁcant drivers of migration. Drought can also be a driver of 
migration, according to S. Barrios, Bertinelli, and Strobl (2006), who 
attribute one rural exodus to rainfall shortages. When the Okovango 
River burst its banks in 2009 in a way that had not happened in 
more than 45 years, about 4,000 people were displaced on both 
the Botswanan and Namibian sides of the river and forced into 
emergency camps (IRIN 2009). Although this event has not been 
attributed to climate change, it does illustrate the repercussions 
that extreme events can have on communities.
Some permanent or temporary population movements are 
associated with other environmental factors, such as desertiﬁcation 
and vegetation cover, which may be affected by human-induced 
land degradation or climate change (Tacoli 2009). Van der Geest, 
Vrieling, and Dietz (2010) ﬁnd that, in Ghana, migration ﬂows can 
be explained partly by vegetation dynamics, with areas that offer 
greater vegetation cover and rainfall generally attracting more in-
migration than out-migration. This study found that the migration 
patterns observed also appeared to be related to rural population 
densities, suggesting that the per capita access to natural resources 
in each area was at least as important as the abundance of natural 
resources per se. Barbier et al. (2009) show that, in Burkina Faso, 
some pastoralists have opted to migrate from the more densely 
populated and more arid north to the south, where population 
density is lower, pastures are available, and the tsetse ﬂy is under 
control. Other migrations from dryland areas in Burkina Faso are 
seasonal; that is, they occur for the duration of the dry season 
(Kniveton, Smith, and Black 2012). Migration as a response to 
environmental stresses, however, can be limited by non-climatic 
factors. In the Kalahari in Botswana, for example, pastoralists have 
employed seasonal migration as a means of coping with irregular 
forage, land tenure reform limits previously high herd mobility 
(Dougill et al. 2010).
Urbanization
The connection between the challenges posed by climate change 
and by urbanization is particularly noteworthy. Africa has the high-
est rate of urbanization in the world; this is expected to increase 
further, with as much as half the population expected to live in 
urban areas by 2030 (UN-HABITAT 2010a). In the face of mounting 
pressures on rural livelihoods under climate change, even more 
people may people may migrate to urban areas (Adamo 2010). For 
example, patterns of urbanization in Senegal have been attributed 
to desertiﬁcation and drought, which have made nomadic pastoral 
livelihoods less feasible and less proﬁtable (Hein et al. 2009).
Urbanization may constitute a form of adaptation and provide 
opportunities to build resilient communities, and the potential 
beneﬁts may extend beyond the urban area. There are, are for 
example, cases in which urban migrants are able to send remit-
tances to family members remaining in rural areas (Tacoli 2009).
Large numbers of urban dwellers, however, currently live in 
precarious situations. For example, the residents of densely popu-
lated urban areas that lack adequate sanitation and water drainage 
infrastructure depend on water supplies that can easily become 
contaminated (Douglas et al. 2008). As discussed above, heat 
extremes are also likely to be felt more in cities. Levels of poverty and 
unemployment are often high in these areas, with many unskilled 
subsistence farmers who move to urban areas experiencing difﬁculty 
in ﬁnding employment (Tacoli 2009). As discussed in Chapter 3 on 
“The Impacts of Food Production Declines on Poverty”, the urban 
poor are also among the most vulnerable to food production shocks.
The vulnerability of new urban dwellers is also increased by 
the pressure that urbanization puts on the natural environment 
and urban services (Kumssa and Jones 2010). Absent careful urban 
planning, such pressure can exacerbate existing stressors (for 
example, by polluting an already limited water supply; Smit and 
Parnell 2012), and heighten the vulnerability of these populations 
to the impacts of disasters, including storm surges and ﬂash ﬂoods 
(McMichael et al. 2012). Many settlements are constructed on 
steep, unstable hillsides, along the foreshores of former mangrove 
swamps or tidal ﬂats, or in low-lying ﬂood plains (Douglas et al. 
2008). Flooding severity is heightened as, for example, natural 
channels of water are obstructed, vegetation removed, ground 
compacted, and drains blocked because of uncontrolled dumping 
of waste (Douglas et al. 2008). Urbanization can hence be seen as 
both a response to and a source of vulnerability to climate change 
(see also Chapter 4 on “Risks to Coastal Cities”).
Conﬂict
There are several scenarios under which climate change could 
trigger conﬂict (Homer-Dixon,1994; Scheffran, Brzoska, Kominek, 
Link, and Schilling 2012). Decreased or unequal access to resources 
following extreme events has been identiﬁed as a possible con-
tributing factor to human conﬂict (Hendrix and Glaser 2007; Nel 
and Righarts 2008). Similarly, on both long and short time-scales, 
depletion of a dwindling supply of resources could lead to competi-
tion between different groups and increase the threat of conﬂict 
(Homer-Dixon 1994; Hendrix and Glaser 2007).
For example, Blackwell (2010) links cattle raiding and violent 
disputes over scarce water resources to escalating competition for 
shrinking pasture and water sources. Rowhani, Degomme, Guha-
Sapir, and Lambin (2011), who investigated the same phenomena 
in East Africa, found no strict causal mechanisms, but they did 
ﬁnd associations between variables, with both malnutrition and 
inter-annual ecosystem variability correlated with violent conﬂict. 
They argue that the impact of environmental change on human 
security is indirect and mediated by several political and economic 
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factors. This more nuanced picture is consistent with the analysis 
of J. Barnett and Adger (2007), who argue that, in some circum-
stances, climate change impacts on human security may increase 
the risk of violent conﬂict.
There is some evidence that the causal connection operates in 
the opposite direction, with conﬂict often leading to environmental 
degradation and increasing the vulnerability of populations to a 
range of climate-generated stressors (Biggs and et al. 2004). The 
breakdown of governance due to civil war can also exacerbate 
poverty and cause ecosystem conservation arrangements to collapse; 
both of these factors can potentially cause further exploitation of 
natural resources (Mitchell 2013).
The potential connection between environmental factors and 
conﬂict is a highly contested one, and the literature contains evi-
dence both supporting and denying such a connection. Gleditsch 
(2012), summarizing a suite of recent studies on the relationship 
between violent conﬂict and climate change, stresses that there is to 
date a lack of evidence for such a connection (see Buhaug 2010 for 
a similar line of argument). However, given that unprecedented 
climatic conditions are expected to place severe stresses on the 
availability and distribution of resources, the potential for climate-
related human conﬂict emerges as a risk—and one of uncertain 
scope and sensitivity to degree of warming.
Conclusion
Key impacts that are expected to affect Sub-Saharan Africa are 
summarized in Table 3.4, which shows how the nature and mag-
nitude of impacts vary across different levels of warming.
Agriculture livelihoods are under threat and the viable options 
to respond to this threat may dwindle. For maize crop areas, for 
example, the overlap between historical maize growing areas and 
regions where maize can be grown under climate change decreases 
from 58 percent under 1.5°C warming above pre-industrial levels 
to 3 percent under 3°C warming. In other words, even at 1.5°C 
warming about 40 percent of the present maize cropping areas 
will no longer be suitable for current cultivars. Risks and impacts 
grow rapidly with increasing temperature. Recent assessments 
project signiﬁcant yield losses for crops in the order of 5–8 percent 
by the 2050s for a warming of about 2°C, and a one-in-twenty 
chance that yield losses could exceed 27 percent. As warming 
approaches 3°C, large areas of Sub-Saharan Africa are projected to 
experience locally unprecedented growing season temperatures. In 
a 2°C world, countries with historically high temperatures begin 
to move toward globally unprecedented crop climates. This means 
that it becomes increasingly unlikely that existent cultivars can 
be obtained that are suitable for the temperature ranges in these 
regions. Should this become impossible, the breeding of new more 
drought-resistant cultivars tolerant of higher temperatures would 
appear to be necessary. In a 4°C world, the likelihood that suitable 
existent cultivars are available further decreases, and the uncertainty 
surrounding the potential of novel cultivar breeding may increase.
Similarly, diversiﬁcation options for agro-pastoral systems 
may decline as heat stress and indirect impacts reduce livestock 
productivity and CO2-driven woody plant encroachment onto 
grasslands diminishes the carrying capacity of the land. Liveli-
hoods dependent on ﬁsheries and other ecosystem services would 
be similarly placed under threat should critical species cease to 
be locally available.
Impacts in these sectors are likely to ripple through other sec-
tors and affect populations in Sub-Saharan Africa in complex ways. 
Undernutrition increases the risk of other health impacts, which 
are themselves projected to become more prevalent under future 
climate change. This may undermine household productivity and 
can cause parents to respond by taking their children out of school 
to assist in such activities as farm work, foraging, and the fetching 
of fuel and water. This may ultimately have long-term implications 
for human capital and poverty eradication in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Threats to agricultural production, which place at risk the 
livelihoods of 60 percent of the labor force of Sub-Saharan Africa, 
may further exacerbate an existing urbanization trend. Migration to 
urban areas may provide migrants with new livelihood opportuni-
ties but also expose them to climate impacts in new ways. Some 
health risk factors, such as heat extremes, are particularly felt in 
urban areas. Other impacts tend to affect the poorest strata of urban 
society, to which urban migrants often belong. Conditions that 
characterize poor urban areas, including overcrowding, inadequate 
access to water, and poor drainage and sanitation facilities, aid the 
transmission of vector- and water-borne diseases. As many cities 
are located in coastal areas, they are exposed to coastal ﬂooding 
because of sea-level rise. The poorest urban dwellers tend to be 
located in the most vulnerable areas, further placing them at risk 
of extreme weather events. Impacts occurring even far removed 
from urban areas can be felt in these communities. Food price 
increases following production shocks have the most deleterious 
repercussions within cities. The high exposure of poor people to 
the adverse effects of climate change implies the potential for 
increasing inequalities within and across societies. It is as yet 
unclear how such an effect could be ampliﬁed at higher levels of 
warming and what this would mean for social stability.
Thus, the range of climate-change-related risks already con-
fronting Sub-Saharan Africa at relatively low levels of warming 
could have far-reaching repercussions for the region´s societies 
and economies well into the future. Even in a situation in which 
warming is limited to below 2°C, there are substantial risks and 
damages; as warming increases these only grow. With a 2°C 
warming, and despite persistent uncertainties, large regional risks 
to development emerge, particularly if adaptation measures fail 
to adequately anticipate the threat.
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Notes to Table 3.4 
1?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
2???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
2100.
3????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
7????????????
????????????????????????????????????
9????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????
10???????????????????????
11????????????
12???????????????????????
13???????????????? ???????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????? ???????? ???????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????
deviates from it after 2100.
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????
17????????????????? ??????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????
19?????????????????????????????
20???????? ?????????????????
21?????????????????????
22?????????????????????????????????????????????????
23?????????????????????????????
???????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
27??????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????
29??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
is held constant.
30???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????
31???????????????????????????????????
32??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
33??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
into increased crop production, however; instead a reduction of 19 percent is 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????
??????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????
37?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????
???????????????????????????????
39???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
Range is full range with and without CO2???????????????
?????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????
????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????
scenarios and warming levels.
????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????? ??????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????
??????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
9 million people would be affected.
????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
up to 9 million people would be affected.
???????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????
shocks were observed in Africa.
?????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????? ????????? ??????????? ???????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
south, and west Sub-Saharan Africa.
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????
?
??
??
??
?
??
??
??
??
coastal zones across a diverse mix of mainland, peninsulas, and 
islands; the related regional sea-land interactions; and the large num-
ber of interacting climate drivers that give rise to the local climate.
Temperature
In a 2°C world, average summer warming in the region is projected 
to be around 1.5°C (1.0–2.0°C) by the 2040s. In a 4°C world, 
South East Asian average summer temperatures over land are 
projected to increase by around 4.5°C (3.5–6°C) by 2100. This is 
51 Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, the 
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor Leste, and Vietnam.
???? ???????????
In this report, South East Asia refers to a region comprising 12 coun-
tries51 with a population of ~590 million in 2010. In 2050, the 
population is projected to be around 760 million, 65 percent 
urban-based, and concentrated along the coast.
Major impacts on the region and its natural resources are 
projected for warming levels of 1.5–2°C, resulting in coral reefs 
being threatened with consequent damage to tourism- and ﬁsheries-
based livelihoods and decreases in agricultural production in the 
delta regions due to sea-level rise. For example, by the 2040s, 
a 30 cm sea-level rise is projected to reduce rice production in the 
region’s major rice growing region—the Mekong River Delta—by 
about 2.6 million tons per year, or about 11 percent of 2011 pro-
duction. Marine ﬁsh capture is also projected to decrease by 
about 50 percent in the southern Philippines during the 2050s due 
to warmer sea temperatures and ocean acidiﬁcation.
With 4°C global warming, there could be severe coastal ero-
sion due to coral reef dieback. Sea level is projected to rise up 
to 100 cm by the 2090s; this would be compounded by projected 
increases in the intensity of the strongest tropical cyclones making 
landfall in the region. In addition, unprecedented heat extremes 
over nearly 90 percent of the land area during the summer months 
(June, July and August) is likely to result in large negative impacts.
Current Climate Trends and Projected 
Climate Change to 2100
Climate projections for South East Asia are very challenging due to 
the region’s complex terrain, comprising mountains, valleys, and 
?????????????????
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substantially lower than the global-mean surface warming over 
land, because the region’s climate is more strongly inﬂuenced by 
sea-surface temperatures that are increasing at a slower rate than 
in other regions with a larger continental land surface.
In tropical South East Asia, however, heat extremes are projected 
to escalate with extreme temperature events frequently exceeding 
temperature ranges due to natural climate variability. For example, 
under a 2°C global warming scenario, currently unusual heat 
extremes52 during the summer are projected to cover nearly 60–70 per-
cent of the land area. Unprecedented heat extremes could occupy 
up to 30–40 percent of land area. In a 4°C world, summer months 
that in today´s climate would be termed unprecedented might be the 
new normal, affecting nearly 90 percent of the land area during the 
summer months. More important, the South East Asia region is one 
of two regions (the other being the Amazon) which is projected to 
see, in the near-term, a strong increase in monthly heat extremes with 
the number of warm days53 projected to increase from 45–90 days/
year under a 2°C world to around 300 days for a 4°C world.
Rainfall
The use of climate models to project future rainfall changes is espe-
cially difﬁcult for South East Asia because both the Asian and the 
Australian summer monsoons affect the region and large differences 
remain between individual models. For 4°C warming, there is no 
agreement across models for South East Asia, with changes either 
not statistically signiﬁcant, or ranging from a decrease of 5 percent 
to an increase of 10 percent in monsoon rainfall. Despite these 
moderate changes, the latest model projections show a substantial 
and rising increase in both the magnitude and frequency of heavy 
precipitation events. The increase of extreme rainfall events54 is 
projected to rise rapidly with warming, and to contribute more 
than a 10-percent share of annual rainfall for 2°C and a 50-percent 
share for 4°C warming, respectively. At the same time the maximum 
number of consecutive dry days, which is a measure for drought, 
is also projected to increase, indicating that both minimum and 
maximum precipitation extremes are likely to be ampliﬁed.
Likely Physical and Biophysical Impacts as a Function of 
Projected Climate Change
Sea-level Rise
Sea-level rise along the South East Asian coastlines is projected to 
be about 10–15 percent higher than the global mean by the end of 
the 21st century. In a 4°C world, the projected regional sea-level 
rise is likely55 to exceed 50 cm above present levels56 by 2060, 
and 100 cm by 2090, with Manila being especially vulnerable. In 
a 2°C world, the rise is signiﬁcantly lower for all locations, but 
still considerable, at 75 (65–85) cm by 2090. Local land subsidence 
due to natural or human inﬂuences would increase the relative 
sea-level rise in speciﬁc locations.
Tropical Cyclone Risk
An increase in the frequency of the most intense storms57 along 
with associated extreme rainfall is projected for South East Asia. 
Maximum surface wind speed during tropical cyclones is projected 
to increase by 7–18 percent for a warming of around 3.5°C above 
pre-industrial levels for the western North Paciﬁc basin, but the 
center of activity is projected to shift north and eastward. The 
maximum wind speed of tropical cyclones making landfall is 
projected to increase by 6 and 9 percent respectively for mainland 
South East Asia and the Philippines, combined with a decrease 
of 35 and 10 percent respectively in the overall number of land-
falling cyclones. As sea-surface temperatures rise, tropical-cyclone-
related rainfall is expected to increase by up to a third, indicating 
a higher level of ﬂood risk in low lying and coastal regions.
Saltwater Intrusion
For several South East Asia countries, salinity intrusion in coastal 
areas is projected to increase signiﬁcantly with rising sea levels. 
For example, a 1 m sea-level rise by 2100 in the land area affected 
by saltwater intrusion in the Mahaka River region in Indonesia 
is expected to increase by 7–12 percent under 4°C warming. In 
the Mekong River Delta, it is projected that a 30-cm sea-level rise 
by the 2050s in both the 2°C and 4°C worlds would increase by 
over 30 percent the total current area (1.3 million ha) affected by 
salinity intrusion.
Coral Reef Loss and Degradation
Coral reefs ﬂourish in a relatively narrow range of temperature 
tolerance and are hence highly vulnerable to sea-surface tempera-
ture increases; together with the effects of ocean acidiﬁcation, 
this exposes coral reefs to more severe thermal stress, resulting 
in bleaching. Rising sea surface temperatures have already led to 
major, damaging coral bleaching events58 in the last few decades. 
Under 1.5°C warming, there is a high risk (50-percent probabil-
ity) of annual bleaching events occurring as early as 2030 in the 
52 Extremes are deﬁned by present-day, local natural year-to-year variability of 
around 1°C, which are projected to be exceeded frequently even with low levels of 
average warming. Unprecedented = record breaking over the entire measurement 
recording period.
53 Deﬁned by historical variability, independent of emissions scenario, with tem-
perature beyond the 90th percentile in the present-day climate.
54 Estimated as the share of the total annual precipitation.
55 Where “likely” is deﬁned as >66 percent chance of occurring, using the modeling 
approaches adopted in this report.
56 1986–2005 levels.
57 Category 4 and 5 on the Safﬁr-Simpson wind scale.
58 Coral bleaching events can be expected when a regional, warm seasonal maximum 
temperature is exceeded by 1°C for more than four weeks, and bleaching becomes 
progressively worse at higher temperatures or longer periods over which the regional 
threshold temperature is exceeded. While coral reefs can survive a bleaching event, 
they are subject to high mortality and take several years to recover. When bleaching 
events become too frequent or extreme, coral reefs can fail to recover.
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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region. Projections indicate that all coral reefs are very likely to 
experience severe thermal stress by the year 2050 at warming 
levels of 1.5°C–2°C above pre-industrial levels. In a 2°C world, 
coral reefs will be under signiﬁcant threat, and most coral reefs 
are projected to be extinct long before 4°C warming is reached 
with the loss of associated marine ﬁsheries, tourism, and coastal 
protection against sea-level rise and storm surges.
Sector-based and Thematic Impacts
River deltas, such as the Mekong River Delta, experience regular 
ﬂooding as part of the natural annual hydrological cycle. Such 
ﬂooding plays an important economic and cultural role in the 
region’s deltas. Climate change projections for sea-level rise and 
tropical cyclone intensity, along with land subsidence caused by 
human activities, would expose populations to heightened risks, 
including excess ﬂooding, saltwater intrusion, and coastal erosion. 
These consequences would occur even though deltaic regions tend 
to be relatively resilient to unstable water levels and salinity. The 
three river deltas of the Mekong, Irrawaddy, and Chao Phraya, all 
with signiﬁcant land areas below 2 m above sea level, are highly 
threatened by these risk factors.
Coastal cities with large and increasing populations and 
assets are exposed to climate-change-related risks, including 
increased tropical storm intensity, long-term sea-level rise, and 
sudden-onset ﬂuvial and coastal ﬂooding. Estimating the number 
of people exposed to the impacts of sea-level rise is made difﬁcult 
by uncertainties inherent to sea-level rise projections, as well as 
population and economic growth scenarios. Bangkok,59 Jakarta, 
Ho Chi Minh City, and Manila stand out as being particularly 
vulnerable to climate-driven impacts. Many millions in Bangkok 
and Ho Chi Minh City are projected to be exposed to the effects 
of a 50 cm sea-level rise60 by the 2070s. High levels of growth of 
both urban populations and GDP further increase exposure to 
climate change impacts in these areas. Further, the effect of heat 
extremes are also particularly pronounced in urban areas due to 
the urban heat island effect, caused in large part by the density 
of buildings and the size of cities, which results in higher human 
mortality and morbidity rates in cities than in the rural surround-
ings. The urban poor are particularly vulnerable to environmental 
stresses; ﬂoods associated with sea-level rise and storm surges 
pose signiﬁcant ﬂood damage and health risks to populations 
in informal settlements. In 2005, about 40 percent of the urban 
population of Vietnam and 45 percent of the urban population in 
the Philippines lived in informal settlements.
Agricultural production in the region, particularly rice pro-
duction in the Mekong Delta, is exposed to sea-level rise due to 
59 Without adaptation, the area of Bangkok is projected to be inundated result-
ing from ﬂooding due to extreme rainfall events and sea-level rise increases from 
around 40 percent under a 15 cm sea-level rise above present levels (which could 
occur by the 2030s), to about 70 percent under an 88 cm sea-level rise scenario 
(which would be approached by the 2080s under 4°C warming).
60 Assuming 50 cm local subsidence.
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its low elevation above sea level. A sea-level rise of 30 cm, which 
could occur as early as 2040, is projected to result in the loss of 
about 12 percent of the cropping area of the Mekong Delta Province 
due to ﬂooding (5 percent loss) and salinity intrusion (7 percent). 
Whilst some rice cultivars are more resilient than others, there is 
evidence that all rice is vulnerable to sudden and total inundation 
when this is sustained for several days, where ﬂooding, sensitivity 
thresholds even of relatively resilient rice cultivars may be exceeded 
and production severely impacted. Temperature increases beyond 
thresholds during critical rice growth phases (tillering, ﬂowering, 
grain ﬁlling) may further impact productivity.
Aquaculture, which is also at risk from several climate change 
impacts, is a rapidly growing and economically important industry 
in South East Asia. In Vietnam, for example, it has grown rapidly; 
in 2011, it generated about 5 percent of its GDP, up from about 3 per-
cent in 2000. Rapid sectoral growth has also been observed in other 
South East Asian countries. Aquaculture also supplies nearly 40 per-
cent of dietary animal protein in South East Asia derived from ﬁsh, 
and is thus critical to food security in the region. Aquaculture farms 
are projected to be damaged by increasingly intense tropical cyclones 
and salinity intrusion associated with sea-level rise, particularly for 
freshwater and brackish water aquaculture farms. In addition increas-
ing temperatures may exceed the tolerance thresholds of regionally 
important farmed species. Extreme weather events, such as tropical 
cyclones and coastal ﬂoods, already affect aquaculture activities in 
South East Asia. For example, the category 4 Typhoon Xangsane 
devastated more than 1,200 hectares of aquaculture area in Vietnam 
in 2006 while the Indonesian Typhoons Vincente (Category 4) and 
Saola (Category 2) negatively impacted about 3,000 aquaculture 
farmers and resulted in over $9 million in damages to the ﬁshery 
sector (Xinhua, 2012).
Fisheries, particularly coral reef ﬁsheries, are expected to 
be effected by the impacts of sea-level rise, warmer oceans, and 
ocean acidiﬁcation associated with rising atmospheric and ocean 
CO2 concentrations. Substantial reductions in catch potential are 
projected. The projected changes in maximum catch potential 
range from a 16-percent decrease in the waters of Vietnam to 
a 6–16 percent increase around the northern Philippines. Addition-
ally, marine capture ﬁsheries production (not directly associated 
with coral systems) are projected to decline by 50 percent around 
the southern Philippines. Such shifts in catch potential are likely 
to place additional challenges on coastal livelihoods in the region.
Table 4.1:??????????????? ????? ???????????????????????????????????
?????? ????
???????????????????????
?????????
??????????????
????????
???????????
???????
???????????
???????
???????????
???????
Regional warming South China Sea warmed 
at average rate of 
?????????????????????
?????????????????????????
warmed at a rate of about 
???????????????????????
1971, more than twice the 
global average
Increasing 
??????????????????
nights
???????????????
??????????????? ????
the new normal
Almost all nights 
??????????????
???????????????????
warm nights
Heat extreme 
(in the Northern 
Hemisphere 
summer period)d
Unusual heat 
????????
???????????????? ?????????????????
land
?????????????????
land
?????????????????? ????????????????????
Unprecedent 
ed heat 
????????
???????????????????????
land
?????????????????
land
70 percent of land ????????????????????
Sea-level rise (above present) About 20cm to 2010 ?????????? 
?????????? 
?????????????????
?????????? 
?????????? 
?????????????????
?????????? 
????????? 
?????????????????
?????????? 
????????? 
??????????????????
Coral reefs Unusual bleaching 
events
????????????????????
bleaching events 
??????????????
?????????????????????
????????????????
???????????????????????
????????????????
????????????????????
bleaching
a A more comprehensive table of impacts and risks for SSA is presented at the end of the Chapter.
b???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
c??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????
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Integrated Synthesis of Climate Change 
Impacts in the South East Asia Region
South East Asia is highly and increasingly exposed to slow 
onset impacts associated with sea-level rise, ocean warming and 
acidiﬁcation, coral bleaching, and associated loss of biodiversity, 
combined with sudden-onset impacts associated with increased 
tropical cyclone intensity and greater heat extremes. The combined 
impacts are likely to have adverse effects on several sectors simul-
taneously. The cumulative effects of the slow-onset impacts may 
undermine resilience and increase vulnerability to more extreme 
weather events, with this complex pattern of exposure increasing 
with higher levels of warming and sea-level rise.
Growing Risks to Populations, Livelihoods and Food 
Production in River Deltas
Populations and associated cropping and ﬁsheries systems and 
livelihoods along the rivers and in the river deltas are expected 
to be the most severely affected by risks from rising sea levels, 
more intense rainfall events, and storm surges associated with 
tropical cyclones.
For example, the Mekong River and its tributaries are crucial to 
rice production in Vietnam. A total of 12 provinces constitute the 
Mekong Delta, popularly known as the “Rice Bowl” of Vietnam; 
it is home to some 17 million people, of whom 80 percent are 
engaged in rice cultivation. The delta produces around 50 percent 
of the country’s total production and contributes signiﬁcantly to 
Vietnam’s rice exports. Any shortfall in rice production in this area 
because of climate change would not only affect the economy in 
and food security of Vietnam but would also have repercussions 
for the international rice market.
The Mekong Delta is also Vietnam’s most important ﬁshing 
region. It is home to almost half of Vietnam’s marine ﬁshing ves-
sels and produces two thirds of Vietnam’s ﬁsh from aquaculture 
systems. Important industries such as aquaculture are projected to 
suffer increasing costs and damages associated with salinization 
and rising temperatures. Observed human vulnerability in deltas in 
the region is high: When tropical cyclone Nargis61 hit the Irrawaddy 
River Delta in Myanmar in 2008 it resulted in over 80,000 deaths, 
temporarily displaced 800,000 people, submerged large areas of 
farming land, and caused substantial damage to food production 
and storage.
Health impacts associated with saltwater intrusion are likely to 
increase. Sea-level rise and tropical cyclones may increase salinity 
intrusion, thereby contaminating freshwater resources—an effect 
that can persist for years. The most common health implication is 
hypertension; however there are a broad range of health problems 
potentially linked to increased salinity exposure through bathing, 
drinking, and cooking. These include miscarriages, skin disease, 
acute respiratory infection, and diarrheal disease.
Increasing Pressure on Coastal Cities and Urban 
Exposure
Especially in South East Asia, coastal cities concentrate increas-
ingly large populations and assets exposed to increased tropical 
storm intensity, long-term sea-level rise, sudden-onset coastal 
ﬂooding, and other risks associated with climate change. Without 
adaptation, Bangkok is projected to be inundated due to extreme 
rainfall events and sea-level rise increases from around 40 percent 
under a 15 cm sea-level rise above present levels (which could 
occur by the 2030s) to about 70 percent under an 88 cm sea-level 
rise scenario (which could occur by the 2080s under 4°C warm-
ing). The effect of heat extremes are particularly pronounced in 
urban areas due to the urban heat island effect; this could result 
in high human mortality and morbidity rates in cities. These risks 
are particularly acute, as in the Philippines and Vietnam, where 
almost 40 percent of the population lives in informal settlements, 
where health threats can quickly be exacerbated by a lack of, and/
or damage to, sanitation and water facilities. The high population 
density in such areas compounds these risks.
The projected degradation and loss of coral reefs, decreased 
ﬁsh availability, and pressures on other near-coastal rural produc-
tion due to sea-level rise within the next few decades is likely 
to lead to diminishing livelihoods in coastal and deltaic areas. 
Increased migration to urban areas has already been occurring. 
Urban migration may result in more urban dwellers being exposed 
to climate impacts in the cities of South East Asia, especially new 
arrivals who are likely to crowd into existing and densely populated 
informal settlements.
Compound Risks to the Tourism Industry and to 
Businesses
Projected increases in sea-level rise, the intensity of tropical 
cyclones, and the degradation and loss of coral reefs pose signiﬁ-
cant risks to the tourism industry by damaging infrastructure and 
natural resources and assets that enhance the region’s appeal as 
a tourist destination. Research indicates that the threat of tropi-
cal cyclones appears to have a negative effect on tourists’ choice 
of destination on the same scale as deterrents such as terrorist 
attacks and political crises.
Loss of coastal assets due to erosion has already been observed 
and can be expected to accelerate. Sea-level rise has already con-
tributed directly to increased coastal erosion in the Red River Delta 
and other regions. Coastal erosion in the Mekong River Delta is 
expected to increase signiﬁcantly under a 100 cm sea-level rise 
by 2100. Projected beach losses for the San Fernando Bay area 
of the Philippines will substantially affect beach assets and a 
considerable number of residential structures.
61 Land fall as a Category 4 storm on the Safﬁr-Simpson scale.
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Coral bleaching and reef degradation and losses are very likely 
to accelerate in the next 10–20 years; hence, revenue generated 
from diving and sport ﬁshing also appears likely to be affected 
in the near term. The degradation of coral reefs could result in 
the loss of ﬁsheries and the coastal protection offered by reefs, as 
well as the loss of tourists upon whom coastal populations and 
economies often depend.
The risks and damages projected for a warming level of 1.5–2°C 
in South East Asia are very signiﬁcant. The physical exposure to 
climate change at this level of warming includes substantial areas 
of South East Asia subjected to unprecedented heat extremes, 
50 cm of sea-level rise by the 2050s and 75 cm or more by 2100. 
The biophysical damages projected include the loss of large areas 
of coral reefs, signiﬁcant reductions in marine food production, 
and more intense tropical cyclones with related storm surges and 
ﬂooding. Substantial losses of agricultural production in impor-
tant rice-growing regions are projected to result from sea-level 
rise, as is the risk of signiﬁcant ﬂooding in major coastal cities. 
Signiﬁcant damages to the tourism industry and to aquaculture 
are also projected.
Introduction
This report deﬁnes South East Asia as Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, 
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam. Speciﬁc atten-
tion is given to Vietnam and the Philippines. For the projections 
on changes to temperature, precipitation, and sea-level rise, the 
deﬁnition of South East Asia from the IPCC´s special report on 
(SREX) region 24 is used.62
Despite continued strong economic growth and a burgeoning 
middle class, poverty and inequality remain signiﬁcant challenges 
in the region. The socioeconomic conditions in these countries are 
diverse in terms of population size, income, and the distribution 
of the inhabitants across urban and rural areas. In addition, a 
number of geographic factors inﬂuence the nature and extent of 
the physical impacts of climate change. Parts of South East Asia 
are located within a tropical cyclone belt and are characterized 
by archipelagic landscapes and relatively high coastal population 
density. This makes the region particularly vulnerable to the fol-
lowing impacts:
?? Sea-level rise
?? Increases in heat extremes
?? Increased intensity of tropical cyclones
?? Ocean warming and acidiﬁcation
These physical impacts are expected to affect a number of 
sectors, including human health, tourism, aquaculture, and 
ﬁsheries. Although changes to precipitation and temperature 
are expected to have adverse effects on terrestrial ecosystems, 
these and other critical biophysical impacts are outside the 
scope of this report.
River deltas and coastal areas are a key focus of this regional 
analysis; these are areas where many of these impacts occur 
and they pose severe risks to coastal livelihoods. Further 
attention is given to coastal cities, which are often situated 
in these deltas and contain a high concentration of people 
and assets.
Regional Patterns of Climate Change
Making climate projections for South East Asia is challenging due 
to the complex terrain, the mix of mainlands, peninsulas, and 
islands, the related regional sea-land interactions, and the large 
number of complex climate phenomena characterizing the region. 
The region’s climate is mainly tropical and determined by the East 
Asian monsoon, a sub-system of the Asian-Australian monsoon, 
which is interconnected with the Indian monsoon (P. Webster 2006).
Observed Trends
Observed trends show a mean temperature increase around the 
South East Asian Seas at an average rate of between 0.27–0.4°C 
per decade since the 1960s (Tangang, Juneng, and Ahmad 2006) 
and, for Vietnam, a rate of about 0.26°C per decade since 1971 
(Nguyen, Renwick, and McGregor 2013). This is more than twice 
the global average rate of about 0.13°C per decade for 1956–2005 
(P. D. Jones et al. 2007). Trends in extreme temperature reveal a 
signiﬁcant increase in hot days and warm nights and a decrease 
in cool days and cold nights (Manton et al. 2001). There is some 
indication of an increase in total precipitation, although these trends 
are not statistically robust and are spatially incoherent (Caesar et 
al. 2011). While regionally different, an increase in frequency and 
intensity of extreme precipitation events is reported (Chang 2010).
Projected Temperature Changes
In a 4°C world the subset of CMIP5 GCMs used within the ISI-
MIP framework and this report projects South East Asian sum-
mer temperatures over land to increase by 4.5°C (model range 
from 3.5°C to 6°C) by 2100 (Figure 4.2). This is substantially lower 
than the global-mean land-surface warming, since the region’s 
climate is driven by sea surface temperature, which is increasing 
at a smaller rate. In a 2°C world, the absolute summer warming 
62 With minor changes at the northern boundary.
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would be limited to around 1.5°C (model spread from 1.0–2.0°C) 
above the 1951–1980 baseline, to be reached in the 2040s. The 
strongest warming is expected in North Vietnam and Laos, with 
the multimodel mean projecting up to 5.0°C under 4°C global 
warming by 2071–2099 and up to 2°C under 2°C global warm-
ing (Figure 4.3). The expected future warming is large compared 
to the local year-to-year natural variability. In a 4°C world, the 
monthly temperature distribution of almost all land areas in South 
East Asia shifts by six standard deviations or more toward warmer 
values. In a 2°C world, this shift is substantially smaller, but still 
about 3–4 standard deviations.
Projected Changes in Heat Extremes
Heat extremes exceeding a threshold deﬁned by the local natural 
year-to-year variability are projected to strongly increase in South 
Figure 4.2:???????????????????????????????????????????????????
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The multi-model mean has been smoothed to give the climatological trend.
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East Asia (Figures4.4 and 4.5). Even under the 2°C warming 
scenario, the multimodel mean projects that, during the second 
half of the 21st century, 30 percent of the South East Asian land 
area would be hotter than 5-sigma during boreal summer months 
(see Figure 4.5). Under the 4°C warming scenario, this value 
approaches 90 percent by 2100. It should be noted, however, that 
the model spread is large, as the averaging is performed over a 
small land surface area.
The strongest increases in frequency and intensity of extremes 
are projected for Indonesia and the southern Philippine islands 
(see Figure 4.4). Roughly half of the summer months is projected 
to be beyond 5-sigma under the 2°C warming scenario (i.e., 
5-sigma would become the new normal) and essentially all sum-
mer months would be 5-sigma under the 4°C warming scenario 
(i.e., a present-day 5-sigma event would be an exceptionally cold 
month in the new climate of 2071–99). Mainland South East Asia 
is projected to be much less impacted; the conditions that are pro-
jected for Indonesia under the 2°C warming scenario only occur 
inland under the 4°C warming scenario. Thus, in the near term, 
the South East Asian region is projected to see a strong increase 
in monthly heat extremes, deﬁned by the limited historical vari-
ability, independent of emissions scenario.
Consistent with these ﬁndings, Sillmann and Kharin (2013a) 
report that South East Asia is one of two regions (the other being 
the Amazon) where the number of heat extremes is expected to 
increase strongly even under a low-emission scenario (although the 
inter-model spread is substantial). Under a low-emission scenario, 
warm nights (beyond the 90th percentile in present-day climate) 
would become the new normal, with an occurrence-probability 
around 60 percent. In addition, the duration of warm spells would 
increase to somewhere between 45 and 90 days, depending on 
the exact location. Under emission scenario RCP8.5, warm spells 
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would become nearly year-round (~300 days), and almost all 
nights (~95 percent) would be beyond the present-day 90th per-
centile (Sillmann and Kharin 2013a).
Precipitation Projections
While multimodel ensembles of GCMs do manage to represent 
monsoon systems, the difference is large among individual models; 
some completely fail in reproducing the observed patterns. The 
monsoon mechanisms in South East Asia are particularly hard to 
reproduce as both the Asian and the Australian summer monsoons 
affect the region (Hung, Liu, and Yanai 2004). Nicolas C. Jourdain 
et al. (2013) present monsoon projections based on CMIP5 models 
that perform best in reproducing present-day circulation patterns. 
Although they report an increase of 5–20 percent monsoon rainfall 
over the whole Indo-Australian region in the second half of the 21st 
century for 4°C warming, there is no agreement across models 
over South East Asia. The changes are either not statistically 
signiﬁcant or range from a decrease of 5 percent to an increase 
of 10 percent in monsoon rainfall.
For the CMIP5 models included in the ISIMIP project (Figure 4.6), 
there is little change in annual mean precipitation over Vietnam 
and the Philippines in a 2°C world and a slight increase in a 4°C 
world relative to the 1951–80 reference period. Again, there is 
very little model agreement for this region. Precipitation appears 
to increase by about 10 percent during the dry season (DJF) for 
the 2°C warming scenario and more than 20 percent for the 4°C 
warming scenario—but it is important to note that these increases 
are relative to a very low absolute precipitation over the dry season.
In the Mekong River Basin, a United States Agency for 
International Development (2013) study63 projects an increase in 
annual rainfall precipitation ranging from 3–14 percent. Seasonal 
variability is projected to increase; the wet season would see a 
rise in precipitation between 5–14 percent in the southern parts 
of the basin (southern Vietnam and Cambodia). In this area, as a 
consequence, the wet season is expected to become wetter and the 
dry season drier. Drier areas in the north of the basin are projected 
to experience relative increases in precipitation of 3–10 percent, 
corresponding to a slight increase of 50 to 100 mm per year.
Although global climate models are needed to project inter-
actions between global circulation patterns of atmosphere and 
ocean, regional models, which offer a higher spatial resolution, 
provide a way to take into account complex regional geography. 
Chotamonsak, Salathé, Kreasuwan, Chantara, and Siriwitayakorn 
(2011) use the WRF regional climate model for studying climate 
change projections over South East Asia. Lacking global circula-
tion patterns and interactions across regions, regional models 
need conditions at the model’s boundaries prescribed by global 
models, for which the authors apply results from ECHAM5 for 
the A1B scenario by mid-century (about 2°C warming globally). 
Likewise, Lacombe, Hoanh, and Smakhtin (2012) use the PRE-
CIS regional model—for mainland South East Asia only—with 
boundary conditions from ECHAM4 under the IPCC SRES sce-
nario A2 and B2 (about 2°C warming globally). These studies 
ﬁnd that the largest changes in annual mean precipitation, as 
well as the extremes, occur over the oceans. For land areas, the 
regional models largely conﬁrm mean changes of global models 
(see Figure 4.6), with somewhat increased precipitation over the 
mainland. Chotamonsak et al. (2011) warn that such regional 
studies should be expanded with boundary conditions of mul-
tiple global models. They further note that changes in mean and 
63 The United States Agency for International Development (2013) report projects 
the impacts of climate change for the period 2045–69 under the IPCC SRES scenario 
A1B (corresponding to about a 2.3°C temperature increase above pre-industrial 
levels) for the Lower Mekong Basin. For the study, authors used six GCMs (NCAR 
CCSM 3.0; MICRO3.2 hires; GISS AOM; CNRM CM3; BCCR BCM2.0; GFDL CM2.1) 
and used 1980–2005 as a baseline period.
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extreme precipitation in a regional model over South East Asia 
might be biased, since high-resolution models produce stronger 
spatial and temporal variability in tropical cyclones, which in 
one single model run might not be representative of the broader 
statistical probability.
Based on their projected changes in precipitation and tempera-
ture over mainland South East Asia only, Lacombe et al. 2012 suggest 
that these changes may be beneﬁcial to the region and generate 
higher agricultural yields, as precipitation and temperatures may 
increase in the driest and coldest areas respectively. However, as 
the authors modelled only changes in climate variables and not in 
agricultural yields, and did not place their results into the context 
of literature on projections of the agricultural sector, there is little 
analytical evidence to support their assertion.64
Drought
Dai (2012) used global models to project changes in drought, 
resulting from the long-term balance of temperature, precipi-
tation, and other variables. While soil-moisture content was 
projected to decrease over much of the mainland and southern 
Indonesia, increases were projected for Myanmar and other 
maritime parts of the region. None of the changes were found 
to be statistically signiﬁcant. A different indicator of drought, 
the Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI), relates changes in 
water balance to locally “normal” conditions. On this relative 
scale, the projected pattern of drought risk is comparable. By 
contrast, Taylor et al. (2012) noted a consistent increase in 
drought risk indicated by PDSI for the whole region, with no 
signiﬁcant change across Myanmar.
Extreme Precipitation Events
Despite the projections of moderate changes in mean precipita-
tion, a substantial increase in the magnitude and frequency of 
heavy precipitation events is projected for South East Asia based 
on CMIP5 models (Sillmann and Kharin 2013a). The median 
increase of the extreme wet day precipitation share of the total 
annual precipitation is projected to be greater than 10 percent 
and 50 percent for 2°C and 4°C warming scenarios respectively. 
At the same time, the maximum number of consecutive dry days 
as a measure of drought is also projected to increase, indicating 
that both minimum and maximum precipitation extremes are 
ampliﬁed.
This general picture arising from global model results is con-
ﬁrmed by higher-resolution regional modeling studies (Chotamon-
sak et al. 2011; Lacombe et al. 2012), which add that the largest 
increase in extreme precipitation, expressed by an index combining 
changes in frequency and intensity, occurs over the oceans and 
over Cambodia and southern Vietnam.
Tropical Cyclone Risks
Tropical cyclones (TCs) pose a major risk to coastal human sys-
tems. In combination with future sea-level rise, the risk of coastal 
ﬂooding due to strong TCs is already increasing and could be 
ampliﬁed in the event of future TC intensiﬁcation (R. J. Nicholls 
et al. 2008). Tropical cyclones are strongly synoptic to meso-scale, 
low-pressure systems, which derive energy primarily from evapora-
tion from warm ocean waters in the presence of high winds and 
low surface pressure and from condensation in convective clouds 
near their center (Holland 1993). According to their maximum 
sustained wind speed, tropical low-pressure systems are catego-
rized from tropical depressions (below 63 km/h), tropical storms 
(63–118 km/h), and tropical cyclones (119 km/h and larger). 
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64 In addition, the modeled increase in mean precipitation only concerns Myanmar, 
for which the regional model of Chotamonsak et al. (2011) shows little change, while 
the temperature increase seems fairly uniform over mainland South East Asia and 
the largest increases reported by Lacombe et al. (2012) are found over eastern India 
and southern China—which is conﬁrmed by Chotamonsak et al. (2011).
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According to the Safﬁr-Simpson hurricane wind scale, TCs can 
be further classiﬁed into ﬁve categories according to their wind 
speed and resulting sea-level rise.
South East Asian Context
In South East Asia, tropical cyclones (TCs) are called typhoons and 
affect vast parts of the region, particularly the islands and coastal 
areas of the mainland. Most TCs reaching landfall in South East 
Asia originate from the western North Paciﬁc basin, the region 
with the highest frequency of TCs in the world (Holland 1993). 
There are also some TCs that develop in the northern Indian Ocean 
basin, speciﬁcally in the Bay of Bengal.
Strong TCs have a devastating impact on human settlements, 
infrastructure, agricultural production, and ecosystems, with 
damages resulting from ﬂooding due to heavy rainfall, high wind 
speeds, and landslides (Peduzzi et al. 2012) (Box 4.1). Storm surges 
associated with tropical cyclones can temporarily raise sea levels 
by 3–10 meters (Syvitski et al. 2009).
Observed Trends in Tropical Cyclone 
Frequency and Intensity
The inﬂuence of recent climate changes on past TC frequency 
and intensity is uncertain and shows low conﬁdence regarding 
detectable long-term trends (Peduzzi et al. 2012). Recent analy-
ses reveal neither a signiﬁcant trend in the global TC frequency 
from 1970 to 2004 nor signiﬁcant changes for individual basins 
worldwide. The North Atlantic is the notable exception (Knutson 
et al. 2010). The western North Paciﬁc and northern Indian Ocean 
do not exhibit a recent change in TC frequency. For example, the 
number of land-falling TCs in Vietnam and the Philippines does not 
display a signiﬁcant long-term trend over the 20th century (Chan 
and Xu 2009); there is, however, a distinct positive correlation 
with the phasing of the ENSO (Kubota and Chan 2009). During the 
same time, western North Paciﬁc TCs exhibited a weak increase in 
intensity (Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2012) and a 
signiﬁcant co-variation with ENSO, with a tendency toward more 
intense TCs during El Niño years (Camargo and Sobel 2005). This 
was probably mediated by the associated sea-surface temperature 
patterns (Emanuel 2007; Villarini and Vecchi 2012).
In contrast to the general absence of a global trend in total TC 
frequency, there has been a clear upward trend in the global annual 
number of strong category 4 and 5 tropical cyclones since 1975, 
as seen in the western North Paciﬁc (1975–89: 85; 1990–2004: 
116) and the Northern Indian Ocean (1975–89: 1; 1990–2004: 7)
(P. J. Webster, Holland, Curry, and Chang 2005). For the time 
period 1981–2006, there have been signiﬁcant upward trends in 
the lifetime maximum TC wind speeds both globally and for the 
western North Paciﬁc and Northern Indian Ocean basins (Elsner, 
Kossin, and Jagger 2008a), with the 30-percent strongest TCs 
shifting to higher maximum wind speeds.
The relationship between TC intensity and damage potential 
is generally highly non-linear. This implies that increases in the 
intensity of the strongest TCs can outperform even a decrease in the 
overall number of typhoons. Indeed, the observed tendency toward 
stronger TCs both globally and in South East Asia is accompanied 
by increasing economic losses. These are also strongly related to 
robust population and economic growth, especially in the most 
vulnerable low-lying coastal areas (Peduzzi et al. 2012).
Projected Changes in Tropical Cyclones
The changes in tropical cyclones as a result of future climate 
change need to distinguish between TC frequency and TC intensity. 
Most literature on TC projections draws from climate model runs 
that reach on average about 3.5°C warming above pre-industrial 
levels. There appear to be no recent studies on TC projections for 
global-mean warming levels of 2°C.
Tropical Cyclone Frequency
On a global scale, TC frequencies are consistently projected to either 
decrease somewhat or remain approximately unchanged by 2100, 
with a less robust decrease in the Northern Hemisphere (Emanuel, 
Sundararajan, & Williams 2008; Knutson et al. 2010). Model projec-
tions vary by up to 50 percent for individual ocean basins.
Future changes in TC frequency are uncertain for the western 
North Paciﬁc, which includes the South China Sea and the Phil-
ippine Sea and borders mainland South East Asia and countries 
Box 4.1: Observed Vulnerability
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like the Philippines and Malaysia. Studies that use atmospheric 
models that explicitly simulate TCs generally show an overall 
decrease in the frequency of TCs over this basin as a whole, with 
some exceptions (Sugi et al. 2009; Knutson et al. 2010; Held and 
Zhao 2011; Murakami et al. 2012). By contrast, projections of indices 
for cyclogenesis (the likelihood of TCs developing and hence an 
indicator of frequency) generally show an increase under warm-
ing for multimodel ensembles (Caron and Jones 2007; Emanuel 
et al. 2008). However, recent work (Zhao and Held 2011) shows 
that the statistical relationships between cyclogenesis parameters 
and the frequency of TCs, which are strong in most ocean basins, 
break down in the western North Paciﬁc. This is particularly the 
case with the South China Sea, possibly because the interactions 
between monsoon circulation, sea-surface temperatures, and cyclone 
activity are not properly accounted for through commonly applied 
cyclogenesis parameters. Within the western North Paciﬁc basin, 
the different methods and models generally agree on a north and/
or eastward shift of the main TC development region (Emanuel et 
al. 2008; Held and Zhao 2011; Kim, Brown, and McDonald 2010; 
Li et al. 2010; Yokoi and Takayabu 2009); the strongest agreement 
across models and methods on a decrease in frequency is found 
for the South China Sea (Held and Zhao 2011; Murakami, Sugi, 
and Kitoh 2012; Yokoi and Takayabu 2009). In a recent study, these 
changes lead to a decrease in frequency of TCs making landfall 
of 35 percent and 10 percent for mainland South East Asia and 
the Philippines respectively (Murakami et al. 2011).
Tropical Cyclone Intensity
Future surface warming and changes in the mean thermodynamic 
state of the tropical atmosphere lead to an increase in the upper 
limit of the distribution of TC intensities (Knutson et al. 2010), 
which was also observed over the years 1981–2006 (Elsner, Kos-
sin, and Jagger 2008). Consistently, the number of strongest 
category 5 cyclones is projected to increase in the western North 
Paciﬁc, with both mean maximum surface wind speed and lifetime 
maximum surface wind speed during TCs projected to increase 
statistically signiﬁcantly by 7 percent and 18 percent, respectively, 
for a warming of about 3.5°C above pre-industrial levels (Murakami 
et al. 2012). The average instantaneous maximum wind speed of 
TCs making landfall is projected to increase by about 7 percent 
across the basin (Murakami et al. 2012), with increases of 6 percent 
and 9 percent for mainland South East Asia and the Philippines, 
respectively (Murakami et al. 2011).
With higher sea-surface temperatures, atmospheric moisture 
content is projected to increase over the 21st century, which might 
lead to increasing TC-related rainfall. Various studies project a 
global increase in storm-centered rainfall over the 21st century 
of between 3–37 percent (Knutson et al. 2010). For the western 
North Paciﬁc, a consistent corresponding trend is found, with rates 
depending on the speciﬁc climate model used (Emanuel et al. 2008).
Regional Sea-level Rise
As explained in Chapter 2, current sea levels and projections of 
future sea-level rise are not uniform across the world. South East 
Asian coastlines stretch roughly from 25° north to 15° south 
latitude. Closer to the equator, projections of local sea-level rise 
generally show a stronger increase compared to higher latitudes. 
Land subsidence, in the tropics mainly induced by human activities, 
increases the risks to coastal areas due to sea-level rise. Without 
taking land subsidence into account, sea-level rise in the region is 
projected to reach up to 100 cm and 75 cm by the 2090s in a 4°C 
and 2°C world, respectively.
Climate Change-induced Sea-level Rise
Due to the location of the region close to the equator, sea-level 
rise along the South East Asian coastlines projected by the end 
of the 21st century relative to 1986–2005 is generally 10–15 per-
cent higher than the global mean. Figure 4.7 shows the regional 
sea-level rise in 2081–2100  in a 4°C world. As described in 
Chapter 2, these projections rely on a semi-empirical approach 
developed by (Rahmstorf (2007) and Schaeffer, Hare, Rahmstorf, 
and Vermeer (2012) for global-mean rise, combined with Per-
rette, Landerer, Riva, Frieler, and Meinshausen (2013) to derive 
regional patterns.65
Figure 4.8 shows a time series for locations in South East Asia 
that receive special attention in Chapter 4 under “Risks to Coastal 
Cities” and “Coastal and Marine Ecosystems.” In a 4°C world, 
locations in South East Asia are projected to face a sea-level rise 
around 110 cm (66 percent uncertainty range 85–130) by 2080–2100 
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(a common time period in the impact studies assessed in the fol-
lowing sections). The rise near Yangon and Krung Thep (Bangkok) 
is a bit lower (by 5 cm). For all locations, sea-level rise is pro-
jected to be considerably higher than the global mean and higher 
than the other regions highlighted in this report, with Manila at 
the high end. For these locations, regional sea-level rise is likely 
(>66 percent chance) to exceed 50 cm above 1986–2005 levels 
by about 2060 and 100 cm by 2090, both about 10 years before 
the global mean exceeds these levels.
In a 2°C world, the rise is signiﬁcantly lower for all locations, 
but still considerable at 75 (66 percent uncertainty range 65–85) cm. 
An increase of 0.5 meters is likely exceeded by about 2070, 
only 10 years after this level is exceeded under a pathway that 
reaches 4°C warming by the end of the century. However, by 
the 2050s, sea-level rise in the 2°C and 4°C scenarios diverges 
rapidly and 1 meter is not likely to be exceeded until well into 
the 22nd century under 2°C warming.
It should be noted that these projections include only the 
effects of human-induced global climate change and not those 
due to local land subsidence.
Additional Risk Due to Land Subsidence
Deltaic regions are at risk of land subsidence due to the natural 
process whereby accumulating weight causes layers of sediment 
to become compressed. Human activities such as drainage and 
groundwater extraction signiﬁcantly exacerbate this process, 
which increases the threat of coastal ﬂooding. The most prominent 
examples of such anthropogenic subsidence are found at the mega-
deltas of Mekong, Vietnam (6 mm per year); Irrawaddy, Myanmar 
(3.4–6 mm per year); and Chao Phraya, Thailand (13–150 mm) 
(Syvitski et al. 2009). The Bangkok metropolitan area in the Chao 
Phraya delta has experienced up to two meters of subsidence over 
the 20th century and a shoreline retreat of one kilometer south 
of the city (Robert J. Nicholls and Cazenave 2010). The coastal 
zone of Semarang, among the ten largest cities in Indonesia with 
about 1.5 million inhabitants and one of the most important 
harbors in Central Java, is another example of the impact of land 
subsidence. The area is increasingly affected, with an estimated 
area of 2,227 hectares lying below sea-level by 2020 (Marfai and 
King 2008).
Risks to Rural Livelihoods in Deltaic and 
Coastal Regions
Flooding as part of the natural annual cycle plays an important 
economic and cultural role in the Mekong and other river deltas 
(Warner 2010). Processes of sea-level rise and land subsidence, 
however, increase the vulnerability of human populations and 
economic activities such as agriculture and aquaculture to risks, 
including saltwater intrusion and coastal erosion. Cyclones and 
other extreme events exacerbate these threats.
Observed and Projected Biophysical 
Stressors in Deltaic and Coastal Regions
Deltaic and coastal regions are already vulnerable to the conse-
quences of coastal ﬂooding and tropical cyclones. It is projected 
that saltwater intrusion and coastal erosion will adversely impact 
human and economic activities carried out in these areas. Agri-
culture and aquaculture occurring in coastal and deltaic regions, 
which are strong components of South East Asian livelihoods, are 
projected to be signiﬁcantly affected by climate change.
Vulnerability Context
South East Asian deltas are densely populated areas. The population 
density of the Mekong River Delta province, at 427 people per square 
kilometer, is the third highest in the country (General Statistics Ofﬁce 
Of Vietnam 2011). The river deltas are also the region’s rice bowls. 
The Mekong River Delta province is densely farmed and home to 
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approximately 47 percent of the farms in Vietnam (General Statistics 
Ofﬁce Of Vietnam 2011). In 2011, this delta produced about 23.2 mil-
lion tons of rice, or approximately 55 percent of the total Vietnamese 
rice production (General Statistics Ofﬁce Of Vietnam 2013). The rice 
production of the Mekong Delta is of signiﬁcant importance in terms 
of both food security and export revenues. In 2011, the Mekong River 
Delta produced 23.2 million tons of rice paddy (General Statistics 
Ofﬁce Of Vietnam 2013); 18.4 million tons were supplied to the 
population. The Delta rice production represents about 125 percent 
of the Vietnamese rice supply for 2011. Furthermore, 72.4 percent of 
the aquaculture, an industry which accounts for nearly 5 percent of 
GDP in Vietnam, was located in the Mekong River Delta province 
in 2010 (General Statistics Ofﬁce of Vietnam 2012).
Past ﬂooding events have highlighted the vulnerability of the 
South East Asian deltas. Critical South East Asian rice-growing 
areas are already considered to be in increasingly greater peril 
(Syvitski et al. 2009). The area of land that lies below 2 m above 
sea level—which in the Mekong River Delta is as much as the total 
land area—is vulnerable to the risks associated with sea-level rise 
and land subsidence. The area affected by past storm surge and 
river ﬂooding events indicates further vulnerability.
Table 4.2 shows the areas of land in the three main deltas in 
the region that are at risk.
Saltwater Intrusion
Saltwater intrusion poses risks to agricultural production as 
well as to human health. The movement of saline ocean water 
into freshwater aquifers can result in contamination of drinking 
water resources. For example, following high levels of saltwater 
intrusion in the Mekong River Delta in 2005, Long An prov-
ince’s 14,693 hectares of sugar cane production was reportedly 
diminished by 5–10 percent; 1,093 hectares of rice in Duc Hoa 
district were also destroyed (MoNRE 2010).
??????????????????????????????????????
Salinity intrusion into groundwater resources occurs naturally to 
some extent in most coastal regions via the hydraulic connection 
between groundwater and seawater including through canals 
and drainage channels. Due to its higher density, saltwater can 
push inland beneath freshwater (Richard G. Taylor et al. 2012). 
Human activities (i.e., groundwater extraction from coastal wells 
that lowers the freshwater table, which is increasingly undertaken 
to expand shrimp farming) can considerably increase the level of 
saltwater intrusion and its extension inland (Richard G. Taylor 
et al. 2012; Ferguson and Gleeson 2012). In addition, long-term 
changes in climatic variables (e.g., precipitation, temperature) 
and land use signiﬁcantly affect groundwater recharge rates and 
thus exacerbate the risk of saltwater intrusion associated with 
non-climatic drivers and reductions in inﬂows (Ranjan, Kazama, 
Sawamoto, and Sana 2009).
Sea-level rise and tropical cyclone-related storm surges may 
increase salinity intrusion in coastal aquifers (Werner and Sim-
mons 2009; Anderson 2002; A. M. Wilson, Moore, Joye, Anderson, 
and Schutte 2011), thereby contaminating freshwater resources 
(Green et al. 2011; Richard G. Taylor et al. 2012). The effects of 
saltwater intrusion due to tropical cyclones remain long after the 
event itself; coastal aquifer contamination has been observed to 
persist for years (Anderson 2002). In the South East Asian mega-
deltas, saltwater intrusion into coastal aquifers is expected to be 
more severely affected by storm surges than by mean sea-level rise 
(Taylor et al. 2012). The risk of saltwater intrusion is particularly 
relevant for smaller islands, where freshwater can only be trapped 
in small layers and the resulting aquifers are highly permeable 
(Praveena, Siraj, and Aris 2012).
There is an ongoing debate about the possible long-term effects 
of rising mean sea levels on saltwater intrusion. A case study in 
California revealed that groundwater extraction is a much larger 
contributor to saltwater intrusion than rising mean sea levels 
(Loáiciga, Pingel, and Garcia 2012). The response of coastal 
aquifers to seawater intrusion is highly non-linear, however, as 
depth, managerial status (volume of groundwater discharge), and 
timing of rise each act as critical factors determining the intrusion 
depth in response to even small rises in sea levels. This implies 
the potential existence of local tipping points, whereby a new state 
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is reached in which responses to small changes in conditions are 
large and can rapidly lead to full seawater intrusion into a coastal 
aquifer (Mazi, Koussis, and Destouni 2013).
Projections of Saltwater Intrusion
Salinity intrusion into rivers is projected to increase considerably 
for several South East Asian countries. In the case of the Mahakam 
river region in Indonesia, for example, the land area affected by 
saltwater intrusion is expected to increase by 7–12 percent under 
a 4°C warming scenario and a 100 cm sea-level rise by 2100 (Mcleod, 
Hinkel, et al. 2010). In the Mekong River Delta, it is projected that the 
total area affected by salinity intrusion with concentrations higher 
than 4 g/l will increase from 1,303,000 hectares to 1,723,000 hect-
ares with a 30 cm sea-level rise (World Bank 2010b).
A United States Agency for International Development 
(2013) study66 also projects changes in salinity intrusion under 
a 30 cm sea-level rise during the 2045–2069 period, which are 
expected to be moderate during the wet season but signiﬁcantly 
more severe during the dry season. During the wet seasons, salin-
ity intrusion levels are projected to be close to 1980–2005 levels, 
both in terms of maximum salinity and duration at a level of 4g 
per liter. During the dry season, salinity is expected to increase 
over 133,000 hectares located in the Mekong River Delta. Maxi-
mum salinity concentration is projected to increase by more 
than 50 percent compared to the reference period and the salinity 
level is projected to exceed 4g/l.
While recent work by Ranjan et al. (2009) concludes that most 
parts of South East Asia display a relatively low-to-moderate risk of 
saltwater intrusion into coastal groundwater resources, this is for a 
sea-level rise of only about 40 cm above 2000 by 2100, signiﬁcantly 
lower than this report’s projections.67 Using the approach to sea-level 
rise in this report, sea-level rise under the A2 scenario (corresponding 
to a warming of approximately 4°C), is about 100 cm by 2100. This 
projected value for sea-level rise, as well as that for a 2°C world, 
is well above the value used by Ranjan et al. (2009) and would 
certainly lead to a greatly increased risk of saltwater intrusion.
Health Impacts of Saltwater Intrusion
Coastal aquifers provide more than one billion people living in 
coastal areas with water resources. Saltwater intrusions already affect 
these coastal aquifers in different regions of the globe (Ferguson 
and Gleeson 2012). The consumption of salt-contaminated water 
can have detrimental health impacts (A. E. Khan, Ireson, et al. 2011; 
Vineis, Chan, and Khan 2011). The most common consequence of 
excessive salt ingestion is hypertension (He and MacGregor 2007). 
Along with hypertension, there is a broad range of health problems 
potentially linked with increased salinity exposure through bath-
ing, drinking. and cooking; these include miscarriage (A. E. Khan, 
Ireson, et al. 2011b), skin disease, acute respiratory infection, and 
diarrheal disease (Caritas Development Institute 2005).
Coastal Erosion
Many South East Asian countries, notably Vietnam, Thailand, and 
the Philippines, are highly vulnerable to the effects of climate-
change-induced coastal erosion. For example, about 34 percent of 
the increase in erosion rates in the south Hai Thinh commune in 
the Vietnamese Red River delta between 1965–95 and 12 percent 
for the period 1995–2005 has been attributed to the direct effect 
of sea-level rise (Duc et al. 2012).
Coastal erosion, leading to land loss, is one of the processes 
associated with sea-level rise (Sorensen et al. 1980) and storm 
surges. Increasing wind stress and loss of vegetation are further 
factors known to enhance coastal erosion (Prasetya 2007).
The mechanisms of coastal erosion and the associated impacts 
depend on the speciﬁc coastal morphology (Sorensen et al. 1980):
?? Beaches: Sand transport on beaches can be affected by sea-
level rise. At higher mean sea level, wind wave action and 
wind-generated currents change the beach proﬁle.
?? Cliffs: Thin protecting beaches can be removed due to rising sea 
levels, increasing the exposure to wave action and leading to an 
undermining of the cliff face—ﬁnally resulting in cliff recession.
?? Estuaries: Because estuary shorelines are typically exposed to 
milder wave action and exhibit relatively ﬂat proﬁles, rising 
sea levels are expected to result in land losses primarily due 
to inundation (rather than due to erosion).
?? Reefed coasts: Reefs cause wave breaking and thus reduce 
wave action on the beach. Higher mean sea levels reduce this 
protecting effect and thus increase the coastline’s exposure to 
wave stress, which results in increased coastal erosion (see 
also Chapter 4 on “Projected Impacts on Coral Reefs” for more 
on the implications of reef loss).
Sandy beach erosion can lead to increasing exposure and possible 
destruction of ﬁxed structures (e.g., settlements, infrastructures) 
close to the coastline due to the direct impact of storm waves. In 
general, empirical results indicate that the rate of sandy beach ero-
sion signiﬁcantly outperforms that of actual sea-level rise (Zhang et 
al. 2004). However, deriving reliable projections of coastal erosion 
under future sea-level rise and other climate change-related effects, 
such as possible increases in wind stress and heavy rainfall, require 
complex modeling approaches (Dawson et al. 2009).
66 The United States Agency for International Development (2013) report projects 
the impacts of climate change for the period 2045–69 under the IPCC SRES sce-
nario A1B (corresponding to a 2.33°C temperature increase above pre-industrial 
levels) for the Lower Mekong Basin. For the study, authors used six GCMs (NCAR 
CCSM 3.0; MICRO3.2 hires; GISS AOM; CNRM CM3; BCCR BCM2.0; GFDL CM2.1) 
and used 1980–2005 as a baseline period.
67 This work assumed a global-mean temperature increase of about 4°C above pre-
industrial levels (IPCC SRES scenario A2); however, the sea-level rise component came 
from the thermal expansion of the oceans only (i.e., no contribution from the melting 
of glaciers and ice caps that currently contribute about half of global sea-level rise).
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In the Mekong River Delta, coastal erosion is expected to increase 
signiﬁcantly by 2100 under a 100 cm rise (Mackay and Russell 2011). 
Under the same conditions, projected beach loss for the San Fernando 
Bay area of the Philippines amounts to 123,033 m², with a simul-
taneous land loss of 283,085 m² affecting a considerable number 
of residential structures (Bayani-Arias, Dorado, and Dorado 2012). 
The projected loss of mangrove forests due to sea-level rise68 and 
human activities (which are known to increase coastal erosion) is 
also a signiﬁcant concern and is likely to accelerate coastal erosion. 
The presence of the mangrove forests is known to provide coastal 
protection: for the coastline of southern Thailand, studies report an 
estimated 30-percent reduction in coastal erosion in the presence of 
dense mangrove stands (Vermaat and Thampanya 2006).
Impacts on Agricultural and Aquaculture 
Production in Deltaic and Coastal Regions
Agriculture and aquaculture are the two main components of rural 
livelihoods in the South East Asian rivers deltas and coastal areas. 
Salinity intrusion and coastal erosion, along with the increased 
frequency and intensity of extreme weather events, sea-level rise 
and coastal ﬂooding, and increased air and water temperature are 
projected to severely impact rural economic activities.
Agriculture
Agricultural production in deltaic regions is largely based on rice, 
a crop that is relatively resilient to unstable water levels and salin-
ity. Nevertheless, rising sea levels and increasing tropical cyclone 
intensity leading to increasing salinity intrusion and inundation 
pose major risks to rice production in deltaic regions (Wassmann, 
Jagadish, Heuer, Ismail, and Sumﬂeth 2009). Impacts are known 
to vary according to a number of factors, such as cultivar and 
duration and depth of ﬂooding (Jackson and Ram 2003). While 
some cultivars are more resilient than others, there is evidence 
that all rice is vulnerable to sudden and total inundation when 
ﬂooding is sustained for several days. The effect can be fatal, 
especially when the plants are small (Jackson and Ram 2003). 
Temperature increases beyond thresholds during critical growing 
seasons may further impact productivity (Wassmann, Jagadish, 
Heuer, Ismail, and Sumﬂeth 2009). Rice production in the Mekong 
Delta is particularly exposed to sea-level rise due to its low eleva-
tion (see Figure 4.9).
The World Bank Economics of Adaptation to Climate Change 
estimated the impact of a 30 cm sea-level rise by 2050  in the 
Mekong River Delta. The projections undertaken for the pres-
ent report ﬁnd that this level of sea-level rise may be reached 
as early as the 2030s. Such sea-level rise is found to result in a 
loss of 193,000 hectares of rice paddies (about 4.7 percent of the 
province) due to inundation. A larger area of 294,000 hectares 
(about 7.2 percent of the Mekong River Delta province) might also 
be lost for agricultural purposes due to salinity intrusion. Without 
implementing adaptation measures, rice production could decline 
by approximately 2.6 million tons per year, assuming 2010 rice 
productivity. This would represent a direct economic loss in export 
revenue of $1.22 billion at 2011 prices (World Bank 2010b).
Furthermore, consistent with other studies estimating the 
impacts of climate change on crop yields in South East Asia 
(MoNRE 2010; Wassmann, Jagadish, Sumﬂeth, et al. 2009; World 
Bank 2010b), the United States Agency for International Develop-
ment (2013)69 projects a decrease in crop yields and, more speciﬁ-
cally, in rice yields. The World Bank (2010b) estimates rice yield 
68 See Chapter 4 on “Coastal Wetlands.”
69 The United States Agency for International Development (2013) projects the 
impacts of climate change for the period 2045–69 under the IPCC SRES scenario 
A1B (corresponding to a 2.33°C temperature increase above pre-industrial levels) 
for the Lower Mekong Basin. For the study, the authors used six GCMs (NCAR 
CCSM 3.0; MICRO3.2 hires; GISS AOM; CNRM CM3; BCCR BCM2.0; GFDL CM2.1) 
and used 1980–2005 as a baseline period.
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declines from 6–12 percent in the Mekong River Delta. Other crops 
may experience decreases ranging from 3–26 percent by 2050 in 
a wet and dry scenario under the SRES scenario A1B.
In light of the importance of deltaic regions for rice produc-
tion, impacts such as those outlined above pose a major risk to 
affected populations and the region’s economy.
Aquaculture
Aquaculture in South East Asia plays a signiﬁcant role in the 
region’s economic and human development, and both the 
population and the national economies rely considerably on sea 
products and services. In Vietnam, for example, aquaculture 
output constitutes a growing share of the gross domestic product 
(GDP). Between 1996 and 2011, aquaculture output was multi-
plied by 24 and its share of GDP increased from 2.6 percent to 
about 4.8 percent. In addition, since 2001, aquaculture production 
has yielded higher output than capture ﬁsheries (General Statistics 
Ofﬁce of Vietnam 2012). Similar trends can be observed in the 
other South East Asian countries (Delgado, Wada, Rosegrant, 
Meijer, and Ahmed 2003). Fisheries and aquaculture also sup-
ply the region and populations with affordable seafood and ﬁsh, 
which constitute an average of 36 percent of dietary animal protein 
consumed in South East Asia (Food and Agriculture Organization 
of the United Nations 2010).
Sea-level rise, intense extreme weather events, associated 
saltwater intrusion, and warmer air temperatures may impact 
aquaculture—especially when it takes place in brackish water 
and deltaic regions (Box 4.2). The extent of the impact, however, 
remains uncertain (Silva and Soto 2009).
Heat waves and associated warmer water temperatures may 
affect aquaculture in South East Asia. The two most cultured species 
in the region, brackish water tiger shrimp (Penaeus monodon) and 
freshwater striped catﬁsh (Pangasianodon hypophthalmus), have 
very similar temperature tolerance ranges around 28–30°C (Harg-
reaves and Tucker 2003; Pushparajan and Soundarapandian 2010). 
More frequent temperatures above the tolerance range would 
create non-optimum conditions for these species and would be 
expected to decrease aquaculture yields.
As a consequence of salinity intrusion, freshwater and brack-
ish aquaculture farms may have to relocate further upstream. To 
respond to this new salinity pattern, local farmers may further 
have to breed more saline-tolerant species. Upstream reloca-
tion and farming more saline-tolerant species are expected to 
be economically costly. Implementing these measures and their 
associated costs would most certainly affect the socioeconomic 
status of aquaculture-dependant households. Neither the cost of 
adapting aquaculture farming practices to the consequences of 
salinity intrusion nor the direct economic losses for aquaculture-
dependent livelihoods has yet been evaluated (Silva and Soto 2009).
Another study70 (United States Agency for International 
Development 2013) ﬁnds that four climate stressors are projected 
to signiﬁcantly affect aquaculture production: increased tempera-
tures, changes in rainfall patterns, increased storm intensities, and 
higher sea levels. According to the study’s projections, intensive 
aquaculture practices are expected to experience a decrease in 
yields due to the combination of these four climate stressors. 
Semi-intensive and extensive systems may only be vulnerable 
to extreme weather events such as droughts, ﬂoods, and tropical 
cyclones. The authors do not, however, provide aquaculture yield 
decrease estimates due to climate stressors.
Two recent studies estimated the cost of adapting shrimp 
and catﬁsh aquaculture to climate change in the Mekong river 
delta. Estimates range from $130 million per year for the peri-
od 2010–5071 (World Bank 2010b) to $190.7 million per year for 
the period 2010–20 (Kam et al. 2012). These valuations may, 
however, be underestimated. Kam et al. (2012) only took into 
account the costs of upgrades to dykes and water pumping. As 
explained earlier in this chapter, other climate-change-associated 
consequences may affect the ﬁnal calculation of the adaptation 
costs in the aquaculture sector. First, the existing studies do not 
account for the costs of relocating aquaculture farms upstream of 
Box 4.2: The Threat of Typhoons to 
Aquaculture
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70 The United States Agency for International Development (2013) report projects 
the impacts of climate change for the period 2045–69 under the IPCC SRES scenario 
A1B (corresponding to a 2.33°C temperature increase above pre-industrial level) 
for the Lower Mekong Basin. For the study, the authors used six GCMs (NCAR 
CCSM 3.0; MICRO3.2 hires; GISS AOM; CNRM CM3; BCCR BCM2.0; GFDL CM2.1) 
and used 1980–2005 as a baseline period.
71 For the World Bank study, projections were calculated from a set of 21 global 
models in the multimodel ensemble approach, from 1980–99 and 2080–99 under the 
IPCC A1B scenario, corresponding to a 2.8°C temperature increase globally (3.3°C 
above pre-industrial levels).
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rivers, despite the fact that most aquaculture activities take place 
in low-lying areas below one meter of elevation above sea level 
(Carew-Reid 2008). Second, warmer air temperatures may force 
aquaculture farmers to dig deeper ponds in order to keep water 
pond temperatures in the tolerance range of the species being 
cultured (Silva and Soto 2009). Finally, the costs of coping with 
the consequences of tropical cyclones on aquaculture activities 
have not been taken into account. Since the intensity of tropical 
cyclones is expected to increase, so are the associated damages 
and losses (Mendelsohn et al. 2012).
Risks to Coastal Cities
South East Asian coastal cities are projected to be affected by sev-
eral climate change stressors, including increased tropical cyclone 
intensity, sea-level rise, and coastal ﬂooding (Brecht, Dasgupta, 
Laplante, Murray, and Wheeler 2012; Dutta 2011; Hanson et al. 
2011; Muto, Morishita, and Syson 2010; Storch and Downes 2011). 
The consequences of these stressors are likely to be exacerbated by 
human-induced subsidence in low-lying, deltaic regions (Brecht et 
al. 2012a; Hanson et al. 2011). South East Asian cities have already 
been exposed to the consequences of coastal ﬂooding, and signiﬁcant 
economic losses have occurred due to ﬂooding-induced damage 
to public and private infrastructure. Increasingly intense rainfall 
events that exacerbate river ﬂooding (Kron 2012) and heat waves 
(World Bank 2011a) may also have a negative impact on coastal 
cities (see also Chapter 4 on “Regional Patterns of Climate Change”).
Vulnerability Context
South East Asia currently experiences high rates of urban popu-
lation growth, which are led by two converging drivers: a rural 
exodus and demographic growth (Tran et al. 2012). By 2025, the 
population of South East Asian cities is projected to be signiﬁcantly 
higher than at present. Ho Chi Minh City, for example, is expected 
to have a population of approximately 9 million people (compared 
to close to 6 million in 2010); 8.4 million people are projected to 
be living in Bangkok (compared to 7 million in 2010) and 14 mil-
lion in Manila (compared to 11.6 million in 2010) (UN Population 
Prospects 2009).
As a result, increasingly large populations and signiﬁcant 
assets are projected to be exposed to sea-level rise and other 
climate change impacts in low-lying coastal areas. The effect of 
heat extremes are particularly pronounced in urban areas due to 
the urban heat island effect, caused in large part by the density 
of buildings and the size of cities. This results in higher human 
mortality and morbidity rates in cities than in the rural surround-
ings (Gabriel and Endlicher 2011). High levels of urban population 
growth and GDP further increase exposure to climate change 
impacts in coastal urban areas.
Most of the national economic production of the region is 
also concentrated in South East Asia’s cities. It has been esti-
mated, for example, that Ho Chi Minh City in 2008 accounted for 
approximately 26 percent ($58 billion) and Hanoi for 19 percent 
($42 billion) of Vietnam’s $222 billion GDP (based on Purchasing 
Power Parity). Metro Manila’s GDP, at 49 percent ($149 billion), 
represented a signiﬁcant share of that country’s $305 billion GDP 
(PricewaterhouseCoopers 2009; World Bank 2013a). In addition, it is 
estimated that, by 2025, Metro Manila’s GDP will be approximately 
$325 billion, Hanoi’s GDP will be $134 billion, and Ho Chi Minh 
City’s GDP will be $181 billion (PricewaterhouseCoopers 2009). In 
other words, the GDP values in these coastal cities are expected to 
double or even quadruple from the present day. Table 4.3 presents 
the population and GDP growth trends in these and other South 
East Asian cities.
Urban density is a further factor that may inﬂuence a city´s 
vulnerability to climate-driven impacts (World Bank 2011a). 
Figure 4.10 shows different types of cities in terms of population 
and density. Cities like Jakarta and Manila clearly stand out in 
Table 4.3:?????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????? ????????????????
?????????? ??????????????????? ??????? ?????? ??????? ???????? ??????? ??????
GDP (US$ billion, PPP) ???? 92.0 ????? ???? 119.0 ????
???? 231.0 ????? ????? ????? ????
Population (million) 2010 9.2 ???? ??? ??? ???
???? ???? ???? ??? ??? ???
Urban Growth Rate 
in 2001 at Country Level
2001 ?? ?? 3% 2% 3%
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terms of population size; however, the density of Jakarta, for 
example, is lower than that of smaller cities like Yangon and 
Zamboanga. In cities where adequate infrastructure and institu-
tional capacity are lacking to support large urban populations, 
density can increase the vulnerability to climate-driven impacts 
by exposing larger numbers of people and assets in a given area 
of land (Dodman 2009).
Informal Settlements
High urban growth rates, combined with inadequate responses to 
the housing needs of urban populations in the region, are leading 
to the expansion of informal settlements. For example, 79 percent 
of the urban population in Cambodia, 41 percent in Vietnam, 
and 44 percent in the Philippines lived in informal settlements 
in 2005 (UN-HABITAT 2013).
Informal settlements are characterized by a lack of water, a 
lack of sanitation, overcrowding, and nondurable housing struc-
tures (UN-HABITAT 2007). Durable housing, in contrast, has 
been deﬁned as “a unit that is built on a non-hazardous location 
and has a structure permanent and adequate enough to protect 
its inhabitants from the extreme of climate conditions, such as 
rain, heat, cold, and humidity” (UN-HABITAT 2007). In informal 
settlements, populations are chronically exposed to health risks 
from perinatal complications to diarrheal diseases to physical 
injuries (C. McMichael et al. 2012). If the number of people living 
in informal settlements continues to grow, the number of people 
vulnerable to these threats will grow too (Box 4.3).
Water in South East Asia is a major vector for diseases such 
as diarrhea and cholera. Improved water sources and sanitation 
facilities contribute to keep water-borne diseases at bay. Despite 
signiﬁcant improvements in South East Asian cities, large propor-
tions of the region’s urban populations (27 percent in Indonesia and 
nine percent in Vietnam) still lack access to improved sanitation 
facilities. In addition, eight percent of the urban population in 
Indonesia and one percent in Vietnam do not have access to 
clean water sources (World Bank 2013c). Lack of access to these 
resources contributes to the vulnerability of South East Asian 
cities to climate-change-induced impacts and associated health 
complications. Table 4.4 summarizes the key vulnerabilities of the 
South East Asian countries studied in this report.
Projected Impacts on Coastal Cities
Projected Exposed Populations
Applying the Dynamic Interactive Vulnerability Assessment model, 
Hanson et al. (2011) project impacts of sea-level rise, taking into 
account natural subsidence (uplift), human-induced subsidence, 
and population and economic growth. They assume a homog-
enous sea-level rise of 50 cm above current levels by 2070 and 
a uniform decline in land level of 50 cm from 2005–70 to reﬂect 
human-induced subsidence. Note that the projections produced 
in this report give a global mean sea-level rise of 50 cm likely as 
early as the 2060s in a 4°C world (greater than 66-percent prob-
ability) and by the 2070s in a 2°C world. There is also a 10-per-
cent chance of this level of rise occurring globally by the 2050s 
(above 2000 sea levels).
For tropical storms, Hanson et al. (2011) assume a 10 percent 
increase in high water levels with no expansion in affected areas; 
this may actually underestimate future exposure. They also estimate 
population in the cities in the 2070s according to three factors: 
projected regional population, the change in urbanization rate, 
and speciﬁc properties of each city. Population data are based on 
the United Nations’ World Urbanization Prospects (2005). Urban 
population projections for 2070 are extrapolated from the 2005–
30  trends in urbanization and assume that urbanization rates 
saturate at 90 percent. Depending on the national context, this may 
over- or underestimate future population exposure in urban areas.
Figure 4.10:???????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????
Manila 
Ho Chi Minh  
Jakarta
Bankok 
Kuala Lumpur  
Bandung 
SingaporeSurabaya , (Ind.) 
Yangon 
0 
2 
4 
6 
8 
10 
12 
14 
16 
18 
20 
22 
24 
26
28
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Density
Population
8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
Zamboanga (Phil.)Hanoi
?????????????????????????
Box 4.3: Freshwater Infrastructure
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????
plants, pump houses, and pipes. Natural disasters report-
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????? ????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
TURN DOWN THE HEAT: CLIMATE EXTREMES, REGIONAL IMPACTS, AND THE CASE FOR RESILIENCE
??
The authors ﬁnd that 3.9 million people in South East Asian 
cities were exposed to coastal ﬂooding in 2005 caused by storm 
surges and sea-level rise. Based on these assumptions, they esti-
mate that 28 million people are projected to be exposed to 50 cm 
sea-level rise, taking into account human-induced subsidence and 
increased storminess in the 2070s.
Jakarta, Yangon, Manila, Bangkok, and Ho Chi Minh City are 
projected to be among the cities in South East Asia most affected 
by sea-level rise and increased storm surges. Table 4.5 shows the 
number of people projected to be exposed to the impacts of sea-
level rise, increased storminess, and human-induced subsidence 
for ﬁve cities in the region.
Brecht et al. (2012) examine the consequences for a 100 cm 
sea-level rise in the same region, making the assumption that the 
urbanization rate will remain constant between 2005 and 2100. 
Based on this ﬁxed urbanization rate, which may signiﬁcantly 
underestimate future population exposure, they ﬁnd slightly lower 
numbers of affected people for a 100 cm sea-level rise scenario, 
increased tropical storm intensity, and human-induced subsid-
ence. For 2100, the authors calculate the increased tropical storm 
intensity by multiplying projected sea-level rise by 10 percent. 
Their results are shown in Table 4.6.
Brecht et al. (2012) and Hanson et al. (2011) apply contrasting 
assumptions, therefore comparing the change in affected population 
in the different levels of sea-level rise (50 cm and 100 cm) is difﬁcult. 
The estimates do, however, offer relevant indications concerning 
the order of magnitude of people projected to be exposed in coastal 
cities by these sea-level rises. Overall, the studies give a potential 
range of the total projected population exposed to sea-level rise and 
increased storminess in South East Asian of 5–22 million during 
the second half of the 21st century.
Projected Exposed Assets
Hanson et al. (2011) also estimate the current and projected asset 
exposure for South East Asian coastal cities. Their study is based 
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on the physical (i.e., sea level, storms, and subsidence) and 
demographic assumptions discussed in Chapter 4 under “Projected 
Impacts on Economic and Human Development.”. To evaluate 
asset exposure, they estimate cities’ future GDP by assuming that 
urban GDP grows at the same rate as the respective national or 
regional GDP per capita trends throughout the period 2005–75. The 
projected exposed population is transposed into exposed assets 
by multiplying each country’s GDP per capita by ﬁve (projected 
exposed asset = projected exposed population * estimated GDP 
per capita * 5). According to Hanson et al. (2011), this methodol-
ogy is widely used in the insurance industry.
The projected asset exposure for South East Asia in 2070 rises 
signiﬁcantly due to the increased impacts of rising sea levels, more-
intense tropical storms, and fast economic growth. Based on the 
assumptions and calculations, the authors project that coastal cities’ 
asset exposure will rises by 2,100–4,600 percent between 2005–70. 
Table 4.7 summarizes the current and projected exposed assets.
The ﬁgures presented in this table should be interpreted with 
care as the asset exposure projections in the study by Hanson et 
al. are based on population exposure projections that assume a 
steady urbanization rate (saturating at 90 percent of the coun-
try population). As a consequence, projected asset exposure is 
extremely high. The table only displays an order of magnitude of 
the impacts of a 50-cm sea-level rise, increased storminess, and 
human-induced subsidence on exposed assets in coastal cities in 
South East Asia in 2070 if no adaptation measures are carried out.
Projected Impacts on Individual Cities
The current understanding of the impacts of sea-level rise on 
speciﬁc coastal cities in South East Asia is rather limited. Despite 
global studies for port and coastal cities (e.g., Brecht et al. 2012; 
Hanson et al. 2011), studies conducted at the city level on the 
impacts of sea-level rise and increased storm intensity are scarce. 
However, projections accounting for sea-level rise, increased 
cyclone intensity, and human-induced subsidence are available 
for Ho Chi Minh City, Manila, and Bangkok.
Ho Chi Minh City
Storch and Downes (2011) quantify current and future citywide ﬂood 
risks to Ho Chi Minh City by taking into account urban develop-
ment (population and asset growth) and sea-level rise scenarios. 
Due to the lack of data available on land subsidence for the city, 
however, their assessment does not include subsidence. They use 
two possible amplitudes of change for sea-level rise in the study: 
50 cm and 100 cm. Combined with the current tidal maximum 
of 150 cm, they quantify built-up land exposed to water levels 
of 150 cm, 200 cm, and 250 cm. According to the report’s projec-
tions, a 50-cm sea-level rise would be reached between 2055–65 in 
the RCP8.5 scenario and between 2065–75 in the RCP2.6 scenario. 
According to the draft land-use plan for 2010–25, the built-up areas 
increase by 50 percent (approximately 750 km²). In these conditions, 
the authors project that up to 60 percent of the built-up area will be 
exposed to a 100 cm sea-level rise. In the absence of adaptation, the 
planned urban development for the year 2025 further increases Ho 
Chi Minh City’s exposure to sea-level rise by 17 percentage points.
Bangkok
Dutta (2011) assesses the socioeconomic impacts of ﬂoods due to 
sea-level rise in Bangkok. He uses a model combining surface and 
river ﬂows to simulate different magnitudes of sea-level rise and 
uses 1980 as the baseline year. The study takes into account two 
different sea-level rise scenarios: 32 cm in 2050 and 88 cm in 2100. 
For the projections of future population and urbanization, the author 
uses the IPCC SRES B1 scenario. For this simulation, the maximum 
population density is 20,000 people per square kilometer (compared 
to 16,000 in Manila, the highest urban population density in 2009), 
effectively leading to an expansion of the total area. Based on this 
simulation of ﬂood and population, Dutta projects that 43 percent 
of the Bangkok area will be ﬂooded in 2025, and 69 percent in 2100. 
The results are displayed in Table 4.8.
According to this simulation, the population is expected to 
be increasingly affected as the sea level rises. Dutta (2011) proj-
ects that, if no adaptation is carried out, 5.7 million people 
in 2025 and 8.9 million people in 2100 are going to be affected 
by inundations in Bangkok when the sea level reaches 88 cm. 
According to the report’s projections, a sea-level rise of 88 cm in 
Bangkok may be reached between 2085 and 2095 in a 4°C world. 
In a 2°C world, sea-level rise of around 75 cm by the end of the 21st 
century would likely limit the percentage of total area of Bangkok 
exposed to inundations between 57–69 percent.
Manila
Muto et al. (2010) assess the local effects of precipitation, sea-level 
rise, and increased storminess on ﬂoods in metropolitan Manila 
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in 2050 under the IPCC SRES scenarios B1 (1.6°C above pre-indus-
trial levels) and A1F1 (2.2°C above pre-industrial levels). Accord-
ing to the study, these scenarios correspond to 19 cm and 29 cm 
increases in sea-level elevation and 9.4 percent and 14.4 percent 
increases in rainfall precipitations (in scenarios B1 and A1F1, 
respectively). The storm surge height as a consequence of the 
increased tropical storm intensity is projected to rise by 100 cm in 
both scenarios. In the A1F1 scenario, the authors ﬁnd that a 100-
year return-period ﬂood is projected to generate damages of up 
to 24 percent of Manila’s total GDP by 2050 and a 30-year return-
period ﬂood would generate damages of approximately 15 percent 
of GDP. The authors ﬁnd, however, that projected damages would 
be only nine percent of the GDP for a 100-year return-period ﬂood 
and three percent for a 30-year return-period ﬂood if infrastructures 
improvements based on the Master Plan designed in 1990 are 
properly implemented.
Coastal and Marine Ecosystems
Livelihoods in the Asia-Paciﬁc region, particularly in South East 
Asia, are often highly dependent on the ecosystem services provided 
by ocean and coastal environments. The associated ecosystem 
goods and services include food, building materials, medicine, 
tourism revenues, and coastal protection through reduced wave 
energy (Hoegh-Guldberg 2013; Villanoy et al. 2012). The ﬁsher-
ies supported by coral reefs, for example, are often vital to the 
livelihoods and diets of populations along reef coastlines (Ove 
Hoegh-Guldberg 1999; Cinner et al. 2012). Marine ecosystems are 
increasingly at risk from the impacts of climate change, including 
ocean acidiﬁcation (Meissner, Lippmann, and Sen Gupta 2012), 
sea-surface water warming (Lough 2012), and rising sea levels 
(Gilman, Ellison, Duke, and Field 2008).
Coastal Wetlands
Coastal wetlands, including mangrove forests, provide important 
ecological services for the region. Mangroves contribute to human 
wellbeing through a range of activities, including provisioning 
(timber, fuel wood, and charcoal), regulating (ﬂood, storm, and 
erosion control and the prevention of saltwater intrusion), habitat 
(breeding, spawning, and nursery habitats for commercial ﬁsh spe-
cies and biodiversity), and cultural services (recreation, aesthetic, 
non-use). The mean economic value of these activities in South 
East Asia has been estimated at $4,185 per hectare per year as 
of 2007 (L. M. Brander et al. 2012). South East Asian countries 
shared mangrove forests covering an area of about six million 
hectares as of 2000 (L. M. Brander et al. 2012). Indonesia (3.1 mil-
lion ha), Malaysia (505,000 ha), Myanmar (495,000 ha), and the 
Philippines (263,000 ha) are ranked 1, 6, 7 and 15 among countries 
worldwide with mangrove forests (Giri et al. 2011). Indonesia 
alone accounts for 22.6 percent of the total global mangrove area. 
Worldwide, mangrove forests are under signiﬁcant pressure due 
to such human activities as aquaculture, harvesting, freshwater 
diversion, land reclamation, agriculture, and coastal development. 
These factors were responsible for at least 35 percent of the global 
mangrove loss between 1980 and 2000, particularly in South East 
Asia (Valiela, Bowen, and York 2001). Rapid sea-level rise poses 
additional risks (Mcleod, Hinkel, et al. 2010).
The vulnerability and response of mangrove forests to sea-
level rise is connected to various surface and subsurface processes 
inﬂuencing the elevation of the mangroves’ sediment surface (Gil-
man et al. 2008). In the long term, mangroves can react to rising 
mean sea level by landward migration. This option is limited in 
many locations, however, by geographic conditions (e.g., steep 
coastal inclines) and human activities (Ove Hoegh-Guldberg and 
Bruno 2010). Erosion of the seaward margin associated with sea-
level rise and a possible increase of secondary productivity due to 
the greater availability of nutrients as a result of erosion further 
threaten mangrove forests (Alongi 2008).
Large losses are projected for countries in the region for a sea-
level rise of 100 cm, which is this report’s best estimate in a 4°C 
world warming scenario regionally by the 2080s (and globally by 
the 2090s). Sea-level rise is expected to play a signiﬁcant role in the 
decline of coastal wetland, low unvegetated wetlands, mangroves, 
coastal forests, and salt marshes with a 100 cm sea-level rise (Mcleod, 
Hinkel, et al. 2010).72 The study was conducted using the DIVA 
model for the six countries of the “Coral Triangle,” which includes 
provinces in the Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia, Timor-Leste, Papua 
New Guinea, and the Solomon Islands. In a 4°C world, total coastal 
wetland area is projected to decrease from 109,000 km² to 76,000 km² 
(about 30 percent) between 2010 and 2100.
At the level of administrative units, between 12 percent 
and 73 percent of coastal wetlands are projected to be lost at 
a 100 cm sea-level rise by the 2080s (compared to wetland area 
in 2010). Regions with a projected loss of more than 50 percent 
can be found in Timor-Leste, Indonesia (Jakarta Raya, Sulawesi 
72 The projections for sea-level rise are 100cm by 2100, above 1995 levels.
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Tengah, Sulawesi Tenggara, Sumatra Barat, Yogyakarta), Malaysia 
(Terengganu), and the Philippines (Cagayan Valley, Central Luzon, 
Central Visayas, Ilocos, Western Visayas), as well as parts of Papua 
New Guinea and the Solomon Islands. For the Philippines, a coastal 
wetland loss of about 51 percent by 2100 is projected (compared 
to 2010) (Mcleod, Hinkel, et al. 2010).
Blankespoor, Dasgupta, and Laplante (2012) apply the DIVA 
model to assess the economic implications of a 100 cm sea-level rise 
on coastal wetlands and estimate that the East Asia Paciﬁc region 
may suffer the biggest loss in economic value from the impacts 
of such a rise. They ﬁnd that the region could lose approximately 
$296.1–368.3 million per year in economic value (2000 U.S. dol-
lars). Vietnam is also expected to lose 8,533 square kilometers 
of freshwater marsh (a 65-percent loss), and the Philippines is 
expected to lose 229 square kilometers of great lakes and wetlands 
by 2100 (or almost 100 percent of the current surface).
Projected Impacts on Coral Reefs
Coral reefs in South East Asia, which play a pivotal role in coastal 
rural livelihoods by providing affordable food and protection 
against waves, are exposed to ocean acidiﬁcation and warming 
temperature as well as to increased human activities such as pol-
lution and overﬁshing.
Coral Reefs in South East Asia
The IPCC Fourth Assessment Report found that coral reefs are vul-
nerable to increased sea-surface temperature and, as a result, to 
thermal stress. Increases of 1–3°C in sea-surface temperature are 
projected to result in more frequent bleaching events and wide-
spread coral mortality unless thermal adaptation or acclimatization 
occurs. The scientiﬁc literature published since 2007, when the 
AR4 was completed, gives a clearer picture of these risks and also 
raises substantial concerns about the effects of ocean acidiﬁcation 
on coral reef growth and viability.
Globally, coral reefs occupy about 10 percent of the tropical 
oceans and tend to occur in the warmer (+1.8°C) parts of lower 
sea-surface temperature variability in regions where sea-surface 
temperatures are within a 3.3°C range 80 percent of the time; this 
compares to temperatures of non-reef areas, which remain within 
a 7.0°C range for 80 percent of the time (Lough 2012). Coral reefs 
ﬂourish in relatively alkaline waters. In the Asia-Paciﬁc region, 
coral reefs occur between 25°N and 25°S in warm, light-penetrated 
waters (O. Hoegh-Guldberg 2013).
At the global level, healthy coral reef ecosystems provide habitat 
for over one million species (O. Hoegh-Guldberg 2013) and ﬂourish 
in waters that would otherwise be unproductive due to low nutri-
ent availability (Ove Hoegh-Guldberg 1999). The loss of coral reef 
communities is thus likely to result in diminished species richness, 
species extinctions, and the loss of species that are key to local 
ecosystems (N. A. J. Graham et al. 2006; K. M. Brander 2007). The 
IPCC AR4 found with high conﬁdence that climate change is likely 
to adversely affect corals reefs, ﬁsheries, and other marine-based 
resources. Research published since 2007 has strongly reinforced 
this message. This section examines projected changes and impacts 
due to climate change in the South East Asian region.
One of the highest concentrations of marine species glob-
ally occurs in the Coral Triangle. Coral reefs in South East Asia73 
have been estimated to cover 95,790 km²; within this region, reef 
estimates for the Philippines are approximately 26,000 km² and, 
for Vietnam, 1,100 km74 (Nañola, Aliño, and Carpenter 2011). 
In addition to the climate-change-related risks posed to reefs, 
including ocean acidiﬁcation and the increasing frequency and 
duration of ocean temperature anomalies, reefs are also at risk 
from such human activities as destructive ﬁshing methods and 
coastal development resulting in increasing sediment outﬂow onto 
reefs (L. Burke, Selig, and Spalding 2002).
Projected Degradation and Loss due to Ocean 
???????????????????????????????????????
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Coral reefs have been found to be vulnerable to ocean acidiﬁcation 
as a consequence of increasing atmospheric CO2 concentrations. 
Critically, the reaction of CO2 with seawater reduces the availability 
of carbonate ions that are used by various marine biota for skeleton 
and shell formation in the form of calcium carbonate (CaCO3). Surface 
waters are typically supersaturated with aragonite (a mineral form of 
CaCO3), favoring the formation of shells and skeletons. If saturation 
levels of aragonite are below a value of 1.0, the water is corrosive to 
pure aragonite and unprotected aragonite shells (R. a Feely, Sabine, 
Hernandez-Ayon, Ianson, and Hales 2008). Due to anthropogenic 
CO2 emissions, the levels at which waters become undersaturated 
with respect to aragonite have been observed to have shoaled when 
compared to pre-industrial levels (R. A. Feely et al. 2004).
Mumby et al. (2011) identify three critical thresholds which 
coral reefs may be at risk of crossing as atmospheric CO2 concentra-
tions increase: ﬁrst, the degradation threshold, beyond which an 
ecosystem begins to degrade (for example, above 350 ppm, coral 
bleaching has been observed to begin occurring); second, thresh-
olds of ecosystem state and process, which determine whether an 
ecosystem will exhibit natural recovery or will shift into a more 
damaged state; and, ﬁnally, the physiological threshold, whereby 
essential functions become severely impaired. These thresholds 
involve different processes, would have different repercussions, 
73 In the study referred to (L. Burke et al. 2002), South East Asia encompasses 
Indonesia; the Philippines; Spratly and Paracel Islands; Japan; Thailand; Myanmar; 
Vietnam; China; Taiwan, China; Brunei Darussalam; Singapore; and Cambodia.
74 It should be noted that satellite measurements yield lower values (Nañola et al. 2011)
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are associated with different levels of uncertainty, and are under-
stood by scientists to varying extents. Mumby et al. (2011) stress 
that while all types of threshold seriously undermine the healthy 
functioning of the reef ecosystem, not all of them imply collapse.
Earlier work by Veron et al. (2009) indicates that a level 
of 350 ppm CO2 could be a long-term viability limit for coral reefs, 
if multiple stressors such as high sea surface water temperature 
events, sea-level rise, and deterioration in seawater quality are 
included. This level of CO2 concentration has already been exceeded 
in the last decade. Even under the lowest of the AR5 scenarios 
(corresponding to a 2°C world), which reaches a peak CO2 concen-
tration at around 450 ppm by mid-century before beginning a slow 
decline, a level of 350 ppm would not be achieved again for many 
centuries. At the peak CO2 concentration for the lowest scenario, 
it has been estimated that global coral reef growth would slow 
down considerably, with signiﬁcant impacts well before 450 ppm 
is reached. Impacts could include reduced growth, coral skeleton 
weakening, and increased temperature sensitivity (Cao and Cal-
deira 2008). At 550 ppm CO2 concentration, which in a 4°C world 
warming scenario would be reached by around the 2050s, it has 
been projected that coral reefs will start to dissolve due to ocean 
acidiﬁcation (Silverman et al. 2009).
Vulnerability to Warming Waters
Since the 1980s, elevated sea-surface temperatures have been 
increasingly linked with mass coral bleaching events in which 
the symbiotic algae (zooxanthellae) and their associated pigments 
are temporarily or permanently expelled (Glynn 1984; Goreau and 
Hayes 1994; Ove Hoegh-Guldberg 1999).
Coral mortality after bleaching events increases with the length 
and extent to which temperatures rise above regional summer 
maxima (Ove Hoegh-Guldberg 1999). Coral bleaching can be 
expected when a region’s warm season maximum temperature 
is exceeded by 1°C for more than four weeks; bleaching becomes 
progressively worse at higher temperatures and/or longer periods 
during which the regional threshold temperature is exceeded 
(Goreau and Hayes 1994; Ove Hoegh-Guldberg and Bruno 2010). 
It is clear from model projections that, within a few decades, 
warming of tropical sea surface waters would exceed the historical 
thermal range and alter the physical environment of the coral reefs.
As expected, tropical oceans have been warming at a slower 
rate than globally (average of 0.08°C per decade over 1950–2011 in 
the tropics, or about 70 percent of the global average rate). 
The observed temperatures in the period 1981–2011 were 0.3–
0.4°C above 1950–80  levels averaged over the tropical oceans 
(Lough 2012). Overall, 65 percent of the tropical oceans have 
warmed signiﬁcantly while 34 percent have as yet shown no 
signiﬁcant change. The observed absolute warming was greatest 
in the northwest and northeast tropical Paciﬁc and the southwest 
tropical Atlantic. It is of substantial relevance to South East Asia 
that, when taking into account inter-annual variability, the strongest 
changes are observed in the near-equatorial Indian and western 
Paciﬁc as well as the Atlantic Ocean.
Global warming-induced in exceedance of the temperature 
tolerance ranges within which coral reefs have evolved has been 
projected to produce substantial damages through thermal stress to 
the coral reefs. There is signiﬁcant evidence that reefs at locations 
with little natural temperature variability (and thus historically 
few warm events) are particularly vulnerable to changes in marine 
chemistry and temperatures (Carilli, Donner, and Hartmann 2012). 
Environmental conditions and background climate conditions 
appear to further inﬂuence the upper thermal tolerance threshold 
temperature such that it varies across locations (Carilli et al. 2012). 
Taking this into account, Boylan and Kleypas (2008) suggest that 
for areas with low natural variability the threshold temperature 
for bleaching is better described (compared to the 1°C threshold) 
with the regionally based threshold twice the standard deviation 
of warm season sea-surface temperature anomalies. For tropical 
reef organisms, compromised physiological processes have been 
observed beyond temperatures of around 30–32°C (Lough 2012).
Significant increases above the historical range of sea-
surface temperatures have been observed in the tropics. Lough 
(2012), for example, ﬁnds that coral reef locations with historical 
(1950–80) ranges of 27–28°C and 28–29°C experienced a shift in 
the 1981–2011 period toward a range of 29–30°C. The percentage of 
months within the upper (29–30°C) range increased signiﬁcantly, 
up 3.1 percentage points per decade over the period 1950–2011. 
There was also a signiﬁcant 0.4 percentage point per decade change 
in the number of months within the 31–32°C range, indicating 
that this estimated upper thermal tolerance threshold for tropical 
coral reefs could be exceeded if this trend continues.
For projections of the risks of global warming on coral reef 
bleaching, it is now standard to use indicators of thermal exposure; 
these include degree heating weeks (DHW) and degree heating 
months (DHM), which are deﬁned as the product of exposure 
intensity (degrees Celsius above threshold) and duration (in weeks 
or months) (Meissner et al. 2012). Bleaching begins to occur when 
the cumulative DHW exceeds 4°C-weeks (1 month within a 12-week 
period) and severe when the DHW exceeds 8°C-weeks (or 2 months).
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Temperature
Meissner et al. (2012) project that a combination of reduced arago-
nite saturation levels (associated with the process of ocean acidiﬁ-
cation) and increasing sea-surface temperatures will expose reefs 
to more severe thermal stress, resulting in bleaching. Projections 
for a 2°C world show some recovery of both aragonite saturation 
and sea surface temperatures within the next 400 years. For this 
scenario, anomalies of mean tropical sea surface temperature do 
not exceed 1.9°C and zonal mean aragonite saturation remains 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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above 3 between 30°N and 30°S. It should be noted that present-day 
open ocean aragonite saturation levels are between 3.28 and 4.06, 
and no coral reefs are found in environments with levels below 3.
In a 3°C world and in a 4°C world, no recovery of either tem-
perature or aragonite saturation occurs within the next 400 years. 
Furthermore, the zonal mean aragonite saturation at all latitudes 
falls below 3.3 as early as 2050 in a 3°C world. In a 4°C world, 
this level is reached as early as 2040; it reaches 3 by the 2050s, and 
continues a steady decline thereafter. In both a 3°C world and a 4°C 
world, open ocean surface seawater aragonite is projected to drop 
below thresholds by the end of the century (Meissner et al. 2012).
By the 2030s (approximately 1.2°C above pre-industrial lev-
els), 66 percent of coral reef areas are projected to be thermally 
marginal, with CO2 concentrations around 420 ppm. In the same 
timeframe in a 4°C warming scenario (about 1.5°C warming), 
about 85 percent of coral reef areas are projected to be thermally 
marginal for a CO2 concentration of around 450 ppm by the 2030s 
(Meissner et al. 2012).
By the 2050s, with global mean warming of around 1.5°C under a 
low emissions (2°C warming by 2100) scenario and about 2°C under 
a high emissions (4°C warming by 2100) scenario, 98–100 percent of 
coral reefs are projected to be thermally marginal. In a 4°C warming 
scenario, in 2100 virtually all coral reefs will have been subject to a 
severe bleaching event every year (Meissner et al. 2012).
The western Paciﬁc clearly stands out as a highly vulner-
able area in all scenarios; even with 2°C warming, in 2100 there 
is a 60–100 percent probability of a bleaching event happening 
every year (see Figure 4.11). It is unlikely that coral reefs would 
survive such a regime. Under all concentration pathways (i.e., 
ranging from 2°C to above 4°C by the end of the century), virtu-
ally every coral reef in South East Asia would experience severe 
thermal stress by the year 2050 under warming levels of 1.5°C–2°C 
above pre-industrial levels (Meissner et al. 2012). Furthermore, 
by the 2030s, there is a 50-percent likelihood of bleaching events 
under a 1.2°C warming scenario and a 70-percent likelihood under 
a 1.5°C warming scenario (above pre-industrial levels).
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The analysis of Frieler et al. (2012) produces quite similar 
results. By 1.5°C warming above pre-industrial levels, about 89 per-
cent of coral reefs are projected to be experiencing severe bleach-
ing (DHM 2 or greater); by 2°C warming, that number rises to 
around 100 percent. Highly optimistic assumptions on coral reef 
thermal adaptation potential would be required if even 66 percent 
of coral reef areas were to be preserved under a 2°C warming 
scenario; only 10 percent would be preserved without such opti-
mistic interpretations (Frieler et al. 2012), which seems the more 
likely assumption. Indeed, a recent statistical meta-analysis of 
over 200 papers published so far on the effects of acidiﬁcation on 
marine organisms suggests that increased temperatures enhance 
the sensitivity of marine species to acidiﬁcation. This study further 
strengthens the evidence that acidiﬁcation negatively impacts the 
abundance, survival, growth, and development of many calcify-
ing marine organisms with corals, calcifying algae, and molluscs 
(e.g. shell ﬁsh) the most severely impacted (Kroeker et al. 2013).
At ﬁner spatial resolution, and taking further stresses such 
as coastal pollution and overexploitation into account, Mcleod, 
Mofﬁtt, et al. (2010) identify the eastern Philippines as the most 
threatened coral reef area of the Coral Triangle.
Human and Development Implications of Coral Reef 
Loss and Degradation
Implications for Coastal Protection
Coral reefs play a vital role in coastal protection. This is particularly 
so in the Philippines. Located in the typhoon belt and consisting of 
an archipelagic structure, the Philippines is naturally vulnerable to 
the impacts of projected sea-level rise and the synergistic effects of 
high-energy waves associated with typhoons (Villanoy et al. 2012).
Villanoy et al. (2012) simulate the role of reefs on coastal wave 
energy dissipation under sea-level rise (0.3 m and 1 m) and under 
storm events at two sites in the Philippines facing the Paciﬁc Ocean. 
Employing a model to simulate wave propagation and prescribing 
a mean depth of 2 m for the reef, they show that for a sea-level rise 
scenario where wave height is increased by 1–200 cm, coral reefs 
continue to afford protection by dissipating wave energy (which 
reduces wave run-up on land). Under simulated sea-level rise and 
wave heights of 400 cm, however, the wave dissipating effects of 
the reefs, while still measurable, are signiﬁcantly decreased. This 
shows that efﬁciency of coastal protection by coral reefs depends 
on the degree of sea-level rise.
It should be noted, however, that Villanoy et al. (2012) assume 
a healthy reef with 50–80 percent coral cover and suggest that 
some corals might grow fast enough to keep pace with projected 
sea-level rise. While they note that the fast-growing species might 
be more susceptible to coral bleaching due to warmer waters, 
they take neither this nor the impacts of ocean acidiﬁcation into 
account. Thus, their assessment of the effectiveness of coral reefs 
for coastal protection may be too optimistic, as oceanic conditions 
in a 4°C world (which would roughly correspond to a 100 cm sea-
level rise) are not considered here. Projections by Meissner et al. 
(2012) show that even under lower warming scenarios, all coral 
reefs in South East Asia as early as 2050 will have experienced 
severe bleaching events every year.
This site-speciﬁc modeling study does, however, conﬁrm the 
importance of coral reefs for protection against wave run-up on 
land. Thus, natural protection against the impacts of sea-level rise 
due to climate change would itself be degraded due to the effects 
of climate change.
Implications for Fishing Communities and the Economic 
Consequences
Coral reefs are pivotal for the socioeconomic welfare of about 500 mil-
lion people globally (Wilkinson 2008). South East Asia alone 
has 138 million people living on the coast and within 30 km of a 
coral reef (L. Burke, Reytar, Spalding, and Perry 2011)—deﬁned as 
reef-associated populations. Coral reefs ﬁsheries are mostly suitable 
for small-scale ﬁshing activities, thanks to the easy accessibility of 
the coral reefs and the need for only minimal investments in capital 
and technology (Whittingham, Townsley, and Campbell 2003). 
Vietnam and the Philippines each have between 100,000 and 1 mil-
lion reef ﬁshers (excluding aquaculture activities) (L. Burke et al. 
2011). Coastal and reef-associated communities are thus likely to 
suffer major social, economic, and nutritional impacts as a result 
of climate change (Sumaila and Cheung 2010).
It is important to note that under future stress, reefs may not 
cease to exist altogether but would become dominated by other 
species. These species might not, however, be suitable for human 
consumption (Ove Hoegh-Guldberg 2010). The present understand-
ing of the mid- and long-term economic and social implications 
of coral reef degradation induced by warming sea temperatures 
and ocean acidiﬁcation on reef ﬁsheries is limited (S. K. Wilson 
et al. 2010). N. A. J. Graham et al. (2006) likewise note the lack 
of empirical data on the implications of coral bleaching for other 
components of reef ecosystems, including for the longer-term 
responses of species such as reef ﬁsh.
Nicholas A. J. Graham et al. (2008) and Nicholas A. J. Graham 
et al. (2011) assess the impacts of climate change on coral ﬁsh 
stock (Box 4.4). In these studies, climate-change-induced impacts 
on coral reefs were estimated based on the consequences of 
the 1998 coral bleaching event in the Indian Ocean. The authors 
ﬁnd a clear correlation between coral bleaching events and the 
depletion of some coral ﬁsh species (the most vulnerable species 
to climate disturbance are the obligate and facultative corallivores). 
Climate change is, however, not the only stressor depleting reef 
ﬁsh stock. The unsustainable use of resources, due primarily to 
overﬁshing, also signiﬁcantly contributes to declines in coral ﬁsh 
stocks (Newton, Côté, Pilling, Jennings, and Dulvy 2007).
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As a consequence, species vulnerable to one threat (climate 
or ﬁshing) is unlikely to be affected by the other. According to 
Nicholas A J Graham et al. (2011), this reduces the probabilities 
of strong synergistic effects of ﬁshing and climate disturbances 
at the species level. Nevertheless, at the coral ﬁsh community 
level, biodiversity is expected to be severely affected as species 
that are less vulnerable to one stressor are prone to be affected 
by the other.
Edward H. Allison et al. (2005) developed a simpliﬁed econo-
metric model to project the consequences of climate change on 
per capita ﬁsh consumption. The analysis takes into account 
four different factors to estimate future ﬁsh consumption: human 
population density, current ﬁsh consumption, national coral reef 
area, and an arbitrary range of values for the loss of coral reef 
(from 5–15 percent over the ﬁrst 15 years of projections). They ﬁnd 
that, in any loss scenario, per capita ﬁsh consumption is expected 
to decrease due to congruent factors: increased population, loss 
of coral reef at the national level, and the ﬁnite amount of ﬁsh 
production per unit of coral area. Expected decreases estimated by 
this simpliﬁed model show that per capita coral ﬁsh availability 
could drop by 25 percent in 2050 compared to 2000 levels. This 
conclusion should be interpreted with care, however, since the 
econometric model is extremely simpliﬁed. It does nonetheless 
further highlight the negative contribution of climate and human 
stressors to coral ﬁsh stocks and their availability in the future.
Primary Productivity and Pelagic Fisheries
Open ocean ecosystems provide food and income through ﬁsheries 
revenues (Hoegh-Guldberg 2013), and capture ﬁsheries remain 
essential in developing economies due to their affordability and 
easy accessibility by coastal populations (Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations 2012b).
According to the FAO Fishery Country Proﬁle,75 ﬁshery exports 
in Vietnam in 2004 amounted to $2.36 billion; 90 percent of 
commercial landings came from offshore ﬁsheries. Exports of 
overall ﬁsh and ﬁshery products in the Philippines amounted to 
$525.4 million. Major exploited stocks in the Philippines include 
small pelagic ﬁsh, tuna and other large pelagic ﬁsh, demersal 
ﬁsh, and invertebrates. Furthermore, pelagic ﬁsheries contribute 
directly to food security. According to the FAO, small pelagic ﬁsh 
are considered the main source of inexpensive animal protein for 
lower-income groups in the Philippines.76
Changes in ocean chemistry and water temperature are 
expected to impact ﬁsheries off the coast by leading to decreases 
in primary productivity77 and direct impacts on ﬁsh physiology, 
and by changing the conditions under which species have devel-
oped—resulting in typically poleward distribution shifts. In fact, 
these shifts have already been observed (Sumaila, Cheung, Lam, 
Pauly, and Herrick 2011).
One effect of increasing sea-surface temperatures is enhanced 
stratiﬁcation of waters. This is associated with a decline in avail-
able macronutrients as waters do not mix and the mixed layer 
becomes more shallow. The resulting nutrient limitation is expected 
to lead to a decrease in primary productivity. Inter-comparing four 
climate models, Steinacher et al. (2010) investigate the potential 
impacts under approximately 4.6°C above pre-industrial levels 
by 2100 globally. They ﬁnd global decreases in primary produc-
tivity between 2 and 20 percent by 2100 relative to pre-industrial 
levels for all four models. While the strength of the signal varies 
across models, all models agree on a downward trend for the 
western Paciﬁc region.
Taking into account changes in sea-surface temperatures, pri-
mary productivity, salinity, and coastal upwelling zones, Cheung 
et al. (2010) project changes in species distribution and patterns of 
maximum catch potential by 2055. It should be noted that while 
distribution ranges of 1066 species were assessed within this model, 
changes were not calculated at the species level. Under a scenario 
of 2°C warming by the 2050s, the western Paciﬁc displays a mixed 
picture. The changes range from a 50-percent decrease in maximum 
catch potential around the southern Philippines, to a 16-percent 
decrease in the waters of Vietnam, to a 6–16 percent increase in 
the maximum catch potential around the northern Philippines. It 
is important to note that the impacts of ocean hypoxia and acidi-
ﬁcation, as further consequences of climate change, are not yet 
accounted for in these projections. These effects are expected to 
decrease catch potentials by 20–30 percent in other regions (see 
Box 4.4: Fundamental Ecosystem 
Change
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shift from a coral-dominated state to a rubble and algal-dominat-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????
75 http://www.fao.org/ﬁshery/countrysector/FI-CP_VN/en.
76 http://www.fao.org/ﬁshery/countrysector/FI-CP_PH/en.
77 Primary productivity refers to photosynthetic production at the beginning of the 
food chain (mainly through algae).
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also Chapter 3 on “Aquatic Ecosystems”) and can be expected to 
have adverse consequences for South East Asian ﬁsheries.
Oxygen availability has been found to decline in 
the 200–700 meter zone and is related to reduced water mixing 
due to enhanced stratiﬁcation (Stramma, Schmidtko, Levin, and 
Johnson 2010). Furthermore, warming waters lead to elevated 
oxygen demand across marine taxa (Stramma, Johnson, Sprintall, 
and Mohrholz 2008). Hypoxia is known to negatively impact the 
performance of marine organisms, leading to additional potential 
impacts on ﬁsh species (Pörtner 2010). Accordingly, a later analysis 
by W. W. L. Cheung, Dunne, Sarmiento, and Pauly (2011) which 
built on Cheung et al. (2010) found that, for the northeast Atlantic 
ocean, acidiﬁcation and a reduction of oxygen content lowered the 
estimated catch potentials by 20–30 percent relative to simulations 
not considering these factors. No such assessments are available 
yet in the literature for South East Asia. Fisheries in Papua New 
Guinea are also expected to be affected by the consequences of 
warmer sea temperatures increasing stratiﬁcation of the upper 
water column. Under the A2 scenario (corresponding to a 4.4°C 
degree increase by 2100 above pre-industrial levels) and using 
the IPSL-CM4, Bell et al. (2013) estimate biomass changes in the 
Paciﬁc Ocean and in Papua New Guinea. They ﬁnd that skip-
jack tuna biomass along PNG’s coasts is expected to decrease 
between 2005 and 2100. Taking only climate change into account, 
they estimate that tuna biomass will decrease by about 25 per-
cent by 2100. Fishing activities further decrease tuna biomass in 
the area (by about 10 percent in 2035, 10 percent in 2050, and 
about 35 percent by 2100 compared to 2000–2010 average catches 
in the region).
Cheung et al. (2012) project a decrease of 14–24 percent in the 
average maximum body weight of ﬁsh at the global level by 2050. 
In the study, they analyze the impacts of warmer water tempera-
tures and decreased oxygen levels on the growth and metabolic 
parameters of ﬁshes. The authors used two climate models (GFDL 
ESM 2.1 and IPSL-CM4-LOOP) under the SRES scenario A2 (cor-
responding to a 1.8°C temperature increase by 2050 above pre-
industrial levels). According to their projections, the ﬁsh of the Java 
Sea and the Gulf of Thailand are expected to be the most severely 
affected; in these seas, average maximum body size in 2050 may 
be reduced 50–100 percent compared to 2000.
On a species level, Lehodey et al. (2010) project changes in 
the distribution of bigeye tuna larvae and adults. In a 4°C world, 
conditions for larval spawning in the western Paciﬁc are projected 
to deteriorate due to increasing temperatures. Larval spawning 
conditions in subtropical regions in turn are projected to improve. 
Overall adult bigeye tuna mortality is projected to increase, leading 
to a markedly negative trend in biomass by 2100.
The analysis above indicates a substantial risk to marine food 
production, at least regionally for a warming of around 2°C above 
pre-industrial levels and on a broader scale in a 4°C world.
Projected Impacts on Economic and 
Human Development
Climate change impacts in South East Asia are expected to affect 
economic activity and decrease the revenues and incomes asso-
ciated with these activities. Similarly, human development and 
primarily health may also be affected by the consequences of 
climate change.
Projected Impacts on Economic 
Development
In the following section, three types of economic impacts are 
explored: decreased tourism revenues due to several factors (includ-
ing sea-level rise), increased damages due to tropical cyclones, 
and business disruptions due to extreme weather events.
Combined Risks to the Tourism Industry
The impacts of sea-level rise, increased tropical cyclone intensity, 
coral bleaching and biodiversity loss can have adverse effects on the 
tourism industry by damaging infrastructure. In addition, tropical 
cyclones have a negative effect on tourists’ choice of destination 
countries on the same scale as such deterrents as terrorist attacks 
and political crises (L. W. Turner, Vu, and Witt 2012).
A growing number of tourists visit South East Asia for its 
cultural richness, landscapes, beaches, and marine activities. The 
contribution of tourism to employment and economic wealth is 
similarly growing. About 25.5 million people in the region beneﬁted 
from direct, indirect, and induced jobs created in the travel and 
tourism industry (World Travel and Tourism Council 2012a). Travel 
and tourism’s total contribution to regional GDP was estimated 
at $237.4 billion (or 10.9 percent) in 2011; the direct contribution 
was estimated at $94.5 billion (or 4.4 percent) of regional GDP.78
In Vietnam, revenues from travel and tourism range from a 
direct contribution of 5.1 percent of 2011 GDP to a total contribution 
of 11.8 percent (World Travel and Tourism Council 2012b). In the 
Philippines, revenues from the travel and tourism industry ranged 
from 4.9 percent of 2011 GDP (direct contribution) to 19.2 percent 
(total contribution) (World Travel and Tourism Council 2012c).
The South East Asian region has been identiﬁed as one of the 
most vulnerable regions to the impacts of climate change on tourism. 
In a global study, Perch-Nielsen (2009) found that when sea-level 
rise, extreme weather events, and biodiversity losses are taken 
into account, Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Myanmar, and 
Cambodia rank among the most vulnerable tourism destinations.79
78 Excluding Timor-Leste.
79 The assessment by Perch-Nielsen (2009) allows for adaptive capacity, exposure, 
and sensitivity in a 2°C warming scenario for the period 2041–70. Adaptive capac-
ity includes GDP per capita, the number of Internet users, regulatory quality, and 
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It is projected that increased weather event intensity—espe-
cially of tropical cyclones—combined with sea-level rise will 
cause severe damage in the region; this is likely to have nega-
tive impacts on beach resorts and other tourism infrastructure 
(Mendelsohn et al. 2012; Neumann, Emanuel, Ravela, Ludwig, 
and Verly 2012).
Coastal erosion, which can be driven or exacerbated by 
sea-level rise (Bruun 1962), also poses a threat to recreational 
activities and tourism—and, consequently, to associated rev-
enues (Phillips and Jones 2006). Studies conducted in other 
regions—for example, in Sri Lanka (Weerakkody 1997), Barbados 
(Dharmaratne and Brathwaite 1998), and Mauritius (Ragoon-
aden 1997)–provide further evidence that coastal erosion can 
be detrimental to tourism.
Damages to coral reefs following bleaching events have also 
been found to negatively affect tourism revenue. Doshi et al. 
(2012) estimate that the 2010 bleaching event off the coasts of 
Thailand, Indonesia, and Malaysia resulted in economic losses 
of $50–80 million. Similar studies in Tanzania and the Indian 
Ocean have also observed that coral bleaching events have a 
signiﬁcant negative impact on non-market beneﬁts derived from 
coral reefs (Andersson 2007; Ngazy, Jiddawi, and Cesar 2004). 
Doshi et al. (2012) further estimate that the cost of coral bleach-
ing ranges from $85–300 per dive. On the other hand, divers’ 
willingness to pay to support reef quality improvements and 
protection increases because of coral bleaching events (Ransom 
and Mangi 2010).
Tropical Cyclone Risks
Across all basins and climate scenarios, tropical cyclone intensity is 
projected to increase. Combined with economic and demographic 
growth, increased TC intensity is expected to generate severe 
damages to both populations and assets. However, TC frequency 
is expected to decrease, potentially reducing associated damages 
and losses. Risk associated with tropical cyclones is a function 
of three parameters: the frequency and intensity of the hazard, 
the exposure (number of people or assets), and the vulnerability. 
The following section assesses the existing knowledge of tropi-
cal cyclones damages, taking into account climate and economic 
development changes.
Projected Population Exposure
Peduzzi et al. (2012) show that, at the global level, mortality risks 
due to tropical cyclones is inﬂuenced by tropical cyclone intensity, 
the exposure to risk, levels of poverty, and governance quality. In 
their study, poverty is assessed using the Human Development 
Index and GDP per capita; governance is deﬁned using the follow-
ing indicators: voice and accountability, government efﬁciency, 
political stability, control of corruption, and the rule of law. The 
authors ﬁrst estimate the current risks in countries based on the 
average number of people killed per year and the average number 
of people killed per million inhabitants. Via this approach, they 
ﬁnd that Myanmar is the country with the highest mortality risk 
index in South East Asia80 (risk deﬁned as medium high).
At the global level, it is estimated that 90 percent of the tropical 
cyclone exposure will occur in Asia. This region is also expected to 
experience the highest increase in exposure to tropical cyclones. It 
is projected that annual exposure will increase by about 11 million 
people in Paciﬁc Asia (deﬁned as Asia 2 in the study) and by 2.5 mil-
lion people in Indian Ocean Asia (Asia 1) between 2010–30.
Projected Damage Costs
Due to the consistent projections of higher maximum wind speeds, 
and higher rainfall precipitation (Knutson et al. 2010), it can be 
expected that tropical cyclone damage will increase during the 21st 
century. Direct economic damages on assets due to strong TCs could 
double by 2100 compared to the no-climate-change baseline for 
population and GDP growth (Mendelsohn, Emanuel, Chonabayashi, 
and Bakkensen 2012).81 Mendelsohn et al. (2012) project damage 
for a set of four climate models from the 1981–2000 period to 
the 2081–2100 period under the IPCC A1B SRES emission scenario, 
corresponding to an average 3.9°C temperature increase above 
pre-industrial levels. Total damage costs are projected to increase 
by a third compared to the no-climate-change baseline for popula-
tion and GDP growth. The projected costs of TC damage in South 
East Asia, however, are strongly dominated by Vietnam and the 
Philippines, which show a large variation in both sign and size 
of damage across models. Above-average increases in TC damage 
as a percentage of GDP are projected for East Asia.
Tropical Cyclone Damage to Agriculture in the Philippines
Agricultural production in the Philippines is less vulnerable to 
the consequences of sea-level rise than production in the Viet-
namese, Thai, and Burmese deltas, as most Philippine agriculture 
does not take place in coastal and low-lying areas. Nonetheless, 
the GDP generated by the travel and tourism industry. Sensitivity accounts for the 
share of arrivals for leisure, recreation, and holidays, the number of people affected 
by meteorologically extreme events, the number of people additionally inundated 
once a year for a sea-level rise of 50 cm, the length of low-lying coastal zones with 
more than 10 persons/km2, and the beach length to be nourished in order to main-
tain important tourist resort areas. Finally, exposure involves the change in modi-
ﬁed tourism climatic index, the change in maximum 5-day precipitation total, the 
change in fraction of total precipitation due to events exceeding the 95th percentile 
of climatological distribution for wet day amounts, and the required adaptation of 
corals to increased thermal stress.
80 Philippines: 5; Vietnam: 5; Laos: 5; Thailand: 4.
81 The authors estimate Global World Product in 2100 assuming that least devel-
oped countries’ economies grow at 2.7 percent per annum, that emerging countries’ 
economies grow at 3.3 percent per annum, and that developed countries grow 
at 2.7 percent per annum. For the global population projections, the authors project 
a population of 9 billion people.
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tropical cyclones affect rice and other agricultural production 
in the Philippines—and may even more severely impact them 
as a result of climate change. The Philippines is located in the 
typhoon belt; on average, seven or eight tropical cyclones make 
landfall each year (Yumul et al. 2011). In recent years, tropical 
cyclones have generated signiﬁcant damage; the agricultural 
sector suffered the most losses. For example, category 5 cyclone 
Bopha generated $646 million in damage to the agricultural sec-
tor in December 2012. Due to the impacts of Bopha, the Philip-
pines Banana Growers and Exporters Association reported that 
about 25 percent of the banana production was devastated and 
that restoring destroyed farms would cost approximately $122 mil-
lion (AON Benﬁeld 2012). In the aftermath of category 4 cyclone 
Imbudo, local farmers in the Isabela Province reported crop losses 
as a proportion of annual farm household income at 64 percent 
for corn, 24 percent for bananas, and 27 percent for rice (Huigen 
and Jens 2006). At the country level, PHP 1.2 billion of damage 
occurred (about $29 million).
Additional Economic Impacts Due to 
Business Disruption
Extreme weather events and sea-level rise induced impacts are 
expected to have two types of economic implications: direct asset 
losses via damage to equipment and infrastructure and indirect 
business and economic disruptions affecting business activities 
and supply chains (Rose 2009).
While the consequences of past events imply that disruption to 
economic activity is a major potential source of losses incurred by 
climate impacts, the current understanding of business disruption 
in developing countries is still very limited. Indirect impacts of 
disasters include, among other things, off-site business interruption, 
reduced property values, and stock market effects (Asgary et al. 
2012; Rose 2009). Business disruption is principally due to inter-
ruptions, changes, and delays in services provided by public and 
private electricity and water utilities and transport infrastructure 
(Sussman and Freed 2008). Coastal ﬂooding and tropical cyclones 
can cause business disruption in developed and developing coun-
tries alike, as witnessed in the case of Hurricane Katrina in 2005. 
These business and economic disruptions generate a major por-
tion of the total commercial insurance losses (Ross, Mills, and 
Hecht 2007). In the case of Hurricane Katrina, for example, losses 
due to business interruption, at $10 billion, were estimated to be 
as high as direct losses. In South East Asia, the 2011 Thai ﬂoods 
generated $32 billion in business interruption and other losses in 
the manufacturing sector (World Bank and GFDRR 2011).
The consequences of past events indicate that economic 
losses due to ﬂooding reach beyond the direct point of impact. 
Future indirect responses to ﬂooding, however, have not yet been 
projected for the region.
Projected Human Impacts
The impacts outlined in the above sections are expected to have 
repercussions on human health and on livelihoods; these impacts 
will be determined by the socioeconomic contexts in which they 
occur. The following provides a sketch of some of the key issues 
in South East Asia.
Projected Health Impacts and Excessive Mortality
South East Asia has been identiﬁed as a hotspot for diseases that 
are projected to pose an increasing risk under climate change. These 
include water- and vector-borne diseases and diarrheal illnesses 
(Coker, Hunter, Rudge, Liverani, and Hanvoravongchai 2011). 
Flooding compounds the risk of these diseases. Flooding is also 
associated with immediate risks, including drowning and the 
disruption of sanitation and health services as a result of damages 
to infrastructure (Schatz 2008).
Drowning is the main cause of immediate death from ﬂoods 
(Jonkman and Kelman 2005). Floodwaters can also damage the 
sewage systems and contribute to local freshwater and food sup-
ply contamination. Faecal contamination due to sewage system 
failure, which can also affect livestock and crops, was observed 
in 1999 following Hurricane Floyd in the United States (Casteel, 
Sobsey, and Mueller 2006).
The transmission of diarrheal diseases is inﬂuenced by a 
number of climatic variables, including temperature, rainfall, 
relative humidity, and air pressure, all of which affect pathogens 
in different ways (Kolstad and Johansson 2011). A factor driving 
the transmission of diarrheal diseases in South East Asia is water 
scarcity during droughts, which often leads to poor sanitation, 
in combination with climate-change-induced impacts such as 
Box 4.5: Business Disruption due to 
River Flooding
???????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????-
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
???????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????
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??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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droughts, ﬂoods, and increased storminess (Coker et al. 2011). In 
a 4°C warming scenario, the relative risk of diarrhea is expected 
to increase 5–11 percent for the period 2010–39 and 13–31 percent 
for the period 2070–99 in South East Asia relative to 1961–1990 
(Kolstad and Johansson 2011).
Moreover, vector-borne diseases, such as malaria and dengue 
fever, may also increase due to ﬂoods (Watson, Gayer, and Con-
nolly 2007). Increased sea-surface temperature and sea-surface 
height has been observed to positively correlate with subsequent 
outbreaks of cholera in developing countries (Colwell 2002).
Heat extremes can also have signiﬁcant impacts on human 
health. The elderly and women are considered to be the most 
vulnerable to heat extremes. South East Asia’s populations are 
rapidly aging; in Vietnam, for example, the percentage of people 
aged 60 and over is projected to increase 22 percent between 2011–50, 
to account for a share of 31 percent of the total population in 2050 
(United Nations Population Division 2011). These increases in the 
proportion of older people will place larger numbers of people at 
higher risk of the effects of heat extremes.
While rural populations are also exposed to climate-related 
risks, the conditions that characterize densely populated cities 
make urban dwellers particularly vulnerable. This is especially 
true of those who live in informal settlements (World Health 
Organization 2009).
Migration
Human migration can be seen as a form of adaptation and an 
appropriate response to a variety of local environmental pres-
sures (Tacoli 2009), and a more comprehensive discussion of 
drivers and potential consequences of migration is provided 
in Chapter 3 on “Population Movement”. While migration is a 
complex, multi-causal phenomenon, populations in South East 
Asia are particularly exposed to certain risk factors to which 
migration may constitute a human response.
Tropical cyclones have led to signiﬁcant temporary population 
displacements in the aftermath of landfall. The tropical cyclone 
Washi, which struck the island of Mindanao in the Philippines 
in 2011, caused 300,000 people to be displaced (Government of 
the Philippines 2012) (see also Box 4.6).
South East Asian deltaic populations are expected to be the most 
severely affected by rising sea levels and storm surges (Marks 2011; 
Warner 2010; World Bank 2010b). In Vietnam alone, if the sea level 
rises up to 100 cm, close to ﬁve million people may be displaced 
due to permanent ﬂooding and other climate-change-related 
impacts resulting in the submergence of deltaic and coastal areas 
(Carew-Reid 2008). However, there is large uncertainty as to the 
number of people expected to be affected by permanent migra-
tions and forced relocations due to uncertainties in the projected 
physical impacts. The impacts of socioeconomic conditions add 
a further unknown to the projections.
Conclusion
The key impacts that are expected to affect South East Asia at 
different levels of warming and sea level rise are summarized in 
Table 4.9.
Due to a combination of the risk factors driven by sea-level 
rise, increased heat extremes, and more intense tropical cyclones, 
critical South East Asian rice production in low lying coastal and 
deltaic areas is projected to be at increasing risk. Coastal liveli-
hoods dependent on marine ecosystems are also highly vulnerable 
to the adverse impacts of climate change. Coral reefs, in particu-
lar, are extremely sensitive to ocean warming and acidiﬁcation. 
Under 1.2°C warming, there is a high risk of annual bleaching 
events occurring (50-percent probability) in the region as early 
as 2030. Under 4°C warming by 2100, the likelihood is 100 per-
cent. There are strong indications that this could have devastat-
ing impacts on tourism revenue and reef-based ﬁsheries already 
under stress from overﬁshing. The coastal protection provided 
by corals reefs is also expected to suffer. In addition, warming 
seas and ocean acidiﬁcation are projected to lead to substantial 
reductions in ﬁsh catch potential in the marine regions around 
South East Asia.
The livelihood alternative offered by aquaculture in coastal 
and deltaic regions would also come under threat from the impacts 
of sea-level rises projected to increase by up to 75 cm in a 2°C 
world and 105 cm in a 4°C world. Salinity intrusion associated 
with sea-level rise would affect freshwater and brackish aquacul-
ture farms. In addition, increases in the water temperature may 
have adverse effects on regionally important farmed species (tiger 
Box 4.6: Planned Resettlement
?????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????? ??????? ??????????????????????????????????-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-
????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????? ?????????? ????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
livelihoods, people have in the past chosen to relocate to urban 
????????? ?????????????????????????????? ??????????????????
????????????Flooding occurs every year at my former living place. 
I could not grow and harvest crops. Life therefore was very miser-
able. Besides? my family did not know what else we could do 
other than grow rice and ?sh. Flooding sometimes threatened our 
lives. ?o we came here to ?nd another livelihood????????????????
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shrimp and stripped catﬁsh) as surface waters warm. Increasingly 
intense tropical cyclones would also impact aquaculture farming.
Migration to urban areas as a response to diminishing liveli-
hoods in coastal and deltaic areas is already occurring. While this 
response may offer opportunities not available in rural areas, cities 
are associated with a high vulnerability to the impacts of climate 
change. The urban poor, who constitute large proportions of city 
populations in the region, would be particularly hard hit. Floods 
associated with sea-level rise and storm surges carry signiﬁcant 
risks in informal settlements, where damages to sanitation and 
water facilities are accompanied by health threats. The high popu-
lation density in such areas compounds these risks.
South East Asia as a region is characterized by a high expo-
sure to both slow-onset impacts associated with sea-level rise, 
ocean warming, and acidiﬁcation, and sudden-onset impacts 
associated with tropical cyclones. The corrosive effects of the 
slow-onset impacts potentially undermine resilience and increase 
vulnerability in the face of devastating extreme weather events. 
This complex vulnerability is set to increase as the world warms 
toward 4°C.
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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Notes to Table 4.9 
1?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
business-as-usual scenario, not in mitigation scenarios limiting warming to these 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????
or not at all.
2?????????????????????????????????
3???????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????
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10????? ??????????????????????????????
11???????????????????????????????????????????????
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13??????????????????????????????????????????
??????? ??????????????????????
??????? ??????????????????????????????
??????? ??????????????????????????????
17???????????????????????????????????????????????????
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22??????????? ??????????????????????
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??????????????????????
37??????????????
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?????????????????????????????????????????
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In this report, South Asia refers to a region comprising seven coun-
tries82 with a growing population of about 1.6 billion people in 2010, 
which is projected to rise to over 2.2 billion by 2050. At 4°C global 
warming, sea level is projected to rise over 100 cm by the 2090s, 
monsoon rainfall to become more variable with greater frequency 
of devastating ﬂoods and droughts. Glacier melting and snow cover 
loss could be severe, and unusual heat extremes in the summer 
months (June, July, and August) are projected to affect 70 percent 
of the land area. Furthermore, agricultural production is likely to 
suffer from the combined effects of unstable water supply, the 
impacts of sea-level rise, and rising temperatures. The region has 
seen robust economic growth in recent years, yet poverty remains 
widespread and the combination of these climate impacts could 
severely affect the rural economy and agriculture. Dense urban 
populations, meanwhile, would be especially vulnerable to heat 
extremes, ﬂooding, and disease.
Current Climate Trends and Projected 
Climate Change to 2100
South Asia has a unique and diverse geography dominated in 
many ways by the highest mountain range on Earth, the Himalayan 
mountain range and Tibetan Plateau, giving rise to the great river 
systems of the Indus, Ganges, and Brahmaputra. The climate of 
the region is dominated by the monsoon: The largest fraction of 
precipitation over South Asia occurs during the summer monsoon 
season. Eighty percent of India’s rainfall, for example, occurs in this 
period. The timely arrival of the summer monsoon, and its regular-
ity, are critical for the rural economy and agriculture in South Asia.
Under future climate change, the frequency of years with 
above normal monsoon rainfall and of years with extremely 
deﬁcient rainfall is expected to increase. The Ganges, Indus, and 
Brahmaputra—are vulnerable to the effects of climate change 
due to the melting of glaciers and loss of snow cover. The result 
82 Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. This 
follows the SREX regional deﬁnition and hence does not include Afghanistan. Some of 
the studies reviewed in the report however include Afghanistan, and less frequently 
Iran or Turkey, in their assessment for South Asia.
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is a signiﬁcant risk to stable and reliable water resources for the 
region, with increases in peak ﬂows associated with the risk of 
ﬂooding and dry season ﬂow reductions threatening agriculture.
In the past few decades a warming trend has begun to emerge 
over South Asia, particularly in India, which appears to be consis-
tent with the signal expected from human induced climate change. 
Recent observations of total rainfall amounts during the monsoon 
period indicate a decline in rainfall, likely due to the effects of 
anthropogenic aerosols, particularly black carbon. In addition to 
these patterns there are observed increases in the frequency of 
the most extreme precipitation events, as well as increases in the 
frequency of short drought periods.
Rainfall
During recent decades, increases in the frequency of the most 
extreme precipitation events have been observed. Annual pre-
cipitation is projected to increase by up to 30 percent in a 4°C 
world. The seasonal distribution of precipitation is expected to 
become ampliﬁed, with a decrease of up to 30 percent during 
the dry season and a 30 percent increase during the wet season.
Temperature
In a 4°C world, South Asian summer temperatures are projected 
to increase by 3°C to nearly 6°C by 2100, with the warming most 
pronounced in Pakistan. The pattern remains the same in a 2°C 
world, with warming reaching 2°C in the northwestern parts 
of the region and 1°C to 2°C in the remaining regions. By the 
time 1.5°C warming is reached, heat extremes that are unusual 
or virtually absent in today´s climate in the region are projected 
to cover 15 percent of land areas in summer.
Under 2°C warming, unusual extreme heat over 20 percent 
of the land area is projected for Northern Hemisphere summer 
months, with unprecedented heat extremes affecting about 5 percent 
of the land area, principally in the south. Under 4°C warming, 
the west coast and southern India, as well as Bhutan and north-
ern Bangladesh, are projected to shift to new, high-temperature 
climatic regimes. Unusual heat is projected for 60–80 percent of 
the Northern Hemisphere summer months in most parts of the 
region. Some regions are projected to experience unprecedented 
heat during more than half of the summer months, including Sri 
Lanka and Bhutan. In the longer term, the exposure of South Asia 
Figure 5.1:???????????? ??????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????
???
to an increase in these extremes could be substantially limited by 
holding warming below 2°C.
Likely Physical and Biophysical Impacts as a Function of 
Projected Climate Change
The projected changes in rainfall, temperature, and extreme event 
frequency and/or intensity would have both direct and indirect 
impacts on monsoon activity, droughts, glacial loss, snow levels, 
river ﬂow, ground water resources, and sea-level rise.
Monsoon
While most modeling studies project increases in average annual 
monsoonal precipitation over decadal timescales, they also project 
signiﬁcant increases in inter-annual and intra-seasonal variability.
For global mean warming approaching 4°C, a 10 percent 
increase in annual mean monsoon intensity and a 15 percent 
increase in year-to-year variability of Indian summer monsoon 
precipitation is projected compared to normal levels during the 
ﬁrst half of the 20th century. Taken together, these changes imply 
Table 5.1:??????????????? ????? ??????????????????????????????
?????? ????
?????????
?????????????????
??????
????????????? 
????????
?????????? 
???????
?????????? 
???????
?????????? 
???????
Regional warming ????????????
????????????????
warmest on record. 
?????????????
??????????????? 
???????????????
????????????
???????????????
????????? ????
nights occur 
?????????????
?????????????
?????????????????????
?????????????????
?????????????????????
???????????????????????
Heat 
extremes
(in the 
Northern 
Hemisphere 
summer)d
Unusual heat 
????????
???????????????? ?????????????????? ?????????????????? ??????????????????? ???????????????????
In south almost all 
summer months 
?????????????
Unprecedented 
?????????????
Absent ???????????????? ?????????????????? ?????????????????? ???????????????????
Precipitation
(including the monsoon)
?????????????????
Asian monsoon 
rainfall since 
??????????????
increases in 
????????????? ????
??????????????????????
events
Change in rainfall 
uncertain
Change in 
rainfall uncertain; 
????????????????????
???????????????????
precipitation share 
of the total annual 
precipitatione
????????????????
increase in summer 
?????????????????????
?????????????????
increase in summer 
???????????????????????
Intra seasonal 
??????????????? ???????
???????????????????????
?????????????????
????????????????????
???????????????????
precipitation share of 
total annual precipitationf
Drought ????????????????????
short droughts
Increased drought 
over north-western 
parts of the region, 
?????????????????????
????????????????????????
??????? ???????????
?????????????????????
in eastern India and 
Bangladesh
Sea-level rise above current: ??????????????????? ??????????
?????????
??????????????????
??????????
?????????
?????????????????
??????????
?????????
?????????????????
??????????
?????????
????????????????????
????????????????????
a???????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
b???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
c???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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indicator values saturate at this level.
e???????????????????????????????????????????
f????????????????????????????????????????????
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that an extreme wet monsoon that currently has a chance of occur-
ring only once in 100 years is projected to occur every 10 years 
by the end of the century.
A series of unusually intense monsoonal rainfall events in 
the mountainous catchment of the Indus River was one of the 
main physical drivers of the devastating Pakistan ﬂoods of 2010, 
which resulted in more than 1,900 casualties and affected 
more than 20 million people. Farms and key infrastructure, 
such as bridges, were washed away in the predominantly rural 
areas affected. The rainfall event itself was only the start of a 
chain of events that led to prolonged and wide-scale ﬂooding 
downstream, with many other factors due to human activity. 
Irrigation dams, barrages, river embankments, and diversions 
in the inland basins of rivers can seriously exacerbate the risk 
of ﬂooding downstream from extreme rainfall events higher up 
in river catchments.
Large uncertainty remains about the behavior of the Indian 
summer monsoon under global warming. An abrupt change in 
the monsoon, for example, toward a drier, lower rainfall state, 
could precipitate a major crisis in South Asia, as evidenced by 
the anomalous monsoon of 2002, which caused the most serious 
drought in recent times (with rainfall about 209 percent below 
the long-term normal and food grain production reductions of 
about 10–15 percent compared to the average of the preceding 
decade). Physically plausible mechanisms have been proposed 
for such a switch, and changes in the tropical atmosphere that 
could precipitate a transition of the monsoon to a drier state are 
projected in the present generation of climate models.
Droughts
The projected increase in seasonality of precipitation is associated 
with an increase in the number of dry days and droughts with 
adverse consequences for human lives. Droughts are expected to 
pose an increasing risk in parts of the region, particularly Paki-
stan, while increasing wetness is projected for southern India. 
The direction of change is uncertain for northern India. Of the 
ten most severe drought disasters globally in the last century, 
measured in terms of the number of people affected, six were in 
India, affecting up to 300 million people. For example, the Indian 
droughts of 1987 and 2002/2003 affected more than 50 percent 
of the crop area in the country and, in 2002, food grain pro-
duction declined by 29 million tons compared to the previous 
year. It is estimated that in the states of Jharkhand, Orissa, and 
Chhattisgarh, major droughts, which occur approximately every 
ﬁve years, negatively impact around 40 percent of agricultural 
production.
Glacial Loss, Snow Cover Reductions, and River Flow
Over the past century most of the Himalayan glaciers have been 
retreating. Currently, 750 million people depend on the glacier-fed 
Indus and Brahmaputra river basins for freshwater resources, 
and reductions in water availability could signiﬁcantly reduce 
the amount of food that can be produced within the river basins. 
These rivers depend heavily on snow and glacial melt water, 
which makes them highly susceptible to climate-change-induced 
glacier and snowmelt. Warming projections of about 2.5°C above 
pre-industrial levels by the 2050s indicate the risk of substantial 
reductions in the ﬂow of the Indus and Brahmaputra in summer 
and late spring, after a period with increased ﬂow. The availability 
of water for irrigation is very much contingent on these water 
resources, particularly during the dry seasons.
?? An increased river ﬂow in spring is projected due to stronger 
glacial melt and snowmelt, with less runoff available prior to 
monsoon onset in late spring and summer.
?? For the Indus River Delta, high ﬂow is projected to increase 
by about 75 percent for warming above 2°C. Higher peak 
river ﬂows expose a growing number of people inhabiting 
the densely populated river deltas of the regions to the com-
bined risks of ﬂooding, sea-level rise, and increasing tropical 
cyclone intensity.
Groundwater Resources 
Groundwater resources, which are mainly recharged by precipita-
tion and surface-water, are also expected to be impacted by climate 
change. South Asia, especially India and Pakistan, are highly 
sensitive to decreases in groundwater recharge as these countries 
are already suffering from water scarcity and largely depend on a 
supply of groundwater for irrigation. In India, for example, 60 per-
cent of irrigation depends on groundwater, while about 15 percent 
of the country’s groundwater tables are overexploited, including 
the Indus basin. Groundwater resources are particularly important 
to mitigate droughts and related impacts on agriculture and food 
security. With increased periods of low water availability and dry 
spells projected, it is likely that groundwater resources will become 
even more important for agriculture, leading to greater pressure on 
resources. Projected increases in the variability and seasonality of 
monsoon rainfall may affect groundwater recharge during the wet 
season and lead to increased exploitation during the dry season.
Sea-level Rise
With South Asian coastlines being located close to the equa-
tor, projections of local sea-level rise show a greater increase 
compared to higher latitudes. Sea-level rise is projected to 
be approximately 100–115 cm by the 2090s in a 4°C world, 
and 60–80 cm in a 2°C world, by the end of the 21st century rela-
tive to 1986–2005, with the highest values (up to 10 cm more) 
expected for the Maldives. This is generally around 5–10 percent 
higher than the global mean, and a 50 cm sea-level rise would 
likely occur by 2060.
??????????????????????????????????????????????????
???
Sector-based and Thematic Impacts
Water Resources are already at risk in the densely populated 
countries of South Asia, according to most studies that assess this 
risk. One study indicates that for a warming of about 3°C above 
pre-industrial levels by the 2080s, it is very likely that per capita 
water availability will decrease by more than 10 percent due to a 
combination of population increase and climate change in South 
Asia. Even for 1.5–2°C warming, major investments in water storage 
capacity would be needed in order to utilize the potential beneﬁts 
of increased seasonal runoff and compensate for lower dry seasons 
ﬂows, to allow improved water availability throughout the year.
The quality of freshwater is also expected to suffer from poten-
tial climate impacts. Sea-level rise and storm surges in coastal 
and deltaic regions would lead to saltwater intrusion degrading 
groundwater quality. Contamination of drinking water by saltwater 
intrusion may cause an increasing number of diarrhea cases. Cholera 
outbreaks may also become more frequent as the bacterium that 
causes cholera, vibrio cholerae, survives longer in saline water. 
About 20 million people in the coastal areas of Bangladesh are 
already affected by salinity in their drinking water.
Crop Yields are vulnerable to a host of climate-related factors in 
the region, including seasonal water scarcity, rising temperatures, 
and salinity intrusion due to sea-level rise. Rising temperatures 
and changes in rainfall patterns have contributed to reduced 
relative yields of rice, the most important crop in Asia, especially 
in rainfed areas. Cultivated crops have been observed to also be 
sensitive to rising temperatures. One study ﬁnds that compared 
to calculations of potential yields without historic trends of tem-
perature changes since the 1980s, rice and wheat yields have 
declined by approximately 8 percent for every 1°C increase in 
average growing-season temperatures. Another study found that 
the combination of warmer nights and lower precipitation at the 
end of the growing season has caused a signiﬁcant loss of rice 
production in India: yields could have been almost 6-percent higher 
without the historic change in climatic conditions.
While overall yields have increased over the last several decades, 
in the last decade worrying signs have emerged of crop yield 
stagnation on substantial areas of Indian cropland. The projected 
increase in extreme heat affecting 10 percent of total land area 
by 2020 and 15 percent by 2030 poses a high risk to crop yields. 
Crop yields are projected to decrease signiﬁcantly for warming in 
the 1.5–2.0°C range; if there is a strong CO
2 fertilization effect, 
however, the negative effects of warming might be offset in part 
by low-cost adaptation measures. Above about 2°C warming 
above pre-industrial levels, crop yields are projected to decrease 
around 10–30 percent for warming of 3–4.5°C, with the largest 
reductions in the cases where the CO2 fertilization effect is weak.
Total Crop Production without climate change is projected to 
increase signiﬁcantly (by 60 percent) in the region and be under 
increased price pressure and a trend factor expressing techno-
logical improvements, research and development, extension of 
markets, and infrastructure. Under 2°C warming by the 2050s, 
the increase may be reduced by at least 12 percent, requiring 
more than twice the imports to meet per capita demand than is 
required without climate change. As a result, per-capita calorie 
availability is projected to decrease signiﬁcantly. Decreasing food 
availability can lead to signiﬁcant health problems in affected 
populations, including childhood stunting, which is projected to 
increase by 35 percent by 2050 compared to a scenario without 
climate change.
Energy Security is expected to come under increasing pressure 
from climate-related impacts to water resources. The two dominant 
forms of power generation in the region are hydropower and ther-
mal power generation (e.g., fossil fuel, nuclear, and concentrated 
solar power), both of which can be undermined by inadequate 
water supplies. Thermal power generation may also be affected 
through pressure placed on cooling systems by increases in air 
and water temperatures.
Integrated Synthesis of Climate Change 
Impacts in the South Asia Region
Water resource dynamics: Many of the climate risks and impacts 
that pose potential threats to populations in the South Asia region 
can be linked back to changes to the water cycle—extreme rainfall, 
droughts, and declining snow fall and glacial loss in the Himalayas 
leading to changes in river ﬂow—combined in the coastal regions 
with the consequences of sea-level rise and increased tropical 
cyclone intensity. Increasing seasonality of precipitation as a 
loss of snow cover is likely to lead to greater levels of ﬂooding, 
and higher risks of dry periods and droughts. Exacerbating these 
risks are increases in extreme temperatures, which are already 
observed to adversely affect crop yields. Should these trends and 
patterns continue, substantial yield reductions can be expected 
in the near and midterm. Changes in projected rainfall amounts 
and geographical distribution are likely to have profound impacts 
on agriculture, energy, and ﬂood risk.
The region is highly vulnerable even at warming of less than 2°C 
given the signiﬁcant areas affected by droughts and ﬂooding at 
present temperatures. In addition, the projected risks to crop 
yields and water resources, and sea-level rise reaching 70 cm by 
the 2070s, are likely to affect large populations.
Deltaic Regions and Coastal Cities are particularly exposed to 
cascading risks resulting from a combination of climatic changes, 
including increased temperature, increased river ﬂooding, rising 
sea levels, and increasingly intense tropical cyclones and their 
consequences. Deaths in India and Bangladesh currently account 
for 86 percent of global mortalities from cyclones even though 
only 15 percent of all tropical cyclones affect this region.
TURN DOWN THE HEAT: CLIMATE EXTREMES, REGIONAL IMPACTS, AND THE CASE FOR RESILIENCE
???
?? Bangladesh emerges as an impact hotspot with increasing and 
compounding challenges occurring in the same timeframe from 
extreme river ﬂoods, more intense tropical cyclones, rising 
sea levels, extraordinarily high temperatures, and declining 
crop yields. Increased river ﬂooding combined with tropical 
cyclone surges poses a high risk of inundation in areas with 
the largest shares of poor populations. A 27 cm sea-level rise, 
projected for the 2040s, in combination with storm surges from 
an average 10-year return period cyclone, such as Cyclone Sidr, 
could inundate an area more than 80-percent larger than the 
area inundated at present by a similar event.
?? Kolkata and Mumbai are highly vulnerable to the impacts of 
sea-level rise, tropical cyclones, and riverine ﬂooding. Floods 
and droughts are associated with health impacts, including 
diarrheal diseases, which at present are a major cause of child 
mortality in Asia and the Paciﬁc.
Climate change shocks to seasonal water availability would 
confront populations with ongoing and multiple challenges to 
accessing safe drinking water, sufﬁcient water for irrigation, and 
adequate cooling capacity for thermal power production.
Irrespective of future emission paths, in the next 20 years a 
several-fold increase in the frequency of unusually hot and extreme 
summer months can be expected from warming already underway. 
A substantial increase in excess mortality is expected to be associ-
ated with such heat extremes and has been observed in the past.
Increasing risks and impacts from extreme river ﬂoods, more 
intense tropical cyclones, rising sea levels, and extraordinarily high 
temperatures are projected. Population displacement, which already 
periodically occurs in ﬂood-prone areas, is likely to continue to 
result from severe ﬂooding and other extreme events. Agricultural 
production is likely to suffer from the combined effects of rising 
temperatures, impacts on seasonal water availability, and the 
impacts of sea-level rise.
Future economic development and growth will contribute to 
reducing the vulnerability of South Asia’s large and poor popula-
tions. Climate change projections indicate, however, that high 
levels of vulnerability are projected and their societal implications 
indicate that high levels of vulnerability are likely to remain and 
persist. Warming is projected to signiﬁcantly slow the expected 
reduction in poverty levels. Many of the climate change impacts 
in the region pose a signiﬁcant challenge to development, even 
with relatively modest warming of 1.5–2°C. Major investments in 
infrastructure, ﬂood defense, and development of high temperature 
and drought resistant crop cultivars, and major improvements in 
such sustainability practices as groundwater extraction, would 
be needed to cope with the projected impacts under this level 
of warming.
Introduction
This report deﬁnes the South Asian region as Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
India, Nepal, the Maldives, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. For the pro-
jections of temperature and precipitation changes, heat extremes, 
and sea-level rise presented here, South Asia is deﬁned as ranging 
from 61.25 to 99.25°E and 2.25 to 30.25°N.83
Although economic growth in South Asia has been robust in 
recent years, poverty remains widespread and the world’s largest 
concentration of poor people reside in the region. The unique 
geography of the region plays a signiﬁcant part in shaping the 
livelihoods of South Asians. Agriculture and the rural economy 
are largely dependent on the timely arrival of the Asian summer 
monsoon. The Hindu Kush and Himalaya mountains to the north 
contain the reach of the monsoon, thereby conﬁning its effects to 
the subcontinent and giving rise to the great river systems of the 
Indus and Ganges-Brahmaputra.
The populations of South Asia are already vulnerable to shocks 
in the hydrological regime. Poverty in the Bay of Bengal region, for 
example, is already attributed in part to such environmental factors 
as tropical cyclones and seasonal ﬂooding. Warming toward 4°C, 
which is expected to magnify these and other stressors, would 
amplify the challenge of poverty reduction in South Asia (Box 5.1). 
These risk factors include:
?? Increases in temperatures and extremes of heat
?? Changes in the monsoon pattern
?? Increased intensity of extreme weather events, including ﬂood-
ing and tropical cyclones
?? Sea-level rise
These physical impacts and their effects on a number of sec-
tors, including agriculture, water resources, and human health, will 
be reviewed in this analysis. Not all potential risks and affected 
sectors are covered here as some (e.g., ecosystem services) fall 
outside the scope of this report.
Regional Patterns of Climate Change
A warming trend has begun to emerge over South Asia in the last 
few decades, particularly in India, and appears to be consistent 
83 Impact assessments pertaining to water resources, droughts and health impacts 
include Afghanistan.
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with the signal expected from human-induced climate change 
(Kumar et al 2010).
Recent observations of total rainfall amounts during the monsoon 
period indicate a decline in the last few decades. While some earlier 
studies ﬁnd no clear trend in the all-India mean monsoon rainfall 
(Guhathakurta and Rajeevan 2008; R. Kripalani, Kulkarni, Sabade, 
and Khandekar 2003),84 more recent studies indicate a decline of as 
much as 10 percent in South Asian monsoon rainfall since the 1950s 
(Bollasina, Ming, and Ramaswamy 2011; Srivastava, Naresh Kumar, 
and Aggarwal 2010; A. G. Turner and Annamalai 2012; Wang, Liu, 
Kim, Webster, and Yim 2011).85 The data also note a downward 
trend in rainfall during monsoon and post-monsoon seasons in the 
basins of the Brahmaputra and Barak rivers in the state of Assam 
in Northeast India for the time period 1901–2010; this trend is most 
pronounced in the last 30 years (Deka, Mahanta, Pathak, Nath, 
and Das 2012). While the observed decline is inconsistent with the 
projected effects of global warming, there are indications that the 
decline could be due at least in part to the effects of black carbon and 
other anthropogenic aerosols (A. G. Turner and Annamalai 2012).
Within this overall picture, important changes have been 
observed in the structure and processes of precipitation events 
in the monsoon region. Most rainfall during the monsoon period 
comes from moderate to heavy rainfall events, yet recent studies 
indicate a decline in the frequency of these events from the 1950s 
to the present (P. K. Gautam 2012;86 R. Krishnan et al. 2012), 
consistent with observations of changes in monsoon physics.87 
These trends are in accordance with very high resolution model-
ing (20 km resolution) of the future effects of greenhouse gases 
and aerosols on the Indian monsoon (R. Krishnan et al. 2012).
In addition to these patterns, there are observed increases in the 
frequency of the most extreme precipitation events (R. Gautam, Hsu, 
Lau, and Kafatos 2009; P. K. Gautam, 2012) and in the frequency 
of short drought periods (Deka et al. 2012). Deka et al. (2012) attri-
bute this to a superposition of the effects of global warming on the 
normal monsoon system. They argue that these changes “indicate 
a greater degree of likelihood of heavy ﬂoods as well as short spell 
droughts. This is bound to pose major challenges to agriculture, 
water, and allied sectors in the near future.” Over northern India, 
the 20th century has witnessed a trend toward increasingly frequent 
extreme rain events attributed to a warming atmosphere (N. Singh 
and Sontakke 2002; B. N. Goswami, Venugopal, Sengupta, Madhu-
soodanan, and Xavier 2006; Ajayamohan and Rao 2008).
Extreme rainfall events over India show wide spatial variability, 
with more extreme events occurring over the west coast and central 
and northeast India (Pattanaik and Rajeevan 2009). The frequency 
and intensity of extreme rainfall events over central India show 
a rising trend under global warming, whereas the frequency of 
moderate events show a signiﬁcant decreasing trend (B. N. Gos-
wami, Venugopal, Sengupta, Madhusoodanan, and Xavier 2006).
Box 5.1: Observed Vulnerabilities
Observed Vulnerability – Floods
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Observed Vulnerability – Droughts
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84 Even though there is no overall rainfall trend in in India, several smaller regions 
within the country show signiﬁcant increasing and decreasing trends (Guhathakurta 
and Rajeevan 2008; K. R. Kumar, Pant, Parthasarathy, and Sontakke 1992).
85 Although most studies agree on the existence of this decrease, its magnitude 
and signiﬁcance are highly dependent on the sub-region on which the analysis 
is performed and the dataset that is chosen (A. G. Turner and Annamalai 2012).
86 Gridded observational data for Central India show a decrease in moderate 
(5–100 mm/day) rainfall events.
87 APHRODITE observational dataset shows that the frequency of moderate-to-heavy 
rainfall events (i.e., local rainfall amounts between the 75th and 95th percentile) 
during the summer monsoon season has decreased between 1951–2010. For the same 
time period, parallel changes in the rising branch of the meridional overturning cir-
culation of the South Asian Monsoon from NCEP reanalysis data are observed with 
a decrease in the variability of the inter-annual vertical velocity.
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Projected Temperature Changes
A 2°C world shows substantially lower average warming over 
the South Asian land area than would occur in a 4°C world. 
Figure 5.2 shows the projected boreal summer the months of 
June, July, and August (JJA) warming over the Indian subcon-
tinent for RCP2.6 and RCP8.5 scenarios. Summer warming in 
India is somewhat less strong than that averaged over the total 
global land area, with temperatures peaking at about 1.5°C above 
the 1951–80 baseline by 2050 under RCP2.6. Under RCP8.5, warm-
ing increases until the end of the century and monthly Indian 
summer temperatures reach about 5°C above the 1951–80 baseline 
by 2100 in the multimodel mean. Geographically, the warming 
occurs uniformly, though inland regions warm somewhat more in 
absolute terms (see Figure 5.3). Relative to the local year-to-year 
natural variability, the pattern is reversed—with coastal regions 
Figure 5.2:???????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????? ??????????? ???????????????????????????????? ??????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????
Figure 5.3:? ??????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????
???
warming more, especially in the southwest (see Figure 5.3). In 
a 4°C world, the west coast and southern India, as well as Bhutan 
and northern Bangladesh, shift to new climatic regimes, with the 
monthly temperature distribution moving 5–6 standard deviations 
toward warmer values.
These projections are consistent with other assessments based 
on CMIP3 models. For example, Kumar et al. (2010) project a 
local warming in India of 2°C by mid-century and 3.5°C above 
the 1961–90 mean by the end of the 21st century. These local 
estimates come with considerable uncertainty; there is high con-
ﬁdence, however, that temperature increases will be above any 
levels experienced in the past 100 years. Using the UK Met Ofﬁce 
regional climate model PRECIS, under the SRES-A2 scenario (lead-
ing to approximately 4.1°C above pre-industrial levels), Kumar 
et al. (2010) ﬁnd local temperature increases exceeding 4°C for 
northern India.
Projected Changes in Heat Extremes
In a 4°C world, the ISI-MIP multimodel mean shows a strong 
increase in the frequency of boreal summer months hotter 
than 5-sigma over the Indian subcontinent, especially in the south 
and along the coast as well as for Bhutan and parts of Nepal 
(Figures 5.4 and 5.5). By 2100, there is an approximately 60-per-
cent chance that a summer month will be hotter than 5-sigma 
(multimodel mean; Figure 5.5), very close to the global average 
percentage. The limited surface area used for averaging implies 
that there is larger uncertainty over the timing and magnitude of 
the increase in frequency of extremely hot months over South Asia 
compared to that of the global mean. By the end of the 21st century, 
most summer months in the north of the region (>50 percent) 
and almost all summer months in the south (>90 percent) would 
be hotter than 3-sigma under RCP8.5 (Figure 5.4).
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In a 2°C world, most of the high-impact heat extremes pro-
jected by RCP8.5 for the end of the century would be avoided. 
Extremes beyond 5-sigma would still be virtually absent, except for 
the southernmost tip of India and Sri Lanka (Figure 5.4). The less 
extreme months (i.e., beyond 3-sigma), however, would increase 
substantially and cover about 20 percent of the surface area of the 
Indian subcontinent (Figure 5.5). The increase in frequency of these 
events would occur in the near term and level off by mid-century. 
Thus, irrespective of the future emission scenario, the frequency of 
extreme summer months beyond 3-sigma in the near term would 
increase several fold. By the second half of the 21st century, mitigation 
would have a strong effect on the number and intensity of extremes.
For the Indian subcontinent, the multimodel mean of all 
CMIP5 models projects that warm spells, with consecutive days 
beyond the 90th percentile, will lengthen to 150–200 days under 
RCP8.5, but only to 30–45 days under RCP2.6 (Sillmann 2013). 
By the end of the century, warm nights are expected to occur at a 
frequency of 85 percent under RCP8.5 and 40 percent under RCP2.6.
Precipitation Projections
A warmer atmosphere carries signiﬁcantly more water than a 
cooler one based on thermodynamic considerations. After taking 
into account energy balance considerations, climate models project 
an increase in global mean precipitation of about 2 percent per 
degree of warming.88
Model projections in general show an increase in the Indian 
monsoon rainfall under future emission scenarios of greenhouse 
gases and aerosols. The latest generation of models (CMIP5) con-
ﬁrms this picture, projecting overall increases of approximate-
ly 2.3 percent per degree of warming for summer monsoon rainfall 
(Menon, Levermann, Schewe, Lehmann, and Frieler 2013). The 
increase in precipitation simulated by the models is attributed to 
an increase in moisture availability in a warmer world; it is, some-
what paradoxically, found to be accompanied by a weakening of 
the monsoonal circulation (Bollasina et al., 2011; R. Krishnan et 
al. 2012; A. G. Turner and Annamalai 2012), which is explained 
by energy balance considerations (M. R. Allen and Ingram 2002). 
Some CMIP5 models show an increase in mean monsoon rainfall 
of 5–20 percent at the end of the 21st century under a high warm-
ing scenario (RCP8.5) compared to the pre-industrial period (N. 
C. Jourdain, Gupta, Taschetto, et al 2013). This newer generation 
of models indicates reduced uncertainty compared to CMIP3; 
however, signiﬁcant uncertainty remains.89
In the 5 GCMs (ISI-MIP models) analyzed for this report, annual 
mean precipitation increases under both emissions of greenhouse 
gases and aerosols in the RCP2.6 and RCP8.5 scenarios over most 
areas of the region. The notable exception is western Pakistan 
(Figure 5.6). The percentage increase in precipitation is enhanced 
under RCP8.5, and the region stretching from the northwest coast 
to the South East coast of peninsular India will experience the 
highest percentage (~30 percent) increase in annual mean rainfall.
It should be noted that the uncertain regions (hatched areas) 
with inter-model disagreement on the direction of percentage 
change in precipitation are reduced under the highest concentra-
tion RCP8.5 scenario. The percentage change in summer (JJA) 
Figure 5.5:? ??????????? ????????????????????????????????
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88 In contrast to the processes behind temperature responses to increased green-
house gas emissions, which are fairly well understood, projecting the hydrological 
cycle poses inherent difﬁculties because of the higher complexity of the physical 
processes and the scarcity of long-term, high-resolution rainfall observations (M. 
R. Allen and Ingram 2002).
89 The projected precipitation from a subset of CMIP-3 models was an overall 
increase—but with a range of trends, including negative, in monsoon rainfall by 2100 
(Turner and Annamalai 2012). The set of four GCMs used by the authors is able to 
simulate the observed seasonality and intra-annual variability of rainfall as well as 
the ENSO-ISM teleconnection; it showed substantial decadal variability. This is similar 
to that observed for the All India Rainfall (AIR) time series. The model ensembles 
did not replicate phasing, mean, or standard deviation of the AIR curve, however, 
from which the authors conclude that the decadal-scale variability is largely due to 
internal variability of the coupled atmosphere-ocean system. The models themselves 
do not show consistent changes.
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precipitation (i.e., during the wet season) resembles that of 
the change in annual precipitation. The winter (the months of 
December, January, February (DJF)) precipitation (Figure 5.6) 
shows a relative decrease in Pakistan and the central and northern 
regions of India, whereas the rest of the regions show inter-model 
uncertainty in the direction of change under the RCP8.5 scenario. 
This is in agreement with previous studies based on the IPCC AR4 
(CMIP3) models (e.g., Chou, Tu, and Tan 2007) which suggest that 
the wet season gets wetter and the dry season gets drier. Under 
RCP2.6, the direction of the percentage change in winter rainfall 
shows large inter-model uncertainty over almost all regions of India.
Increased Variability in the Monsoon System
The largest fraction of precipitation over South Asia occurs dur-
ing the monsoon season. For example, approximately 80 percent 
of the rainfall over India occurs during the summer monsoon 
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(June–September), providing the required amount of water for 
both rainfed crops and for the irrigated crops which largely depend 
on surface or groundwater reserves replenished by the monsoon 
rains (Mall, Singh, Gupta, Srinivasan, and Rathore 2006). The 
timing of monsoon rainfall is very important for agriculture and 
water supply, and variability in the monsoon system increases 
South Asia’s risk of ﬂooding and droughts. A decrease in seasonal 
water availability, together with population increases, may have 
severe effects on water and food security in this densely populated 
region (K. K. Kumar et al. 2010).
IPCC AR4 found projected increases in the variability of the 
monsoon and the seasonality of precipitation; these ﬁndings are 
reinforced by the new CMIP5 model projections. These changes 
in monsoon variability are expected to pose major challenges 
that increase with rising levels of warming to human systems 
that depend on precipitation and river runoff as major sources of 
freshwater (Box 5.2).
The total amount of rainfall, the length of the monsoon season, 
and the distribution of rainfall within the season determine the out-
come of the monsoon season for the human population dependent 
on it. For example, the number of rainy days and the intensity of 
rainfall are key factors (K. K. Kumar et al. 2010). Along with the 
projected total increase in summer monsoon rainfall, an increase 
in intra-seasonal variability of approximately 10 percent for a near 
–4°C world (3.8°C warming in RCP 8.5 for the period 2050–2100) 
is projected, based on CMIP5 GCMs (Menon, Levermann, and 
Schewe 2013). The intra-seasonal variability in precipitation, which 
may lead to ﬂoods, can be one of the greatest sources of risk to 
agriculture and other human activities in South Asia. Sillmann 
and Kharin (2013a) project, also based on CMIP5 GCMs, that the 
total annual precipitation on wet days increases signiﬁcantly over 
South Asian regions under both high- and low-emission scenarios.
While most modeling studies project average annual mean 
increased monsoonal precipitation on decadal timescales, they 
also project signiﬁcant increases in inter-annual and intra-seasonal 
variability (Endo, Kitoh, Ose, Mizuta, and Kusunoki 2012; May, 
2010; Sabade, Kulkarni, and Kripalani 2010; A. G. Turner and 
Annamalai 2012; K. K. Kumar et al. 2010):
?? The frequency of years with above-normal monsoon rainfall 
and of years with extremely deﬁcient rainfall is projected to 
increase in the future (R. H. Kripalani, Oh, Kulkarni, Sabade, 
and Chaudhari 2007; Endo et al. 2012).
?? An increase in the seasonality of rainfall, with more rainfall 
during the wet season (Fung, Lopez, and New 2011; A. G. 
Turner and Annamalai 2012), and an increase in the number 
of dry days (Gornall et al. 2010) and droughts (Aiguo Dai, 
2012; D.-W. Kim and Byun 2009).
?? An increase in the number of extreme precipitation events 
(Endo et al. 2012; K. K. Kumar et al. 2010).
Although uncertainty in the effects of global warming on total 
wet-season rainfall is considerable in the region (see hatched 
areas in Figure 5.6 JJA), there are particularly large uncertain-
ties in GCM projections of spatial distribution and magnitude 
of the heaviest extremes of monsoon rainfall (A. G. Turner and 
Annamalai 2012). The models assessed by Kumar et al. (2010)90 
in general show an increase in the maximum amount of seasonal 
rainfall for the multimodel ensemble mean around June, July, 
and August.
There are also a number of simulations assessed in the 
study by K. K. Kumar et al. (2010) that actually project less 
rainfall for JJA by 2100. The relative rainfall increase with 
Box 5.2: Indian Monsoon: Potential 
“Tipping Element”
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warming, toward a much drier, lower rainfall state. The emergence 
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proposed for such a switch and the geological record for the 
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China has undergone strong and abrupt changes in the past 
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the tropical atmosphere that could precipitate a transition of the 
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with large-scale hardship and loss of food production. In India, 
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declines in crop production.
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irreversible mass loss of the Greenland ice sheet and a dieback of the 
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90 Temperature and rainfall characteristics in past and future monsoonal climate 
are analyzed based on an observational-based, all-India summer monsoon rain-
fall dataset and the projections made by 22 CMIP3 GCMs. For the baseline runs 
from 1861–1999, observational and reanalysis data were used to force the models, 
with the projection period from 2000–2100 for which the SRES A1B scenario was 
employed (approximately 3.5°C warming above pre-industrial levels).
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climate change, which amounts to about 10 percent for the 
future (2070–98) with respect to the JJA rainfall in the baseline 
period (1961–90), was accompanied by a 20-percent increase 
in the “ﬂank periods” of May and October; this could indicate 
an increase in the length of the monsoon season. The relation-
ship between monsoonal precipitation and ENSO appears to 
be unchanged for the time periods 2041–60 and 2070–98 with 
respect to the baseline. This is to some extent ambiguous, as 
the future expected warming could result in a more permanent 
El Niño-like state in the Paciﬁc that could, in principle, lead 
to a decrease in monsoonal rainfall.
Although these results come with a considerable amount of 
uncertainty, K. K. Kumar et al. (2010) conclude that there are 
severe risks for critical socioeconomic sectors, including agricul-
ture and health.
Regional Sea-level Rise
As explained in Chapter 2, current sea levels and projections 
of future sea-level rise are not uniform across the world. South 
Asian coastlines are situated between approximately 0° and 25° 
N. Being this close to the equator, projections of local sea-level 
rise show a stronger increase compared to higher latitudes (see 
Figure 2.10). For South Asian coastlines, sea-level rise is projected 
to be approximately 100–110 cm in a 4°C world and 60–80 cm in 
a 2°C world by the end of the 21st century (relative to 1986–2005). 
This is generally around 5–10 percent higher than the global 
mean. Figure 5.7 shows the regional sea-level rise for South Asian 
coastlines for 2081–2100 under the high emissions scenario RCP8.5 
(a 4°C world). Note that these projections include only the effects 
of human-induced global climate change and not those of local 
land subsidence due to natural or human inﬂuences; these factors 
need to be accounted for in projecting the local and regional risks, 
impacts, and consequences of sea-level rise.
Figure 5.8 shows the time series of sea-level rise in a selec-
tion of locations in South Asia. These locations are projected 
to face a sea-level rise around 105 cm (66 percent uncertainty 
range of 85–125 cm) by 2080–2100. The rise near Kolkata and 
Dhaka is 5 cm lower, while projections for the Maldives are 10 cm 
higher. In a 2°C world, the rise is signiﬁcantly lower for all 
locations, but still considerable at 70 (60–80) cm. According 
to the projection in this report, there is a greater than 66-per-
cent chance that regional sea-level rise for these locations will 
exceed 50 cm above 1986–2005 levels by the 2060s in a 4°C world, 
and 100 cm by the 2090s; both of these dates are about 10 years 
before the global mean exceeds these levels. In a 2°C world, 
a rise of 0.5 meter is likely to be exceeded by about 2070, 
only 10 years after exceeding this level in a 4°C world. By that 
time, however, the high and low scenarios diverge rapidly, with 
one meter rise in a 2°C world not likely to be exceeded until 
well into the 22nd century.
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the global mean sea-level rise for comparison.
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Water Resources
Apart from the monsoon, the dominant geographical feature of 
South Asia fundamentally inﬂuencing its water hydrography is the 
Hindu Kush and Himalayan mountain complex. These mountains 
block the northerly push of the monsoon, conﬁning its precipitation 
effects to the South Asian subcontinent and providing, with their 
snow and glacial melt, the primary source of upstream freshwater 
for many of South Asia’s river basins. Climate change impacts 
on the Himalayan and the Hindu Kush glaciers therefore directly 
affect the people and economies of the countries of Afghanistan, 
Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, and Pakistan.
These “water towers of Asia” play a dominant role in feeding 
and regulating the ﬂow of the major river systems of the region: 
the Indus, the Ganges, and the Brahmaputra. These rivers drain 
into the coast, with the Ganges and the Brahmaputra carrying huge 
sediment loads from the Himalayas, creating the densely populated 
mega-delta that encompasses West Bengal and Bangladesh (see 
Figures 5.10 and 5.11). Reductions in the glacial mass and snow 
cover of the Hindu Kush and the Himalayas can have a profound 
effect on the long-term water availability over much of the sub-
continent. Changes in the characteristics of precipitation over the 
mountains, leading to increasingly intense rainfall, contribute along 
with other factors to much higher ﬂood risks far downstream and 
interact adversely with rising sea levels on the coast.
The Indus, the Ganges, and the Brahmaputra basins provide 
water to approximately 750 million people (209 million, 478 mil-
lion, and 62 million respectively in the year 2005; Immerzeel et al. 
2010). The Ganges basin on the east of the subcontinent has the 
largest population size and density of the three basins. Both the 
Indus and the Ganges supply large areas with water for irrigation 
(144,900m² and 156,300m² respectively), while the 2,880-kilometer 
Indus River constitutes one of the longest irrigation systems in the 
world. All three rivers are fed by the Tibetan Plateau and adjacent 
mountain ranges (Immerzeel, Van Beek, and Bierkens 2010; Uprety 
and Salman 2011).
In fact, over 50 percent of the world’s population lives down-
stream of the Greater Himalaya region, with snowmelt providing 
over 40 percent of pre- and early-monsoon discharge in the Greater 
Himalaya catchments, and more than 65 percent and 30 percent 
of annual discharge in the Indus and Tsangpo/Brahmaputra catch-
ments, respectively. An increasing occurrence of extremely low 
snow years and a shift toward extremely high winter/spring runoff 
and extremely low summer runoff would therefore increase the 
ﬂood risk during the winter/spring, and decrease the availability 
of freshwater during the summer (Giorgi et al. 2011).
The Indus and the Brahmaputra basins depend heavily on 
snow and glacial melt water, which make them extremely sus-
ceptible to climate-change-induced glacier melt and snowmelt 
(Immerzeel, Van Beek, and Bierkens 2010).91 In fact, most of the 
Himalayan glaciers, where 80 percent of the moisture is supplied 
by the summer monsoon, have been retreating over the past 
century. Where the winter westerly winds are the major source 
of moisture, some of the glaciers in the northwestern Himalayas 
and in the Karakoram have remained stable or even advanced 
(Bolch et al. 2012; Immerzeel et al. 2010).
Projections for the future indicate an overall risk to the ﬂow 
of these rivers. For the 2045–65 period (global mean warming 
of 2.3°C above pre-industrial levels), very substantial reductions in 
the ﬂow of the Indus and Brahmaputra in late spring and summer 
are projected. These reductions would follow the spring period of 
increased ﬂow due to melting glaciers and are not compensated 
by the projected increase in rainfall upstream. The Ganges, due 
to high annual downstream precipitation during the monsoon 
season, is less dependent on melt water (Immerzeel et al. 2010).92
Although snowfall in the mountainous areas in South Asia 
may increase (e.g., Immerzeel et al. 2010; Mukhopadhyay 2012), 
this may in the long run be offset by the decrease in glacial melt 
water as glaciers retreat due to warming (Immerzeel et al. 2010a). 
Furthermore, the distribution of the available river melt water 
runoff within the year may change due to accelerated snowmelt. 
This is caused by increased spring precipitation (Jeelani, Feddema, 
Van der Veen, and Stearns 2012), with less runoff available prior 
to the onset of the monsoon.
More recent research projects a rapid increase in the frequency 
of low snow years in the coming few decades, with a shift toward 
high winter and spring runoff and very low summer ﬂows likely 
well before 2°C warming. These trends are projected to become 
quite extreme in a 4°C warming scenario (Diffenbaugh, Scherer, 
and Ashfaq 2012).
Combined with precipitation changes, loss of glacial ice and 
a changing snowmelt regime could lead to substantial changes in 
downstream ﬂow. For example, the Brahmaputra River may experi-
ence extreme low ﬂow conditions less frequently in the future (Gain, 
91 Immerzeel et al. (2010) deﬁne a Normalized Melt Index (NMI) as a means to 
assess the relative importance of melt water, as opposed to downstream precipita-
tion (less evaporation), in sustaining the ﬂow of the three river basins. They deﬁne 
it as the volume of upstream melt water discharge divided by the downstream 
natural discharge, with the natural discharge calculated as the difference between 
the received precipitation and the natural evaporation in the basin. Changes in river 
basin runoff in both volume (volumetric discharge) and distribution throughout the 
year (seasonal distribution) are determined by changes in precipitation, the extent of 
the snow covered area, and evapotranspiration (Mukhopadhyay 2012).
92 To project the impacts of climate change on future runoff, Immerzeel et al. (2010) 
use a hydrological modeling approach and force the model through the output 
of 5 GCMs run under the A1B scenario for the time period of 2046–65 (global mean 
warming of 2.3°C above pre-industrial levels). They employ a best-guess glacial 
melt scenario for the future that assumes linear trends in degree-days and snowfall 
between the observational period and 2050, where degree-days (here expressed in 
mm/C) measure snow or ice melt expressed in depth of water for the difference 
between the base temperature (usually 0°C) and the mean air temperature per day 
(P. Singh, Kumar, and Arora 2000).
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Immerzeel, Sperna Weiland, and Bierkens 2011). There could be 
a strong increase in peak ﬂow, however, which is associated with 
ﬂooding risks (Ghosh and Dutta 2012). Combined with projected 
sea-level rise, this could have serious implications for Bangladesh 
and other low-lying areas in the region (Gain et al. 2011).
Given the potential impacts across the Northern Hemisphere, 
this report highlights the likelihood of intensifying hydrologic 
stress in snow-dependent regions, beginning in the near-term 
decades when global warming is likely to remain within 2°C of 
the pre-industrial baseline.
Water Security
Water security is becoming an increasingly important develop-
ment issue in South Asia due to population growth, urbanization, 
economic development, and high levels of water withdrawal. The 
assessment of water security threats is undertaken using differing 
metrics across the studies, which often makes a comprehensive 
assessment difﬁcult. In India, for example, gross per capita water 
availability (including utilizable surface water and replenishable 
groundwater) is projected to decline from around 1,820m³ per 
year in 2001 to about 1,140m³ per year in 2050 due to population 
growth alone (Bates, Kundzewicz, Wu, and Palutikof 2008b; S. K. 
Gupta and Deshpande 2004). Although this estimate only includes 
blue water availability (water from rivers and aquifers), it has to be 
kept in mind that in South Asia, in contrast to Europe or Africa, the 
consumption of blue water in the agricultural sector exceeds that of 
green water (precipitation water inﬁltrating into the soil) (Rockström 
et al. 2009). Thus, climate change, by changing hydrological patterns 
and freshwater systems, poses an additional risk to water security 
(De Fraiture and Wichelns 2010; ESCAP 2011; Green et al. 2011), 
particularly for the agricultural sector (Sadoff and Muller 2009).
Water demand in agriculture and the competition for water 
resources are expected to further increase in the future as a side 
effect of population growth, increasing incomes, changing dietary 
preferences, and increasing water usage by industrial and urban 
users. Even without climate change, satisfying future water demand 
will be a major challenge. Observations and projections point to 
an increase in seasonality and variability of monsoon precipitation 
with climate change; this poses additional risks to human systems, 
including farming practices and irrigation infrastructure that have 
been highly adapted to the local climate. In fact, extreme departures 
from locally expected climates that delay the onset of monsoons and 
extend monsoon breaks may have a much more profound impact 
on agricultural productivity than changes in absolute water avail-
ability or demand (see Chapter 5 on “Agricultural Production”).
Present Water Insecurity
Based on several different methods of measuring water security, 
the densely populated countries of South Asia are already exposed 
to a signiﬁcant threat of water insecurity. Taking into account 
water quality and exposure to climate change and water-related 
disasters, ESCAP (2011) identiﬁes India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, the 
Maldives, and Nepal as water hotspots in the Asia-Paciﬁc region.
South Asia’s average per capita water availability,93 deﬁned by 
the sum of internal renewable water sources and natural incom-
ing ﬂows divided by population size, is less than 2,500m³ annu-
ally (ESCAP 2011); this is compared to a worldwide average of 
almost 7,000m³ per capita per year (World Bank 2010c). In rural 
areas of India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Nepal, and Sri Lanka,94 
10 percent or more of the population still remain without access 
to an adequate amount of water, even if deﬁned at the relatively 
low level of 20 liters per capita per day for drinking and other 
household purposes. Rates of access to sanitation are also low. 
In the year 2010 in India, only 34 percent of the population had 
access to sanitation; in Pakistan, that number is 48 percent and in 
Bangladesh it is 54 percent (2010 data based on World Bank 2013b).
Applying a multi-factorial water security index,95 Vörösmarty 
et al. (2010) ﬁnd that South Asia’s present threat index varies 
regionally between 0.6 and 1, with a very high (0.8–1) threat 
over central India and Bangladesh on a threat scale of 0 (no 
apparent threat) to 1 (extremely threatened). Along the mountain 
ranges of the Western Ghats of South India, in Nepal, in Bhutan, 
in the northeastern states of India, and in the northeastern part 
of Afghanistan, the incident threat level is high to very high 
(0.6–0.8).96 Another approach, in which a country is considered 
to be water stressed if less than 1,700m³ river basin runoff per 
capita is available, also found that South Asia is already a highly 
water-stressed region (Fung et al. 2011).
Projected Changes in Water Resources and Security
The prognosis for future water security with climate change 
depends on the complex relationship among population growth, 
increases in agricultural and economic activity, increases in total 
precipitation, and the ultimate loss of glacial fed water and snow 
cover, combined with regional variations and changes in seasonal-
ity across South Asia. Projections show that in most cases climate 
93 Including Afghanistan, Iran and Turkey.
94 Bhutan and the Maldives have slightly higher levels of access to water.
95 Aggregating data on river ﬂows, using cumulative weights based on expert 
judgment on 23 factors relating to catchment disturbance, pollution, water resource 
development, and biotic factors.
96 Insufﬁcient river ﬂow over parts of Pakistan, the southwestern parts of Afghani-
stan, and the northwestern arid desert regions of India, especially Rajasthan and the 
Punjab, precludes the investigation of ongoing changes in the water security index 
(Vörösmarty et al. 2010b). In these areas, water availability is predominantly inﬂu-
enced by snowmelt generated upstream in the Hindu Kush and Himalayas (Barnett 
and Webber 2010) and, as shown by Immerzeel et al. (2010), climate-change-induced 
glacier retreat can signiﬁcantly inﬂuence water availability in river basins which 
heavily depend on snow and glacial melt water.
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change aggravates the increasing pressure on water resources 
due to high rates of population growth and associated demand.
An example of this complexity can be seen in the work of Fung et 
al. (2011), who project the effects of global warming on river runoff 
in the Ganges basin.97 A warming of about 2.7°C above pre-industrial 
levels is projected to lead to a 20-percent increase in runoff, and 
a 4.7°C warming to approximately a 50-percent increase. Without 
taking seasonality into account, the increase in mean annual runoff 
in a 4°C world is projected to offset increases in water demand due 
to population growth.98 With 2°C warming, the total mean increase 
in annual runoff is not sufﬁciently large to mitigate the effects of 
expected population growth in these regions; water stress, therefore, 
would not be expected to decrease in South Asia.
While an increase in annual runoff sounds promising for a 
region in which many areas suffer from water scarcity (Bates et al. 
2008; Döll 2009; ESCAP 2011), it has to be taken into account that 
the changes are unevenly distributed across wet and dry seasons. 
In projections by Fung et al. (2011), annual runoff increases in the 
wet season while further decreasing in the dry season—with the 
ampliﬁcation increasing at higher levels of warming. This increase 
in seasonality implies severe ﬂooding in high-ﬂow seasons and 
aggravated water stress in dry months in the absence of large-scale 
infrastructure construction (Fung et al. 2011; World Bank 2012).
River runoff, however, is just one measure of available water; 
more complex indexes of water security and availability have also 
been applied. A recent example is that of Gerten et al. (2011c), who 
apply the concept of blue water and green water to evaluate the 
effects of climate change on available water supplies for agriculture 
and human consumption. They ﬁnd that a country is water scarce 
if the availability of blue water used for irrigation and green water 
used for rainfed agricultural production does not exceed the required 
amount of water to produce a diet of 3,000 kilocalories per capita 
per day. For a diet based on 80 percent vegetal and 20 percent 
animal product-based calories, Gerten et al. (2011c) estimate this 
amount at 1,075m³ of water per capita per year.
For global warming of approximately 3°C above pre-industrial 
levels and the SRES A2 population scenario for 2080, Gerten et al. 
(2011) project that it is very likely (>90 percent conﬁdence) that 
per capita water availability in South Asia99 will decrease by more 
than 10 percent.100 While the population level plays an important 
role in these estimates, there is a 10–30 percent likelihood that 
climate change alone is expected to decrease water availability 
by more than 10 percent in Pakistan and by 50–70 percent in 
Afghanistan. The likelihood of water scarcity driven by climate 
change alone is as high as >90 percent for Pakistan and Nepal 
and as high as 30–50 percent for India. The likelihood of a country 
becoming water scarce is shown in Figure 5.9.
Another study examining the effects of climate change on 
blue and green water availability and sufﬁciency for food produc-
tion arrives at broadly similar conclusions. In a scenario of 2°C 
warming by 2050, Rockström et al. (2009) project food and water 
requirements in India to exceed green water availability by more 
than 150 percent, indicating that the country will be highly 
dependent on blue water (e.g., irrigation water) for agriculture 
production.101 At the same time, blue water crowding, deﬁned 
as persons per ﬂow of blue water, is expected to increase due to 
population growth. As early as 2050, water availability in Pakistan 
and Nepal is projected to be too low for self-sufﬁciency in food 
production when taking into account a total availability of water 
below 1300m³ per capita per year as a benchmark for the amount 
of water required for a balanced diet (Rockström et al. 2009).
The projection of impacts needs to rely on accurate predic-
tions of precipitation and temperature changes made by GCMs 
(see Chapter 5 on “Regional Patterns of Climate Change”). In 
addition, the estimation of impacts relies on (and depends on) 
hydrological models and their accurate representation of river runoff. 
Furthermore, as the above results demonstrate, water scarcity in 
the future is also highly dependent on population growth, which 
poses a large source of uncertainty. Finally, many studies use dif-
ferent metrics to estimate water resource availability and water 
scarcity, making direct intercomparison difﬁcult. Irrespective of 
these multiple sources of uncertainty, with a growing population 
and strong indications of climate-related changes to the water cycle, 
clear and growing risks to stable and safe freshwater provisions 
to populations and sectors dependent on freshwater are projected 
to increase with higher levels of warming.
Projected Changes to River Flow
South Asia has very low levels of water storage capacity per capita, 
which increases vulnerability to ﬂuctuations in water ﬂows and 
changing monsoon patterns (Ministry of Environment and For-
ests 2012; Shah 2009). India, for example, stores less than 250m³ of 
water per capita (in contrast to countries such as Australia and the 
U.S., which have a water storage capacity of more than 5,000m³ per 
capita). There is a large potential in South Asian countries to both 
utilize existing natural water storage capacity and to construct addi-
tional capacity (Ministry of Environment and Forests, 2012). The 
potential for improvements in irrigation systems, water harvesting 
97 Estimates are based on an application of the climateprediction.net (CPDN). 
HADCM3 global climate model ensemble runs with the MacPDM global hydrological 
model and under the SRES A1B climate change scenario, together with the expected 
UN population division population growth scenario. Warming levels of 2°C and 4°C 
compared to the 1961–90 baseline were examined. The years by which the temperature 
increase is expected to occur varies as an ensemble of models was used.
98 Population projections are based on UN population growth rate projections 
until 2050 and linear extrapolations for the 2060s.
99 Except for Sri Lanka; no estimates are reported for the Maldives.
100 Ensemble of  17 CMIP3 GCMs for SRES A2 and B1  climate and population 
change scenarios.
101 Using the LPJmL dynamic vegetation and a water balance model driven by climate 
output from HadCM² forced by A2 SRES emission scenario.
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techniques, and water productivity, and more-efﬁcient agricultural 
water management in general, is also high; such improvements 
would serve to offset risks from climate variability.
A pronounced ampliﬁcation of river ﬂows, combined with large 
changes in the discharge cycle from glaciers and snowpack in the 
Himalayas, point to substantial risks, not least related to ﬂooding, 
in the future. River ﬂooding can have far-reaching consequences, 
directly affecting human lives and causing further cascading impacts 
on affected businesses, where small-scale enterprises are often the 
most vulnerable. Asgary, Imtiaz, and Azimi (2012) evaluated the 
impacts of the 2010 river ﬂoods on small and medium enterprises 
(SME) in Pakistan. The authors ﬁrst found that 88 percent of the 
sample business owners had to evacuate their towns due to the ﬂood, 
therefore causing a major disruption to business. They further found 
that 47 percent of the businesses had recovered within 1–3 months 
after the occurrence of the ﬂoods; 90 percent had recovered after 
six months. However, most of the businesses suffered losses and 
only a few of them were at the same level or wealthier afterwards 
than prior to the event. The authors further explain that small busi-
nesses have a higher probability of being located in hazard-prone 
areas, occupying unsafe business facilities and lacking the ﬁnancial 
and human resources to cope with the consequences of disasters.
The climate model projections discussed in the previous sec-
tion strongly indicate that there is likely to be a strong increase 
in seasonal ﬂows due to global warming—on top of likely overall 
increases in precipitation. These patterns appear differently in 
different river basins. For example, recent work by Van Vliet et 
al. (2013) projects changes in low, mean, and high river ﬂows 
globally and ﬁnds pronounced differences between the Indus 
and the Ganges-Brahmaputra basins.102 For the Indus, the mean 
ﬂow is projected to increase by the 2080s for warming levels of 
around 2–°C by around 65 percent, with low ﬂow increasing 
by 30 percent and the high ﬂow increasing by 78 percent. For 
the Ganges-Brahmaputra system, the mean ﬂow increases by 
only 4 percent, whereas the low ﬂow decreases by 13 percent and 
the high ﬂow by 5 percent. The changes are ampliﬁed with higher 
levels of warming between the individual scenarios.
Given these large changes in seasonal ampliﬁcation of river 
ﬂows and rainfall amounts, it is clear that, even for 2°C warming, 
major investments in water storage capacity will be needed in order 
to utilize the potential beneﬁts of increased seasonal runoff for 
improved water availability throughout the year. At the same time, 
infrastructure for ﬂood protection has to be built. The required invest-
ment in water infrastructure is likely to be larger with a warming of 
above 4°C compared to a warming of above 2°C (Fung et al. 2011).
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102 Three GCMs forced by the SRES A2 and B1 scenarios with hydrological changes 
calculated with the VIC (Variable Inﬁltration Capacity) model.
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Cities and Regions at Risk of Flooding
Coastal and deltaic regions are particularly vulnerable to the risks 
of ﬂooding. Cities in particular agglomerate high numbers of 
exposed people. A number of physical climatic changes indicate 
an increased risk of ﬂooding, including more extreme precipitation 
events, higher peak river ﬂows, accelerated glacial melt, increased 
intensity of the most extreme tropical cyclones, and sea-level 
rise. These changes are expected to further increase the number 
and severity of ﬂood events in the future (Eriksson, Jianchu, 
and Shrestha 2009; Ministry of Environment and Forests 2012; 
Mirza 2010). A number of these projected changes are likely to 
interact, exacerbating damages and risk (e.g., higher peak river 
ﬂows in low-lying coastal deltas potentially interacting with rising 
sea levels, extreme tropical cyclones, and associated storm surges). 
Such events could in turn pose additional threats to agricultural 
production and human health, as will be discussed in Chapter 5 
under “Agricultural Production” and “Human Impacts.”
A wide range of ﬂooding events can be inﬂuenced or caused 
by climate change, including ﬂash ﬂoods, inland river ﬂoods, 
extreme precipitation-causing landslides, and coastal river ﬂood-
ing, combined with the effects of sea-level rise and storm-surge-
induced coastal ﬂooding. In addition to ﬂoods and landslides, the 
Himalayan regions of Nepal, Bhutan, and Tibet are projected to 
be exposed to an increasing risk of glacial lake outbursts (Bates 
et al. 2008; Lal 2011; Mirza 2010).103 The full scope of possible 
ﬂooding events will not be explored; the focus of this section 
will instead be on low-lying river delta regions where there is a 
conﬂuence of risk factors. This does not mean that other kinds of 
ﬂooding events are not signiﬁcant—merely that they fall outside 
the scope of this report.
Climate change is not the only driver of an increasing vul-
nerability to ﬂoods and sea-level rise. Human activities inland 
(such as upstream damming, irrigation barrages, and diversions) 
as well as activities on the delta (such as water withdrawal) can 
signiﬁcantly affect the rate of aggradation and local subsidence 
in the delta, thereby inﬂuencing its vulnerability to sea-level rise 
and river ﬂoods. Subsurface mining is another driver (Syvitski et 
al. 2009). Subsidence, meanwhile, exacerbates the consequences 
of sea-level rise and increases susceptibility to river ﬂooding.
The Current Situation in the Region
The frequency of extreme ﬂoods and the scope of ﬂood-prone 
areas are increasing, particularly in India, Pakistan, and Bangla-
desh. Precipitation is the major cause of ﬂooding (Mirza 2010). 
Since 1980, the risks from ﬂooding have grown due mainly to 
population and economic growth in coastal regions and low-lying 
areas. In 2000, approximately 38 million people were exposed to 
ﬂoods in South Asia; almost 45 million were exposed in 2010, 
accounting for approximately 65 percent of the global population 
exposed to ﬂoods (UNISDR 2011). Figure 5.10 shows the popula-
tion density in the Bay of Bengal region.
Deltaic regions in particular are vulnerable to more severe ﬂood-
ing, loss of wetlands, and a loss of infrastructure and livelihoods 
as a consequence of sea-level rise and climate-change-induced 
extreme events (Ian Douglas 2009; Syvitski et al. 2009; World 
Bank 2010d). It is important to recognize, however, that river deltas 
are very dynamic; where the rate of aggradation (inﬂow of sedi-
ment to the delta) exceeds the local rate of sea-level rise (taking 
into account subsidence caused by other factors), a delta may be 
stable in the face of rising sea levels. The vulnerability to climate-
related impacts in the region is modulated by factors determining 
the level of sediment inﬂow. Reductions in sediment inﬂow have 
led to an increase in the relative sea-level rise in the deltas; where 
sediment inﬂow increases, relative sea-level rise may decrease.
The two major deltas in South Asia are those of the Ganges, 
Brahmaputra, and Meghna Rivers and of the Indus River:
?? The Indus Delta in Pakistan has an area of 4,750 km² below 
2 meters above sea level and a population of approximately 
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103 The buildup of melt water behind glacial moraines as glaciers retreat forms 
lakes; eventually the moraine dams can burst, leading to catastrophic ﬂooding 
downstream. An increase in the frequency of glacial lake outburst ﬂoods has already 
been observed (Bates et al. 2008).
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350,000.104 The storm-surge areas of the deltas are at present 
3,390 km², and the recent area of river ﬂooding is 680 km² 
(1,700 km² in situ ﬂooding) (Syvitski et al. 2009). The Indus 
was recently ranked as a delta at greater risk, as the rate of 
degradation of the delta (including inﬂow of sediments) no 
longer exceeds the relative sea-level rise. In the Indus Delta, 
a sediment reduction of 80 percent has been observed and 
the observed relative sea-level rise is more than 1.1 mm per 
year (Syvitski et al. 2009), exacerbating the global sea-level 
rise of 3.2 mm/yr (Meyssignac and Cazenave 2012).
?? The Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Delta encompasses Ban-
gladesh and West Bengal, including the city of Kolkata in 
India. Within Bangladesh’s borders, the area of the delta lying 
below 2 meters is 6,170 km² and the population at present is 
more than 22 million. The storm-surge areas of the delta are at 
present 10.500km², and the recent area of river ﬂooding in the 
Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Delta is 52,800 km² (42,300 km² in 
situ ﬂooding) (Syvitski et al. 2009). The Ganges-Brahmaputra 
Delta was recently ranked as a “delta in peril” due to reduced 
aggregation and accelerated compaction of the delta. This is 
expected to lead to a situation where sea-level rise rates are 
likely to overwhelm the delta. A sediment inﬂow reduction 
of 30 percent has been observed in this delta and aggradation 
no longer exceeds relative sea-level rise, which is particularly 
high in the Ganges Delta at 8–18 mm per year (Syvitski et al., 
2009). Figure 5.11 shows the basins of the Ganges, Brahma-
putra, and Meghna Rivers.
Projections: Risks to Bangladesh
Bangladesh is one of the most densely populated countries in 
the world, with a large population living within a few meters of 
sea level (see Figure 5.10). Flooding of the Ganges-Brahmaputra-
Meghna Delta occurs regularly and is part of the annual cycle of 
agriculture and life in the region.
Up to two-thirds of the land area of Bangladesh is ﬂooded every 
three to ﬁve years, causing substantial damage to infrastructure, 
livelihoods, and agriculture—and especially to poor households 
(World Bank 2010d; Monirul Qader Mirza 2002).
Projections consistently show substantial and growing risks for 
the country, with more climate change and associated increases 
in river ﬂooding and sea-level rise. According to Mirza (2010), 
changes in precipitation are projected to result in an increase 
in the peak discharges of the Ganges, the Brahmaputra, and the 
Meghna Rivers. Mirza (2010) estimates the ﬂooded area could 
increase by as much as 29 percent for a 2.5°C increase in warm-
ing above pre-industrial levels, with the largest change in ﬂood 
depth and magnitude expected to occur in up to 2.5°C of warm-
ing. At higher levels of warming, the rate of increase in the extent 
of mean-ﬂooded-area per degree of warming is estimated to be 
lower (Mirza 2010).
Tropical cyclones also pose a major risk to populations in 
Bangladesh. For example, Cyclone Sidr exposed 3.45 million 
Bangladeshis to ﬂooding (World Bank 2010d). In comparison 
to the no-climate-change baseline scenario, it is projected that 
an additional 7.8 million people would be affected by ﬂooding 
higher than one meter in Bangladesh as a consequence of a poten-
tial 10-year return cyclone in 2050 (an increase of 107 percent). 
A total of 9.7 million people (versus the 3.5 million in the baseline 
scenario) are projected to be exposed to severe inundation of 
more than 3 meters under this scenario. Agriculture in the region 
would also be severely affected. In addition, rural communities 
representing large parts of the population are expected to remain 
dependent on agriculture despite structural economic changes in 
the future away from climate-sensitive sectors; this would leave 
them vulnerable to these climate change impacts. Furthermore, 
the highest risk of inundation is projected to occur in areas with 
the largest shares of poor people (World Bank 2010d).
Projections: Risks to Two Indian Cities
The following discussion of the climate-change-related risks 
to two Indian cities—Mumbai and Kolkata—is intended to be 
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104 This estimate accounts for the population of the four Teluka (sub-districts of 
the Sind Province, based on the 1998 census) within the coastline. Mipur Sakro: 
198,852; Keti Bunder: 25,700; Shah Buner: 100,575; Kharo Chann: 25,656. The data 
can be found at http://www.districtthatta.gos.pk/Taluka%20Administration.htm.
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illustrative rather than to provide a comprehensive assessment of 
risks to urban areas in the region. The focus is on large cities as 
these represent high agglomerations of assets and people, which 
however does not imply a relatively higher human resilience in 
rural areas.
Mumbai
Mumbai, due to its geography, is particularly exposed to both 
ﬂooding from heavy rainfall during the monsoon and sea-level rise 
inundation as large parts of the city are built on reclaimed land 
which lies lower than the high-tide level. Indeed, the city has the 
largest population exposed to coastal ﬂooding in the world (IPCC 
2012) (Box 5.3). The city’s drainage system is already inadequate 
in the face of heavy rainfall, and rapid and unplanned urbaniza-
tion is likely to further increase the ﬂood risk in Mumbai (Ranger 
et al. 2011).
The projected increase in heavy precipitation events associ-
ated with climate change poses a serious risk to the city—and 
that does not even take into account the effects of sea-level 
rise. By the 2080s and with a warming of 3°C to 3.5°C above 
pre-industrial levels, climate projections indicate a doubling of 
the likelihood of an extreme event similar to the 2005 ﬂoods 
(and a return period reduced to around 1-in-90 years).105 Direct 
economic damages (i.e., the costs of replacing and repairing 
damaged infrastructure and buildings) of a 1-in-100 year event 
are estimated to triple in the future compared to the present day 
and to increase to a total of up to $1.9 billion due to climate 
change only (without taking population and economic growth 
into account). Additional indirect economic costs, such as sectoral 
inﬂation, job losses, higher public deﬁcit, and ﬁnancial constraints 
slowing down the process of reconstruction, are estimated to 
increase the total economic costs of a 1-in-100 year event to 
$2.4 billion (Ranger et al. 2011). Without adaptation, popula-
tion and economic growth would increase the exposure to and 
damage of ﬂooding events in the future. In terms of adaptation, 
Ranger et al. (2011) estimate that improved building codes and 
improving the drainage system in Mumbai could reduce direct 
economic costs by up to 70 percent.
A limitation of Ranger et al. (2011) is that the study does not 
include the impacts of sea-level rise—even though it is very plau-
sible that even low levels of sea-level rise would further reduce the 
effectiveness of drainage systems. This report projects the sea-level 
rise in Mumbai at around 35 cm by the 2050s under either of the 
emission pathways leading to the 2°C or 4°C worlds; for the 2° 
world, a rise of around 60 cm by the 2080s and, for the 4°C world, a 
rise of close to 80 cm (see Chapter 5 on “Regional Sea-level Rise”).
Kolkata
Kolkata is ranked among the top 10 cities in the world in terms of 
exposure to ﬂooding under climate change projections (IPCC 2012; 
UN-HABITAT 2010b; World Bank 2011a). The elevation of Kol-
kata city and the metropolitan area surrounding the city ranges 
from 1.5–11 meters above sea level (World Bank 2011a). Kolkata is 
projected to be exposed to increasing precipitation, storm surges, 
and sea-level rise under climate change scenarios. Roughly a third of 
the total population of 15.5 million (2010 data; UN-HABITAT 2010) 
live in slums, which signiﬁcantly increases the vulnerability of the 
population to these risk factors. Furthermore, 15 percent of the 
population live by the Hooghly River and are highly exposed to 
ﬂooding. Another factor adding to the vulnerability of Kolkata is 
unplanned and unregulated urbanization; infrastructure develop-
ment is insufﬁcient and cannot keep pace with current urbanization 
rates (World Bank 2011a).
A recent study by the World Bank (2011a)106 on urban ﬂooding 
as a consequence of climate-change ﬁnds that a 100-year return 
period storm will result in doubling the area ﬂooded by a depth of 
0.5–0.75m (i.e. high threat level) under the A1F1 climate change 
scenario (this scenario considers  a projected sea-level rise of 27 cm 
and a 16 percent increase in precipitation by 2050). This excludes 
Kolkata city, which is analyzed separately, as the city has sewer-
age networks in place; these sewerage networks are essentially 
absent in the peri-urban areas surrounding the city. According 
105 For these estimates, projections of precipitation are taken from the regional 
climate model PRECIS. They are driven by the A2 SRES scenario, which projects 
a 3.6°C mean temperature increase across India compared to the 1961–90 baseline 
period and a 6.5 percent increase in seasonal mean rainfall by 2080 representing an 
upper-end estimate of future climate risks (Ranger et al. 2011).
106 Projections are based on the A1F1 SRES emission scenario leading to a global-mean 
warming of 2.2°C above pre-industrial levels by 2050, 12 GCMs, and an estimated 
sea-level rise of 27 cm by 2050. Historical rainfall data for 1976–2001 represent the 
baseline (no climate change) scenario. Land subsidence was not accounted for in 
the study. Impacts were analyzed in terms of the projected extent, magnitude, and 
duration of ﬂooding by deploying a hydrological model, a hydraulic model, and 
an urban storm drainage model. The population of Kolkata in 2050 was estimated 
by extrapolation based on the past decadal growth rates adjusted for likely future 
changes in population growth. A decadal population growth rate of 4 percent was 
applied. Past average per capita GDP growth rates were used to estimate property 
and income levels in 2050. The presented estimates are based on 2009 prices and 
thus do not consider inﬂation (World Bank 2011a).
Box 5.3: The 2005 Mumbai Flooding
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to the projections presented in Chapter 5 on “Regional Sea-level 
Rise”, the sea-level rise in Mumbai and Kolkata is expected to 
reach 25 cm by the 2030s–40s.
In Kolkata city, with a population of approximately ﬁve million 
and a population density almost three times higher than the met-
ropolitan area (the city has a population density of 23,149 persons 
per km² while the metropolitan area has a population density of 
only 7,950 people per km²), a ﬂood depth of more than 0.25 meters 
is expected to affect 41 percent of the city area and about 47 per-
cent of the population in 2050 compared to 39 percent of the city 
area and 45 percent of the population under the baseline scenario 
(World Bank 2011a).
In terms of damages in Kolkata city only, which accounts for 
an area of around 185 km² (the metropolitan area surrounding the 
city is about 1,851 km²) the World Bank (2011a) study estimates 
the additional climate-change-related damages from a 100-year 
return-period ﬂood to be $790 million in 2050 (including damages 
to residential buildings and other property, income losses, losses in 
the commercial, industrial, and health care sectors, and damages 
to roads and the transportation and electricity infrastructures). Due 
to data constraints, both total damages and the additional losses 
caused by increased ﬂooding as a consequence of climate change 
should be viewed as lower-bound estimates (World Bank 2011a).
Given that sea-level rise is projected to increase beyond 25 cm 
to 50 cm by 2075 (and 75 cm by 2100) in the lower warming 
scenario of 2°C, these risks are likely to continue to grow with 
climate change.
Scale of Flooding Risks with Warming, and 
Sea-level Rise
With a few exceptions, most of the studies reviewed here do not 
examine how ﬂooding risks change with different levels of climate 
change and/or sea-level rise. In speciﬁc locations, this very much 
depends on local topographies and geography; on a broader regional 
and global scale, however, the literature shows that river ﬂooding 
risks are quite strongly related to the projected level of warming. 
Recent work by Arnell et al (2013) reinforces earlier work, show-
ing that the proportion of the population prone to river ﬂooding 
increases rapidly with higher levels of warming. Globally about twice 
as many people are predicted to be ﬂood prone in 2100 in a 4°C 
world compared to a 2°C scenario. Arnell and Gosling (2013) ﬁnd 
that increases in ﬂooding risk are particularly large over South Asia 
by the 2050s, both in percentage and absolute terms. Reinforcing 
this are recent projections of the consequence of snow reductions 
in the Himalayan region: increasing frequency of extremely low 
snow years causes extremely high northern hemisphere winter/
spring runoff increasing ﬂood risks (Diffenbaugh et al 2012).
The response to coastal ﬂooding caused by sea-level rise tends 
to be much less pronounced; this is principally because, by 2100, 
the differences between scenarios are not large when adaptation 
is assumed (i.e., rising wealth drives increasing levels of coastal 
protection) (Arnell et al 2013). The full difference in impacts would 
be felt in following centuries.
For the cases studied here, such as the Indus-Brahmaputra 
Delta, Bangladesh and the cities, it is plausible that higher rates 
of sea-level rise and climate change together will lead to greater 
levels of ﬂooding risk. How these risks change, and likely increase, 
with high levels of warming and sea-level rise remains to be fully 
quantiﬁed.
Agricultural Production
Agriculture contributes approximately 18 percent to South Asia’s 
GDP (2011 data based on World Bank 2013l); more than 50 percent 
of the population is employed in the sector (2010 data based on 
World Bank 2013m) and directly dependent on it. In Bangladesh, 
for example, rural communities, representing large parts of the 
population, are expected to remain dependent on agriculture despite 
structural changes in the economy away from climate-sensitive sec-
tors in the future. As a result, much of the population will remain 
vulnerable to these climate change impacts (World Bank 2009). 
Productivity growth in agriculture is thus an important driver of 
poverty reduction, and it is highly dependent on the hydrological cycle 
and freshwater availability (Jacoby, Mariano, and Skouﬁas 2011).
The rice-wheat system in the Indo-Gangetic Plain, which meets 
the staple food needs of more than 400 million people, is a highly 
vulnerable regional system. The system, which covers an area of 
around 13.5 million hectares in Pakistan, India, Bangladesh, and 
Nepal, provides highly productive land and contributes substan-
tially to the region’s food production. Declining soil productivity, 
groundwater depletion, and declining water availability, as well 
as increased pest incidence and salinity, already threaten sus-
tainability and food security in the region (Wassmann, Jagadish, 
Sumﬂeth, et al. 2009).
Climate change is projected to have a signiﬁcant and often 
adverse impact on agricultural production in South Asia, the 
development of the sector, and the economic beneﬁts derived 
from it (Nelson et al. 2009). There are a signiﬁcant number 
of risks arising from climate-change-related phenomena that 
need to be considered in assessing the future impacts on the 
sector (Box 5.4). For example, the upper temperature sensitiv-
ity threshold for current cultivars for rice is 35–38°C and for 
wheat is 30–35°C (Wassmann, Jagadish, Sumﬂeth, et al. 2009). 
Future heat extremes may thus pose a signiﬁcant risk to regional 
production of these crops. This section will provide a short 
overview of the major risks to crop and agricultural production 
in the region before turning to model-based projections of future 
agricultural output.
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The effects of rainfall deﬁcits, extreme rainfall events, and ﬂooding 
are projected to be felt differently in different parts of South Asia. 
For examples, Asada and Matsumoto (2009) analyze the effects of 
variations in rainfall on rice production in the Ganges-Brahmaputra 
Basin in India and Bangladesh. This is one of the most important 
regions for rice production in South Asia and is responsible for 
about 28 percent of the world’s total rice production. Their focus 
is on regional differences between the upper and the lower Ganges 
and the Brahmaputra Basin. Based on climate and rice production 
data from 1961–2000, Asada and Matsumoto (2009) apply statistical 
modeling and ﬁnd that the effect of changes in rainfall differs among 
the regions analyzed. While rice production in the upper Ganges 
Basin is strongly affected by rainfall variation and is vulnerable to 
rainfall shortages, rice production in the lower Ganges Basin is more 
strongly affected by ﬂoods. In the Brahmaputra Basin, in contrast, 
the drought effect is stronger than the ﬂood effect as a consequence 
of increasing rainfall variation, though crops are vulnerable to 
both droughts and ﬂoods. These ﬁndings are highly relevant in the 
context of climate change as they provide a better understanding of 
regional differences and vulnerabilities to provide a stronger basis 
for adaptation and other responses (Asada and Matsumoto 2009).
Climatic Risk Factors
Extreme Heat Effects
Heat stress, which can be particularly damaging during some 
development stages and may occur more frequently with climate 
change, is not yet widely included in crop models and projections. 
Lobell et al. (2012) use satellite data to investigate the extreme heat 
effects on wheat senescence; they ﬁnd that crop models probably 
underestimate yield losses for +2°C by as much as 50 percent for 
some sowing dates. Earlier work by Lobell et al. (2011) shows the 
sensitivity of rice, and wheat in India to increases in maximum 
temperature in the growing season. Compared to calculations of 
potential yields without historic trends of temperature changes 
since the 1980s, rice and wheat yields have declined by approxi-
mately 8 percent for every 1°C increase in average growing-season 
temperatures (David B Lobell, Schlenker, and Costa-Roberts 2011).
If temperatures increase beyond the upper temperature for 
crop development (e.g., 25–31°C for rice and 20–25°C for wheat, 
depending on genotype), rapid decreases in the growth and pro-
ductivity of crop yields could be expected, with greater tempera-
ture increases leading to greater production losses (Wassmann, 
Box 5.4: Observed Rice Yield Declines
Observed Rice Yield Decline and Slowdown in Rice Harvest Growth
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Wheat Yield Stagnation and High-Temperature Negative Effects
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Jagadish, Sumﬂeth, et al. 2009). By analyzing the heat stress in 
Asian rice production for the period 1950–2000, Wassmann et al. 
(2009) show that large areas in South Asia already exceed maxi-
mum average daytime temperatures of 33°C.
By introducing the response to heat stress within different 
crop models, A. Challinor, Wheeler, Garforth, Craufurd, and Kas-
sam (2007) simulate signiﬁcant yield decreases for rice (up to 
–21 percent under double CO2) and groundnut (up to –50 percent). 
Under a doubling of atmospheric CO2 from the 380 ppm baseline, 
they show that at low temperature increases (+1°C, +2°C), the 
CO2 effect dominates and yields increase; at high temperature 
increases (+3°C, +4°C), yields decrease.
Areas, where temperature increases are expected to exceed 
upper limits for crop development in critical stages (i.e., the 
ﬂowering and the maturity stage) are highly vulnerable to heat-
induced yield losses. Aggravating heat stress due to climate change 
is expected to affect rice crops in Pakistan, dry season crops in 
Bangladesh, and crops in the Indian States of West Bengal, Bihar, 
Jharkhand, Orissa, Tamil Nadu, Kerala, and Karnataka. The situ-
ation may be aggravated by reduced water availability due to 
changes in precipitation levels and falling groundwater tables, as 
well as by droughts, ﬂoods, and other extreme events (Wassmann, 
Jagadish, Sumﬂeth, et al. 2009).
Water and Groundwater Constraints
Agriculture and the food demands of a growing population are 
expected to be the major drivers of water usage in the future (De 
Fraiture and Wichelns 2010; Ian Douglas 2009), demonstrating 
the direct linkage between water and food security. At present, 
agriculture accounts for more than 91 percent of the total fresh-
water withdrawal in South Asia (including Afghanistan); Nepal 
(98 percent), Pakistan (94 percent), Bhutan (94 percent) and India 
(90 percent) have particularly high levels of water withdrawal 
through the agricultural sector (2011 data by World Bank 2013d). 
Even with improvements in water management and usage, agri-
culture is expected to remain a major source of water usage (De 
Fraiture and Wichelns 2010).
Even without climate change, sustainable use and development 
of groundwater resources remain a major challenge (Green et al. 
2011). In India, the “global champion in groundwater irrigation” 
(Shah 2009), resources are already at critical levels and about 15 per-
cent of the country’s groundwater tables are overexploited, mean-
ing that more water is being extracted than the annual recharge 
capacity (Ministry of Environment and Forests 2012). The Indus 
Basin belongs to the areas where groundwater extraction exceeds 
annual replenishment. In addition, groundwater utilization in 
India is increasing at a rate of 2.5–4 percent (Ministry of Environ-
ment and Forests 2012). Year-round irrigation is especially needed 
for intensifying and diversifying small-scale farming. Without 
any measures to ensure a more sustainable use of groundwater 
resources, reductions in agricultural production and in the avail-
ability of drinking water are logical consequences—even without 
climate change (Rodell et al. 2009). Climate change is expected 
to further aggravate the situation (Döll 2009; Green et al. 2011).
Immerzeel, Van Beek, and Bierkens (2010) demonstrate how 
changes in water availability in the Indus, Ganges, and Brahmaputra 
rivers may impact food security. The authors estimate that, with a 
temperature increase of 2–2.5°C compared to pre-industrial levels, 
by the 2050s reduced water availability for agricultural production 
may result in more than 63 million people no longer being able 
to meet their caloric demand by production in the river basins.
Depending on rainfed agriculture for food production carries 
high risks, as longer dry spells may result in total crop failure 
(De Fraiture and Wichelns 2010). In India, for example, more 
than 60 percent of the crop area is rainfed (e.g., from green water), 
making it highly vulnerable to climate induced changes in precipi-
tation patterns (Ministry of Environment and Forests 2012). The 
bulk of rice production in India, however, comes from irrigated 
agriculture in the Ganges Basin (Eriksson et al. 2009); changes in 
runoff patterns in the Ganges River system are projected to have 
adverse effects even on irrigated agriculture.
Based on projections for the 2020s and 2030s for the Ganges, 
Gornall et al. (2010) provide insight into these risks. Consistent with 
other studies, they project overall increased precipitation during 
the wet season for the 2050s compared to 2000,107 with signiﬁcantly 
higher ﬂows in July, August, and September. From these global 
model simulations, an increase in overall mean annual soil moisture 
content is expected for 2050 (compared to 1970–2000); the soil is 
also expected to be subject to drought conditions for an increased 
length of time. Without adequate water storage facilities, however, 
the increase of peak monsoon river ﬂow would not be usable for 
agricultural productivity; increased peak ﬂow may also cause 
damage to farmland due to river ﬂooding (Gornall et al. 2010).
Other river basins are also projected to suffer surface water 
shortages. Gupta, Panigrahy, and Paribar (2011) ﬁnd that Eastern 
Indian agriculture may be affected due to the shortage of surface 
water availability in the 2080s as they project a signiﬁcant reduc-
tion in the lower parts of the Ganga, Bahamani-Baitrani, and 
Subarnrekha rivers and the upper parts of the Mahanadi River.
In addition to the large river systems, groundwater serves as 
a major source of water, especially for irrigation in South Asia 
(here referring to India, Pakistan, lower Nepal, Bangladesh, and 
Sri Lanka) (Shah, 2009). In India, for example, 60 percent of 
irrigation for agriculture (Green et al. 2011) and 50–80 percent of 
domestic water use depend on groundwater, and yet 95 percent 
of total groundwater consumption is used for irrigation (Rodell, 
Velicogna, and Famiglietti 2009).
107 SRES A1F scenario leading to a temperature increase of approximately 2.3°C 
above pre-industrial levels by 2050.
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With its impacts on surface water and precipitation levels, 
climate change would affect groundwater resources (Green et al. 
2011). South Asia, and especially India and Pakistan, are highly 
sensitive to decreases in groundwater recharge as these countries are 
already suffering from water scarcity and largely depend on water 
supplied from groundwater (Döll 2009). Groundwater resources 
are particularly important to mitigate droughts and related impacts 
on agriculture and food security, and it is likely that groundwater 
resources will become even more important in the future at times 
of low surface water availability and dry spells (Döll 2009; Green et 
al. 2011). To date, climate-related changes in groundwater resources 
have been relatively small compared to non-climatic forces such as 
groundwater mining, contamination, and reductions in recharge.
Groundwater recharge is highly dependent on monsoon rainfall, 
and the changing variability of the monsoon season poses a severe risk 
to agriculture. Farming systems in South Asia are highly adapted to 
the local climate, particularly the monsoon. Approximately 80 percent 
of the rainfall over India alone occurs during the summer monsoon 
(June-September). This rainfall provides water for the rainfed and 
irrigated crops that depend largely on surface and groundwater 
reserves that are replenished by the monsoon rains. Observations 
indicate the agricultural sector´s vulnerability to changes in monsoon 
precipitation: with a 19-percent decline in summer monsoon rainfall 
in 2002, Indian food grain production was reduced by about 18 per-
cent compared to the preceding year (and 10–15 percent compared 
to the previous decadal average) (Mall et al. 2006).
Observations of agricultural production during ENSO events 
conﬁrm strong responses to variations in the monsoon regime. 
ENSO events play a key role in determining agricultural produc-
tion (Iglesias, Erda, and Rosenzweig 1996). Several studies, using 
historical data on agricultural statistics and climate indices, have 
established signiﬁcant correlations between summer monsoon 
rainfall anomalies, strongly driven by the ENSO events, and crop 
production anomalies (e.g., Webster et al. 1998).
Recent statistical analysis by Auffhammer, Ramanathan, and 
Vincent (2011) also conﬁrm that changes in monsoon rainfall over 
India, with less frequent but more intense rainfall in the recent 
past (1966–2002) contributed to reduced rice yields. Droughts 
have also been found to have more severe impacts than extreme 
precipitation events (Auffhammer et al. 2011). This decrease in 
production is due to both direct drought impacts on yields and 
to the reduction of the planted areas for some water-demanding 
crops (e.g., rice) as farmers observe that the monsoon may arrive 
too late (Gadgil and Rupa Kumar 2006).
Salinization
Soil salinity has been hypothesized to be one possible reason for 
observed yield stagnations (or decreases) in the Indo-Gangetic 
Plain (Ladha et al. 2003). Climate change is expected to increase 
the risk of salinity through two mechanisms. First, deltaic regions 
and wetlands are exposed to the risks of sea-level rise and increased 
inundation causing salinity intrusion into irrigation systems and 
groundwater resources. Second, higher temperatures would lead 
to excessive deposits of salt on the surface, further increasing the 
percentage of brackish groundwater (Wassmann, Jagadish, Heuer, 
Ismail, Redonna, et al. 2009). However, similar to diminished 
groundwater availability, which is largely due to rates of extraction 
exceeding rates of recharge and is, in this sense, human induced 
(Bates 2008), groundwater and soil salinization are also caused by 
the excessive use of groundwater in irrigated agriculture. Salinity 
stress through brackish groundwater and salt-affected soils reduces 
crop yields; climate change is expected to aggravate the situation 
(Wassmann, Jagadish, Heuer, et al., 2009).
Drought
Droughts are an important factor in determining agricultural pro-
duction and food security. They can also have severe implications 
for rural livelihoods, migration, and economic losses (Intergovern-
mental Panel on Climate Change 2012; UNISDR 2011). Evidence 
indicates that parts of South Asia have become drier since the 1970s 
(Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 2007) in terms of 
reduced precipitation and increased evaporation due to higher 
surface temperatures, although the attribution of these changes 
in dryness has not yet been resolved.
Bangladesh is regularly affected by severe droughts as a result 
of erratic rainfall and unstable monsoon precipitation. While 
country-wide droughts occur approximately every ﬁve years, local 
droughts in rainfed agricultural areas, such as the northwest of 
Bangladesh, occur more regularly and cause yield losses higher 
than those from ﬂooding and submergence (Wassmann, Jagadish, 
Sumﬂeth, et al. 2009).
Droughts can be a result of an overall decline in rainfall in 
wet or dry season, a shift in the timing of the wet season, as well 
as a strong local warming that exhausts water bodies and soils 
by evaporation. Across models, total annual precipitation is pro-
jected on average to increase over southern India and decrease 
over northwestern India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan, while the 
difference between years might increase due to increased inter-
annual variability of the monsoon (Chapter 5 on “Precipitation 
Projections”). Some models show a peak in precipitation increase 
over northern India and Pakistan rather than over southern India 
(e.g., Taylor et al. 2012). In the dry season, the models generally 
agree on a projected widespread reduction in precipitation across 
the region (Chapter 5 on “Precipitation Projections”), which 
increases the population’s dependence on river ﬂow, above ground 
water storage, and ground water for natural systems during the 
monsoon season. In a 4°C warming scenario globally, annual 
mean warming is projected to exceed 4°C in southern India and 
rise to more than 6°C in Afghanistan (Chapter 5 on “Projected 
Temperature Changes”)—increasing both evaporation and water 
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requirements of plants for evapotranspiration. Using such projec-
tions in precipitation and warming, (Dai 2012) estimates that, for 
a global mean warming of 3°C by the end of the 21st century, the 
drought risk expressed by the Palmer Drought Severity Index (PDSI) 
becomes higher across much of northwestern India, Pakistan, and 
Afghanistan but becomes lower across southern and eastern India.
It should be noted that such projections are uncertain, not only 
due to the spread in model projections but also to the choice of drought 
indicator (Taylor et al. 2012). For example, drought indicators like 
PDSI include a water balance calculation involving precipitation and 
evaporation and relate the results to present-day conditions, so that 
drought risk is presented relative to existing conditions. By contrast, 
Dai (2012) showed that projected changes in soil-moisture content 
indicate a drying in northwestern Pakistan, Afghanistan, and the 
Himalayas—but no signiﬁcant drying or wetting over most of India.
Flooding and Sea-level Rise
Flooding poses a particular risk to deltaic agricultural production. 
The rice production of the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Delta 
region of Bangladesh, for example, accounts for 34 percent of the 
national rice production and is used for domestic consumption 
only. Large parts of the area are less than ﬁve meters above sea 
level and therefore at high risk of sea-level rise (see Figure 5.12). 
Bangladesh is a rice importer; even today, food shortages are a 
persistent problem in the country, making it even more vulner-
able to production shocks and rising food prices (Douglas 2009; 
Wassmann, Jagadish, Sumﬂeth, et al. 2009). Higher ﬂood risk 
as a consequence of climate change poses a severe threat to the 
Aman rice crop in Bangladesh, which is one of the three rice crops 
in Bangladesh that grows in the monsoon season; it accounts 
for more than half of the national crop (Wassmann, Jagadish, 
Sumﬂeth, et al. 2009). Increased ﬂood risk to the Aman and Aus 
(pre-monsoon) rice crops is likely to interact with other climate 
change impacts on the Boro (post-monsoon) rice crop production, 
leading to substantial economic damages (Yu et al. 2010). In this 
region, large amounts of productive land could be lost to sea-level 
rise, with 40-percent area losses projected in the southern region 
of Bangladesh for a 65 cm rise by the 2080s (Yu et al. 2010).
Tropical Cyclone Risks
Tropical cyclones already lead to substantial damage to agricultural 
production, particularly in the Bay of Bengal region, yet very few 
assessments of the effects of climate change on agriculture in the 
region include estimates of the likely effects of increased tropical 
cyclone intensity.
Tropical cyclones are expected to decrease in frequency and 
increase in intensity under future climate change (see Chapter 
4 on “Tropical Cyclone Risks” for more discussion on tropical 
cyclones). More intense tropical cyclones, combined with sea-level 
rise, would increase the depth and risk of inundation from ﬂoods 
and storm surges and reduce the area of arable land (particularly 
in low-lying deltaic regions) (Box 5.5). In Bangladesh, for example, 
a projected 27 cm sea-level rise by 2050, combined with a storm 
surge induced by an average 10-year return-period cyclone such 
as Sidr, could inundate an area 88-percent larger than the area 
inundated by current cyclonic storm surges108 (World Bank 2010d). 
Under this scenario, for the different crop seasons, the crop areas 
108 Based on the assumption that landfall occurs during high-tide and that wind 
speed increases by 10 percent compared to cyclone Sidr.
Box 5.5: The Consequences of 
Cyclone Sidr
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exposed to inundation are projected to increase by 19 percent for 
the Aman crop, by 18 percent for the Aus crop, and by 43 percent 
for the Boro crop. The projected regional sea-level rise by 2050 is 
estimated in Chapter 5 on “Regional Patterns of Climate Change” at 
around 30–35 cm under both the 2°C and 4°C scenarios, with sea 
levels rising to 80 cm by 2100 in the former scenario and to over 
a meter in the latter one.
Uncertain CO2 Fertilization Effect
Despite the different representations of some speciﬁc biophysical 
processes, the simulations generally show that the positive fertilization 
effect of the increasing atmospheric CO2 concentration may counteract 
the negative impacts of increased temperature (e.g., A. J. Challinor 
& Wheeler 2008). There are, however, regional differences: For the 
intensive agricultural areas of northwest India, enhanced wheat 
and rice yields might be expected under climate change, provided 
that current irrigation can be maintained. Enhanced yields could 
also be expected for rainfed rice in southwest India if the tempera-
ture increase remains limited, as water use efﬁciency is enhanced 
under elevated atmospheric CO2  levels. Uncertainties associated 
with the representation or parameterization of the CO2 fertilization 
effect, however, lead to a large range of results given by different 
crop models (see Chapter 3 on “Crops” for more discussion on the 
CO2 fertilization effect). For example, large parts of South Asia are 
projected to experience signiﬁcant declines in crop yield without 
CO2  fertilization, while increases are projected when taking the 
potential CO2 fertilization effect into account. However, controversy 
remains as to the strength of the effect, and there is considerable 
doubt that the full beneﬁts can be obtained (Müller et al. 2010).
Projected Changes in Food Production
The impacts of climate change on crop production in South Asia 
could be severe. Projections are particularly negative when CO2 fer-
tilization, of which the actual beneﬁts are still highly uncertain, 
is not accounted for. Low-cost adaptation measures may mitigate 
against yield declines up to 2.5°C warming if the CO2 fertilization 
effect is taken into account; where the CO2 fertilization effect is 
not accounted for, yields show a steady decline.
It is important to recognize that the assessments outlined below 
do not yet include the known effects of extreme high temperatures 
on crop production, the effects of extreme rainfall and increased 
seasonality of the monsoon, lack of needed irrigation water (many 
assessments assume irrigation will be available when needed), or 
the effects of sea-level rise and storm surges on loss of land and 
salinization of groundwater. The evidence from crop yields studies 
indicates that the CO
2 fertilization effect is likely to be outweighed 
by the negative effects of higher warming above 2.5°C.
The crop yield review here shows a signiﬁcant risk, in the 
absence of a strong CO2  fertilization effect, of a substantial, 
increasing negative pressure from present warming levels upward. 
The rapid increase in the area of South Asia expected to be affected 
by extreme monthly heat is 10 percent of total land area by 2020 and 
approximately 15 percent by 2030;109 combined with evidence of 
a negative response to increases in maximum temperature in the 
growing season, this points to further risks to agricultural produc-
tion in the region.
There are relatively few integrated projections to date of total 
crop production in South Asia. Most published studies focus on 
estimating changes in crop yield (that is, yield per unit area) for 
speciﬁc crops in speciﬁc regions, and examine the consequences 
of climate change and various adaptation measures on changes 
in yield. Although total crop production (for a given area over a 
given timeframe) is fundamentally inﬂuenced by crop yield, other 
factors (availability of water, soil salinization, land availability, 
and so forth) play an important role and need to be accounted for.
Crop yields in South Asia have improved over time, and it can be 
expected that future improvements may occur due to technological 
changes, cultivar breeding and optimization, production efﬁciencies, 
and improved farm management practices. A recent global assess-
ment of crop yield trends, however, indicates grounds for concern 
in South Asia (Lobell, Schlenker, and Costa-Roberts 2011). In India, 
rice crop yields have been improving on about 63 percent of the 
cropped area—but not improving on the remainder. For wheat, 
crop yield is increasing on about 30 percent of the cropped area 
in India, but not on the rest. In Pakistan, wheat crop yields are 
improving on about 87 percent of the cropped area. For soybean 
crops in India, yield improvements are occurring on about half 
of the area. Maize, not yet a large crop in India, exhibits yields 
improving on over 60 percent of the cropped area.
Figure 5.13 shows the relationship between global mean 
temperature and yield changes for most of the crops grown in 
South Asia. Recent studies show results for different crops (maize, 
wheat, rice, groundnut, sorghum, and soybean), for different 
irrigation systems, and for different regions (see Appendix 4 for 
details). Often the results are presented as a range for different 
GCM models or for a region or sub-regions. In the following 
analysis, which is an attempt to identify a common pattern of 
the effects of CO2 fertilization and adaptation measures on crop 
yield, all crops are gathered together without distinction among 
crop types, irrigation systems, or regions in Asia. In cases in 
which a study showed a range of GCM models for a speciﬁc 
crop, the average of the models was considered as representa-
tive of yield change.
Across the whole warming range considered, there exists a 
signiﬁcant relationship between crop yield decrease and tem-
perature increase (F=25.3, p<0.001) regardless of crop type or 
109 Values for this timeframe are independent of the warming scenario that is pro-
jected for both a 2°C and a 4°C world.
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whether the effects of CO2 fertilization or adaptation measures 
are taken into account:
?? For warming below about 2.1 degrees above pre-industrial 
levels, and with cases with and without CO2 fertilization 
taken together, there is no longer a signiﬁcant relationship 
between warming and yield loss. This suggests that the effects 
of adaptation measures and CO2 fertilization are stronger and 
may compensate for the adverse effects of climate change 
under 2°C warming.
?? If one excludes cases that include CO2 fertilization, then sig-
niﬁcant yield losses may occur before 2°C warming.
?? With increases in warming about 2°C above pre-industrial 
levels, crop yields decrease regardless of these potentially 
positive effects. While CO2 fertilization partly compensates 
for the adverse effects of climate change, this compensation 
appears stronger under temperature increases below 2°C above 
pre-industrial levels.
The same data as above is shown in Figure 5.14 with statisti-
cal relationships. The median estimates of yields indicate that 
studies with CO2 fertilization and adaptation measures (dark 
blue) and CO2 fertilization without adaptation measures (red) 
show a fairly ﬂat response to about 2°C warming—and then 
show a decreasing yield trend. Yields excluding these effects 
(green and light blue) show a decreasing yield trend with a 
temperature increase. There is no signiﬁcant difference between 
red bars (adding only CO2 fertilization effects) between 1.2–2.1°C 
temperature increase levels; this becomes signiﬁcant at 2.5°C. 
If the effects of both CO2 fertilization and adaptation measures 
are taken into account (dark blue bars), then the medians only 
differ signiﬁcantly at the highest level of temperature increase. 
This suggests that a substantial, realized CO2 fertilization effect 
and adaptation measures have positive effects at lower levels of 
temperature increases but that, at higher temperature increases, 
this effect is overshadowed by the stronger effects of greater 
climate change. If there is a strong CO2  fertilization effect, 
the effects of warming might be compensated for by low-cost 
adaptation measures below about 2°C warming, whereas for 
warming greater than this yield levels are likely to decrease. 
With increases in warming above about 2°C above pre-industrial 
levels, crop yields appear likely to decrease regardless of these 
potentially positive effects.
This overall pattern of increasingly large and likely negative 
impacts on yields with rising temperatures would have a substantial 
effect on future crop production.
Lal (2011) estimates the overall consequences for crop produc-
tion in South Asia. He ﬁnds that in the longer term CO2 fertilization 
effects would not be able to offset the negative impacts of increases 
in temperatures beyond 2°C on rice and wheat yields in South Asia. 
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He estimates that cereal production would decline 4–10 percent 
under the most conservative climate change projections (a regional 
warming of 3°C) by the end of this century.
A recent assessment by Nelson et al. (2010) is a fully integrated 
attempt to estimate the global crop production consequences of 
climate change; this report draws substantially upon that work. The 
most important crops in South Asia are rice and wheat, accounting 
for about 50 percent and 40 percent of production, respectively. 
Nelson et al. (2009, 2010)110 estimate the direct effects of climate 
change (changes in temperature and precipitation for rainfed crops 
and temperature increases for irrigated crops) on the production of 
different crops with and without the effect of CO2 fertilization under 
a global mean warming of about 1.8°C above pre-industrial levels 
by 2050. They ﬁnd that South Asia (including Afghanistan) is affected 
particularly hard by climate change—especially when the potential 
beneﬁts of the CO2 fertilization effect are not included (Nelson et 
al., 2009, 2010). The authors make the decision in conducting their 
analysis to show mainly results excluding the CO2 fertilization effect 
as “this is the most likely outcome in farmers’ ﬁelds.”
Two climate model projections are applied for the South Asian 
region in 2050. One of the models (NCAR) projects a substantial 
(11 percent) increase in precipitation; the other (CSIRO) model 
projects about a 1.6 percent increase above 2000  levels. The 
CMIP5 projections reviewed above project about a 2.3 percent 
increase in precipitation per degree of global mean warming 
(1.3–3 percent range); hence, more recent projections than those 
deployed by Nelson et al. (2010) imply a likely total increase of 
about 4 percent in 2050. In analyzing the results of this work, this 
report averages the model results; in the case of South Asia there 
is little overall difference between the models.
Table 5.2 provides a summary of the assessment of the inte-
grated effects of climate change on crop production in South Asia. 
Without climate change, overall crop production is projected to 
increase signiﬁcantly (by about 60 percent) although, in per capita 
terms, crop production will likely not quite keep pace with projected 
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110 The estimates are based on the global agriculture supply and demand model 
IMPACT 2009, which is linked to the biophysical crop model DSSAT. Climate 
change projections are based on the NCAR and the CSIRO models and the A2 SRES 
emissions scenario, leading to a global mean warming of about 2.0°C above pre-
industrial levels by 2050 (Nelson et al. 2009, 2010). To capture the uncertainty in 
the CO2 fertilization effect, simulations are conducted at two levels of atmospheric 
CO2 in 2050: the year 2000 level of 369 ppm, called the no-CO2fertilization scenario; 
and the projected level in 2050 for 532 ppm under the SRES A2 scenario, termed 
the with-CO2 fertilization scenario.
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population growth. Under climate change, however, and assuming 
the CO2 fertilization effect does not increase above present levels, a 
signiﬁcant (about one-third) decline in per capita South Asian crop 
production is projected. With much larger yield reductions projected 
after 2050 than before (based on the above analysis), it could be 
expected that this food production deﬁcit could grow further.
In South Asia, with the growth in overall crop production 
reduced from about 60 percent in the absence of climate change 
to a little over a 12 percent increase, and with population increas-
ing about 70 percent over the same period, there would be a need 
for substantial crop imports. Nelson et al. (2010) estimate imports 
in 2050 to be equivalent to about 20 percent of production in the 
climate change scenario. Compared to the case without climate 
change, where about ﬁve percent of the assessed cereals would be 
imported in 2050 under the base scenario (costing over $2 billion per 
year), import costs would increase to around $15 billion per year.
In addition to the direct impacts of climate change on water 
and agricultural yield, there are also indirect impacts which have 
major implications for the food security of the region. These 
include food price ﬂuctuations and trade and economic adjust-
ments, which may either amplify or reduce the adverse effects 
of climate change.
Even without climate change, world food prices are expected to 
increase due to population and income growth as well as a grow-
ing demand for biofuels (Nelson et al. 2010). At the global level 
and with climate change, Nelson et al. (2010) estimate additional 
world food price increases to range from 32–37 percent for rice 
and from 94–111 percent for wheat by 2050 (compared to 2000). 
Adjusting for CO2 fertilization as a result of climate change, price 
increases are projected to be 11–17 percent lower for rice, wheat, and 
maize, and about 60-percent lower for soybeans (Nelson et al. 2010).
While per capita calorie availability would be expected to 
increase by 9.7 percent in South Asia by 2050 without climate 
change, it is projected to decline by 7.6 percent below 2000 levels 
with climate change. Taking CO2 fertilization into account, the 
decline would be 4.3 percent compared to calorie availability 
in 2000, which is still a signiﬁcant change compared to the no-
climate-change scenario. The proportion of malnourished children 
is expected to be substantially reduced by the 2050s without 
climate change. However, climate change is likely to partly offset 
this reduction, as the number of malnourished children is expected 
to increase by 7 million compared to the case without climate 
change (Nelson et al. 2010).111
Impacts in Bangladesh
While the risks for South Asia emerge as quite serious, the risks 
and impacts for Bangladesh are arguably amongst the highest in 
the region. Yu et al. (2010) conducted a comprehensive assess-
ment of future crop performance and consequences of production 
losses for Bangladesh.
Yu et al. (2010) assess the impacts of climate change on four 
different crops under 2.1°C, 1.8°C, and 1.6°C temperature increases 
above pre-industrial levels in 2050.112 They also take into account 
soil data, cultivar information, and agricultural management 
practices in the CERES (Crop Environment Resources Synthesis) 
model. The study accounts for temperature and precipitation 
changes, ﬂood damage, and CO2 fertilization for Aus (rice crop, 
planted in April), Aman (rice crop, planted in July), Boro (rice 
crop, planted in December), and wheat. Aman and Boro produc-
tion areas represent 83 percent of the total cultivated area for 
these four crops, Aus production areas represent 11.1 percent, 
and wheat production areas represent 5.9 percent.
Yu et al. (2010) ﬁrst estimate the impacts of climate change 
without taking into account the effects of ﬂooding on production. 
They ﬁnd that the Aus, Aman, and wheat yields are expected to 
increase whereas Boro production is expected to decrease as the 
Boro crop is more reactive to changes in temperature than changes 
in precipitation. When river and coastal ﬂooding are taken into 
account, Aus and Aman crop production is expected to decrease. 
Note that Boro and wheat production are not expected to be 
affected by river or coastal ﬂooding.
Yu et al. (2010) also evaluate the impact of coastal ﬂooding 
on the production of rice and wheat in Bangladesh. The authors 
estimate the effects of ﬂoods on production using sea-level rise 
projections under the scenarios B1 and A2 only. Table 5.3 displays 
the sea-level rise values under the scenarios B1 and A2 used in this 
study. Taking into account the number of days of submergence, 
the relative plant height being submerged, and development stage 
of the plant (from 10 days after planting to maturity), the authors 
calculate the ﬂood damage as a percentage of the yield reduction. 
Values for yield reduction vary from 0 percent when ﬂoods sub-
merge the plants to 25–50 percent of the mature plant height for 
fewer than six days, to 100 percent when ﬂoods submerge more 
than 75 percent of plant height for more than 15 days at any stage 
of plant development.
Taking into account the impact of changes in temperature and 
precipitation, the beneﬁts of CO
2 fertilization, mean changes in 
ﬂoods and inundation, and rising sea levels, the authors estimate 
that climate change will cause an approximately 80-million-ton 
reduction in rice production from 2005–50, or about 3.9 percent 
111 All estimates presented by Nelson et al. (2010) are based on the global agricul-
ture supply and demand model IMPACT 2009, which is linked to the biophysical 
crop model DSSAT. Climate change projections are based on the NCAR and CSIRO 
models and the A2 SRES emissions scenario (global-mean warming of about 1.8°C 
above pre-industrial levels by 2050 globally). In this study, crop production growth 
is determined by crop and input prices, exogenous rates of productivity growth and 
area expansion, investments in irrigation, and water availability. Demand is a func-
tion of price, income, and population growth, and is composed of four categories of 
commodity demand: food, feed, biofuels, feedstock, and other uses.
112 These temperature increases are based on the IPCC SRES A1B, A2, and B1 sce-
narios, respectively.
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annually113 (World Bank 2010a; Yu et al. 2010). With an annual 
rice production of 51 million tons (2011 data based on FAO 2013), 
this amount is almost equivalent to two years of current rice 
production in Bangladesh. The results should probably be seen 
as optimistic as the simulations include highly uncertain beneﬁts 
from CO2 fertilization (Yu et al. 2010).
Yu et al. (2010) estimate the discounted total economy-
wide consequences of climate change at about $120 billion 
between 2005–50, or $2.68 billion per year. This represents a 
decline of 5.14 percent in the national GDP. In the scenario with 
the most severe climate change impacts, however, GDP is expected 
to decrease by about eight percent during the same period and 
up to 12.2 percent between 2040–50. They also ﬁnd that the 
discounted total losses in agricultural GDP due to the combined 
impacts of climate change would be approximately $25.8 billion, 
or $0.57 billion per annum.
The Implications of Declining Food Production for 
Poverty
The impacts of climate change on food prices, agricultural yields, 
and production are expected to have direct implications for human 
well-being. In particular, per capita calorie availability and child 
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113 Projected annual reduction losses over the 45-year period range from 4.3 percent 
under the A2 scenarios to 3.6 percent under the B1 scenarios. GCM uncertainty 
further widens the range of projections from 2–6.5 percent. The 16 GCMs applied 
in this study for the two climate scenarios project a median warming of 1.6°C 
above 1970–99 temperatures (approximately 2°C above pre-industrial levels) and 
an increase of 4 percent in annual precipitation as well as greater seasonality in 
Bangladesh by 2050 (World Bank, 2010a).
Table 5.3:??????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????? ????????????
????????? ????? ??????????????? ????? ????? ?????
???? ???? ???????????? ??? ??? ????
?????? 20cm ???? ????
???? ???? ???????????? ???? 27cm ????
?????? 20cm ???? ????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????
???
malnutrition, affecting long-term growth and health, may be 
severely affected by climate change and its various effects on 
the agricultural sector (Nelson et al. 2010). Furthermore, uneven 
distribution of the impacts of climate change is expected to have 
adverse effects on poverty reduction.
Hertel et al. (2010) show that, by 2030, poverty implications 
due to rising food price in response to productivity shocks would 
have the strongest adverse effects on a selected number of social 
strata. In a low-productivity scenario, described as a world with 
rapid temperature increases and crops highly sensitive to warming, 
higher earnings result in declining poverty rates for self-employed 
agricultural households. This is due to price increases following 
production shocks. Non-agricultural urban households, in turn, are 
expected to suffer the most negative impacts of food price increases. 
As a result, the poverty rate of non-agricultural households in this 
scenario rises by up to a third in Bangladesh.114
Human Impacts
Populations in the region are expected to experience further reper-
cussions from the climatic risk factors outlined above. The human 
impacts of climate change will be determined by the socioeconomic 
context in which they occur. The following sections outline some 
of these expected implications, drawing attention to how particular 
groups in society, such as the poor, are the most vulnerable to the 
threats posed by climate change.
Risks to Energy Supply
Sufﬁcient energy supply is a major precondition for development, 
and electricity shortages remain a major bottleneck for economic 
growth in South Asian countries (ADB 2012). A lack of energy, 
and poor infrastructure in general, deter private investment and 
limit economic growth (Naswa and Garg 2011). Only 62 percent of 
the South Asian population (including Afghanistan) has access to 
electricity, including 62 percent in Pakistan, 66 percent in India, 
41 percent in Bangladesh, 43 percent in Nepal, and 77 percent in Sri 
Lanka; no data are available for Bhutan and the Maldives (2009 data; 
World Bank 2013e). This indicates that there is still a major gap in 
electricity supply to households—especially in rural areas.
As Table 5.4 shows, the two main sources of electricity in the 
region are hydroelectric and thermoelectric power plants. Both 
sources are expected to be affected by climate change.
The high proportion of electricity generation in South Asia 
that requires a water supply points to the potential vulnerability 
of the region’s electricity sector to changes in river ﬂow and 
in water temperature. Hydroelectricity is dependant only on 
river runoff (Ebinger and Vergara 2011). Thermoelectricity, on 
the other hand, is inﬂuenced by both river runoff and, more 
generally, the availability and temperature of water resources 
(Van Vliet et al. 2012).
Hydroelectricity
India is currently planning large investments in hydropower to 
close its energy gap and to provide the energy required for its 
targeted 8–9 percent economic growth rate (Planning Commission, 
2012a). This is in spite of the potential negative impacts on local 
communities and river ecosystems (Sadoff and Muller 2009). The 
major as yet unexploited hydropower potential lies in the Northeast 
and Himalayan regions. As it is estimated that so far only 32 percent 
of India’s hydropower potential, estimated at 149 GW, is being 
utilized, India is planning to harness the estimated additional 
capacity of 98,863 MW in the future (Planning Commission 2012a). 
Substantial undeveloped potential for hydropower also exists in 
other South Asian countries (Sadoff and Muller 2009). Nepal, for 
example, utilizes only approximately 0.75 percent of its estimated 
hydropower potential (Shrestha and Aryal 2010).
With the projected increasing variability of and long-term 
decreases in river ﬂow associated with climate change, electricity 
generation via hydropower systems will become more difﬁcult to 
forecast. This uncertainty poses a major challenge for the design 
and operation of hydropower plants. In Sri Lanka, for example, 
where a large share of the electricity is generated from hydropower, 
the multipurpose Mahaweli scheme supplies 29 percent of national 
power generation and 23 percent of irrigation water. A projected 
decrease in precipitation in the Central Highlands of Sri Lanka may 
cause competition for water across different sectors (Eriyagama, 
Smakhtin, Chandrapala, and Fernando 2010).
Table 5.4:?????????????????????????????????????????????
???????
?????????????????
? ??????????
?????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????
???????? ??????????
Bangladesh 3.9 ????
Bhutan n.a n.a
India 11.9 ????
Maldives n.a n.a
Nepal 99.9 0.1
???????? 33.7 ????
????????? ???? ????
??????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????? ??????????
????????? ??????????????????? ??????????????????? ??????????????????? ?????
?????????????
114 Hertel et al. (2010) assume an unchanged economy from 2001. Their low-productivity 
scenario is associated with a 32 percent food price increase.
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Increasing siltation of river systems also poses a risk to 
hydropower. India, for example, has already recorded many cases 
of malfunctioning power turbines due to high levels of siltation 
(Naswa and Garg 2011; Planning Commission 2012b). Yet another 
climate-induced risk for hydropower systems is physical damage 
due to landslides, ﬂoods, ﬂash ﬂoods, glacial lake outbursts, and 
other climate-related natural disasters (Eriksson et al. 2009; Naswa 
and Garg 2011; Shrestha and Aryal 2010). Nepal (with 2,323 gla-
cial lakes) and Bhutan (with 3,252 glacial lakes) are particularly 
vulnerable to glacial lake outbursts. The glacial lake ﬂood from 
the Dig Tsho in Nepal in 1985, for example, destroyed 14 bridges 
and caused approximately $1.5 million worth of damage to a small 
hydropower plant (Ebi, Woodruff, Hildebrand, and Corvalan 2007); 
it also affected a large area of cultivated land, houses, human 
inhabitants, and livestock (Shrestha and Aryal 2010).
As resources for rebuilding damaged infrastructure tend to be 
scarce and carry large opportunity costs, climate change may pose 
an additional risk and, indeed, a possible deterrent to infrastructure 
development in developing countries (Naswa and Garg 2011).
Thermal Power Generation
The primary source of vulnerability to a thermal power plant from 
climate change is potential impacts on its cooling system as the full 
efﬁciency of a plant depends on a constant supply of fresh water at 
low temperatures (I. Khan, Chowdhury, Alam, Alam, and Afrin 2012). 
Decreases in low ﬂow and increases in temperature are the major 
risk factors to electricity generation (Mcdermott and Nilsen 2011). 
Heat waves and droughts may decrease the cooling capacity of 
power plants and reduce power generation (I. Khan et al. 2012).
Studies quantifying the impacts of climate change on thermal 
power generation in South Asia speciﬁcally are not available. 
However, a study by Van Vliet et al. (2012) evaluates these impacts 
in 2040 and 2080. They examine the effects of changes in river 
temperatures and in river ﬂows, and ﬁnd that the capacity of power 
plants could decrease 6.3–19 percent in Europe and 4.4–16 percent 
in the United States over the period 2031–60 for temperature ranges 
of 1.5–2.5°C. Other climate-related stressors may also affect elec-
tricity production in South Asia, including salinity intrusion due 
to sea-level rise, which can disturb the normal functioning of the 
cooling system; increasing intensity of tropical cyclones, which 
can disrupt or damage power plants within coastal areas; and river 
erosion, which can damage electricity generation infrastructures 
on the banks of rivers (I. Khan et al. 2012).
Health Risks and Mortality
Climate change is also expected to have major health impacts in 
South Asia, and it is the poor who are expected be affected most 
severely. The projected health impacts of climate change in South 
Asia include malnutrition and such related health disorders as 
child stunting, an increased prevalence of vector-borne and diar-
rheal diseases, and an increased number of deaths and injuries 
as a consequence of extreme weather events (Markandya and 
Chiabai 2009; Pandey 2010).
Childhood Stunting
Climate change is expected to negatively affect food production (see 
Chapter 5 on “Agricultural Production”), and may therefore have 
direct implications for malnutrition and undernutrition—increasing 
the risk of both poor health and rising death rates (Lloyd, Kovats, 
and Chalabi 2011). The potential impact of climate change on 
childhood stunting, an indicator measuring undernourishment, is 
estimated by Lloyd, Kovats, and Chalabi (2011). At present, more 
than 31 percent of children under the age of ﬁve in South Asia are 
underweight (2011 data based on World Bank 2013n).
Using estimates of changes in calorie availability attributable to 
climate change, and particularly to its impact on crop production, 
Lloyd et al. (2011) estimate that climate change may lead to a 62 
percent increase in severe childhood stunting and a 29 percent 
increase in moderate stunting in South Asia by 2050 for a warming 
of approximately 2°C above pre-industrial levels.115 As the model 
is based on the assumption that within-country food distribution 
remains at baseline levels, it would appear that better distribution 
could to some extent mitigate the projected increase in childhood 
stunting.
Diarrheal and Vector-Borne Diseases
Diarrhea is at present a major cause for child mortality in Asia and 
the Paciﬁc, with 13.1 percent of all deaths under age ﬁve in the 
region caused by diarrhea (2008 data from ESCAP 2011). Pandey 
(2010) investigates the impact of climate change on the incidence 
of diarrheal disease in South Asia and ﬁnds a declining trend in the 
incidence of the disease but an increase of 6 percent by 2030 (and 
an increase of 1.4 percent by 2050) in the relative risk of disease 
from the baseline, compared to an average increase across the 
world of 3 percent in 2030 (and 2 percent in 2050) (Pandey 2010).116 
Noteworthy in this context is the ﬁnding by Pandey (2010) that, 
in the absence of climate change, cases of diarrheal disease in 
South Asia (including Afghanistan) would decrease earlier, as the 
expected increase in income would allow South Asian countries 
to invest in their health services.
115 The estimates are based on the climate models NCAR and CSIRO, which 
were forced by the A2 SRES emissions scenario (ca. 1.8°C above pre-industrial 
by 2050 globally). By 2050, the average increases in maximum temperature over land 
are projected as 1.9°C with the NCAR and 1.2°C with the CSIRO model, compared 
to a 1950–2000 reference scenario (Lloyd et al. 2011).
116 This study is based on two GCMs, NCAR, the colder and drier CSIRO model, and 
the A2 scenarios (global-mean warming about 1.2°C by 2030 and 1.8°C by 2050 above 
pre-industrial levels). For establishing the baseline incidence of these diseases (for 2010, 
2030, and 2050), the author uses WHO projections. Population estimates are based 
on UN projections, and GDP estimates are based on an average of integrated models.
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Climate change is expected to affect the distribution of malaria 
in the region, causing it to spread into areas at the margins of 
the current distribution where colder climates had previously 
limited transmission of the vector-borne disease (Ebi et al. 2007). 
Pandey (2010) ﬁnds that the relative risk of malaria in South Asia 
is projected to increase by 5 percent in 2030 (174,000 additional 
incidents) and 4.3 percent in 2050 (116,000 additional incidents) 
in the wetter scenario (NCAR). The drier scenario (CSIRO) does 
not project an increase in risk; this may be because calculations of 
the relative risk of malaria consider the geographical distribution 
and not the extended duration of the malarial transmission season 
(Pandey 2010). As in the case of diarrheal disease, malaria cases 
are projected to signiﬁcantly decrease in the absence of climate 
change (from 4 million cases in 2030 to 3 million cases in 2050).
Salinity intrusion into freshwater resources adds another health 
risk. About 20 million people in the coastal areas of Bangladesh 
are already affected by salinity in their drinking water. With ris-
ing sea levels and more intense cyclones and storm surges, the 
contamination of groundwater and surface water is expected to 
intensify. Contamination of drinking water by saltwater intrusion 
may cause an increasing number of cases of diarrhea. Cholera 
outbreaks may also become more frequent as the bacterium that 
causes cholera, vibrio cholerae, survives longer in saline water 
(A. E. Khan, Xun, Ahsan, and Vineis 2011; A. E. Khan, Ireson, et 
al. 2011). Salinity is particularly problematic in the dry season, 
when salinity in rivers and groundwater is signiﬁcantly higher 
due to less rain and higher upstream freshwater withdrawal. It is 
expected to be further aggravated by climate-change-induced sea-
level rise, reduced river ﬂow, and decreased dry season rainfall.
A study conducted in the Dacope sub-district in Bangladesh found 
that the population in the area consumed 5–16g of sodium per day 
from drinking water alone in the dry season, which is signiﬁcantly 
higher than the 2g of dietary sodium intake per day recommended 
by WHO and FAO. There is strong evidence that higher salt intake 
causes high blood pressure. Hypertension in pregnancy, which is 
found to be 12 percent higher in the dry season compared to the 
wet season in Dacope, also has adverse effects on maternal and 
fetal health, including impaired liver function, intrauterine growth 
retardation, and preterm birth (A. E. Khan, Ireson, et al. 2011).
The Effects of Extreme Weather Events
In South Asia, unusually high temperatures pose health threats 
associated with high mortality. This is particularly so for rural 
populations, the elderly, and outdoor workers. The most com-
mon responses to high average temperatures and consecutive hot 
days are thirst, dizziness, fatigue, fainting, nausea, vomiting and 
headaches. If symptoms are unrecognized and untreated, heat 
exhaustion can cause heatstroke and, in severe cases, death. In 
Andhra Pradesh, India, for example, heat waves caused 3,000 deaths 
in 2003 (Ministry of Environment and Forests 2012). In May 2002, 
temperatures increased to almost 51°C in Andhra Pradesh, leading 
to more than 1,000 deaths in a single week. This was the high-
est one-week death toll due to extreme heat in Indian history. In 
recent years, the death toll as a consequence of heat waves has 
also increased continuously in the Indian states of Rajasthan, 
Gujarat, Bihar, and Punjab (Lal 2011).
In their global review, Hajat and Kosatky (2010) ﬁnd that 
increasing population density, lower city gross domestic product, 
and an increasing proportion of people aged 65 or older were all 
independently linked to increased rates of heat-related mortality. 
It is also clear that air pollution, which is a considerable problem 
in South Asia, interacts with high temperatures and heat waves 
to increase fatalities.
Most studies of heat-related mortality to date have been 
conducted for cities in developed countries, with relatively few 
published on developing country cities and regions (Hajat and 
Kosatky 2010). Cities such as New Delhi, however, exhibit a sig-
niﬁcant response to warming above identiﬁed heat thresholds. One 
recent review found a 4-percent increase in heat-related mortality 
per 1°C above the local heat threshold of 20°C (range of 2.8–5.1 
°C) (McMichael et al. 2008).
A study by Takahashi, Honda, and Emori (2007) further 
found that most South Asian countries are likely to experience 
a very substantial increase in excess mortality due to heat stress 
by the 2090s, based on a global mean warming for the 2090s 
of about 3.3°C above pre-industrial levels under the SRES A1B 
scenario and an estimated increase in the daily maximum tem-
perature change over South Asia in the range of 2–3°C. A more 
recent assessment, by Sillmann and Kharin (2012), based on the 
CMIP5 models, projects an annual average maximum daily tem-
perature increase in the summer months of approximately 4–6°C 
by 2100 for the RCP 8.5 scenario. The implication may be that the 
level of increased mortality reported by Takahashi et al. (2007) 
could occur substantially earlier and at a lower level of global 
mean warming (i.e., closer to 2°C) than estimated. Takahashi et 
al. (2007) assume constant population densities. A further risk 
factor for heat mortality is increasing urban population density.
While methodologies for predicting excess heat mortality are 
still in their infancy, it is clear that even at present population 
densities large rates of increase can be expected in India and other 
parts of South Asia. The projections used in this report indicate a 
substantial increase in the area of South Asia exposed to extreme 
heat by as early as the 2020s and 2030s (1.5°C warming above 
pre-industrial levels), which points to a signiﬁcantly higher risk 
of heat-related mortality than in the recent past.
The Effects of Tropical Cyclones
Although only 15 percent of all tropical cyclones affect South 
Asia, India and Bangladesh alone account for 86 percent of global 
deaths from cyclones. The high mortality risk is mainly due to high 
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population density in the region (Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change 2012). Projected casualties for a 10-year return cyclone 
in 2050 in Bangladesh are estimated to increase to 4,600 casualties 
(for comparison, Cyclone Sidr caused 3,406 deaths), with as many 
as 75,000 people projected to be injured (compared to 55,282 as 
a result of Cyclone Sidr)(World Bank 2010d).117
Besides deaths and injuries, the main health effects of ﬂoods 
and cyclones are expected to result from indirect consequences, 
including disruptions to both the food supply and to access to 
safe drinking water. An increased intensity of tropical cyclones 
could therefore pose major stresses on emergency relief and food 
aid in affected areas.
Population Movement
Migration, often undertaken as short-term labor migration, is a 
common coping strategy for people living in disaster-affected or 
degraded areas (World Bank 2010f). (See Chapter 3 on “Population 
Movement” for more discussion on the mechanisms driving migra-
tion.) There is no consensus estimate of future migration patterns 
resulting from climate-change-related risks, such as extreme weather 
events and sea-level rise, and most estimates are highly speculative 
(Gemenne 2011; World Bank 2010g). Nevertheless, the potential 
for migration, including permanent relocation, is expected to be 
heightened by climate change, and particularly by sea-level rise 
and erosion. Inland migration of households and economic activity 
has already been observed in Bangladesh, where exposed coastal 
areas are characterized by lower population growth rates than the 
rest of the country (World Bank 2010d). A sea-level rise of one 
meter is expected to affect 13 million people in Bangladesh (World 
Bank 2010d),118 although this would not necessarily imply that all 
people affected would be permanently displaced (Gemenne 2011).
Hugo (2011) points out that migration occurs primarily within 
national borders and that the main driver of migration is demo-
graphic change; environmental changes and other economic and 
social factors often act as contributing causes. In the speciﬁc case 
of ﬂooding, however, environmental change is the predominant 
cause of migration. Hugo (2011) identiﬁes South Asia as a hotspot 
for both population growth and future international migration as 
a consequence of demographic changes, poverty, and the impacts 
of climate change.
Conﬂict
Although there is a lack of research on climate change and conﬂicts, 
there is some evidence that climate change and related impacts 
(e.g., water scarcity and food shortages) may increase the likeli-
hood of conﬂicts (De Stefano et al. 2012; P. K. Gautam 2012).
A reduction in water availability from rivers, for example, could 
cause resource-related conﬂicts and thereby further threaten the 
water security of South Asia (P. K. Gautam 2012). The Indus and 
the Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna Basins are South Asia’s major 
transboundary river basins, and tensions among the riparian 
countries over water use do occur.
In the context of declining quality and quantity of water sup-
plies in these countries, increasing demand for water is already 
causing tensions over water sharing (De Stefano et al. 2012; Uprety 
and Salman 2011). Water management treaties are considered to be 
potentially helpful in minimizing the risk of the eruption of such 
conﬂicts (Bates et al. 2008; ESCAP 2011). There are bilateral water 
treaties established for the Indus Basin (although Afghanistan, to 
which 6 percent of the basin belongs, and China, to which 7 per-
cent of the basin belongs, are not signatories), between India and 
Bangladesh for the Ganges, and between India and Nepal for the 
most important tributaries of the Ganges; there are, however, no 
water treaties for the Brahmaputra (Uprety and Salman 2011).
It has been noted that China is absent as a party to the 
above-mentioned treaties, though it is an important actor in the 
management of the basins (De Stefano et al. 2012). Although 
water-sharing treaties may not avert dissension, they often help 
to solve disagreements in negotiation processes and to stabilize 
relations (De Stefano et al. 2012).
Uprety and Salman (2011) indicate that sharing and managing 
water resources in South Asia have become more complex due to 
the high vulnerability of the region to climate change. Based on 
the projections for water and food security presented above, it is 
likely that the risk of conﬂicts over water resources may increase 
with the severity of the impacts.
Conclusion
The key impacts that are expected to affect South Asia are sum-
marized in Table 5.5, which shows how the nature and magnitude 
of impacts vary across different levels of warming.
Many of the climatic risk factors that pose potential threats 
to the population of the South Asian region are ultimately related 
to changes in the hydrological regime; these would affect popula-
tions via changes to precipitation patterns and river ﬂow. One of 
the most immediate areas of impact resulting from changes in the 
117 These projections assume no changes in casualty and injury rates compared to 
Cyclone Sidr.
118 The World Bank (2010a) estimation of the number of people affected by a one 
meter sea-level rise in Bangladesh refers to Huq, Ali, and Rahman (1995), an article 
published in 1995. More recent projections estimate that between 1.5 million people 
(Dasgupta, Laplante, Meisner, Wheeler, and Yan 2008), and up to 1.540 million people 
by 2070 could be affected by a one meter sea-level rise and increased storminess in 
the coastal cities of Dhaka, Chittagong, and Khulna (Brecht, Dasgupta, Laplante, Mur-
ray, and Wheeler 2012). With a different methodology, Hanson et al. (2011) ﬁnd that 
approximately 17 million people could be exposed to 0.5 meter sea-level rise. More 
details on the methodologies can be found in Chapter 4 on “Risks to Coastal Cities.”
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hydrological regime is agriculture, which is highly dependent on 
the regularity of monsoonal rainfall. Negative effects on crop yields 
have already been observed in South Asia in recent decades. Should 
this trend persist, substantial yield reductions can be expected in 
the near and midterm.
The region’s already large population of poor people is par-
ticularly vulnerable to disruptions to agriculture, which could 
undermine livelihoods dependent on the sector and cause food 
price shocks. These same populations are likely to be faced with 
challenges on a number of other fronts, including limited access 
to safe drinking water and to electricity. The proportion of the 
population with access to electricity is already limited in the region. 
Efforts to expand power generation capacity could be affected by 
climate change via changes in water availability, which would 
affect both hydropower and thermoelectricity, and temperature 
patterns, which could put pressure on the cooling systems of 
thermoelectric power plants.
The risks to health associated with inadequate nutrition or 
unsafe drinking water are signiﬁcant: childhood stunting, transmis-
sion of water-borne diseases, and hypertension and other disorders 
associated with excess salinity. Inundation of low-lying coastal 
areas due to sea-level rise may also affect health via saltwater 
intrusion. Other health threats are also associated with ﬂooding, 
heat waves, tropical cyclones, and other extreme events. Population 
displacement, which already periodically occurs in ﬂood-prone 
areas, is likely to continue to result from severe ﬂooding and other 
extreme events.
Bangladesh is potentially a hotspot of impacts as it is projected 
to be confronted by a combination of increasing challenges from 
extreme river ﬂoods, more intense tropical cyclones, rising sea 
levels, and extraordinary temperatures.
The cumulative threat posed by the risks associated with 
climate change, often taking the form of excesses or scarcities of 
water, would substantially weaken the resilience of poor popula-
tions in the region. While the vulnerability of South Asia’s large 
and poor populations can be expected to be reduced in the future 
by economic development and growth, projections indicate that 
high levels of vulnerability are likely to persist. Many of the cli-
mate change impacts in the region, which appear quite severe 
with relatively modest warming of 1.5–2°C, pose a signiﬁcant 
challenge to development. Major investments in infrastructure, 
ﬂood defense, and the development of high temperature and 
drought resistant crop cultivars, and major improvements in 
sustainability practices (e.g., in relation to groundwater extrac-
tion), would be needed to cope with the projected impacts under 
this level of warming.
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Notes to Table 5.5 
1?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
business-as-usual scenario, not in mitigation scenarios limiting warming to these 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????
or not at all.
2????????????????????????????????????
3???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
over the total global land area.
??????????????????????????????????????????????
?????? ??????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
7????? ??????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????
9?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
10??????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????
????????????????????
11????? ??????????????????????
12????????????
13????? ??????????????????????
?????????????????? ???????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????
deviates from it after 2100.
??? ??????????????????
17????????????
??? ??????????????????????? ??????????????????
19 In comparison to the no-climate change baseline scenario.
20? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
21??????????????
22??????????????
23? ?????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????
????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????
??????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??? ?????????????????
27??????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
reconstruction, are estimated to increase the total economic costs of a 1-in-100-
?????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
29???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????
30???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
31???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????
32????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
industrial levels.
33???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
industrial levels.
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????
37???????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????3??????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
39????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
length of time.
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????
??????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
scenario.
????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????

?
??
??
??
???
???????????????????????????????????
???????????????? ???????????????
??? ??????????? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????? ?????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????? ????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????
This chapter identiﬁes hotspots of coinciding pressures from 
the agriculture, water, ecosystems, and health (malaria) sectors at 
different levels of global warming. It does so by synthesizing the 
ﬁndings presented in Piontek et al. (accepted) obtained as part 
of the ISI-MIP119 project; that made an initial attempt at deﬁning 
multisector hotspots or society-relevant sectors simultaneously 
exposed to risks. It introduces a number of recent attempts to 
identify different kinds of hotspots to help put the ISI-MIP results 
into a broader context. These are further complemented by a review 
of observed vulnerability hotspots to drought and tropical cyclone 
mortality risk. This review helps gain an appreciation of factors of 
vulnerability that are not included within the ISI-MIP framework 
but that are known to pose severe risks in the future under cli-
mate change. It also allows the systematic comparison of impacts 
within a number of sectors for different levels of global warming.
The methodology for multisectoral exposure hotspots for climate 
projections from ISI-MIP models is ﬁrst introduced (Chapter 6 on 
“Multisectoral Exposure Hotspots for Climate Projections from 
ISI-MIP Models”). Results are then presented for changes to water 
availability (Chapter 6 on “Water Availability”; based on Schewe, 
Heinke, Gerten, Haddeland et al.) and biome shifts (Chapter 6 
on “Risk of Terrestrial Ecosystem Shifts”; based on Warszawski, 
Friend, Ostberg, and Frieler n.d.). Furthermore, the ISI-MIP frame-
work allows for a ﬁrst estimate of cascading interactions between 
impacts, presented in Chapter 6 on “Crop Production and Sector 
Interactions” (based on Frieler, Müller, Elliott, Heinke et al. in 
review). Overlaying impacts across four sectors (agriculture-crop 
productivity, water resources, ecosystems, and health-malaria) 
allows for identiﬁcation of multisectoral hotspots (Chapter 6 on 
“Regions Vulnerable to Multisector Pressures” based on Piontek et 
al.), denoting vulnerability to impacts within these sectors. In order 
to capture vulnerability to further impacts, hotspots of observed 
tropical cyclone mortality complement the sectoral assessment. 
Finally, non-linear and cascading impacts are discussed (Chapter 6 
on “Non-linear and Cascading Impacts”).
Multisectoral Exposure Hotspots for 
Climate Projections from ISI-MIP Models
The following analysis relies on biophysical climate change impacts 
and examines the uncertainty across different climate and impact 
models. It complements previous studies on hotspots based on 
pure climate indicators, such as temperature and precipitation 
and their variability, or with single models. The impacts in the 
119 Note that the studies referenced—Warszawski et al., Frieler et al. Schewe et al., 
—are in review and results may be subject to change.
TURN DOWN THE HEAT: CLIMATE EXTREMES, REGIONAL IMPACTS, AND THE CASE FOR RESILIENCE
???
four sectors taken into account here represent important risk 
multipliers for human development (UNDP 2007). It is likely that 
overlapping effects increase risk as well as the challenge presented 
for adaptation, especially in regions with low adaptive capacity. 
Furthermore, impact interactions may amplify each impact (see 
Chapter 6 on “Crop Production and Sector Interactions”), which 
is not captured in the following analysis.
Hotspots are understood to be areas in which impacts in multiple 
sectors fall outside their respective historical range—resulting in 
signiﬁcant multisectoral pressure at the regional level. Signiﬁcant 
pressure in this context means conditions being altered so much 
that today’s extremes become the norm. Figure 6.1 shows the 
steps for identifying multisectoral hotspots.120
For each sector, a representative indicator with societal relevance 
is selected, together with a corresponding threshold for signiﬁcant 
change, owing to the structural differences between the sectors. 
The focus is on changes resulting in additional stress for human 
and biological systems as the basis for analyses of vulnerability, 
leaving aside any positive effects climate change may have.
Emerging Hotspots in a 4°C World
The overall image that emerges from the hotspots assessments is 
a world in which no region would be immune to climate impacts 
in a 4°C world but some regions and people would be affected in 
a disproportionately greater manner.
While the depicted pattern of vulnerability hotspots often 
depends on the metric chosen to measure the impact exposure, 
it is important to remember that the impacts are not projected to 
increase in isolation from one another. As a result, maps of exposure 
and vulnerability hotspots (e.g., Figure 6.8) should be understood 
as complementary to each other—and certainly not exhaustive.
It is important to note that hotspot mapping based on projec-
tions inherit the uncertainty from the climate or impact modeling 
exercise and are subject to the same limitations as the projections 
themselves. Thus, in the agricultural sector, sensitivity thresholds 
of crops are mostly not included, leading to a potentially overly 
optimistic result. The uncertainty of the CO
2 fertilization effect 
further obscures any clarity in the global image.
Further research is therefore needed to better understand the 
consequences of overlapping sectoral and other impacts. Particular 
attention will need to be drawn to potential interactions between 
impacts, as well as on including more relevant sectors and tying 
analyses in with comprehensive vulnerability analyses. While 
further research can reduce uncertainty, it should be clear that 
uncertainty will never be eradicated.
Water Availability
Freshwater resources are of critical importance for human liveli-
hoods. For the three regions analyzed in this report, large quanti-
ties—between 85–95 percent of the total freshwater withdrawal 
(World Bank, 2013a)—are required for agriculture, while a lesser 
share (1–4 percent) is currently required for industrial purposes 
such as generating hydropower and cooling thermoelectric power 
plants (Kummu, Ward, De Moel, and Varis, 2010; Wallace 2000). 
Freshwater availability is a major limiting factor to food produc-
tion and economic prosperity in many regions of the world (OKI 
et al. 2001; Rijsberman 2006).
In the framework of ISI-MIP, a set of 11 global hydrological 
models (GHMs), forced by ﬁve global climate models (General 
Circulation Models [GCMs]), was used to simulate changes in 
freshwater resources under climate change and population change 
scenarios. This allows for an estimate of the effects of climate change 
on water scarcity at a global scale and enables the assessment of 
the degree of conﬁdence in these estimates based on the spread 
in results across both hydrological models and climate models.
Whether water is considered to be scarce in a given region is 
determined by the amount of available water resources and by 
the population’s demand for water. Water demand depends on 
many factors that may differ from region to region, such as eco-
nomic structure and land-use patterns, available technology and 
infrastructure, and lifestyles (Rijsberman 2006). Most importantly, 
it depends directly on the size of the regional population—more 
people need more water. Given the current rates of population 
growth around the world, and the fact that this growth is projected 
to continue for the better part of the 21st century, water scarcity 
will increase almost inevitably simply because of population 
changes (Alcamo, Flörke, and Märker 2007; N. W. Arnell 2004; C. 
120 See Appendix 3 for further information on methodology.
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Four sectors:
1. Water
2. Agriculture
3. Biomes
4. Health 
(Malaria)
Four crossing 
temperatures:
ΔGMT when 
threshold is 
crossed ﬁrst
Hotspots:
Regions of 
multisectoral 
pressure at 
different levels 
of ΔGMT
Four indicators:
1. Discharge
2. Crop yields
3. Γ-metric
4. Length of 
transmission 
season
Signiﬁcance: 
1. Water availability
2. Food production in 4 
staple crops (wheat, 
maize, soy, rice)
3. Risk of ecosystem shifts
4. Malaria prevalence
Four thresholds
1. & 2. < 10th percentile of 
reference period 
distribution
3. > 0.3 (scale: 0–1)
4. < 3 months (endemic) to 
> 3 months (epidemic)
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???
J. Vorosmarty 2000). Thus, when assessing the effect of climate 
change on water scarcity, one has to realize that climate change 
does not act on a stationary problem but on a trajectory of rapidly 
changing boundary conditions.
Water Availability in Food Producing Units
The relative changes in water availability reﬂect adaptation chal-
lenges that may arise in the affected regions. Such challenges will 
be harder to tackle if a region is affected by water shortages in an 
absolute sense. A widely used, simpliﬁed indicator of water scarcity 
is the amount of available water resources divided by the popula-
tion in a given country (or region)—the so-called “water crowding 
index” (M. Falkenmark et al. 2007; Malin Falkenmark, Lundqvist, and 
Widstrand 1989). To estimate water resources per country, simply 
summing up discharge would lead to individual water units being 
counted multiple times. Using runoff, on the other hand, would not 
account for ﬂows of water between countries within a river basin. 
Here, runoff in each basin is redistributed according to the pattern 
of discharge in the basin (Gerten et al. 2011). The resulting “blue 
water” resource can then be aggregated over a country or region.
To capture the baseline for future changes, the multi-model 
median of present-day availability of blue-water resources is shown 
in Figure 6.2, aggregated at the scale of food-producing units 
(FPU; intersection of major river basins and geopolitical units). 
Results given in this section are based on Schewe et al., in review. 
Importantly, the scale of aggregation inﬂuences the resulting water 
scarcity estimate considerably. For example, if water resources are 
aggregated at the scale of food productivity units, one FPU within 
a larger country may fall below a given water scarcity threshold, 
while another does not. The same country as a whole, on the other 
hand, may not appear water scarce if a lack of water resources 
in one part of the country is balanced by abundant resources in 
another. Thus, global estimates of present-day water scarcity are 
usually higher when resources are aggregated on smaller scales 
(for example, FPUs) rather than on a country-wide scale.
It is difﬁcult to determine which scale is more appropriate to 
assess actual water stress. While FPUs give a more detailed picture 
and can highlight important differences within larger countries, 
the country scale takes into account the transport of food (and 
thus “virtual water”) from agricultural areas to population centers 
within a country, and may be deemed more realistic in many 
cases. Nonetheless, assessments of water availability should be 
viewed as approximations.
Results show that corresponding to the regional distribution of 
changes in water discharge, climate change is projected to diminish 
per-capita water availability in large parts of North, South, and 
Central America as well as in the Mediterranean, Middle East, 
western and southern Africa, and Australia (Figure 6.3, left panel). 
In a 4°C world, the decreases exceed 50 percent in many FPUs by 
the end of the century, compared to decreases of 10–20 percent 
under 2°C warming. The effects of projected population changes 
are even larger than those of climate change, and the combination 
of both leaves much of the world threatened by a severe reduction 
in water availability (Figure 6.3, right panel). Moreover, the spread 
across the multi-model ensemble is large; thus, more negative out-
comes than reﬂected in the multi-model mean cannot be excluded.
These results illustrate that the effect of climate change on 
water resources are regionally heterogeneous. Some countries are 
expected to beneﬁt from more abundant resources even after other 
countries have become water-scarce because of shrinking resources.
In terms of the regions reviewed in this report, these results 
broadly show:
?? Sub-Saharan Africa: In the absence of population increase, 
increased projected rainfall in East Africa would increase the 
level of water availability, whereas in much of southern Africa 
water availability per capita would decrease, with the patterns 
increasing in strength with high levels of warming. With high 
levels of warming, West Africa would also show a decrease 
in water availability per capita. With projected population 
increase, climate change reduces water resources per capita 
(compared to the recent 20-year period) over most of Africa 
in the order of 40–50 percent under both a 1.8°C and a 3.8°C 
warming scenario by 2069–99.
?? South Asia: Consistent with the expected increase in precipita-
tion with warming and assuming a constant population, the 
level of water availability per capita would increase in South 
Asia. With the projected population increase factored in, how-
ever, a large decrease in water availability per capita in the 
order of 20–30 percent is estimated under a 1.8°C warming 
by 2069–99. A higher level of warming is projected to further 
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increase average precipitation, and the decrease in water 
availability per capita would be reduced to 10 to 20 percent 
over much of South Asia.
?? South East Asia: A very similar broad pattern to that described 
in South Asia is exhibited in the results shown here. Under a 
constant population, climate change is expected to increase 
the average annual water availability per capita. Population 
growth, however, puts water resources under pressure, decreas-
ing water availability per capita by up to 50 percent by the 
end of the century.
Review of Climate Model Projections for 
Water Availability
The ISI-MIP results shown above apply a range of CMIP5 GCMs 
and a set of hydrology models to produce the model intercompari-
son and median results (Schewe et al. in review.). Recent work 
based on the earlier generation of climate models (CMIP3) and 
one hydrology model121 shows similar overall results for the three 
regions (Arnell 2013).
Of interest here are the levels of impacts and different levels of 
warming. This work examines the change in population exposed 
to increased water resources stress (using 1,000 m³ of water 
per capita threshold) between a warming of just above 2°C and 
scenarios reaching between 4°C and 5.6°C by 2100. In this work, 
the SRES A1B population scenario was assumed, which has quite 
different and lower regional population numbers compared to the 
SSP2 population scenario used in the ISI-MIP analysis.122
Figure 6.4 shows the level of impact avoided due to limiting 
warming to under 2°C compared to a warming of 4–5.6°C by 2100 by 
indicating the percentage of the population that would be spared 
the exposure to increased stress on water resources. Compared 
to many other regions, the level of avoided impact in South Asia 
is relatively low (in the order of 15–20 percent). South East Asia 
shows very little, if any, avoided impacts against this metric. 
Similarly, for East Africa, where increased rainfall is projected, 
there are very few, if any, avoided impacts. For West Africa, where 
models diverge substantially, the median of avoided impacts is 
in the order of 50 percent, with a very wide range. In Southern 
Africa, where the CMIP5 models seem to agree on a reduction 
in rainfall, the CMIP3 models show a range from 0–100 percent 
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regional distribution of population.
121 HADCM3, HadGEM1, ECHAM5, IPSL_CM4, CCSM3.1 (T47), CGCM3.1 (T63), 
and CSIRO_MK3.0, and MacPDM hydrology model. Precipitation for the different 
scenarios was pattern scaled.
122 In the SRES A1B population scenario, global population peaks at 8.7 billion 
in 2050 and then decreases to about 7 billion in 2100 (equal to 2010 global population).
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in avoided impacts. At the global level, limiting warming to 2°C 
reduces the global population exposed to 20 percent.
Risk of Terrestrial Ecosystem Shifts
Climate change in the 21st century poses a large risk of change to 
the Earth’s ecosystems: Shifting climatic boundaries trigger changes 
to the biogeochemical functions and structures of ecosystems. 
Such changing conditions would render it difﬁcult for local plant 
and animal species to survive in their current habitat.
The extent to which ecosystems will be affected by future 
climate change depends on relative and absolute changes in the 
local carbon and water cycles, which partly control the composition 
of vegetation. Such shifts are likely to imply far-reaching transfor-
mations in the underlying system characteristics, such as species 
composition (Heyder, Schaphoff, Gerten, and Lucht 2011) and 
relationships among plants, herbivores, and pollinators (Mooney 
et al. 2009); they are thus essential to understanding what con-
stitutes “dangerous levels of global warming” with respect to 
ecosystems. Feedback effects can further amplify these changes, 
both by contributing directly to greenhouse gas emissions (Finzi 
et al. 2011) and through accelerated shifts in productivity and 
decomposition resulting from species loss (Hooper et al. 2012).
A uniﬁed metric—which aggregates information about changes to 
the carbon stocks and ﬂuxes, and to the water cycle and vegetation 
composition across the global land surface—is used to quantify the 
magnitude and uncertainty in the risk of these ecosystem changes 
(with respect to 1980–2010 conditions) occurring at different levels of 
global warming since pre-industrial times. The metric uses changes 
in vegetation composition as an indicator of risk to underlying 
plant and consumer communities. Both local (relative) and global 
(absolute) changes in biogeochemical ﬂuxes and stocks contribute 
to the metric, as well as changes in the variability of carbon and 
water ﬂuxes and stocks as an indicator of ecosystem vulnerability. 
The metric projects a risk of severe change for terrestrial ecosys-
tems when very severe change is experienced in at least one of the 
metric components, or moderate to severe change in all of them. 
Marine ecosystems, which are not taken into account here, are 
further outlined in Chapter 4 on “Coastal and Marine Ecosystems.”
123 Three of the seven models consider dynamic changes to vegetation composition, 
and all models only consider natural vegetation, ignoring human-induced land-use 
and land-cover changes. The response of models in terms of the uniﬁed metric is 
shown to be reasonably predicted by changes in global mean temperatures. Note 
that the ecosystems changes are with respect to 1980–2010 conditions.
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important to note that changes are compared to the present baseline.
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The fraction of the global land surface at risk of severe ecosystem 
change is shown in Figure 6.5 for all seven models as a function 
of global mean temperature change above pre-industrial levels.123 
Under 2°C warming, 3–7 percent of the Earth’s land surface is 
projected to be at risk of severe ecosystem change, although there 
is limited agreement among the models on which geographical 
regions face the highest risk of change. The extent of regions at 
risk of severe ecosystem change is projected to rise with changes 
in temperature, reaching a median value of 30 percent of the land 
surface under 4°C warming and increasing approximately four-fold 
between 2°C and 3°C. The regions projected to face the highest 
risk of severe ecosystem changes by 4°C include the tundra and 
shrub lands of the Tibetan Plateau, the grasslands of eastern India, 
the boreal forests of northern Canada and Russia, the savannah 
region in the Horn of Africa, and the Amazon rainforest.
In some regions, projections of ecosystem changes vary 
greatly across models, with the uncertainty arising mostly from 
the ecosystem models themselves rather than from differences in 
the projections of the future climate. Global aggregations, such as 
reported here, should be treated cautiously, as they can obscure the 
fact that these arise from signiﬁcantly different spatial distributions 
of change. Nonetheless, clear risks of biome shifts emerge when 
looking at the global picture, which can serve as a backdrop for 
more detailed assessments.
Review of Climate Model Projections for 
Terrestrial Ecosystem Shifts
Projections of risk of biome changes in the Amazon by a majority of 
the ecosystem models in the ISI-MIP study (Warszawski et al. n.d.) 
arise in most cases because of increases in biomass over this region. 
This is in agreement with studies considering 22 GCMs from the 
CMIP3 database with a single ecosystem model (not used in ISI-MIP), 
which projected biomass increases by 2100 between 14–35 percent 
over 1980 levels (Huntingford et al. 2013). When considering only 
projections in the reduction in areal extent of the climatological 
niche for humid tropical forests, up to 75 percent (climate model 
mean is 10 percent) of the Amazon is at risk (Zelazowski, Malhi, 
Huntingford, Sitch, and Fisher 2011). Such discrepancies between 
ecosystem models and climatological projections are already present 
in the historical data, in particular with respect to the mechanisms 
governing tree mortality resulting from drought and extreme heat. 
For example, observations in the Amazon forest link severe drought 
to extensive increases in tree mortality and subsequent biomass loss 
(C. D. Allen et al. 2010). Even in regions not normally considered 
to be water limited, observed increases in tree mortality suggest a 
link to global temperature rises because of climate change (Allen 
et al. 2010; Van Mantgem et al. 2009).
More generally, the recent emergence of a pattern of drought 
and heat-induced tree mortality, together with high ﬁre occurrence 
and reduced resistance to pests globally points to a risk that is 
not presently included in ecosystem models. These observations 
point to potential for more rapid ecosystem changes than presently 
projected in many regions (C. D. Allen et al. 2010). The loss and or 
transformation of ecosystems would affect the services that they 
provide to society, including provisioning (food and timber) and 
such support services as soil and nutrient cycling, regulation of 
water and atmospheric properties, and cultural values (Anderegg, 
Kane, and Anderegg 2012).
The projected rate of ecosystem change is large in many 
cases compared to the ability of species and systems to migrate 
(Loarie et al. 2009). One measure of this, which has been termed 
the “velocity of climate change,” represents the local horizontal 
velocity of an ecosystem across the Earth´s surface needed to 
maintain constant conditions suitable for that ecosystem. For the 
tropical and subtropical grasslands, savannahs, and shrub lands 
which are characteristic of much of Sub-Saharan Africa (see also 
Chapter 3 on “Projected Ecosystem Changes”), an average veloc-
ity of 0.7 km per year is projected under approximately 3.6°C 
warming by 2100. For the tropical and subtropical broadleaved 
forest ecosystems characteristic of much of South and South East 
Asia, the average velocity is about 0.3 km per year, but with a 
wide range (Loarie et al. 2009). Under this level of warming, the 
global mean velocity of all ecosystems is about 0.4 km per year; 
whereas for a lower level of warming of approximately 2.6°C 
by 2100, this rate of change is reduced to about 0.3 km per year. 
As horizontal changes are measured, relatively slow velocity is 
measured in mountainous regions in contrast to ﬂatter areas. For 
some species, however, such shifts may not be possible, putting 
them at risk of extinction (La Sorte and Jetz 2010).
Under future warming, regions are expected to be subject 
to extreme or unprecedented heat extremes (see also Chapter 2 
on “Projected Changes in Heat Extremes”). (Beaumont et al. 
(2011) measure the extent to which eco-regions, which have been 
classiﬁed as exceptional in terms of biodiversity, are expected 
to be exposed to extreme temperatures. They ﬁnd that, by 2100, 
86 percent of terrestrial and 83 percent of freshwater eco-regions 
are projected to experience extreme temperatures on a regular 
basis, to which they are not adapted (see Figure 6.6).
In conclusion, the state-of-the-art models of global ecosystems 
project an increasing risk of severe terrestrial ecosystem change 
with increasing global mean temperature. The area affected 
increases rapidly with warming. The affected surface increases 
almost four-fold between warming levels of 2°C and 3°C. The most 
extensively affected regions lie in the northern latitudes, where 
current climate conditions would ﬁnd no analogue in a warmer 
world. These changes, resulting in shifts in the variability and 
mean values of carbon and water stock and ﬂuxes and, in some 
cases, vegetation composition, would pose a major challenge to 
the survival of plant and animal species in their current habitat.
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Crop Production and Sector Interactions
Population increases and diet changes because of economic devel-
opment are expected to impose large pressures on the world’s 
food production system. Meeting future demand for food requires 
substantially improving yields globally as well as coping with pres-
sures from climate change, including changes in water availability.
There are many uncertainties in projecting both future crop 
yields and total production. One of the important unresolved issues 
is the CO2 fertilization effect on crops. As atmospheric CO2 con-
centrations rise, the CO2 fertilization effect may increase the rate 
of photosynthesis and water use efﬁciency of plants, thereby 
producing increases in grain mass and number; this may offset 
to some extent the negative impacts of climate change (see Laux 
et al. 2010 and Liu et al. 2008). Projections of crop yield and total 
crop production vary quite signiﬁcantly depending on whether the 
potential CO2 fertilization effect is accounted for. As is shown in 
the work of Müller, Bondeau, Popp, and Waha (2010), the sign of 
crop yield changes (that is, whether they are positive or negative) 
with climate change may be determined by the presence or absence 
of the CO2 fertilization effect. Their work estimates the effects of 
climate change with and without CO2 fertilization on major crops 
(wheat, rice, maize, millet, ﬁeld pea, sugar beet, sweet potato, 
soybean, groundnut, sunﬂower, and rapeseed) in different regions.124
Uncertainty surrounding the CO2 fertilization effect remains, 
however, meaning that the extent to which the CO2 fertilization 
effect could counteract potential crop yield reductions associated 
with climatic impacts is uncertain. This is problematic for risk 
assessments in the agricultural sector. When compared with the 
results from the free-air CO2 enrichment (FACE) experiments, the 
fertilization effects used in various models appear to be overes-
timated (e.g., P. Krishnan, Swain, Chandra Bhaskar, Nayak, and 
Dash 2007; Long et al. 2005). Further, the C4 crops, including 
maize, sorghum, and pearl millet—among the dominant crops 
in Africa—are not as sensitive to elevated carbon dioxide as the 
C3 crops.125 Consequently, the beneﬁts for many of the staple crops 
of Sub-Saharan Africa are not expected to be as positive (Roudier 
et al. 2011). A recent review of the experimental evidence for 
CO2 fertilization indicates that there may be a tendency in crop 
models to overestimate the beneﬁts for C4 crops, which appear 
more likely to beneﬁt in times of drought (Leakey 2009).
Although, in CO2 fertilization experiments, the grain mass, 
or grain number of C3 crops generally increases, the protein con-
centration of grains decreases, particularly in wheat, barley, rice, 
and potatoes (e.g., Taub, Miller, & Allen, 2008). In other words, 
under sustained CO2 fertilization the nutritional value of grain per 
unit of mass decreases. A recent statistical meta-analysis (Pleijel 
and Uddling 2012) of 57 CO2 fertilization experiments on wheat 
shows that if other limiting factors prevent CO2 fertilization from 
enhancing grain mass, or number, the diluting effect of enhanced 
CO2 on protein content still operates, hence effectively decreasing 
the total nutritional value of wheat harvests.
The IPCC AR4 found that in the tropical regions a warming 
of 1–2°C locally could have signiﬁcant negative yield impacts on 
major cereal crops, whereas in the higher latitudes in temperate 
regions there could be small positive beneﬁts on rainfed crop yields 
for a 1–3°C local warming. Research published since has tended to 
conﬁrm the picture of a signiﬁcant negative yield potential in the 
tropical regions, with observed negative effects of climate change 
on crops in South Asia (David B. Lobell, Sibley, and Ivan Ortiz-
Monasterio 2012), Africa (David B Lobell, Bänziger, Magorokosho, 
and Vivek 2011; Schlenker and Lobell 2010) and the United States 
(Schlenker and Roberts 2009) and concerns that yield beneﬁts 
may not materialize in temperate regions (Asseng, Foster, and 
Turner 2011). In particular, the effects of high temperature on 
crop yields have become more evident, as has the understanding 
that the projected global warming over the 21st century is likely 
to lead to growing seasonal temperatures exceeding the hottest 
presently on record. Battisti and Naylor (2009) argue that these 
factors indicate a signiﬁcant risk that stress on crops and livestock 
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124 For their projections, the authors apply three SRES scenarios (A1B, A2, and 
B1 leading to a global-mean warming of 2.1°C, 1.8°C, and 1.6°C above pre-industrial 
levels by 2050) and ﬁve GCMs, and compare the period 1996–2005 to 2046–55.
125 C3 plants include more than 85 percent of plants on Earth (e.g. most trees, wheat, 
and rice) and respond well to moist conditions and to additional carbon dioxide in 
the atmosphere. C4 plants (for example, sugarcane) are more efﬁcient in water and 
energy use and out perform C3 plants in hot and dry conditions. C3 and C4 plants 
differ in the way they assimilate CO2 into their system to perform photosynthesis. 
During the ﬁrst steps in CO2 assimilation, C3 plants form a pair of three carbon-atom 
molecules. C4 plants, on the other hand, initially form four carbon-atom molecules.
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production will become global in character, making it extremely 
challenging to balance growing food demand.
The scope of the potential risk can be seen in the results of a 
recent projection of global average crop yields for maize, soya bean, 
and wheat by 2050 (Deryng, Sacks, Barford, and Ramankutty 2011). 
Including adaptation measures, the range of reductions for maize 
is –6 to –18 percent, for soya bean is –12 to –26 percent, and for 
spring wheat is –4 to –10 percent, excluding the CO2 fertilization 
effect. Losses are larger when adaptation options are not included.
A recent review of the literature by J. Knox, Hess, Daccache, and 
Wheeler (2012) indicates signiﬁcant risks of yield reductions in Africa, 
with the mean changes being –17 percent for wheat, –5 percent for 
maize, –15 percent for sorghum, and –10 percent for millet. For South 
Asia, mean production is –16 percent for maize and –11 percent for 
sorghum. Knox et al. (2012) ﬁnd no mean change in the literature 
for rice. However, analysis by Masutomi, Takahashi, Harasawa, and 
Matsuoka (2009) points to mean changes in Asia for rice yields of 
between –5 and –9 percent in the 2050s without CO2 fertilization 
and between +0.5 and –1.5 percent with CO2 fertilization.
To cope with the scale of these challenges (even if they are 
signiﬁcantly less than shown here) would require substantial 
increases in crop productivity and yield potential. The recent 
trend for crop yields, however, shows a worrying pattern where 
substantial areas of crop-growing regions exhibit either no improve-
ment, stagnation, or collapses in yield. Ray, Ramankutty, Mueller, 
West, and Foley (2012) show that 24–39 percent of maize, rice, 
wheat, and soya growing areas exhibited these problems. The top 
three global rice producers—China, India, and Indonesia—have 
substantial areas of cropland that are not exhibiting yield gains. 
The same applies to wheat in China, India, and the United States. 
Ray et al. (2012) argue that China and India are now “hotspots 
of yield stagnation,” with more than a third of their major crop-
producing regions not experiencing yield improvements.
Within ISI-MIP, climate-change-induced pressure on global 
wheat, maize, rice, and soy production was analyzed on the 
basis of simulations by seven global crop models assuming ﬁxed 
present day irrigation and land-use patterns (Portmann, Siebert, 
& Döll, 2010). In a ﬁrst step, runoff projections of 11 hydrologi-
cal models were integrated to estimate the limits of production 
increases allowing for extra irrigation but accounting for limited 
availability of renewable irrigation water. In a second step, illus-
trative future land-use patterns, provided by the agro-economic 
land-use model MAgPIE (Lotze-Campen et al., 2008; Schmitz et 
al., 2012), were used to illustrate the negative side effects of the 
increase in crop production on natural vegetation and carbon sinks 
due to land use changes. To this end, simulations by seven global 
biogeochemical models were integrated. Given this context, the 
urgency of a multi-model assessment with regard to projections 
of global crop production is evident and has been addressed by 
the Agricultural Model Intercomparison and Improvement Project 
(AgMIP; Rosenzweig et al. 2013), with results that will be forthcom-
ing. Similarly, cross-sectoral assessments are needed, as potential 
sectoral interactions can be expected.
Potential impact cascades are found that underline the critical 
importance of cross-sectoral linkages when evaluating climate 
change impacts and possible adaptation options. The combina-
tion of yield projections and biogeochemical and hydrological 
simulations driven by the same climate projections provides a 
ﬁrst understanding of such interactions that need to be taken into 
account in a comprehensive assessment of impacts at different 
levels of warming. The impacts, which would not occur in isola-
tion, are likely to amplify one another.
Regions Vulnerable to Multisector 
Pressures
At 4°C above pre-industrial levels, the exposure to multisectoral 
climate change impacts starts to emerge under the robustness 
criteria. This means that the sectoral thresholds for severe changes 
have been crossed at lower levels of global mean temperature. 
At 5°C above pre-industrial levels, approximately 11 percent of 
the global population (based on the 2000 population distribu-
tion126) is projected to be exposed to severe changes in conditions 
resulting from climate change in at least two sectors (Figure 6.7, 
bright colored bars).
At the global mean temperature levels in this study, no robust 
overlap of the four sectors is seen. The fraction of the population 
affected in the risk analysis is much higher, going up to 80 percent 
at 4°C above pre-industrial levels, with the effects starting at 2°C 
(Figure 6.7, light colored bars). There is a clear risk of an overlap 
of all four sectors.
Multisectoral pressure hotspots are mapped based on pure 
climate exposure (Figure 6.8, left panel) as well as on a simple 
measure for vulnerability based on the number of sectors affected 
and the degree of human development (Figure 6.8, right panel). 
The grey-colored areas in the left panel are areas at risk. The 
southern Amazon Basin, southern Europe, eastern Africa, and 
the north of South Asia are high-exposure hotspots. The Amazon 
and the East African highlands are particularly notable because 
of their exposure to three overlapping sectors. Small regions in 
Central America and western Africa are also affected. The area at 
risk covers most of the inhabited area, highlighting how common 
overlapping impacts could be and, therefore, their importance for 
possible adaptation strategies.
126 The gridded population distribution for  2000  is based on UNPWWW data 
(UNDESA 2010), scaled up to match the country totals of the Socio-Economic Pathways 
database (http://secure.iiasa.ac.at/web-apps/ene/SspDb) using the NASA GPWv3 
2010 gridded dataset (http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/data/collection/gpw-v3).
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To get a simpliﬁed measure for vulnerability, the number 
of overlapping exposed sectors is combined with the level of 
human development as provided by the Human Development 
Index (UNDP 2002), which is a simple proxy for adaptive capac-
ity (Figure 6.8). Based on that vulnerability measure, all regions 
in Sub-Saharan Africa affected by multisectoral pressures clearly 
stand out as the most vulnerable areas (Figure 6.8, right panel). 
Latin America, South Asia, and Eastern Europe are also vulner-
able. Weighing it with population density would paint a slightly 
different picture (hatched regions in the lower panels of Figure 6.8, 
based on year 2000 population), with large numbers of people 
potentially affected by multiple pressures in Europe and India. Of 
note, the vulnerable regions extend over developing, emerging, 
and developed economic areas.
These results are very conservative. While the thresholds are 
deﬁned based on historical observations within each sector, the 
interactions between impacts in each sector are not taken into 
account. Furthermore, the probability of overlap between the 
sectors is restricted by the choice of sectors. Agricultural impacts 
are only taken into account in currently harvested areas and 
malaria impacts are very limited spatially. Taking into account 
extreme events would possibly lead to the emergence of a very 
different hotspot picture. Therefore, what follows is a discus-
sion on the state of knowledge on vulnerability to a subset of 
extreme events.
Regions with Greater Levels of Aggregate 
Climate Change
Climate change occurs in many different ways. Increases in mean 
temperature or changes in annual precipitation as well as seasonal 
changes, changes in variability, and changes in the frequency of 
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certain kinds of extremes all affect the way in which impacts are 
expected to unfold and be felt. A region with the largest change 
in average annual temperature may not be the one with the most 
overall impact, or the annual average temperature change may 
not be as signiﬁcant as other effects, such as seasonal changes. To 
capture this complexity, Diffenbaugh and Giorgi (2012) used the 
new CMIP5 global climate models, applying seven climate indica-
tors from each of the four seasons to generate a 28-dimensional 
measure of climate change.127
The picture that emerges is of an increasingly strong change 
of climatic variables with greater levels of global mean warming. 
The greater global warming is, the larger the difference between 
the present climate and the aggregated climate change metric—
in other words, the larger the overall effects of climate change 
(Figure 6.9). This analysis indicates a strong intensiﬁcation of 
climate change at levels of warming above 2°C above pre-industrial 
127 Diffenbaugh and Giorgi (2012) considered land grid points north of 60° southern 
latitude. To calculate the change in each climate indicator, each one is ﬁrst normal-
ized to the maximum global absolute value in the 2080–99 period for the highest 
scenario (RCP 8.5), and then the standard Euclidean distance between each of 
the 28 dimensions and the base period is calculated.
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levels. It is also clear that some regions begin to show strong 
signs of overall change at lower levels of global mean warming 
than others. In terms of the regions studied in this report, much 
of Africa stands out: West Africa, the Sahel, and Southern Africa 
emerge consistently with relatively high levels of aggregate climate 
change. South Asia and South East Asia show moderate to high 
levels of climate change above 1.5°C compared to more northerly 
and southerly regions.
Vulnerability Hotspots for Wheat  
and Maize
Fraser et al. (2012) identify hotspots for wheat and maize based 
on a comparison of regions subject to increasing exposure to yield 
decreases that are predicted to experience declining adaptive capac-
ity. Where these regions overlap, a hotspot is identiﬁed for the time 
period studied: the 2050s and 2080s. They identify ﬁve wheat hotspots 
(southeastern United States, southeastern South America, northeast 
Mediterranean region, and parts of central Asia). For maize, three 
hotspots are found: southeastern South America, parts of southern 
Africa, and the northeastern Mediterranean. This study uses only 
one climate model and one hydrology model, limiting the ability to 
understand the uncertainty of climate model and hydrology model 
projections in identifying regions at risk. It should be noted that 
maize is particularly important in Southern Africa.
Vulnerability Hotspots for Drought  
and Tropical Cyclones
Droughts and tropical cyclones have been among the most severe 
physical risk factors that are projected to increase with climate 
change, and the severity and distribution of these impacts may 
change in the future. Looking at impacts from past occurrences 
illustrates regional vulnerabilities that could be ampliﬁed with 
increasing exposure in the future.
Vulnerability hotspots related to droughts have in the past 
been highest in Sub-Saharan Africa, with exceptions in southern 
Africa (Figure 6.10). Much of South Asia and South East Asia 
also show high levels of vulnerability. It should be noted that the 
analysis is based only on drought-related mortality. Impacts on 
agricultural productivity (as have been observed during the Rus-
sian drought in 2010 and the American (U.S.) drought in 2012) are 
not included here.
Taking into account observed vulnerability to tropical 
cyclones, the East and South East Asian coasts, as well as the 
eastern North American and Central American coasts, emerge 
as vulnerability hotspots (Figure 6.11). Madagascar and the 
densely populated deltaic regions of India and Bangladesh, 
as well as parts of the Pakistan coast, mark areas of extreme 
vulnerability. As noted before, the hotspots are based on 
observed events.
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Implications for Poverty
Climate impacts can have negative effects on poverty reduction. 
While the population´s vulnerability is determined by socioeco-
nomic factors, increased exposure to climate impacts can have 
adverse consequences for these very factors. It has been observed 
that natural disasters, such as droughts, ﬂoods, or cyclones, have 
direct and indirect impacts on household poverty—and in some 
cases could even lead households into poverty traps.
A study assessing the impacts of a three-year long drought 
in Ethiopia (1998–2000) and category 5 Hurricane Mitch in 
Honduras found that these shocks have enduring effects on 
poor households’ assets and recovery (Carter, Little, Mogues, 
and Negatu 2007). The authors observed a critical differential 
impact of cyclones on poorer households (representing a quartile 
of the population). Before the occurrence of the disasters, it was 
assessed that these poor households accumulated assets faster 
than rich households. As a consequence, this faster accumula-
tion led to a convergent growth path between poorer and richer 
households. The authors found, however, that both slow and 
sudden onset disasters slowed down poor households’ capacity 
to accumulate assets.
Figure 6.12 illustrates the impacts of such shocks as cyclones 
and droughts on the assets of two categories of households (rich 
and poor). This simpliﬁed model only illustrates how climate-
induced shocks could drive households into poverty traps.
Because of the consequences of the shocks, assets at the 
household level signiﬁcantly decrease; they later increase dur-
ing the recovery period. For the poorer households, the decrease 
in assets has the potential to lead them below the poverty trap 
threshold, preventing households from recovering from the disas-
ter. This ﬁgure only gives a schematic representation, however, 
of the potential impacts of natural disasters on rich and poor 
households.
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Hallegatte and Przyluski (2010) ﬁnd that these poverty traps 
at the household level induced by natural disasters could lead to 
poverty traps at the macroeconomic level. Poor countries’ limited 
capacity to rebuild after disasters, long reconstruction periods, 
the relatively large economic costs of natural disasters, reduced 
accumulation of capital and infrastructure, and reduced economic 
development contribute to amplifying the consequences of these 
natural disasters. From a long-term perspective, this loop reduces 
the capacity of a country to cope with the consequences of a 
disaster. Furthermore, this feedback loop reduces the capacity of 
developing countries to beneﬁt from natural disasters through the 
accelerated replacement of capital (Hallegatte and Dumas 2009) 
after the occurrence of disaster as the damages from the disaster 
exceed their capacity for reconstruction.
Non-linear and Cascading Impacts
In this report the risks of climate change for a number of major 
sectors were examined within three regions at different levels 
of global mean warming. While the attempt was made to draw 
connections between sectors, the literature does not yet permit a 
comprehensive assessment of the quantitative magnitude of these 
risks to elucidate risks of multiple and/or cascading impacts which 
occur on a similar timescale in the same geographical locations. 
Nevertheless, one of the ﬁrst studies of these risks indicates that 
the proportion of the global population at risk from simultaneous, 
multiple sectoral impacts increases rapidly with warming. By the 
time warming reaches 4°C, more than 80 percent of the global 
population is projected to be exposed to these kinds of risks (see 
Chapter 6 on “Regions Vulnerable to Multisector Pressures”). 
While adaptation measures may reduce some of these risks and/
or impacts, it is also clear that adaptation measures required 
would need to be substantial, aggressive and beyond the scale of 
anything presently contemplated, and occur simultaneously across 
multiple sectors to signiﬁcantly limit these damages.
There is also limited literature on non-linear effects and risks. 
Potential tipping points and non-linearities due to the interactions 
of impacts are mostly not yet included in available literature. The 
tentative assessment presented here indicates the risk of such 
interactions playing out in the focus regions of this report and 
suggests a need for further research in this ﬁeld.
In some cases of non-linear behavior observed in certain sec-
tors, such as high-temperature thresholds for crop production, 
response options are not readily available. For example crop cul-
tivars do not presently exist for the high temperatures projected 
at this level of warming in current crop growing regions in the 
tropics and mid-latitudes.
To point the way to future work assessing the full range of 
risks, it is useful to conclude this report with a brief set of examples 
that illustrate the risk of non-linear and cascading impacts occur-
ring around the world. The physical mechanisms and thresholds 
associated with these risks are uncertain, but have been clearly 
identiﬁed in the scientiﬁc literature.
Non-Linear Responses of the Earth System
?? Sea-level rise. In this report the focus has been on sea-level rise 
of up to a meter in the 21st-century. This excluded an assess-
ment of faster rates, and of longer term, multi-meter sea-level 
rise increases and what this might mean for the regions studied. 
Disintegration of the West Antarctic ice sheet could raise sea levels 
by 4–5 m over a number of centuries, and there is already evidence 
that the ice sheet is responding rapidly to a warming ocean and 
climate. Complete loss of the Greenland ice sheet over many 
centuries to millennia would raise sea levels by 6–7 m. A recent 
analysis estimates the warming threshold for the Greenland Ice 
Sheet to irreversibly lose mass at 1.6°C global-mean temperature 
increase above pre-industrial levels (range of 0.8°C – 3.2°C). 
Already the damages projected for a 0.5 metre and 1 metre sea 
level rise in the three regions are very substantial and very few 
studies have examined the consequences of two, three or 5 m 
sea-level rise over several centuries. Those that are based on 
such assessments, however, show dramatic problems. In this 
report Bangladesh was identiﬁed as a region facing multiple 
simultaneous impacts for large vulnerable populations, due to 
the combined effects of river ﬂoods, storm surges, extreme heat 
and sea-level rises of up to a meter. Multi-meter sea level rise 
would compound these risks and could pose an existential risk 
to the country in coming centuries.
?? Coral reefs. Recent studies suggest that with CO2 concentrations 
corresponding to 2°C warming, the conditions that allow coral 
reefs to ﬂourish will cease to exist. This indicates a risk of an 
abrupt transition, within a few decades, from rich coral reef 
ecosystems to much simpler, less productive and less diverse 
systems. These changes would lead to major threats to human 
livelihoods and economic activities dependent upon these rich 
marine ecosystems, in turn leading to the feedbacks in social 
systems exacerbating risks and pressures in urban areas.
?? Ecosystems in Sub-Saharan Africa. The complex interplay 
of plant species in the African savannas and their different 
sensitivities to ﬁre regimes and changes in atmospheric CO
2 con-
centrations implies a potential tipping point from a C4 (grass) 
to a C3 (woody plants) dominated state at the local scale. Such 
a transition to a much less productive state, exacerbated by 
already substantial pressures on natural systems in Africa, 
would place enormous, negative pressure on many species 
and threaten human livelihoods in the region.
?? The Indian monsoon. Physically plausible mechanisms have 
been proposed for a switch in the Indian monsoon, and changes 
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in the tropical atmosphere that could precipitate a transition of 
the monsoon to a drier state are projected in the present gen-
eration of climate models. An abrupt change in the monsoon, 
towards a drier, lower rainfall state, could precipitate a major 
crisis in South Asia, as evidenced by the anomalous monsoon 
of 2002, which caused the most serious drought in recent times, 
with rainfall about 19 percent below the long term normal, 
and food grain production reductions of about 10–15 percent 
compared to the average of the preceding decade.
Non-linearity due to Threshold Behavior and Interactions
?? Crop yields. Non-linear reductions in crop yields have been 
observed once high temperature thresholds are crossed for 
many major crops including rice, wheat and maize in many 
regions. Within the three regions studied temperatures already 
approach upper limits in important food growing regions. Pres-
ent crop models have not yet fully integrated the consequences 
of these responses into projections, nor are high-temperature, 
drought resistant crop cultivars available at present. When these 
regional risks are put into the context of probable global crop 
production risks due to high temperatures and drought, it is 
clear that qualitatively new risks to regional and global food 
security may be faced in the future that are little understood, 
or quantiﬁed.
?? Aquaculture in South East Asia. Temperature tolerance 
thresholds have been identiﬁed for important aquaculture 
species farmed in South East Asia. More frequent temperatures 
above the tolerance range would create non-optimum culture 
conditions for these species and are expected to decrease 
aquaculture yields. Such damages are expected to be con-
temporaneous in time with saltwater intrusion losses and 
inundation of important rice growing regions in, for example 
Vietnam, as well as loss of marine natural resources (Coral 
reefs and pelagic ﬁsheries) upon which people depend for 
food, livelihoods and tourism income.
?? Livestock production in Sub-Saharan Africa, particularly in 
the case of small-scale livestock keeping in dryland areas, is 
under pressure from multiple stressors. Heat and water stress, 
reduced quantity and quality of forage and increasing preva-
lence of diseases have direct impacts on livestock. Changes 
in the natural environment due to processes of desertiﬁcation 
and woody plant encroachment may further limit the carrying 
capacity of the land. Traditional responses are narrowed where 
diversiﬁcation to crop farming may no longer be viable and 
mobility to seek out water and forage is restricted by insti-
tutional factors. These stress factors compound one another, 
placing a signiﬁcantly greater pressure on affected farmers 
than if impacts were felt in isolation.
Cascading Impacts
A framing question for this report was the consequence for 
development of climate change. What emerges from the analyses 
conducted here and the reviewed literature is a wide range of 
Box 6.1: Emerging Vulnerability Clusters: the Urban Poor
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risks. One cluster of impacts that needs to be highlighted is the 
risk of negative feedbacks on poverty from climate shocks on poor 
countries, leading to the potential for climate driven poverty traps 
migration (see Box 6.1). Recent observational evidence indicates 
that the poor countries that are most vulnerable to increases in 
temperature show the least resilience to shocks of extremes. The 
impacts of a three year long drought in Ethiopia (1998 2000), for 
example or the Category Five Hurricane Mitch in Honduras have 
been observed to have long-lasting effects on poverty. These 
climate-related extreme events and natural disasters can overwhelm 
a poor country’s ability to recover economically, reducing the 
accumulation of capital and infrastructure, leading to a negative 
economic feedback. This would reduce the capacity of developing 
countries to economically beneﬁt from natural disasters through 
more rapid replacement of capital as the reconstruction capacity 
is exceeded by the disaster damages.
Increases in climatic extremes of all kinds are projected for 
the three regions studied: increased tropical cyclone intensity in 
South East Asia, extreme heat waves and heat intensity in all 
regions, increased drought in many regions, an increased risk of 
ﬂooding and consequent damages on agriculture and infrastructure 
in many regions. Few studies have really integrated these risks 
into projections of future economic growth and development for 
these regions.
The analyses presented in this report show that there are 
substantial risks to human development in the three regions 
assessed and a consideration of the risks of non-linearity and 
cascading impacts tends to amplify this picture. Impacts have 
already begun to occur and in many cases are projected to be 
severe under 1.5–2°C warming, depending upon the sector and 
the region. As warming approaches 4°C, very severe impacts are 
projected, affecting ever larger shares of the global population. 
Critically the risk of transgressing thresholds and tipping points 
within sectors and on vital human support systems increases 
rapidly with higher levels of warming. While limiting warming 
to 1.5 to 2°C does not eliminate risk and damage to many sec-
tors and regions, it does create breathing space for adaptation 
measures to limit damage and for populations to learn to cope 
with the signiﬁcant, inevitable damage that would occur even at 
this level of change.
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4°C - Business-As-Usual Emission 
Estimates
Recent independent estimates by an international consortium 
of eight Integrated Assessment Modeling (IAM) research groups 
investigated how the world can be expected to evolve under a wide 
variety of climate policies (Kriegler et al. 2013; Riahi et al. 2013; 
Schaeffer et al. 2013). One of the scenarios investigated is known 
as the “business-as-usual” (BAU) pathway. In this scenario, which 
is characterized by a lack of strong climate policies throughout 
the 21st century, GDP (Kriegler et al. 2013) and population projec-
tions (UN 2010) continue to drive energy demand. Global energy 
intensity roughly follows historical rates of improvements because 
of the lack of targeted policies. Accordingly, greenhouse gas emis-
sions continue to rise in the estimates of each respective research 
group and follow an intermediate-to-high BAU path compared to 
the earlier literature (Nakicenovic and Swart 2000; IPCC 2007a; 
Rogelj et al. 2011; Riahi et al. 2012).
Recently, questions have been raised in the scientiﬁc litera-
ture about the validity of the high fossil fuel production outlooks 
required for such high-emissions BAU scenarios (e.g., Höök et al. 
2010). While these critiques, which infer a possible global peak in 
fossil fuel availability, are not irrelevant, they mainly result from 
a different interpretation of the availability of fossil fuels from 
“reserves,” “estimated ultimately recoverable resources,” and 
additional “unconventional” resources. The recent Global Energy 
Assessment (Rogner et al. 2012) provides a discussion of this issue 
and a detailed assessment of fossil fuel resources. It concludes that 
enough fossil fuels will be available to satisfy future demand and 
to continue on a very high emissions pathway (see the GEA-Supply 
baseline in Riahi et al. 2012). This is in line with the RCP8.5 scenario 
used in this report (see Box I below), which forms a basis for some 
of the impacts studies in the rest of this report.
Temperature Changes Implied by 
Business-As-Usual Emissions Estimates
To compute the global mean temperature increase implied by the 
business-as-usual scenarios discussed above and in Box A1.1, the 
authors run a reduced-complexity carbon cycle and climate model 
in a probabilistic setup, which closely represents the uncertainty 
assessments of the earth system’s response to increasing emissions.
Figure A1.1 below shows global mean temperature projections 
above pre-industrial levels. In the left panel, the “best-estimate”128
projections (lines) are put in the context of carbon-cycle and climate-
system uncertainties (shaded areas). According to the RCP8.5 sce-
nario, the best-estimate warming is approximately 5.2°C by 2100. 
There is a 66 percent likelihood129 that emissions consistent with 
RCP8.5 lead to a warming of 4.2–6.5°C, and a remaining 33 per-
cent chance that warming would be either lower than 4.2°C or 
higher than 6.5°C by 2100.
The eight BAU scenarios generated by the international 
IAM research groups included here are on average slightly 
lower than RCP8.5, with some scenarios above it. On average, 
128 In this report, the authors speak of “best-estimate” to indicate the median esti-
mate, or projection, within an uncertainty distribution, that is, there is a 50-percent 
probability that values lie below and an equal 50-percent probability that values lie 
above the “best-estimate.”
129 A probability of greater than 66 percent is labeled “likely” in IPCC’s uncertainty 
guidelines (Mastrandrea et al. 2010) adopted here.
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these scenarios lead to warming projections close to those of 
RCP8.5 and a medium chance that end-of-century temperature 
rise exceeds 4°C (see Figure A1.1, right-hand panel). Across 
all these scenarios, the median projections reach a warming 
of 4.7°C above pre-industrial levels by 2100.130 This level is 
achieved 10 years earlier in RCP8.5.
By contrast, the CAT reference scenario (see Box A1.1), used 
in this report to derive the CAT Current Pledges scenario (Climate 
Analytics et al. 2011), results in warming below the BAU median 
across the IAM models, with only about 15 percent of climate 
projections using the IAM results lying below the CAT Reference 
BAU131(see Figure A.1, right-hand panel).
Thus, the most recent generation of energy-economic models 
estimate emissions in the absence of further substantial policy 
130 Note the uncertainty ranges in Figure 2.4: among the various other BAU scenarios, 
about 30 percent reach a warming higher than RCP8.5 by 2100 (compare light-red 
shaded with black line).
131 The lower emissions in the CAT Reference BAU scenario compared to the recent 
BAU literature scenarios is explained by the fact that the CAT Reference BAU includes 
more of the effects of currently implemented energy policies than the BAU scenarios 
from the literature. This also explains why the reduction in future warming is stronger 
between the multi-model Reference and Current Pledge scenarios than in the CAT 
cases, since some policies required to achieve current pledges are already included 
in the CAT Reference BAU (Figure 2.4).
Box A1.1 Emission Scenarios in this Report
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action (business as usual), with the median projections reaching 
a warming of 4.7°C above pre-industrial levels by 2100—with 
a 40-percent chance of exceeding 5°C.
Probabilities
From a risk assessment point of view, the probability that speciﬁc 
levels of warming are exceeded in the course of the 21st century is 
of particular interest. The probabilistic uncertainty ranges of the 
Simple Climate Model (SCM; see Box A 1.2) projections in this 
report, as well as the spread in results of complex Atmosphere Ocean 
General Circulation Models (AOGCMs), provide valuable informa-
tion for this. For the four emission scenarios, Figure A1.2 shows 
the gradually increasing probability of exceeding warming levels 
of 3°C and 4°C. 4°C is “likely” (with a greater than 66-percent 
chance) exceeded around 2080 for RCP8.5. Consistent with the 
SCM, 80 percent of the AOGCMs project warming higher than 4°C 
by the 2080–2100 period. For other scenarios, lower probabilities 
of exceeding 4°C are found.
Figure A1.2 also shows that the CAT Reference BAU results 
in a 40-percent probability of exceeding 4°C by the end of the 
century, and still increasing thereafter. Recalling that the CAT 
Reference BAU is situated at the low end of most recent refer-
ence BAU estimates from the literature and that real-world global 
CO
2 emissions continue to track along a high emission pathway 
(Peters et al. 2013), the authors conclude that in the absence of 
greenhouse gas mitigation efforts during the century, the likeli-
hood is considerable that the world will be 4°C warmer by the 
end of the century.
The results presented above are consistent with recently pub-
lished literature. Newly published assessments of the recent trends 
in the world’s energy system by the International Energy Agency 
in its World Energy Outlook 2012 indicate global mean warming 
above pre-industrial levels would approach 3.8°C by 2100. In this 
assessment, there is a 40-percent chance of warming exceeding 4°C 
by 2100 and a 10-percent chance of warming exceeding 5°C. The 
updated UNEP Emissions Gap Assessment, released at the Climate 
Convention Conference in Doha in December 2013, found that 
present emission trends and pledges132 are consistent with emission 
pathways that reach warming in the range of 3–5°C by 2100, with 
global emissions estimated for 2020 closest to levels consistent 
with a 3.5–4°C pathway.
Can Warming Be Held Below 2°C?
The previous section explained why it is still plausible that a high-
carbon emissions future could lead to a considerable probability 
that warming exceeds 4°C by the end of the century. The question 
that now arises is whether the signiﬁcant reduction in greenhouse 
gas emissions required to hold the global temperature increase to 
below 2°C is feasible. This section discusses some of the latest 
scientiﬁc insights related to keeping warming to low levels.
First of all, most recent results with state-of-the-art AOGCMs 
and SCMs show that under reference emissions temperatures 
can exceed 2°C as early as the 2040s, but can also be held to 
below 2°C relative to pre-industrial levels with a high probabil-
ity if emissions are reduced signiﬁcantly (see Box A1.2, Figures 
A1.1, A1.2, and A1.3). This shows that, from a geophysical 
point of view, limiting temperature increase to below 2°C is still 
possible. Other assessments that take into account a large set of 
scenarios from the literature come to the same conclusion with 
Figure A1.2 ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????
???????????????????????? ???? ???????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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an SCM (Van Vuuren et al. 2008; Rogelj et al. 2011; UNEP 2012). 
The one overarching feature of these scenarios is that they limit 
the cumulative amount of global greenhouse gas emissions to a 
given emissions budget (Meinshausen et al 2009); to not exceed 
this budget, emissions start declining by 2020 in most of these 
scenarios (Rogelj et al. 2011).
International climate policy has until now not managed to 
curb global greenhouse gas emissions on such a declining path, 
and recent inventories show emissions steadily on the rise (Peters 
et al. 2013). However, recent high emission trends do not imply 
high emissions forever (van Vuuren and Riahi 2008). Several 
studies show that effective climate policies can substantially 
inﬂuence the trend and bring emissions onto a feasible path in 
line with a high probability of limiting warming to below 2°C 
even after low short-term ambition (e.g., OECD 2012; Rogelj et 
al. 2012a; UNEP 2012; van Vliet et al. 2012; Rogelj et al. 2013). 
Choosing such a path would however imply higher overall costs, 
higher technological dependency, and higher risks of missing the 
climate objective (Rogelj et al. 2012a; UNEP 2012). The Global 
Energy Assessment (Riahi et al. 2012) and other studies (Rogelj 
et al. 2012a, 2013) also highlight the importance of demand-side 
efﬁciency improvements to increase the chances of limiting warm-
ing to below 2°C across the board.
The available scientiﬁc literature makes a strong case that 
achieving deep emissions reductions over the long term is feasible 
Box A1.2 Climate Projections and the Simple Climate Model (SCM)
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(Clarke et al. 2009; Fischedick et al. 2011; Riahi et al. 2012); recent 
studies also show the possibility together with the consequences 
of delaying action (den Elzen et al. 2010; OECD 2012; Rogelj et 
al. 2012a, 2013; van Vliet et al. 2012).
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Bias Correction for Subset of 
CMIP5 GCMs as Used Within  
the ISI-MIP Framework and for 
Temperature, Precipitation, and Heat 
Wave Projections in this Report
The temperature, precipitation, and heat wave projections were 
based on the ISI-MIP global climate database, using the historical 
(20th century) period and future scenarios RCP2.6 and RCP8.5. 
The ISI-MIP database consists of 5 CMIP5 global climate models 
(gfdl-esm2m, hadgem2-es, ipsl-cm5a-lr, miroc-esm-chem, noresm1-
m), which were bias-corrected, such that the models reproduce 
historically observed mean temperature and precipitation and their 
year-to-year variability. The statistical bias correction algorithm as 
used by WaterMIP/WATCH has been applied to correct temperature 
and precipitation values. The correction factors were derived over 
a construction period of 40 years, where the GCM outputs are 
compared to the observation-based WATCH forcing data. For each 
month, a regression was performed on the ranked data sets. Subse-
quently, the derived monthly correction factors were interpolated 
toward daily ones. The correction factors were then applied to the 
projected GCM data (Warszawski et al. in preparation)
Heat Wave Analysis
For each of the ISI-MIP bias-corrected CMIP5 simulation runs, the 
authors determined the local monthly standard deviation due to 
natural variability over the 20th century for each individual month. 
To do so, they ﬁrst used a singular spectrum analysis to extract 
the long-term non-linear warming trend (that is, the climatological 
warming signal). Next, they detrended the 20th century monthly 
time series by subtracting the long-term trend, which provides 
the monthly year-to-year variability. From this detrended signal, 
monthly standard deviations were calculated, which were then 
averaged seasonally. In the present analysis, the authors employ 
the standard deviation calculated for the last half of the 20th cen-
tury (1951–2010); they found, however, that this estimate is robust 
with respect to different time periods.
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With ET0  in mm day
–1, Rn the net radiation at the crop surface 
[MJ m–2 day–1], G the soil heat ﬂux density [MJ m–2 day–1], T the 
mean air temperature at 2 m height [°C], u2 the wind speed at 2m 
height [m s–1], es the saturation vapor pressure [kPa], ea the actual 
vapour pressure [kPa], Δ the slope of the vapor pressure curve 
[kPa °C–1] and γ psychrometric constant [kPa °C–1].
The authors calculate monthly ET0 values for each grid point 
using climatological input from the ISI-MIP database for both the 
historic period and future scenarios.
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All indicators have annual temporal resolution, neglecting sea-
sonal patterns. For discharge and the Γ-metric, very low values 
(for the latter of natural vegetation) can lead to spurious effects 
when looking at changes by amplifying very small changes and 
overemphasizing those regions (e.g., the Sahara). Therefore, values 
are set to zero below a lower limit 0.01 km² yr–1 and a 2.5 percent 
cover fraction of natural vegetation, respectively (Warszawski et 
al. in review; von Bloh et al. 2010). The four crops are combined 
through conversion to energy-weighted production per cell using 
the following conversion factors for energy content [MJ kg–1 dry 
matter]: wheat – 15.88, rice (paddy) – 13.47, maize – 16.93, and 
soy – 15.4 (Wirsenius 2000; FAO 2001). Since only negative changes 
are considered, a possible expansion of cropland to higher latitudes, 
which is not accounted for because of the masking, is not impor-
tant. Furthermore, this analysis can only give a limited perspective 
of agricultural hotspots as for instance millet and sorghum, crops 
widely grown in Africa, are not included in the analysis. Malaria 
prevalence, representing the health sector, is only one example 
of human health effects from climate change—although it is a 
very relevant one given its potential links to human welfare and 
economic development (Sachs and Malaney 2002). The impact 
of climate change on malaria occurrence focuses on changes in 
length of transmission season. This simple metric represents an 
aggregated risk factor, since it neglects age-dependent immunity 
acquisition associated with transmission intensity. Increases in 
impacts associated with transitions from malaria-free to epidemic 
conditions are also not considered. Initial areas of endemic malaria 
vary widely between models and depend on their calibration and 
focus region.
GMT is calculated from the GCM data before bias correction; 
change is measured with respect to pre-industrial levels assuming 
an offset from 0.8°C of the ISI-MIP 1980–2010 baseline.
Temperatures are binned at ΔGMT=1,2,3,4, and 5°C (±0.5°). 
If a grid cell is identiﬁed as having crossed the threshold, the whole 
area of the grid cell is assumed to be affected. This neglects, for 
example, the separation of agricultural and natural vegetation 
areas in a grid-cell, as such separation is below the resolution of 
the analysis. The affected population fraction is not very sensitive 
to applying population distributions for the year 2000 or for 2084, 
although the total number of affected people would increase, 
possibly substantially.
Methodology for Sectoral and 
Multisectoral ISI-MIP Climate Model 
Projections
Discharge is chosen as a measure for water availability. Food security 
is represented by crop yields from four major staple crops (wheat, 
rice, maize, and soy) on current rainfed and irrigated cropland, 
synthesized by their caloric content. Thresholds are selected to 
represent severe changes in the average conditions people have 
experienced in the past. This suggests that impacts would be 
severe, particularly when occurring simultaneously
For discharge (and cropland), severe changes are assumed when 
the future projected average discharge (and crop yields) measured 
over periods of 31 years is lower than today’s (1980–2010) 1-in-
10-year events. This concept is illustrated in Figure 6.2, and it means 
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that very low discharge/crop yields would become the norm. The 
risk of a biome change metric with a severity threshold of 0.3, as 
introduced in Chapter 6 on “Risk of Terrestrial Ecosystem Shifts”, 
is applied to measure the impacts on ecosystems. Such impacts 
could severely affect biodiversity and ecosystem services, which 
would certainly affect livelihoods. Finally, the length of transmis-
sion season for malaria is included as an example for impacts of 
climate change on human health, relevant not only for individu-
als but also for societies in terms of economic consequences. 
The selected threshold is a transition from a transmission season 
shorter than three months to one longer than three months, which 
is associated with a transition from epidemic to endemic malaria.133 
All the indicators measure potential impacts and do not take into 
account socioeconomic conditions, livelihood strategies, and a 
multitude of adaptation options that could mitigate the impacts 
of the changes. Moreover, no absolute level of impacts is taken 
into account, merely the crossing of the threshold.
As this analysis is based on multiple impact models per sector, 
the robustness of results is ensured by requiring at least 50 percent 
of the models to agree that the threshold has been crossed. A risk 
estimate is included in the analysis, as the uncertainty stemming 
from the different impact and climate models turns out to be very 
large, and a weighting of models is neither possible nor desirable. 
For that risk estimate, all regions with overlapping impacts are 
taken into account, without restrictions on the minimum number 
of models agreeing, and the sectoral crossing temperature is taken 
as the 10th percentile of all climate-impact-model combinations. 
The area is estimated in which two, three, and four sectors have 
crossed their respective thresholds. Note that the maximum area 
assessed is not equal for all sectors, as crop yields are only con-
sidered on present day cropland.
133 This is based on data from the MARA (Mapping Malaria Risk in Africa) Project: 
www.mara.org.za.
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would be the temperature where the blue line falls below the red line.
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Table A4.1 ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???? ?????? ??????????????????????
All crops ???????????????????? ????????????????????? ???????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????????????? ????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????-
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????2??????????-
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????2?????????????????????????????????? ???????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????? ?????????-
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
?????????????????????
Rice ?????????????????????????? ?? ????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????2?????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????2????????????????
???????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??? ?????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the shortening of crop duration under high temperature, whereas shifting the transplanting date seems to 
???????????????? ?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
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